JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for ejectment and recovery of rent. The accommodation was governed by the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The plaintiff landlords case for getting over the bar of Section 3 of the Act was that the defendant had defaulted in payment of more than three months rent in spite of the service upon him of a notice of demand, the date of the notice being June 17, 1964 and the date of its service being June 19, 1964. The defendants case was that the entire rent had been deposited under Section 7-C (2) of the Act as there was a bona fide dispute as to person entitled to receive the rent. It is not necessary to state the facts of that dispute for the purposes of this second appeal. The trial Court dismissed the suit and the lower appellate Court has confirmed that decree. 2. The only point urged before me by Mr. S. N. Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellants, is that the finding of the two courts below about the validity of the deposit under Section 7-C (2) of the Act is erroneous in law. 3. Now, in paragraph 5 of the plaint it was pleaded that the defendant gave a reply to the notice (notice dated 17-6-1964 served by the plaintiffs) stating wrong facts and alleging therein that the rent has been deposited under Section 7-C of the Act, but the rent had not been paid either to Lala Rang Lal, the deceased predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, or to the plaintiffs and the defendant had without any reason impleaded some strangers in those proceedings as a result of which the plaintiffs could not get the rent and at any rate the defendant is liable to pay the rent and further that the deposits made under Section 7-C of the Act are not admitted by the plaintiffs. 4. The essential facts may now be stated. The plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest purchased the property on 27th August, 1959. The defendant had been a tenant since long before that purchase. One of the co-owners of the property, who had been realising the rent in the past, served a notice on the defendant to pay the rent to her. The defendant thereupon deposited a sum of Rs. The plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest purchased the property on 27th August, 1959. The defendant had been a tenant since long before that purchase. One of the co-owners of the property, who had been realising the rent in the past, served a notice on the defendant to pay the rent to her. The defendant thereupon deposited a sum of Rs. 209 being the rent for the period up to 30th June, 1960 on 15th July, 1960 under Section 7-C (2) of the Act as he believed that there was a bona fide dispute about the right of the plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest who received the rent. The deposit was accepted by the court of Munsif, Etawah in Misc. Case No. 59 of 1960 (Shri Naresh Chandra v. Lala Bhagwan Dass) by an order dated November 19, 1960. A certified copy of which is Ext A-7 on the record. It is apparent from that order that although the plaintiffs or their predecessor-in-interest had been duly served of the notice of the proceedings, they chose to remain absent and the learned Munsif having come to the conclusion that there was a bona fide dispute about the fact as to which party is entitled to the amount deposited in the Court, the application was allowed with the direction that the amount in deposit shall be held by the court for the benefit of the person who was held entitled to the rent by a competent court of law. Further, the rent amounting to Rs. 684 for the period 1-4-1961 to 31st March, 1964 was deposited on April 26, 1964 in another proceedings under Section 7-C (2) of the Act being Misc. Case No. 47 of 1964. In this case also the plaintiffs chose to remain absent and the court of the Munsif having come to the conclusion that there was a bona fide dispute between the opposite parties about the right to receive the rent, the amount deposited shall remain in deposit and be payable to the person found entitled by compromise or by any competent court of law and further that it was valid discharge of the liability to pay rent by the appellant. It has already been noticed above that in reply to the notice of demand dated 17th June, 1964, served by the plaintiffs on the defendant the defendant had pleaded that there was no arrears of rent against him as the amount of rent had already been deposited under Section 7-C of the Act. However, since in fact there was same amount of rent in arrears, the defendant took the precaution of depositing a further sum of Rs. 228 on 16th July, 19-64 within the period of one month from the date of service of the notice of demand on him. The amount deposited was Rs. 228 and comprised all the rent for the period July 1960 to 31st March, 1961 and April 1964 to 30th June, 1964. This deposit was made in Misc. Case No. 72 of 1964 in the court of the Munsif, Etawah and was again accepted by the court by an order dated 2nd January, 1965 on coming to the conclusion that there was a bona fide dispute among the opposite parties, with the direction that the rent shall remain in deposit until the matter is decided by the competent court and further that it shall be valid discharge for the applicant. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants that in case there was a bona fide doubt or dispute about the right of the plaintiffs to receive the rent at the time when the said deposits were made, the making of those deposits will amount to a valid payment of rent by the defendant to the plaintiffs, vide Section 7-C (6) of the Act, but he contends that there could have been no bona fide dispute about the plaintiffs right to receive the rent after the death of Smt. Gajraj Kunwar which occurred in 1963. Now, an order under Section 7-C (2) of the Act is a judicial order, may be in a proceeding of a summary nature, passed by a court of competent jurisdiction which has the legal effect of demanding (sic) (deciding) that the rent has been duly paid by the tenant, on the making of such deposit, so long as the order stands. Since the order is passed in a proceeding of a summary nature its correctness could certainly be impugned in a regular suit by the party aggrieved from the consequences of that order and in this case it could have been impugned by the plaintiffs in the suit giving rise to this appeal. However, the fact remains that the precise ground or grounds on which the plaintiffs had stated in paragraph 5 of the plaint that the deposit under Section 7-C did not affect their rights, had not been stated or pleaded anywhere in the plaint. The learned counsel, however, contends that it was for the defendant to establish as a fact in the present suit that the deposits made under Section 7-C amounted to valid payment of rent. Now, in view of the facts stated above and the fact which the plaintiffs have admitted in the plaint itself that they had been told of the fact of the rent having been deposited under Section 7-C it is obvious that the plaintiffs ought to have pleaded the necessary/ facts on the basis of which they wanted to get over the effect of the deposits under Section 7-C (2) of the Act. In Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mst. Saran ( AIR 1930 PC 57 (1)) it has been laid down that "no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward." The allegation that there was in fact no bona fide dispute about the plaintiffs right to receive the rent, at the time when the deposits under Section 7-C were made has not been pleaded by the plaintiffs anywhere in the plaint, the only issue being whether the defendant had made the deposits under Section 7-C of the said Act If so, their effect. The fact that the defendant had made the deposit is amply proved by the record. Their effect is laid down by sub-section (16) of Section 7-C of the Act. In the absence of a plea that the deposits were invalid on account of there being no bona fide dispute about the right of the plaintiffs to receive the rent, the question whether the deposits were illegal on that ground could not be enquired into by the court in the suit giving rise to the present appeal, nor was it open to the learned counsel for the appellant to raise it before me. Moreover, on the facts on record, it does appear that there was in fact a bona fide dispute about the rights of the plaintiffs to receive the rent at the time the deposit under Section 7-C (2) of the Act was made. No other point was pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant before me. 5. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.