JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - By this petition under Article 226 or the Constitution, Shri R.K. Gupta, official Liquidator, High Court, Allahabad has challenged the validity of an order dated 22.2.1977 passed by the District Judge, Allahabad. 2. The dispute in the present case is with respect to a portion of House No. 33 Edmonston Road, Allahabad , which belongs to Maharaja Bahadur Lal Srivastava, respondent No. 2. This portion was admittedly in the tenancy of the State of Uttar Pradesh in which an office of the Irrigation Department was housed. After the portion was vacated by the said Department, the proceedings for its allotment were started before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Maharaja Bahadur Lal Srivastava, respondent No. 2, filed an application for the release of this portion under section 16 of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") whereas several persons, including the petitioner, filed applications for its allotment. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer hold that the need of respondent No. 2 for the release of the accommodation was not genuine and bona fide. On this finding, he rejected the application for release. He, thereafter, considered the comparative merits of the claims of the applicants for allotment and having found that the need of the petitioner was more pressing than that of the others, he allowed his application and allotted the premises to him by the order passed on 9th November, 1970. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer an appeal was taken by respondent No. 2 before the District Judge. The District Judge agreed with the findings of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer so far as the question of release of the premises in favour of respondent No. 2 was concerned and thus being of the view that the premises was not required by the said respondent, the appeal of the said respondent was dismissed. The learned District Judge, however, felt that as the premises in question was one to which the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act were attracted, therefore, he set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotting the premises to the petitioner. The learned District Judge, however, felt that as the premises in question was one to which the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act were attracted, therefore, he set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotting the premises to the petitioner. The learned District Judge sent back the case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for deciding the question of allotment afresh in the light of the observations made by him in his judgment. 3. Feeling aggrieved Sri R.K. Gupta has preferred the present petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties but I am unable to find any substance in the writ petition. The first contention raised before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the learned District Judge committed an error in applying the provisions of Section 17(2) of the Act to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the premises in question was not a part of the residential house in occupation of the landlord. In this connection reference may be made to the explanation added by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 to sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act. The said explanation lays down the criteria or the circumstances in which a part of a building in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes shall be treated as a part of the remaining building, which was in occupation of the tenant. Amongst others, it mentions that where a building in the occupation of a landlord for residential purposes adjoins the building sought to be allotted and the two buildings share the sanitary conveniences or other amenities then notwithstanding that the two buildings are independently fit for residential purposes, they shall be deemed to be part of each other for the purposes of this sub-section. In the instant case the finding given by the learned District Judge is that the court yard of the portion in the occupation of the landlord was common to that which was the subject matter of allotment. In my opinion the expression "two buildings............other amenities", would include a case of enjoyment of a court yard by the landlord with that of the tenant as well. It is needless to point out the importance of a court-yard in an Indian house which is used for multifarious purposes. In my opinion the expression "two buildings............other amenities", would include a case of enjoyment of a court yard by the landlord with that of the tenant as well. It is needless to point out the importance of a court-yard in an Indian house which is used for multifarious purposes. Keeping the object of Section 17(2) in the view which obviously was not to inconvenience a landlord where a portion of the premises is let out to a stranger was to allot the portion to such a person who may be suited to the wishes of the landlord. It is worthy of being noted that sub-section (2) of section 17 does not leave any discretion with the Rent Control and Eviction Officer not to allot to the nominee where this sub-section applies. Accordingly, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the explanation added to sub-section (2) of Section 17 was wrongly pressed into service by the court below in arriving at a finding of the portion sought to be let out is common with that of the respondent No. 2 cannot be accepted. 5. Learned counsel also attempted to challenge the finding of the District Judge that the disputed portion was a part of the residential houses in the occupation of the landlord. This cannot, however, be accepted, firstly because the finding given is one of fact. Its decision was to be given on the appreciation of the evidence given by the parties. In the instant case there were reports of the Inspectors who visited the house in question on two occasions i.e. on 22.3.76 and 27.3 76 and other evidence. On the basis of that evidence the learned District Judge held that the portion in dispute was the part of the residential building which, was in occupation of the landlord. 6. Shri P.C. Gupta also relied on a decision reported in Nawal Kishore v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Bulandshahr, 1959 A.L.J. 66. The said case arose out of rule 4 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and from the facts mentioned in the report it appears clear that the same is distinguishable from.the one with which we are concerned. The said case arose out of rule 4 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and from the facts mentioned in the report it appears clear that the same is distinguishable from.the one with which we are concerned. Moreover, the present cases arises out of proceedings taken under the new Act and the provision being different., some observations made in the earlier case would not be helpful in deciding the controversy involved in the present case. So far as the present case is concerned, sub section (2) of Section 17 is clear and does not leave any ambiguity that in an event under which such provision applies it will be incumbent upon the Court to give an opportunity to the landlord to make a nomination. It is also not acceptable to me that simply because the respondent No. 2 had made an application for the release of the premises in question that he should be deprived of his right to make the nomination. The right to get a portion released is altogether different one than to make a nomination of a person to whom the portion be allotted. The two things cannot be mixed up. Neither I know any legal principle nor was any such cited before me on the basis of which I would be prepared to deprive the landlord of his right of nomination conferred upon him by sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act. Subsection (2) of Section 17, as already said above, was enacted with the object of safeguarding the interest of a landlord so that an undesirable person does not come in the house and live with him. 7. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to the costs.