Short Note : 1. The trial Court, after examining the documents and affidavits, granted an injunction against the non-applicant on 24-08-1977. In appeal, the District Judge Sagar held that the applicants having no prima facie case and their claim being vexatious, had no right to obtain temporary injunction. The order of the trial Court granting injunction was, therefore, set aside. 2. The point for decision in this revision is, whether the applicants are entitled to grant of temporary injunction. 3. Held : While considering the question of grant of temporary injunction, three ingredients have to be kept in view : (i) Is there a prima facie case in favour of the party claiming temporary injunction? (ii) Whether the refusal of temporary injunction will result in irreparable loss? (iii) On whose side the balance of convenience lies? 4. I have perused the plaint and the written statement in C. S. No. 108-A/77. The non-applicant, in para 1, admitted that the applicants are in possession of some portions of the disputed house. In para 5, she admitted that she was kept as a mistress by Laxminarayan. In para 6, she asserted that she had right to the extent of half in the disputed house. In para 9, she asserted that she was in possession of half portion. Thus the non-applicant, in her pleadings, admitted that the applicants were in possession of a portion of the disputed house. 5. Copy of the reply dated 03-10-1969 is filed in M.C.C. No. 11/69 in which Laxminarayan filed an affidavit that he was not selling the disputed house and that the non-applicant had neither any share nor interest in any portion of the disputed house. In spite of this affidavit, there has been a sale-deed by Laxminarayan stating that he is the sole owner of the disputed house in which the non-applicant has no right or interest. Laxminarayan did not contest C. S. No. 18-A/72 and allowed it to be decreed ex-parte. Admittedly the applicants were not the parties to the suit and, therefore, the decree prima facie cannot bind them. 6. The question of doctrine of lis pendence could better be considered after the parties have completed their pleadings. Laxminarayan did not contest C. S. No. 18-A/72 and allowed it to be decreed ex-parte. Admittedly the applicants were not the parties to the suit and, therefore, the decree prima facie cannot bind them. 6. The question of doctrine of lis pendence could better be considered after the parties have completed their pleadings. But as the matter stands, Laxminarayan himself asserted that the non-applicant has no right or interest in the disputed house and that the non-applicant admitted that the applicants were in possession of some portion of the disputed house. The documents relied upon by the applicants also support their title and possession. There is the certified copy of the sale-deed dated 13-10-1969, the Corporation receipts for number of years, mutation of the applicants in the suit house and payment of conservancy taxes. These documents prima facie indicate possession of the applicants to some extent. 7. In C. S. No. 18-A/72, there is an order sheet dated 15-07-1977 where the two applicants had raised an objection to the executeability of the partition decree, but the Additional District Judge rejected this objection under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The question of application of section 52 could be better considered in the light of pleadings which the parties finally raise. In the memo of revision (para 10), it is specifically stated that the non-applicant and Laxminarayan both have colluded as far as partition decree in C.S. No. 18-A /72 is concerned. 8. Having considered the matter in the light of the material placed before me, I am of the view that the order of the District Judge holding that the applicants have no prima facie case, is wrong. Since both the parties are asserting their possession over the disputed property and since the applicants are admittedly in possession of a portion of the disputed house, their possession needs to be protected, because balance of convenience will lie in their favour and that there will be irreparable loss to the applicants as they have purchased the house from Laxminarayan who himself, in his affidavit in Misc. Case No. 11/69, asserted that the non-applicant had no right or title. In the circumstances, it will be just and proper that possession of both the parties is protected against interference by each of them during the pendency of the suit. Revision party allowed.