S. Harnam Singh v. Punjab And Sind Bank Ltd. — 1978 DIGILAW 582 (ALL)

JUDGMENT DEOKI NANDAN, J. 1. THERE are two connected matters. The special appeal is directed against the judgment dated February 5, 1970 of a learned single Judge of this Court dismissing Civil Misc. Writ No. 3963 of 1963 in which the appellant before us was the petitioner and the two respondents were : (1) M/s. Punjab and Sind Bank Ltd.,; and (2) Labour Court (Central), Lucknow. The second appeal is directed against the judgment dated October 10, 1975 of the court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dehradun, dismissing the plaintiff's appeal from the judgment and decree of the court of Second Additional Civil Judge, Dehradun, dismissing his suit No. 143 of 1959, the appellant before us being the plaintiff in that suit and the respondent Punjab and Sind Bank Ltd., being the sole defendant. Both these matters centre round the dismissal of the appellant from the service of the respondent Bank with effect from January 11, 1955. The following are the relevant facts : The appellant was employed by the respondent Bank from December 1942. On September 27, 1954 he was working as an Investment Assistant in the Bank's Dehradun office when he applied for leave, which was sanctioned upto 4th October, 1954, with permission to suffix Dushehra holidays upto October 7, 1954. The applicant applied for extension of leave. The application was supported by a medical certificate. Some correspondence ensued between the appellant and the respondent Bank. The Bank refused to extend the leave after October 7, 1954 and suspended him from service on January 11, 1955. The appellant was directed to appear before the Enquiry Officer Sardar Gur Dayal Singh on January 13, 1955. On the basis of the Enquiry Officer's decision dated January 18, 1955, the appellant was dismissed from service of the respondent Bank with effect from January 11, 1955, the date on which he was suspended. The appellant's appeal to the Appellate Board constituted by the respondent Bank for the purpose, was unsuccessful, The appellant raised an industrial dispute and the Government referred it to the Tribunal at Delhi by an order dated June 9, 1956. The respondent Bank preferred a writ petition before Punjab High Court. The Punjab High Court quashed the reference to the Industrial Tribunal at Delhi, by its judgment dated August 20, 1957. The appellant appealed to a Division Bench of that Court. The respondent Bank preferred a writ petition before Punjab High Court. The Punjab High Court quashed the reference to the Industrial Tribunal at Delhi, by its judgment dated August 20, 1957. The appellant appealed to a Division Bench of that Court. That appeal was dismissed on July 27, 1959. 2. IN the meanwhile, on February 1, 1958, the appellant filed a suit in the Civil Judge's court at Dehradun which was -registered as Suit No. 143 of 1959. The relief claimed in that suit was a declaration that the order dated January 18, 1956 dismissing the appellant from the respondent Bank's service was void and inoperative, and that he still continued to be its permanent employee. A decree for recovery of Rs. 12,400.32 was also claimed. While the suit was still pending, the appellant also moved the Labour Court (Central), Lucknow, under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) claiming that he was entitled to pay calculated at the maximum basic salary in the clerical grade and allowances, as provided for by the modified Sastry Award and later on by the Desai Award, as from October 1, 1954 onwards, and also arrears from April 1, 1954 to September 30, 1954 on account of the difference between the amount payable to him under the Sastry Award and the amount actually paid to him during that period. He also claimed other benefits in the nature Provident Fund, Gratuity, Pension, etc., as and when they fell due for payment along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum for the period his dues were, or would be withheld by the respondent Bank. The appellant's application to the Labour Court (Central), Lucknow, was dismissed by an order dated May 8, 1965. That was the order against which the writ petition giving rise to the special Appeal in this Court was directed. Against the aforesaid judgment dated November 30, 1965 dismissing the suit, the appellant had appealed to this Court. The first appeal was transferred to the court of Additional District Judge, Dehradun, and was registered there as Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1971. The appeal was dismissed by the Court of the Additional District Judge, Dehradun, by judgment dated October 10, 1975, which has given rise to the second appeal. 3. The first appeal was transferred to the court of Additional District Judge, Dehradun, and was registered there as Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1971. The appeal was dismissed by the Court of the Additional District Judge, Dehradun, by judgment dated October 10, 1975, which has given rise to the second appeal. 3. IN the writ petition Hon'ble Broome, J. held that the Labour Court was right in holding that in a proceeding under section 33-C(2) of the Act, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the major claim of the petitioner, that is, the claim for emoluments after the date of his dismissal, inasmuch as the dispute with regard to the lawfulness or otherwise of the dismissal of the appellant from service by the respondent Bank could not be enquired into by the Labour Court in such proceedings. With regard to the appellants claim for emoluments upto the date of his dismissal from service, the learned Single Judge held that the Labour Court was not right in holding that it had no jurisdiction to go into the question whether or not the appellant was a workman within the meaning of the definition of that term under the Act. However, since the court of the Second Additional Civil Judge, Dehradun had, in its judgment dated November 30, 1965, in the appellant's suit against the respondent Bank already held that the appellant was not a workman within the definition of that term under section 2(s) of the Act, Hon'ble Broom, J , held that the case was not a fit one for the issue of a writ, even to the limited extent of remanding the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication of the question whether the appellant was a workman, and, if it were found that he was a workman to adjudicate upon the dispute relating to the emoluments payable to him by the respondent Bank upto the date of his dismissal. The learned Single Judge negatived the appellant's argument that the finding of the court of the Additional Civil Judge being that of court having no jurisdiction to try the suit, should not be treated to be binding on him, by saying that it did not lie in the mouth of the appellant to question the jurisdiction of the court of learned Additional Civil Judge, when he was himself the plaintiff in the suit and had chosen that forum. It was also urged that the judgment of the learned Additional Civil Judge had not become final inasmuch as it was under appeal, and the learned counsel for the appellant even stated that the appeal would be withdrawn ; but the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition as aforesaid, with the observation that the judgment of the learned Additional Civil Judge must hold the field till such time as it is modified on appeal therefrom. Now the situation is that the lower appellate court has affirmed the findings of the learned Additional Civil Judge, that the appellant is not a workman and also that the civil court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief of declaration as the matter did not involved any breach of its statutory obligations by the respondent Bank, and the Second Appeal therefrom along with the Special Appeal from the learned Single Judge's judgment, are both before us. 4. FROM the above resume of the facts, the salient features of the case, which emerge, are : (1) It has been finally held by the Punjab High Court that the dispute between the appellant and the respondent Bank was not an industrial dispute and a reference by the government concerned to the Industrial Tribunal under the Act did not lie ; (2) According to the findings of the civil court the appellant was not a workman within the meaning of the definition of that term under section 2(s) of the Act, but it had no jurisdiction to grant the main relief of declaration to the effect that the appellant's dismissal from service was void and ineffective, because the matter did not involve any breach of statutory obligations by the respondent Bank ; (3) The Labour Court could have gone into the question whether the appellant was a workman and if it found that he was one, to adjudicate upon and to award him the emoluments upto the date of his dismissal, in case he was found entitled to receive anything more than the amount paid to him. (4) On the finding that the petitioner was not a workman, the civil court had the jurisdiction to award the plaintiff damages for wrongful dismissal from service, when it came to the conclusion that the dismissal was wrongful, but it had no jurisdiction to grant a declaration that the plaintiff continued in service of the respondent Bank. (4) On the finding that the petitioner was not a workman, the civil court had the jurisdiction to award the plaintiff damages for wrongful dismissal from service, when it came to the conclusion that the dismissal was wrongful, but it had no jurisdiction to grant a declaration that the plaintiff continued in service of the respondent Bank. In view of the above position, we put it to the appellant whether he would like to amend his plaint by claiming an appropriate relief for damages for wrongful dismissal, particularly in view of the rinding of the lower appellate court that his dismissal was wrongful. But the appellant who is now 68 years old and already past the age of superannuation, stated before us that he was not interested in the same and that his main interest was to have a declaration of his status as an employee of the respondent Bank in the terms prayed for by him in the suit. 5. WE must now advert to the decision of the Supreme Court in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others( AIR 1975 SC 2238 ), where in the principles for determining the jurisdiction of the civil courts in matters like the one raised by the appellant, have been defined thus : "(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an anjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be". (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be". Applying these principles to the appellant's case, it appears to us that if the finding of the civil court that the petitioner is not a workman is accepted to be correct, only the civil court will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the appellant's claim arising out of the wrongs committed, if any, by the respondent Bank in respect of his contract of employment, subject to the rider that it will not be competent for the civil court to grant any decree of declaration in the terms prayed for by the appellant. This is so because it has already been held the Punjab High Court that the dispute is not an industrial dispute. But the difficulty lies in the fact that the very basis of the claims made by the appellant is rested not in the general common law but under the Sastry Award or Desai Award which were Awards made under the Act, and the appellant had at one stage even elected to withdraw his appeal arising from the suit in the civil court, but insists on claiming a declaration of his status as an employee Of the Bank, which could only be granted by the Industrial Tribunal on a proper reference being made to it in case he was a workman. If he is a workman as has been claimed by him throughout, even in the civil court, the civil court has no jurisdiction to grant him any relief in respect of his claim for emolument upto the date of his dismissal, which could be granted only by the Labour Court, and no jurisdiction either to grant the relief of declaration or of his status as an employee of the respondent Bank, and reinstatement in service, which could be done only by raising an industrial dispute under the appropriate provision of the Industrial Disputes Act and having it referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. This the appellant actually did, and did succeed in having the dispute referred to the Industrial Tribunal but the Punjab High Court held that it was not an industrial dispute and accordingly no reference could have been to the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of the Act. That judgment of the Punjab High Court having become final and binding between the parties, the only alternative left before the appellant was to claim damages for wrongful dismissal before a civil court of competent jurisdiction. That the appellant is not prepared to do. Further in view of the finding of the civil court in the suit filed by the appellant himself that he is not a workman, it is in our view, not open to him to now to contend before the labour court that he is a workman, unless the finding is set aside by us on appeal. The finding is a finding given by a civil court of competent jurisdiction on an issue between the parties, and it forecloses litigation before the Labour Court, but the appellant contends that it is open to us to review that finding in his second appeal, and if we find that the finding was wrong, the Labour Court would in any case have the jurisdiction to award him his emoluments upto the date of his dismissal, if any thing was found due to him on the basis of the claim made by him under section 33-C (2) of the Act. 6. WE accordingly proceed to consider the issue. The appellant's case on this point was that he was required to do only clerical duties at the time of dispute. The appellant relied on the respondent Bank's reply (63-C) to his interrogatories (35-C) and argued that after his transfer to Dehradun Branch on June 14, 1950, he was assigned only clerical duties. The contention of the Bank was that the appellant was working as an Officer and held a Power of Attorney as an Accountant. The fact that the appellant held a power of Attorney is not disputed. But the appellant's case was that the Power of Attorney was kept in deposit and was actually not effective at the relevant time. The issue framed by the trial court were : 1. Whether the charge brought against the plaintiff amounted to a minor offence within the meaning of Sastry Award ? 2A. But the appellant's case was that the Power of Attorney was kept in deposit and was actually not effective at the relevant time. The issue framed by the trial court were : 1. Whether the charge brought against the plaintiff amounted to a minor offence within the meaning of Sastry Award ? 2A. Whether the plaintiff is a workman within the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act ? 2B. Whether the plaintiff was an officer of the defendant within the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act ? 2C. Whether the Sastry Award is applicable to the plaintiff or not ? Effect ? 3. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity or otherwise of the termination of the plaintiff's service ? Its effect ? 4. Whether the plaintiff had been given any opportunity to defend himself before his services were terminated, if so is the termination of his services invalid on this account ? 5. Whether the present suit is barred by res judicata ? 6. Whether the suit or any part of it is barred by time ? 7. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from challenging the dismissal order ? 8. To what damages relief and arrears of pay is the plaintiff entitled ? 9. Whether the suit is barred by section 21 and 42 (s) Relief Act ? 10. Whether the suit is barred under section 9 of C.P.C. ? 11. Whether the court has no jurisdiction to try as pleaded in para 39-C of written statement ? 7. THE relevant dates with reference to which the question has to be decided are December 24, 1954, on which date the appellant was first charge-sheeted ; and January 11,1955, with effect from which date he was dismissed by order dated January 18, 1955. The question is whether the appellant was a workman on the date when he was charge-sheeted and continued to be so till the date with effect from which he was dismissed. 8. ACCORDING to the appellant, the burden is on the employers to prove that the employee's duties were supervisory and managerial and he says that the finding is not a finding on a question of fact, because the inference drawn from the facts found pertain to the realm of law. 8. ACCORDING to the appellant, the burden is on the employers to prove that the employee's duties were supervisory and managerial and he says that the finding is not a finding on a question of fact, because the inference drawn from the facts found pertain to the realm of law. The first case relied upon by the appellant on this point is that of Loyds Bank Ltd. v. Panna Lal Gupta and others(1961 2 FLR 219= 1961 1 LLJ 18 ), wherein the Supreme Court held that : "The status of the three workmen has to be inferred as a matter of law from facts found, and there can be little doubt that if the question involved is one of drawing a legal inference as to the status of party from facts found, that is not a pure question of fact. In the inference drawn by the tribunal in regard to the status of the three workmen involved the application of certain legal tests, that necessarily becomes a mixed question of face and law, and the respondent would not be justified in raising a preliminary objection that the appellant should not be allowed to urge his contention against the correctness of the rinding of the tribunal on such a mixed question of fact and law. We would, however, like to add that even if the question raised is one of mixed fact and law, we would not readily interfere with the conclusion of the tribunal unless we are satisfied that the said conclusion is manifestly or obviously erroneous." The second case relied upon by the appellant is that of Ananda Bazar Patrika (Private), Ltd. v. Its workmen(1969 18 FLR 186=1969 II LLJ 670). It was held by the Supreme Court in this case that : "The question, whether a person is employed, in a supervisory capacity or on clerical work, in our opinion, depends upon whether the main and principal duties carried out by him are those of a supervisory character, or of a nature carried out by a clerk. It was held by the Supreme Court in this case that : "The question, whether a person is employed, in a supervisory capacity or on clerical work, in our opinion, depends upon whether the main and principal duties carried out by him are those of a supervisory character, or of a nature carried out by a clerk. If a person is mainly doing supervisory work, but, incidentally or for a fraction of the time, also does some clerical work, it would have to be held that he is employed in supervisory capacity and, conversely, if the main work done is of clerical nature, the mere tact that some supervisory duties are also carried out incidentally or as a small fraction of the work done by him will not convert his employment as a clerk into one in supervisory capacity. In the present case, we have, therefore, to examine the evidence to see whether the labour court is right in holding that, the main work of the employee in that case is clerical in nature, and he was not employed in supervisory capacity." 9. THE Supreme Court then observed certain facts put forward by the employers in the background of their assertion that the employee was incharge or Manager of the Provident Fund Section of the employer Company. 10. IT was admitted that he was Incharge of the Provident Fund Section and was designated as Manager. The Supreme Court observed that "mere designation as Manager cannot be decisive of the nature of employment," and in this contest further observed that "the appellant-Company (employer) in order to succeed had to show that Gupta 'the employee concerned) was in fact mainly doing the work stated in the pleading." This observation of the Supreme Court lays down no more than this that a party must prove what it pleads and it would not be right to read it as laying down any general proposition that in a case of this nature the burden of proving that the nature of duties performed by an employee is supervisory or managerial is invariably on the employer. The next case relied upon by the appellant on this point was that of Bihar State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Bihar and others(1970 21 FLR 11=1970 II LLJ 138). The next case relied upon by the appellant on this point was that of Bihar State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Bihar and others(1970 21 FLR 11=1970 II LLJ 138). This again is the decision of the Supreme Court, and on the evidence, the Supreme Court found that the third respondent was prima-jacie neither an officer nor a member of the office staff and that "no evidence was led by the Corporation (employer in this case) that respondent 3 as a head clerk was concerned with or doing managerial or supervisory duties, and "The definition of a workman in section 2 (s) of the Industrial disputes Act being a comprehensive one, respondent 3 must be held to be a workman within the meaning of section 2 (s)." Here too the Supreme Court did not lay down any principle of general applicability with regard to the burden of proof in these matters. The observations were confined to the facts of each case and were made in the course of appraising the material on the record for finding out whether the employee concerned was a workman or not. Be that as it may, even assuming that the burden of proof to show that the appellant was performing supervisory and managerial functions lay on the respondent Bank, it has yet to be seen whether the findings of the two courts below on the question whether the appellant was a workman, are vitiated by placing the burden of proof on wrong shoulders, for otherwise, this question about burden of proof would be of no consequence. 11. THE trial court has, after quoting the law as declared by the Supreme Court in Lyod Bank's case (supra) proceeded to refer to the contents of paragraph 10 of the writ petition, for culling out the fact that in September, 1 54, the designation of the appellant was that of Investment Assistant and the allegation that his duties were only of clerical nature. The trial court then referred to the original power of attorney (Ext. 156) and then to Exhibit 155 dated March 3, 1955 which showed that it was cancelled. According to the trial court, the power of attorney was granted to the appellant on January, 10, 1948, and its first paragraph showed that the appellant was appointed as an Accountant at Amritsar. 156) and then to Exhibit 155 dated March 3, 1955 which showed that it was cancelled. According to the trial court, the power of attorney was granted to the appellant on January, 10, 1948, and its first paragraph showed that the appellant was appointed as an Accountant at Amritsar. On a perusal of the terms of the authority given to the appellant in the several clauses of the power of attorney, the trial court inferred that the work entrusted to the appellant was of a supervisory nature and that he was holding the post of an officer in the respondent Bank and could not consequently be held to be a workman within the definition of that term under the Act ; but, according to the trial court, the question was whether the said power of attorney was effective in September, 1954, when the appellant was posted as an Investment Assistant. It found that the appellant was an officer in 1942, when he was posted as an Accountant, and in 1954 he was an Investment Assistant. He was a Law Graduate. The Post of an Investment Assistant can be given only to a law graduate. He also worked as an officiating Manager. In Investment Assistant could be promoted to the post of Assistant Manager or the General Manager of the Bank From these facts, the trial court inferred that the position of the plaintiff was not that of a clerk, that he performed the duties of a supervisory nature and his position was that of an Officer. The power of attorney held good at the relevant time. It could not have been granted nor could it be cancelled without a resolution of the Board of Directors of the respondent Bank and the appellant could exercise all the powers given to him under the power of attorney. According to the appellant's statement before the trial court he was not an investment Assistant in September, 1954. This was dis-believed by the trial court in view of the statement in paragraph 10 of the writ petition, referred to above. According to the appellant's statement before the trial court he was not an investment Assistant in September, 1954. This was dis-believed by the trial court in view of the statement in paragraph 10 of the writ petition, referred to above. The trial court then proceeded to notice that from the statement of the appellant it appears that he used to supervise the Accounts Section, that the duty of an Investment Assistant was, apart from his other duties, to go through title deeds and to put up notes ; that his power of attorney was deposited which meant that he should not exercise the powers conferred on him thereunder. The trial court did not believe this statement and held that the deposit of the power of attorney was only for the purpose of safe custody. It found the statements made by the appellant contradictory ; that his power of attorney was not cancelled at the relevant time and it was not proved that his work was of a clerical nature ; and that on the other hand it was fully provided that at the time when the appellant was dismissed from service, he was posted as an Investment Assistant and was holding a position of responsibility, command and power, that the appellant was performing the duties of supervisory nature and was an officer of the Bank. On these findings, the trial court held that the appellant was not a workman within the meaning of the definition of that term under section 2 (s) of the Act. 12. THE lower appellate court discussed together all the three points raised by it, namely ; (1) whether the plaintiff was a. workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act ? and if so (2) whether the provisions of the Sastry Award apply to his service conditions ; and (3) whether the Sastry Award has got force of statutory law as alleged ? It was not disputed before the lower appellate court that the Sastry Award did not apply to officers of a Bank, and applied only to workmen, and accordingly the primary question to be decided by the lower appellate court was whether the appellant was a workman. It was not disputed before the lower appellate court that the Sastry Award did not apply to officers of a Bank, and applied only to workmen, and accordingly the primary question to be decided by the lower appellate court was whether the appellant was a workman. The lower appellate court then proceeded to notice the arguments raised by the appellant and the respondent Bank in some detail and held that : "In the instant case, it has been proved that although, the plaintiff was designated as a Clerk, but nevertheless, he had been entrusted with responsible supervisory duties by virtue of power of attorney executed in his favour which had not been revoked. As such, keeping in view this aspect of the case, I am of the opinion that the appellant was not a workman and as such Sastry Award did not apply to him." The way in which the matter has been dealt with by the lower appellate court is not at all satisfactory. It is impossible to discern and differentiate between the arguments raised by the parties before the lower appellate court, and its findings on the issues of fact or of law, raised by them respectively. The finding of the lower appellate court has been culled out in the two sentences quoted above, which do not give any proper reasons on the basis of which the learned Judge reached that conclusion. The assumption that the appellant's designation was that of a clerk at the relevant time appears to be contrary to the un-disputed facts of the case, inasmuch as the appellant had already been transferred in September, 1954 to the Investment Section of the respondent Bank and designated as an Investment Assistant. On the other hand in an earlier part of the judgment of the lower appellate court, after a reference to certain documents Ext. 85 to 100, it is stated that; "I have already mentioned that the appellant was dismissed with effect from 11.1.1955 on the basis of the charge-sheet served on him on 24.12.1954. It is, therefore, to be seen whether he had been permitted to perform supervisory duties after the period he was shown as a clerk. I have already referred that by interrogator no. 26 wherein it was answered that the plaintiff was transferred to Dehradun Branch Office on 14.6 1950. It is, therefore, to be seen whether he had been permitted to perform supervisory duties after the period he was shown as a clerk. I have already referred that by interrogator no. 26 wherein it was answered that the plaintiff was transferred to Dehradun Branch Office on 14.6 1950. The plaintiff was then transferred to the Investment Department in September, 1954 and his designation was as Investment Assistant. All the duties of the plaintiff as have come in answer to the interrogatories are of clerical nature within the meaning of the rule laid down in the case of Loyd Bank v. Panna Lal Gupta and others (1961 2 FLR 219=1950-67 1 SCLJ 88=1961 I LLJ 18). There is one more additional feature that the plaintiff was also holder of power of attorney. There are numerous documents that the plaintiff used to submit draft of the letters and he was not a final authority inasmuch as the drafts were to be corrected by the superior officers. Paper No. 80-C is the answer of the Additional interrogatory wherein it has been replied that the plaintiff used to submit, vouchers to superior officers for orders as a matter of normal routine like brother officers and there were the superior officers above him who have to supervise the acts of subordinate officers............... Thereafter the learned Judge has again proceeded to notice some cases cited by the appellant and then the case cited and the arguments submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent. 13. THE judgment of the lower appellate court being what it is, the interest of justice would have required that the consideration of the question whether the appellant was a workman or not, were remanded to the lower court for recording a proper finding on the question on an appraisal of the facts and the law placed before it by the two contesting parties. However, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case already indicated above, particularly the fact that the civil court will have no jurisdiction to grant to the appellant any relief in case it finds that he was a workman as contended for by him, we consider it appropriate that the findings of the trial court and the lower appellate court in suit No. 143 of 1959 and Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1971 arising therefrom on the question whether the appellant was a workman may be set aside by us in Second Appeal No. 126 of 1976, and further that the order dated May 8, 1965 of the Labour Court (Central), Lucknow, in the proceedings under section 33-C (2) of the Act, may be partly quashed, in so far as it held that it had no jurisdiction to enquire into the question whether the appellant was a workman upto the date of his dismissal on January 11, 1955, and if he is found entitled, to grant him relief in respect of the arrears of emoluments claimed by him upto the said date, and we order accordingly. In the result Special Appeal No. 275 of 1970 is allowed in part. The judgment of the learned Single Judge in so far as he refused to quasi the order of the Labour Court refusing to entertain the appellants' claim for enhanced emoluments from 1.4. 1954 upto the date of his dismissal (11.1.1955), is set aside, and the order of the Labour Court dated May 8, 1955, is to that extent quashed and the writ petition allowed in part. The Second appeal No. 126 of 1976 is dismissed, but the findings of the court of Second Additional Civil Judge, Dehradun in Suit No. 143 of 1959 and that of the court of the Additional District Judge, Dehradun in Civil Appeal No, 66 of 1971 on the issue whether the appellant was a workman and whether the Sastry Award applied to him are also set aside and the suit is dismissed for being incompetent on the plaintiff-appellants own allegation that he was a workman. The appellant will be free to agitate the matter in accordance with law in the proceedings under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which will in consequence of our order become pending before the Labour Court (Central), Lucknow. The appellant will be free to agitate the matter in accordance with law in the proceedings under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which will in consequence of our order become pending before the Labour Court (Central), Lucknow. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.