JUDGMENT M. P. Mehrotra, J. This writ petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. The relevant facts given briefly are these: The petitioner is a tenureholder in village Faridpur, Tahsil Bazpur, district Nainital. He was issued a notice under section 10 (2) of the aforesaid Act by the Prescribed Authority, Kashipur, district Nainital proposing the 127 bighas and 7 biswas of his land would be declared surplus. The petitioner contested the said notice and, inter alia, he relied on the two sale deeds both dated 2221971 which were executed on his behalf by his Mukhtaream Sri Balbir Singh. By one deed 74 bighas and 6 biswas of bhumidhari land were sold to one Smt. Jogender Kaur and by the other document 83 bighas and 6 biswas of land were sold to Smt. Ajeet Kaur. The first deed was executed for a sum of Rs. 13,000/ and the other deed for Rs. 11,640/. The true copies of the sale deeds have been filed by the petitioner along with the writ petition and they have been marked as Annexure T (A and B). In the objection the petitioner stated that the transactions were at the prevalent market rate, hence for an adequate consideration and were in good faith and were by irrevocable instruments and were not benami transactions. The Prescribed Authority, however, while disposing of the objection of the petitioner, did not accept the said contention and held that the transactions were not genuine. The Prescribed Authority held that as the consideration mentioned in the documents was not paid before the SubRegistrar at the time of the registration, therefore, he felt that the transactions lacked genuineness. Adverting to the question of possession, he observed that the said consideration was not relevant under the aforesaid status. The petitioner filed an appeal and the same was heard by the Civil Judge, Nainital. The appeal was partly allowed but so far as the aforesaid two sale deeds were concerned, the Appellate Court maintained the finding of the Prescribed Authority and held that they were rightly ignored by the said authority in view of section 5(6) of the aforesaid Act. The petitioner has now come up in the instant petition and in support thereof I have heard Sri S. P. Gupta, his learned counsel. In opposition learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. The petitioner has now come up in the instant petition and in support thereof I have heard Sri S. P. Gupta, his learned counsel. In opposition learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. Sri Gupta raised the following contentions: (1) The appellate Court did not give any definite finding in reference to the requirements of law as laid down in section 5(6) of the said Act. The appellate authority was a regular Civil Court and it was not an administrative tribunal and, therefore, was bound to record a definite categorical finding in the manner in which Civil Courts should record findings on controversies raised before them. (2) The authorities below were not justified in disregarding the aspect of actual possession and it was a relevant consideration which should have been taken into account. (3) The lower appellate Court did not care to consider the aspect of consideration involved in the said transaction. (4) The necessity under which a transaction has to be affected is a matter of relative assessment and a finding cannot be based merely in the absence of proof in support of the alleged finding. Learned Counsel relied on Daryao v.State of U.P.( A.IR. 1961 S.C. p. 1457),in Para 19 whereof the Court observed as under: "If the petitition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of resjudicata. It is true that, prima facie, dismissal in limine even without passing a speaking order in that behalf may strongly suggest that the Court took the view that there was no substance in the petition at all; but in the absence of a speaking order it would not be easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind of the Court and that makes it difficult and unsafe to hold that such a summary dismissal is a dismissal on merits and as such constitute a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed under Art. 32. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel drew my attention to Para 4 of the writ petition and pointed out that the land had been sold for grossly low amount and such a transaction could never be said to be a bona fide one in good faith and for adequate consideration. He also drew my attention to the fact that the Prescribed Authority has observed that consideration passed during the registration proceedings. He also drew my attention to the fact that the Prescribed Authority has observed that consideration passed during the registration proceedings. I have considered these rival contentions. The language of section 5(6) of the said Act is preemptory. The said provision is as follows: (5) In determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenureholder, any transfer of land made after the twentyfourth day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account: Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply to (a) a transfer in favour of any person (including Government) referred to in subsection (2); (b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument, not being a benami transaction or for the immediate or deferred benefit of the tenureholder or other members of his family. Explanation I.For the purpose of this subsection the expression 'transfer of land made after the twentyfourth day of January, 1971', includes (a) a declaration of a person as a cotenureholder made after the twentyfourth day of January, 1971 in a suit or proceeding irrespective of whether such suit or proceeding was pending on or was instituted after the twentyfourth day of January, 1971; (b) any admission acknowledgment, relinquishment or declaration in favour of a person to the like effect, made in any other deed or instrument or in any other manner. Explanation II.The burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit. In terms of the said provisions it was for the petitioner to have satisfied the Prescribed Authority that the transactions in question were in good faith and for adequate consideration and under irrevocable instruments and that they were not benami transactions. In these cases this Court, it is well known, and it is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, has its own limitations. It cannot act as an appellate Court. In M. Naina Mohd. In these cases this Court, it is well known, and it is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, has its own limitations. It cannot act as an appellate Court. In M. Naina Mohd. v. K. A. Natrajan (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. p. 1867), it was laid down as under: "The boundaries of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 are clearly and strongly built and cannot be breached without risking jurisprudential confusion Sri Rama Vilas Service (P.) Ltd. v. C. Chandrasekharan ( (1964) 5 S.C.R. 869 =A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 107). The power is supervisory in nature although the Judges at both the tiers, in the instant case, have unwittingly slipped into the subtle, but fatal error of exercising a kind of appellate review." Similarly in Khazan Singh v. Hukum Singh (A.I.R. 1977 S.O. p. 2032), it was laid down "It may be that some other view, and what according to Mr. Sen was a better view, could have been arrived at on the facts, but the position in law is clear that the High Court in a writ petition cannot interfere with a finding of fact as that finding is based upon the relevant circumstances and is not shown to be perverse." In the light of the aforesaid law it has to be seen that the simple position is that the two authorities below held that the burden of proof which in law has been on the petitioner, had not been discharged. Whether the burden was or was not discharged in the light of the evidence placed before a Court or Tribunal cannot be said to be a question touching on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or the Court. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is an ambiguity in the finding recorded by the lower appellate court is concerned, it seems that what matters is the drift of the entire discussion and not a particular sentence dulled from the appellate order. So far as the entire discussion on the appellate order is concerned, it shows that the lower appellate court was not satisfied with the plea raised on behalf of the petitioner that he needed money for his studies abroad. That plea had been raised by the petitioner in support of the genuineness of the documents. So far as the entire discussion on the appellate order is concerned, it shows that the lower appellate court was not satisfied with the plea raised on behalf of the petitioner that he needed money for his studies abroad. That plea had been raised by the petitioner in support of the genuineness of the documents. One may feel that certain aspects have been considered by the lower appellate court and certain inference have been drawn with which one may not agree, and yet the real point remains that the said court was entitled to come to a finding as to whether the petitioner had made out his case about the necessity which impelled him to sell the lands by the said two saledeeds. The petitioner sought to discharge the burden which lay upon him by establishing the good faith on the ground that he needed the moneys for his studies abroad. Obviously the lower appellate court was entitled to decide whether the said plea had been made out to its satisfaction or not and the said court on the material on record, was not satisfied what the said plea had been substantiated. In this view of the matter, the said Court held that the saledeeds were not saved in view of the provisions of Section 6(6) of the aforesaid Act. The Civil Judge, I stated above, was entitled to record the said finding on the basis of the material placed before him, but that is not to say that this Court itself would have recorded such a finding in case the matter had been heard by it at any stage. I am only emphasising the limitations of this Court in the. writ jurisdiction. A finding has been recorded and it cannot be denied that relevant considerations were taken into consideration. The counsel's contention that the court was bound to take into consideration the fact of the actual possession also cannot be accepted. The fact of possession may have relevance in certain circumstances but obviously the authorities below were entitled to record a finding about the genuineness of the transactions ignoring the fact that the vendees had been put in possession. The more fact of possession will not induce a prescribed authority to hold that the transaction must necessarily be held to be genuine. The more fact of possession will not induce a prescribed authority to hold that the transaction must necessarily be held to be genuine. It is true that if the vendee has not been put in possession then that would be a relevant consideration for the prescribed authority to come to a finding that the transaction lacked genuineness but the reverse is not true. The mere fact that a vendee has been put into possession will not close the enquiry and the authorities below were bound to consider the good faith in the transactions apart from the aspect of possession. So far as the aspect of consideration is concerned, the trial court was entitled to take into account the fact that nothing was paid at the stage of the registration of the documents. The lower appellate court did not advert to the said aspect of the matter. It has to be seen that the lower appellate court's verdict was one of affirmance. In such a verdict it is not necessary that every aspect of the matter which has been examined at the trial stage must necessarily be adverted to in the lower appellate court's judgment also. Moreover, the petitioner had burden of proof in respect of both the ingredients laid down in the aforesaid provision, namely, he had to prove the good faith as well as the adequacy of the consideration. Irrespective of whether the adequacy of consideration stood proved or not, the lower appellate court was entitled to give a finding that good faith had not been established inasmuch as the necessity for the transaction which had been set up, had not been proved. If the necessity set up is not proved, in my opinion, the transaction can be said to be not in good faith. For example, if a necessity is set up on the ground that the vendor had a daughter to marry and for the said purpose a sale was effected, and it is found that there was no daughter to be married or even though there was a daughter, she, due to her tender age, was not likely to be married in the near future, in such a situation, the Prescribed Authority would be entitled to hold that good faith in the transaction had not been established. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed with costs.