G. Eswarappa and another v. State of Karnataka by the Taluk Magistrate, Holalkere, Chitradurga District, and others
1978-11-24
N.R.KUDOOR
body1978
DigiLaw.ai
Order.- A notice dated 6th November, 1978 issued by the Taluk-Executive Magistrate, Holalkere, to the petitioners herein directing the sale by public auction fixing the date of sale on 13th November, 1978 of the standing crop on S. No. 97 of Shivapura Village Kasaba Hobli, Holalkere Taluk is sought to be set aside by the petitioners in this criminal revision petition which is ore filed under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (shortly called the ‘Code’). 2. The matter arises in this way. The Sub-Inspector of Police of Chikkajajur police station filed a report on 31st October, 1978, before the Taluk Magistrate, Holalkere showing the petitioners herein as the First Party and respondents 2 to 7 as the Second Party requesting the Taluk Magistrate to take action under section 145 of the Code since there was dispute between the parties in respect of the said survey number and the crops standing thereon and there was likelihood of breach of the peace and further requesting to attach the standing crops and to appoint a receiver to sell the standing crop in public auction and to deposit the sale proceeds in the said Court The worn statement of the Sub-Inspector of Police was recorded on the same day. Therefore the Executive Magistrate directed issue of the impugned notice on the basis of an office note on 6th November, 1978, directing sale of the standing crop on the spot by public auction after notice to the parties. It is the validity of this notice that is assailed in this revision petition. 3. Shri N.S. Srinivasan, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners vehemently contended that the impugned notice directed to be issued by the Executive Magistrate is one without jurisdiction since no proceeding under section 145 of the Code was initiated by him on the basis of the report of the Sub-Inspector, Dilating this contention, he contended that unless the Executive Magistrate makes a preliminary order under section 145(1) of the Code, he has no jurisdiction to make any other order either under section 145 or under section 146 of the Code. 4.
4. Per contra, it was contended by Shri K. Chandrasekhar, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 4, that it is open to the Magistrate in a given ease if the circumstances justify, to make an urgent order as laid down in sub-section (8) of section 145 of the Code, even without making a preliminary order under section 145(1) of the Code. In other words, his contention is that an order under section 145(8) is an independent order and a preliminary order as contemplated under section 145(1) of the Code is not sine qua non to take action under section 145(8) of the Code. 5. Chapter X of the Code deals with maintenance of public order and tranquility. Part-D of Chapter X relates to disputes as to immovable property. Section 145 deals with the procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace. Section 146 deals with the power of the Magistrate to attach the subject of dispute and to appoint receiver. Sub-section (1) of section 145 provides that whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by a pleader on a specified date and time and to put in written statement of the respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of subject of dispute. The various other sub-sections of section 145 deal with the procedure of the enquiry to be conducted in a proceeding initiated under section 145 of the Code. It is obvious from the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 146 that the very foundation of initiation of the proceedings under section 145 is, making an order in full compliance with the provisions of section 145(1) of the Code. The order under section 145(1) of the Code shall have to be made if the Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or boundaries thereof.
The order under section 145(1) of the Code shall have to be made if the Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or boundaries thereof. It is further stipulated therein that such an order shall be made in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claim as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. Unless an order under sub-section (1) of section 145 of the Code is made, the Executive Magistrate shall have no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 145. Any order made under any of the provisions of either under section 145 or under section 146 as a matter of fact, without making a preliminary order as contemplated under sub-section (1) of section 145 will be without jurisdiction. I am unable to persuade myself to accede to the contention urged by Shri K. Chandrasekhar that an order contemplated under sub-section (8) of section 145 is an independent order. This is clear from the language employed in sub-section (8) which reads thus: “If the Magistrate is of opinion that any crop or other produce of the property, the subject of dispute in a proceedings under this section pending before him is subject to speedy and natural decay, he may make an order for the proper custody or sale of such property, and, upon the completion of the inquiry, shall make such order for the disposal of such property, or the sale proceeds thereof, as he thinks fit.” (Italics is mine). 6. It is clear from the language employed in sub-section (8) of section 145 that the Magistrate is competent to take action under subsection (8) in respect of any crop or other produce of the property which is the subject of dispute in a proceeding under section 145 pending before such Executive Magistrate and not otherwise.
6. It is clear from the language employed in sub-section (8) of section 145 that the Magistrate is competent to take action under subsection (8) in respect of any crop or other produce of the property which is the subject of dispute in a proceeding under section 145 pending before such Executive Magistrate and not otherwise. Unless the proceeding is initiated by making a preliminary order as required under sub-section (1) of section 145 it cannot be said that any proceeding if pending before the Magistrate so as to clothe him with the jurisdiction to make an order under sub-section (8) of section 145 of the Code In that view of the matter, it cannot be maintained that on order contemplated under sub-section (8) of section 145 will be an independent order as contended by Shri K. Chandrasekhar, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 4. Hence the contention urged is rejected as untenable. 7. From what has been stated above, it follows that the impugned notice issued by the Executive Magistrate without taking recourse to making a preliminary order as contemplated under sub-section (1) of section 145 is wholly without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. 8. In the result, for the reasons stated above, the criminal revision petition is allowed and the impugned notice dated 6th November, 1978 is hereby set aside.