Short Note : 1. A preliminary point which was raised by the appellant was that since the decree for eviction of the appellant from the tenanted premises has been made on the sole ground of bona fide need of the original plaintiff Babulal for starting his business of cloth the said need being of Babulal had come to an end on his death. The argument was that when he died leaving minor sons and widow, the existence of the said need did not continue and by taking into consideration this subsequent event which had taken place when the decree impugned is already subjudice in second appeal, the claim for evictions is liable to be dismissed. Held : It is now well settled by the repeated decisions of the Supreme Court that subsequent events can be taken into account at the stage of appeal or revision and accordingly. If the existence of the ground which is essential sinequa non for passing the decree for eviction comes to an end such a decree cannot be sustained. Reference was made to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Pasupuleti v. The Motor and General Parts, AIR 1975 SC 1409 . 2. Being faced with this situation an attempt was made on behalf of the respondents to contend that even after the death of Babulal, the original plaintiff, the decree for eviction can be sustained because sub-section (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, permits decree of eviction even for the need of major sons and unmarried daughters of the landlord. It was contended that though at the time of death of the original plaintiff none of his sons was major, one of the his sons now recently a few months back has became major. It is true that sub-section (1) of section 12(1) of the Act does permit a decree of eviction on the ground of need of the major son of the land lard plaintiff also., but the fact still remains that the said need according to the language of the Act itself is altogether a different need than that of the plaintiff landlord himself. In order to satisfy that the need of the suit premises far the purpose of starting business by the son is genuine, the Court has to consider various circumstances i. e. the genuineness of the accommodation far the purpose of the business alleged by the plaintiff and availability of funds and such other circumstances. In the present case, the decree for eviction was made by holding that the original plaintiff landlord Babulal himself was to do the said business which was in addition to his business of stationary already being done in a different shop belonging to him without expressing any opinion that after the death of the original plaintiff, the claim of his major son for continuing the suit on the ground of his own need which is definitely a different one than that of the need of his father can now be tried in the present suit or a fresh suit will have to be filed far claiming eviction an the said ground it would suffice to observe for the propose of the present appeal that the respondent had not come with any such case by way of proposed amendment of the plaint to state that one of the sons of the original landlord who had recently became major is in a position to commence the new business of cloth Nothing has been said whether the said san still is studying probably in a scholar in a college going student prosecuting his studies or whether he has any intention to give up the studies and is in a position to commence the business of doth. AIR 1975 SC 1409 , relied on 1976 (4) SCC 417 , distinguished. 1973 (1) SCC 688 , referred to. Appeal allowed.