Messrs Radheshyam Sons P. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta
1978-11-10
C.K.BANERJEE
body1978
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER The petitioner No. 1 M/s, Radheshyam Sins Private limited is a Private Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner No. 8 is a director of the petitioner No. 1. The petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 are individuals. The petitioner No. 1 is the owner of premises No. 228A, Acharya Jagadish Bose Road, Calcutta (hereinafter called 228A). The petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 are the joint owners of the premises No. 229 Acharya Jagadish Bose Road, Calcutta (hereinafter called 229) 228A and 229 are contiguous plots. 2. The case of the petitioners is that on the 23rd June, 1974 the petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 entered into an agreement with the petitioner No. 1 for sale of 229 to the petitioner No. 1 but the sale was not effected. On the 26th June, 1974 the petitioner No. 1 and the petitioners 2 to 7 entered into an agreement for construction of a multistoried building on 228A and 229 jointly until the purchase of 229 by the petitioner No. l was completed and thereby also agreed to apply to the Corporation of Calcutta, the respondent No. 1, for sanction of construction of the said building on 228A and 229 and to submit jointly a plan for the same under the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the 1951 Act.) The parties also agreed to make an application for amalgamation of 228A & 229 jointly to the respondent No. 1 and to be jointly and equally liable for all municipal rates, taxes, fees, rents etc. until the said sale in favour of the petitioner No. 1 was completed or further arrangements were done in accordance with law. Pursuant to the said agreements, on the 17th August, 1974 the petitioner No. 1 and the petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 jointly made an application to the respondent No. 1 under Rule 50 of Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act for sanction of an eighteen storied building. Thereafter pursuant to directions of the officer of the respondent No. 1 the petitioners on the 7th October, 1974 jointly filed a revised plan for sanction of a ten storied building along with the requisite number of plans, both structural and elevation as required for sanction of construction of the said building.
Thereafter pursuant to directions of the officer of the respondent No. 1 the petitioners on the 7th October, 1974 jointly filed a revised plan for sanction of a ten storied building along with the requisite number of plans, both structural and elevation as required for sanction of construction of the said building. The said revised plan, for ten storied building was intended to be preliminary step for the sanction of the eighteen storied building for which plans were later submitted by the petitioners jointly. The petitioners deposited the requisite fees for sanction of the said revised plan. The plans and the applications for sanction of the said plans were signed jointly by the petitioner No. 1 and the petitioners Nos. 2 to 7. On the 10th October, 1974 the petitioners were served with a notice in form ‘C’ under Rule 54 of Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act dated the 4th October, 1974 relating to their application for sanction of the eighteen storied building although they had subsequently submitted a revised plan for a ten storied building on the 7th October, 1974. By a latter dated 25th November, 1974 the petitioners duly replied to the said notice inter alia intimating that they had on the 7th October, 1974, filed a revised plan for a ten storied building and giving answers to all objections raised and/or information, required by the authorities of the respondent No. 1 in the said notice. On the 1st March, 1975 the said application of the petitioners for sanction of the ten storied building was placed before the Tall Building Committee wherein a resolution was passed and the plan submitted by the petitioners was approved on the 7th March, 1975. The Tall Building Committee, however, considered only the plan for the eighteen storied building under a misapprehension or misconception of facts as relevant matters were not properly placed before the said Committee by the authorities. On the 21st July, 1975 a meeting was convened on the 1st August, 1975 to consider the plan for the ten storied building recommended by the authorities and in the agenda of the said meeting it was mentioned "there was no objection, vide report dated the 24th December, 1974 by the Director of Fire Services to certain conditions." 3.
On the 21st July, 1975 a meeting was convened on the 1st August, 1975 to consider the plan for the ten storied building recommended by the authorities and in the agenda of the said meeting it was mentioned "there was no objection, vide report dated the 24th December, 1974 by the Director of Fire Services to certain conditions." 3. In the mean time, the petitioners were served with a notice by the Calcutta Improvement Trust for acquisition of a portion of the land on the side of Lansdowne Road measuring about 20 to 25 ft. wide straight and 200 ft. long. The petitioners had objected to the said acquisition but subsequently considering the public purpose thereof withdrew their objection and the Calcutta Improvement Trust acquired the said land on the 3rd October 1975 and took over possession thereof on the 5th April, 1975. The petitioners jointly filed an application to the respondent No. 1 for amalgamation of 228A and 229 under S. 175 of the 1951 Act, which was considered by the authorities and after a thorough enquiry and investigation, a report was made by the authorities on the basis of a report of the Assessment Inspector that amalgamation as prayed for was feasible but the petitioners were neither intimated of the result of the said application not the same was refused. 4. On the 5th July 1975 the petitioners wrote a letter to the Assessor of respondent No. 1 asking for the number of the amalgamation premises and pressed for a decision on the said application of the petitioner for amalgamation. By a letter dated 26th September, 1975 the petitioner was informed that the plans submitted by the petitioner were place before the Tall Building Committee on the 1st August, 1975 which passed a resolution that the said plans could not be considered by the Committee for approval unless all requisition made by the Director of Fire Service and the said Committee were complied with. The said resolution was recommended by the Chairman on the 13th August, 1975. 5. On the 18th October, 1975 the petitioner were served with a further notice in form ‘C’ under Rule 54 of Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act directing the petitioner to furnish certain information and particular necessary for sanction of the said revised plan.
The said resolution was recommended by the Chairman on the 13th August, 1975. 5. On the 18th October, 1975 the petitioner were served with a further notice in form ‘C’ under Rule 54 of Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act directing the petitioner to furnish certain information and particular necessary for sanction of the said revised plan. The petitioners tried to meet the objections of the authorities and after they had met all the objections, fresh objections were raised to harass the petitioners. 6. Under instruction of the officers of the respondent No. 1, on the 4th December 1975, the petitioners submitted a further revised plan bearing side space a to the proposed building which were not necessary together with elevation plans so at to remove all objections to sanction of the said plan and again deposited the requisite fees for sanction of the said further revised plan. 7. On the 9th December, 1975 the petitioners received a still further notice in form 'C' under Rule 54 of the Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act raising objections against the said finally revised plan submitted on the 4th December, 1975. By a letter dated 10th December, 1975 the petitioners duly replied to the said objections and intimated that the petitioners have duly complied with the rules and regulations under the 1951 Act and there were no reasons whatsoever why sanction should not be given of the proposed building. The structural plans for the said finally revised plan not having been submitted earlier the same were submitted on the 10th January 1976 together with the requisite fees. No further objections or requisition a with regard to said finally revised plan were raised or sent nor any information was given to the petitioners whether the same had been disposed of or not. 8. The petitioners have complied with and duly answered all objections raised and requisitions made from time to time and submitted revised plans from time to time so as to meet all the objections and requisitions, but in spite thereof nothing has been done by the respondents.
8. The petitioners have complied with and duly answered all objections raised and requisitions made from time to time and submitted revised plans from time to time so as to meet all the objections and requisitions, but in spite thereof nothing has been done by the respondents. Under Rule 55 of Schedule XVI to 1951 Act it was incumbent on the respondents to dispose of the application of the petitioners for sanction of the finally revised plan submitted on the 4th December, 1975, the other documents in respect whereof were submitted on the 10th December, 1975, within one month from the date of submission of the same i.e. latest by 10th January, 1976, which had not been done. Therefore under Rule 56 of Schedule XVI of the 1951 Act the petitioners became entitled to execute the work after 10th January, 1976, in accordance with the said finally revised plan. By a letter dated 16th February 1976 written through their learned Advocate the petitioner inter alia pointed out that the respondents neither granted unction nor refused the same within the stipulated time as contained in Rule 55 of Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act and therefore under rule 56 the petitioners were entitled to proceed with the construction in terms of their application for sanction and of the plan submitted on the 4th December 1975. By a latter dated 20th February, 1976 the Deputy City Architect, the respondent No. 6 gave a reply to the said latter dated the 16th February, 1970 wherein it was inter alia alleged that the client of Mr. Samarjit Gupta the learned Advocate, never acquired ownership of 229, in spite of requisitions made by the Department on the 27th January, 1976 and only an agreement for sale was shown and no conveyance had ever been produced. Therefore rule 56 of the Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act did not apply to the case and if in spite of this, unauthorised and illegal constructions were made steps would be taken for stopping the same in pursuance of the provisions of the 1951 Act. 9.
Therefore rule 56 of the Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act did not apply to the case and if in spite of this, unauthorised and illegal constructions were made steps would be taken for stopping the same in pursuance of the provisions of the 1951 Act. 9. Thereafter the petitioners were served with a notice dated 29th May, 1976 under S. 416 of the 1951 Act directing them to stop forth with all constructions of the building as the same had been commenced and/or was being carried on without sanction/in deviation from the sanction or approved plan/or in violation of the condition of sanction and in breach of the 1951 Act. The said notice was issued mechanically and without applying its mind by the authority concerned and the reasons for issuing the same was not known to the authority who issued the same. The petitioners were specifically permitted to make the construction under 1951 Act and they commenced the construction in accordance with specific rules framed thereunder and therefore the said notice directing stoppage of the work of all constructions was in excess of power and jurisdiction and the same is bad, illegal and inoperative and without jurisdiction. On the 3rd June, 1976 a reply was given to the said latter dated the 20th February, 1976 by the learned Advocate of the petitioners inter alia stating that in view of the Commissioner the respondent No. 3, not passing an order of amalgamation his clients were being prejudiced and the amalgamation must be deemed to have been effected and thereby also called upon the respondent No. 3 to pass an order of amalgamation immediately with effect from the date of the application for the same and unless such order was made and communicated within 7 days from the date of the said letter the petitioners would be compelled to move the High Court for a writ of mandamus. 10.
10. In reply to the said letter the respondent No. 6 reiterated what had been stated in his latter dated the 20th February, 1976 and posed a question as to how without a sale deed and a registered conveyance the petitioner No. 1 could be a purchaser of a property by virtue of an agreement for sale and that by his letter No. CAP/21138 dated 5th April, 1976 it was communicated that the rejection of the application for the sanction of the building was in accordance with rules 54(4) and 57 of Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act and the petitioner No. 1 had not chosen to comply with the said requisitions. By the said letter it was also stated that the question of amalgamation did not arise at that stage as the petitioner No. 1 uptil then was not the owner of all the premises. A reply to the said letter dated 14th June 1976 was given by Mr. Samarjit Gupta by his letter dated 15th July, 1976 wherein it was stressed that the amalgamation was made pursuant to an agreement between the owners of 228A and 229 who jointly applied for amalgamation and submitted plans for sanction of the building. Therefore withholding an amalgamation on the plea of non-completion of sale and withholding of sanction for alleged non-amalgamation was motivated, malafide and improper and the building plans submitted must be deemed to have been sanctioned under Rule 56 of Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act. Notice was given thereby that the petitioners will make a writ petition to the Court. 11. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, the learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the Corporation or any of the Municipal Authorities under the 1951 Act have no power to amalgamate two or more premises. The power of such amalgamation is vested with the owner or owners of such premises. In support of his contention Mr. Chatterjee referred to Ss. 175, 191, 246 and 253 of the 1951 Act.
The power of such amalgamation is vested with the owner or owners of such premises. In support of his contention Mr. Chatterjee referred to Ss. 175, 191, 246 and 253 of the 1951 Act. The said sections may conveniently be set out as under :- Section 175.-"It any land or building, bearing two or more municipal numbers or portions thereof, be amalgamated into one or mace new premises, the Commissioner shall (value) them, on amalgamation, after assigning to them one or more numbers, as the case may be, for the purpose of this Chapter : Provided that no (valuation) on amalgamation of premises shall be made by the Commissioner unless there is a cause for the revaluation of any of such premises except on an application being made to him by the owner or owners thereof, in which case such (valuation) if made, shall remain in force for the unexpired portion of the period prescribed by S. 172, sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (4) : Provided also that the total (valuation) on amalgamation shall not be greater than the sum of the previous (valuations) of the several premises amalgamated except when there is any revolution of any of the said premises." Section 19 :-"One-half of the consolidated rate shall be payable by the owners of the lands and buildings and the other half by the occupiers thereof. The payment shall be made in quarterly instalments and the quarters shall be taken to commence on the first day of April, the first day of July, the first day of October and the first day of January, The instalments shall be payable on or before the fifteenth day of May, the fifteenth day of August, the fifteenth day of November and the fifteenth day of February, respectively, for such quarters." Section 246.-“(1) If the sum due from the owner of any land or building **on account of the consolidated rate remains unpaid after notice of demand has been duly served upon him, the Commissioner may cause a notice of demand to be served upon the occupier of such land or building, or upon any of his sub-tenants or upon the owner or occupier of a but (thereon for the time being).
(2) If such occupier or any of such sub-tenants or any of such owner or occupier of a but fails within fifteen days from the service of such notice to pay the amount therein demanded; the said amount may be recovered from him under the provisions of this Chapter. (3) No arrears of the owners’ share of the consolidated rate shall be recovered from any occupier or sub-tenant or owner or occupier of a hut under this section if it has remained due for more than one year or if it is due on account of any period during which such occupier or sub-tenant or owner or occupier of a hut was not in occupation of the land or building or the hut * * * in respect of which the rate is due, (4) If any sum is paid by or recovered from any occupier or subtenant or owner or occupier of a hut of any land or building * * under this section, he shall be entitled to deduct the same from the rent payable by him in respect of such land or building or hut for the period for which the arrear of consolidated rate was due, or for any subsequent period’ Section 253.-"The consolidated rate due from any person in respect of any land or building * * together with interest thereon, if any, payable under S. 236, sub-s (3) shall, subject to the prior payment) of the land revenue (if any) due to the Government thereupon be a first charge upon the said land or building * * and upon the movable property (if any) found within or upon such land or building * * and belonging to the said person." 12. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that inasmuch as the two premises, namely 228A and 229 were contiguous plots and did not belong to the same owner or owners, therefore, the owner of the said two premises applied for amalgamation thereof and gave undertaking to the Municipal Authorities that all liabilities for the rates and taxes and other impositions that may be levied on the amalgamated premises would be borne by the owners of the two plots jointly and severally. The Corporation was and is only interested in the rates and taxes and the same were fully secured.
The Corporation was and is only interested in the rates and taxes and the same were fully secured. The Corporation had no fight and could not refuse amalgamation under S. 175 or any other section of the 1951 Act. The sanction of the plan was wrongfully refused on the ground that there being separate owners of the said two premises, the same could not be amalgamated. Mr. Chatterjee contended that in the absence of any statutory provision imposing a bar on two persons or sets of persons enjoying their properties jointly, the Corporation of the Municipal Authorities could neither impose any obligation requiring transfer by the owner or owners of the one property to the owner or owners of the other property sought to be amalgamated nor could it raise any objection to such amalgamation. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that under the 1951 Act no conditions have been laid down for amalgamation of two premises. It is clear from the provisions of S. 175 of the Act that there were no restrictions on the powers of the Corporation or the other Municipal Authorities to make a revolution of the amalgamated premises after amalgamation had been effected by the owners interested in the properties so amalgamated. The respondent have made their position clear in paragraph 17 of the affidavit-in opposition filed on their behalf affirmed by Biswanath Mukherjee, Deputy City Architect, the respondent No. 6 on the 1st December, 1977, where it is inter alia stated that the respondents would have no objection to the proposed amalgamation if the same was permissible in law and if this Court held that such amalgamation as proposed by the petitioners could be made or be given effect to under S. 175 of the 1951 Act and the same did not militate against the other provisions of the laid Act or any other law in force. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that therefore the only point that need be decided in this writ petition was whether the amalgamation of 228A and 229 was permissible in law. No other points were urged on behalf of the petitioner. 13. Mr. Chatterjee, in support of his contention cited a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sree Sridhar Jiew & Ors. v. Corporation of Calcutta & Ors. reported in AIR 1959 Calcutta 320.
No other points were urged on behalf of the petitioner. 13. Mr. Chatterjee, in support of his contention cited a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sree Sridhar Jiew & Ors. v. Corporation of Calcutta & Ors. reported in AIR 1959 Calcutta 320. In this case the appellant Sree Sridhar Jiew was the owner of six distinct premises which were separately valued for the purpose of assessment to consolidate rates under the provisions of the 1951 Act. On the 20th September, 1956 a notice was served on the appellants stating that it was proposed to amalgamate the said six premises into one premises and to allot thereto one municipal number which was ultimately carried into effect and the Municipal Authorities treated the said six premises as one and allotted to it a single premises number and thereafter with intent to value the same for the purpose of assessment of rates issued a notice dated the 9th January, 1975 that the said amalgamated premises had been valued at Rs. 4465/-. The appellants made a writ petition in this court inter alia challenging the amalgamation. The rule having been ultimately discharged by a learned Single Judge the appellants preferred an appeal which was heard by a Division Bench of this Court constituted by K.C. Das Gupta, C.J., and R.S. Bachawat, J where it was contended on behalf of the respondent, that the power of amalgamation though not expressly given, has been conferred on the Corporation by implication under S. 175 and clauses (i) of the proviso to S. 297 (2) of the 1951 Act. It was contended on behalf of the appellants, on the other hand that the 1951 Act did not confer any power on the Corporation Authorities to effect any such amalgamation. 14.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants, on the other hand that the 1951 Act did not confer any power on the Corporation Authorities to effect any such amalgamation. 14. K.C. Dasgupta C.J., observed as follows:- "I can see no difficulty in construing the provisions of S. 174 on the basis that when says that “if any land or building, bearing two or more municipal numbers or portions thereof be amalgamated into one or more new promises", the Legislature is thinking of the amalgamation by the owner, that is, the act of the owner in treating the two portions as one; and when the section says further that “the Commissioner shall value them on amalgamation, after assigning to them one or more numbers, as the case may be, for the purposes of this Chapter”, the Legislature is authorising the Commissioner to give effect to the intention of the owner and to treat them as one or more premises in accordance with the amalgamation which has already taken place by the act of the owner I am of opinion that reading Ss. 174 and 175 together it is abundantly clear that the Legislature did not intend that the Commissioner or any authority of the Corporation should have this power of amalgamation. I have, therefore come to the conclusion that the provisions of S. 175 and S. 207 of Calcutta Municipal Act have given no power to the Commissioner or any other authority of the Corporation to amalgamate premises”. And R.S. Bachawat, J, observed as follows: “It is said that we must imply this power because it is incidental to and consequential upon the exercise of the special power of valuation under S. 175. The basic assumption upon which this argument is founded does not exist. The special power of valuation under S. 175 does not arise unless and until there is an amalgamation. The amalgamation is the condition upon which this special power spring into existence. If we are to say that one thing incidental to another it is far more accurate to say that the special power of valuation under S. 175 is incidental to and consequential upon the amalgamation which precedes it than to say that the basis condition of amalgamation is incidental to and consequential upon exercise of this special power.
If we are to say that one thing incidental to another it is far more accurate to say that the special power of valuation under S. 175 is incidental to and consequential upon the amalgamation which precedes it than to say that the basis condition of amalgamation is incidental to and consequential upon exercise of this special power. "In the absence of clear and ex-plicit words conferring on the Commissioner a power of amalgamation it is reasonable to think that the Legislature contemplated an amalgamation by the owner. The land or building with two or more municipal numbers must be capable of amalgamation and their owner must decide to amalgamate them". 15. Mr. Pradip Ghosh, the leaned Counsel for the respondents contended that under S. 174 of the 1951 Act upon sub division of the ownership of any land or building or portion thereof into separate shares, commissioner may on the application of any of the co-owners divided the value thereof in the manner as provided in the said section and on such application being made and if the condition set out in the said section are fulfilled the Commissioner may assign separate numbers to the sub divided premises. Mr. Ghosh submitted that amalgamation was a converse case. When the owner of two or more continuous premises makes an amalgamation thereof then the Commissioner may allot a number to the amalgamated premises and also value the same. Amalgamation is effected only when there is a merger of the ownership of the two distinct premises. Mr. Ghosh submitted that unity of ownership was the criterion under the scheme of valuation and assessment under the 1951 Act and amalgamation leads to revaluation and re-assessment. To show the scheme of valuation and assessment under the 1951 Act Mr. Ghosh referred to Ss. 185, 186, 187, 191, 192, 193, 194, 198 and 200 and several other sections of the 1951 Act. Mr. Ghosh submitted that all the above sections relate and refer to owner of the premises. 16. Mr. Ghosh next contended that the concept of property under the 1951 Act was based on ownership of the property and in this connection Mr. Ghosh referred to Ss. 246 to 258 of the 1951 Act relating to recovery of consolidated rates and taxes which, Mr. Ghose submitted, make the owner of the property liable. Mr.
16. Mr. Ghosh next contended that the concept of property under the 1951 Act was based on ownership of the property and in this connection Mr. Ghosh referred to Ss. 246 to 258 of the 1951 Act relating to recovery of consolidated rates and taxes which, Mr. Ghose submitted, make the owner of the property liable. Mr. Ghosh next referred to rule 51(2)(a), (c)(i) of Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act relating to Sita plan to be sent with an application for permission to erect a masonry new building under Rule 50 of the said Schedule. The said provision, require that boundaries of the site and of any continuous land belonging to the owner thereof and also of the position of the building and all other buildings which the applicant intends to erect upon his contiguous land referred to in clause (a) in relation to the boundaries of the site and in calc where the site has been partitioned the boundaries of the portion owned by the applicant and of the portions owned by the other owners have to be shown Mr. Ghosh therefore submitted that in the matter of sanction of a plan for erection of a building again the criterion is ownership of the land on which the erection is proposed to be made and the particular to be shown in the site plan inter alia requires, that boundaries of the site as well all of the contiguous land belonging to the owner and if it is a partitioned site the boundaries of the applicant and also of the portions owned by the other owner have to be shown. The building rules also therefore do not contemplate that sanction could be given for construction of a building on contiguous plots belonging to different owners. Mr. Ghosh therefore contended that both the valuation and assessment as well as the building rule under the 1951 Act. contemplate that the plots on which construction is proposed to be made and are amalgamated, must belong to a single owner or a single set of owners all of them having interest in all the plots amalgamated. If the amalgamation is allowed to be made by various owners each having separate plots contiguous to each other the same would give rise to a very anomalous situation and would create a complete chaos.
If the amalgamation is allowed to be made by various owners each having separate plots contiguous to each other the same would give rise to a very anomalous situation and would create a complete chaos. It would be impossible in that event for the Municipal Authorities to realise the consolidated rates inasmuch as the lands would belong to different persons or sets of persons while the building thereon would belong to all of them. This would neither be nor analogous to the case of holding of a joint properly by several co-sharers where each of the co-sharers has an interest in every part of the land and building which they jointly own and possess. Various other anomalous situations would also arise. 17. Mr. Ghosh next urged that the contention raised by the petitioner No. 1 Radheshyam & Sons Private Ltd., before the Municipal Authorities that inasmuch as neither permission to execute the work had been granted within one month of the receipt of the application for sanction of the plan under rule 50 or from the date of submission of further information or documents nor refusal to grant permission to execute the work had been communicated within the said period therefore under Rule 56 the permission should be deemed to have been granted and the petitioners were entitled to proceed to execute the work would not be available to the petitioners inasmuch as the plans submitted were defective, requisitions made from time to time had not been complied with and further as there could be no amalgamation of 228A and 229, there could be no sanction of the plan under the provisions of the 1951 Act. Thus there was neither any question of granting permission to execute the work nor of refusing such permission within the time as specified in rule 55 or 56 of Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act and the petitioners therefore were not entitles to execute the work under the deeming provision contained in rule 56. 18. Mr. Ghosh next referred to two letters written by Mr. Samarjit Gupta, the learned Advocate for the petitioners, one to the respondent No. 6 dated the 16th February, 1976 and the other to the respondent No. 3 dated the 3rd June, 1976. Both the said letters were written by Mr. Gupta on behalf of the petitioner No. l only.
18. Mr. Ghosh next referred to two letters written by Mr. Samarjit Gupta, the learned Advocate for the petitioners, one to the respondent No. 6 dated the 16th February, 1976 and the other to the respondent No. 3 dated the 3rd June, 1976. Both the said letters were written by Mr. Gupta on behalf of the petitioner No. l only. In both the said letters it was unequivocally stated by Mr. Gupta that both the applications for sanction of the plan for the eighteen storied building and for sanction of the revised plan for the ten atoned building were submitted on behalf of his client, that is, the petitioner No. 1 and that the petitioner No. 1 entered into an agreement for sale by the petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 in respect of 229. Mr. Ghosh also referred to paragraph 4(b) of the affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the respondents 1 to 7 where the specific case of the respondents was that the application for building sanction was submitted only on behalf of the petitioner No. 1. The said allegation is, however, denied by the petitioners in the affidavit-in-reply affirmed by Lakshmi Sankar Gupta, the constituted Attorney of the petitioners. 19. Mr. Ghosh cited the following decisions : (1) Administrator, Howrah Municipality vs. M/s. The Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd., reported in 62 CWN 293. The question in this case was as to amalgamation under S. 134 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 as extended to the Howrah Municipality. It may be noted that the provisions contained in S. 134 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 are same as the provisions contained in S. 175 of the Calcutta Municipal Act 1951 and a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows :- "The act no where defines amalgamation. Ordinarily the word amalgamation means merger but the word has no precise legal meaning. Therefore, amalgamation of land and building or premises has to be taken in its general sense, namely the making or the conversion of plots of land or buildings into one, either by erection of one boundary wall or by removal of the marks of separation between them". (2) The Commissioner of the Municipality of Howrah v. Rojendra Nath Das reported in AIR 1948 Cal. 109.
(2) The Commissioner of the Municipality of Howrah v. Rojendra Nath Das reported in AIR 1948 Cal. 109. Here this Court considered the provisions of Rule 57 of Schedule XVII of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 which substantially corresponds to rule 56 of Schedule XVI of the Calcutta Municipal Act 1951 and Harris C.J. observed as follows :- "The time prescribed by R. 57 is fifteen days and therefore, if the Municipal Commissioners neither sanctioned nor rejected the plan in fifteen days, it will be deemed to have been approved. But quite clearly the approval is in a strictly limited form. The applicant must be deemed to be permitted to execute the work, but he can not in so doing contravene any of the provisions of the Act or any of the rules or by-laws made thereunder. In shore the permission which the Municipal Commissioners are deemed to give is a permission to execute the work in accordance with the plan in so far as the plan complies with the Act and bye laws made thereunder. The fact that permission is deemed to be granted does not mean that the plan must be deemed to be in accordance with the Ace and the bye laws made thereunder. It seems that this rule was drafted to prevent delays in the case of applicants who had been careful to comply with the Act and the bye laws. If he complied with the Act permission would be deemed to be granted in fifteen days. But the rule was never intended to cover plans which were clearly in contravention of the Act or the bye laws". 20. The Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 does not define the word 'amalgamation'. This Court has held in the case of Administrator Howrah, Municipality v. Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Limited (supra) that "ordinarily amalgamation means merger but the word has no precise meaning." I respectfully agree with the above observation. 21. The expression merger is found in the Transfer of Property Act and in legal parlance the expression merger has been used in the context of Transfer of Property Act as well as in the context of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the context of Code of Civil Procedure it is said that the decree of the trial court merges into the decree of the Appellate Court.
In the context of Code of Civil Procedure it is said that the decree of the trial court merges into the decree of the Appellate Court. The expression merger is also commonly used with reference to determination of lease of immovable property under S. 111 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act, when the interest of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property became vetted at the same time in one person in the same right the same is conveniently described as merger of the lessee's interest in the lessor’s interest. Sir Dinshaw Mulla in his book on the Transfer of Property Act, (6th Edition) at pages 741-742 observes as under :- "When a lease-hold and a reversion coincide there is a merger of a lesser estate in the greater. The lease-hold is the lesser estate, for it is carved out of the estate of the owner which is the revision. The lesser estate is merged, that is, sunk or drowned in the greater. The lease determines, for it sinks into the reversion. Thus if the lessor purchases the leasees interest the lease is extinguished, as the same man cannot at the same time both landlord and tenant. But a mere agreement to sale cannot, of coursed result, in a merger. The interest of the lessor and of the lessee must be in the whole of the property, otherwise there is no merger. The interest of the lessor and of in the whole of the property should became vested at the same time in one person in the same right i.e. to say, their must be the union of the entire interest of the lessor and the lessee." 22.
The interest of the lessor and of in the whole of the property should became vested at the same time in one person in the same right i.e. to say, their must be the union of the entire interest of the lessor and the lessee." 22. The expression merge or merger is used in S. 101 of the Transfer of Property Act, which may be quoted as under: "Any mortgagee of, or person having a charge upon, immovable property, or any transferee from such mortgagee or charge-holder may purchase or otherwise acquire the rights in the property of the mortgagor or owner as the case may be, without thereby causing the mortgage or charge to be merged as between himself and any subsequent mortgagee of, or person having a subsequent charge upon the same property; and no such subsequent mortgagee or charge-holder shall be entitled to foreclose or sell such property without redeeming the prior mortgage or charge, or otherwise than subject thereto." 23. In his commentaries on S. 101, Sir Dinshaw Mulla in his book on the Transfer of Property Act (6th Edition) at pages 630 and 631 observes as under :- "A security may be extinguished by merger. This occurs (i) by the merger of a lower in a higher security and (ii) by the merger of a lesser estate in a greater estate ........................ ..................................................................................................................................................................The acquisition by a person of a security of a superior nature in law to the one he has, merges or extinguishes his legal remedies on the inferior security. So when a person recovers judgment on a contract debt, the debt is extinguished being merged in the judgment.................................................................................................................................... .......................The legal effect in English Common Law of the union of a charge and the ownership of an estate is merger either because the lesser estate is drowned in the greater or because a man cannot be his own debtor." 24. The expression ‘amalgamation’ finds place in the Company Laws both English and India where provision is made for amalgamation of two or more Companies. In India such provision for amalgamation is contained in S. 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 corresponding to S. 153A of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and in England similar provision is made in S. 208 of the Companies Act, 1948. The Companies Acts also do not define the word ‘amalgamation.’ 25.
In India such provision for amalgamation is contained in S. 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 corresponding to S. 153A of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and in England similar provision is made in S. 208 of the Companies Act, 1948. The Companies Acts also do not define the word ‘amalgamation.’ 25. Buckley in his treatise on the Companies Acts, defines amalgamation as under :- "The word 'amalgamation' has no definite legal meaning. It contemplates a state of things under which two Companies are so joined as to form a third or one Company is absorbed into and blended with another Company." 26. Similar views are expressed by Topham and Charlesworth in their books on Company Law. Palmer in his book on Company Law lays thus:- “Amalgamation denotes such a blending of two or more undertakings as to fuse them into one.” 27. The only point that has been canvassed and argued by Mr. Chatterjee was whether there could be an amalgamation of 228A belonging to the petitioner No. 1 with 229 belonging to the petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 and whether a plan for construction of building on the said two premises sought to be amalgamated could be sanctioned. It is therefore not necessary to go into any other question in this case. 28. From the scheme of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 relating to valuation or revised valuation of premises and assessment and recovery consolidated rates and taxes thereon, I am of the opinion that the entire scheme makes the owner of the premises primarily liable for the rates and taxes which includes not only the building but also the land whereon the building is erected and built. There is great force in the contention of Mr. Ghosh that a very anomalous situation would arise if contiguous plots belonging to different persons or sets of persons are amalgamated into one premise, and a building is allowed to be constructed thereon. So far as the plots of lands are concerned the same would belong to different persons or sets of parsons such having separate right, title and interest in his or their respective plots, while the building would belong to all of them jointly. Again each of the plots may not be of the same size or value and the portions of the building on each of the plots may not also be of the same size or value.
Again each of the plots may not be of the same size or value and the portions of the building on each of the plots may not also be of the same size or value. The expression amalgamation or merger, connotes fusion of two interests into one. There is no dispute that if two or more contiguous plots belong to the same owner there could be an amalgamation of the same, The effect of merger has been explained by Sir Dinshaw Mulla in his book on the Transfer of Property Act and the effect amalgamation has been explained by Buckley in his treaties on the Companies Acts and by Palmer in his book on Company Law. From the above exposition of the law as to merger and amalgamation the following characteristics of merger or amalgamation may be deduced. (a) The whole estate must vest in one and the same person or persons jointly in respect of the properties amalgamated, and (b) The two estates when amalgamated or merged would lose their separate existence both with regard to their identity and estate and would be fused into one. 29. If amalgamation is made on 228A and 229 the above characteristics would not and could be fulfilled the two premises cannot vest in one and same person or jointly. 222A would remain vested in the petitioner No. 1 as its owner, while 229 would remain vested in the petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 as its joint owners. The two estates in 222A and 229 cannot lose their separate existence and would retain their separate ownership even if they are sought to be amalgamated. There cannot be any fusion of the two plots namely 228A and 229 into one with their respective ownerships. 30. Therefore, in my opinion, there cannot be any amalgamation of 228A and 229. No act of parties short of transfer either by petitioner No. 1 of 228A in favour of the petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 or of transfer by petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 of 229 in favour of the petitioner No. 1 can lead to amalgamation of the said two premises. 31. In my opinion, as there could not be any amalgamation of 228A and 229 therefore no plan for construction of a single building on the said two premises belonging to two separate owners could also be sanctioned.
2 to 7 of 229 in favour of the petitioner No. 1 can lead to amalgamation of the said two premises. 31. In my opinion, as there could not be any amalgamation of 228A and 229 therefore no plan for construction of a single building on the said two premises belonging to two separate owners could also be sanctioned. Even if the petitioners had applied jointly for sanction of such a plan no undertaking by the petitioners to share and bear the liability for rates, taxes or other impositions jointly and severally, could cure the initial disability in the matter of amalgamation of the two premises. 32. In the view, that I have taken the petitioner are not entitled to any relief. The Rule is therefore discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be, however, no order as to costs. Rule, discharged.