Judgment : Pahari Mata Iron & Steel Works Private Limited, petitioner No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the said Company), is an existing Company within the meaning of Company's Act and it carries on business inter alia as iron founders, iron master, iron mangers, iron smith, iron makers, Steel converters, smelters, engineers, tin plate makers and re-rolling in all their respective branches. The same was incorporated for the objects contained in the Memoradum of Association and the petitioner No.2, Shri Sheo Bhagwan Kajaria (hereinafter referred to as the said Director), is a Director and shareholder of the same. 2. Those petitioners have impeached in this rule, the validity and bonafide of an order dated 22nd June, 1974, as mentioned in paragraph 20 of the petition of motion and whereby all supplies of raw materials to them have been directed to be suspended forthwith, on the allegations that they nave misutilised pig-iron, received by them for their consumption in their foundry, in contravention of clause 7 of the Iron and Steel (Control) Order, 1956 as amended (hereinafter referred to as the said order), which again was issued in terms of clause 11(a) thereunder. 3. There is no doubt or any dispute that in exercise of powers conferred by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), and in supersession of all previous orders on the subject, the Central Government has promulgated the said order and the Iron & Steel Controller concerned has been appointed by the said Government, in terms of the powers as conferred by the said order. The said order also shows that under its various provisions, the Iron & Steel Controller has been given diverse powers. The powers which are relevant for the purpose of this rule arc quoted hereunder :- "11 A.-Power to suspend supplies under Part II.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Part or in the conditions governing the acquisition or disposal of any categories of iron or steel the Controller may for reasons to be recorded in writing, order suspension of supplies of Iron or Steel forthwith to any person against whom there exists a credible information or a reasonable suspicion of the contravention of any conditions laid down under this order or of any directions issued thereunder. Note (1)-The provisions of this clause shall be invoked only as an interim action in order to forestall further mis-utilisation of iron and steel and shall be followed up with further action, regard being had to the circumstances of the case. Note (2)- The follow-up action as contemplated in Note (1) shall be initiated within a period of three months of the date of order of suspension of supplies. Note (3)- The Controller may by order for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the period of follow-up action for a further period not exceeding three months. Note (4)- The order of suspension of supplies shall stand withdrawn if the Controller fails to initiate the follow-up action within the said period of three months or within the extended period if the period of follow-up action has been so extended as the case may be". "28. Powers of the Controller. The Controller may, with a view to securing compliance with this Order- (a) require any person to give such information in his possession in respect of stocks of iron or steel or of scrap acquired by him or in respect of any business carried on by that or any other person : (b) inspect or cause to be inspected any stocks of iron or steel or of scrap held by any person and any books or other documents belonging to or under the control of any person; (c) enter and search, or authorise any Gazetted Officer to enter and search any premises and seize or authorize the officer aforesaid to seize any article in respect of which he has reason to believe that a contraventions of this Order has been, is being or is about to be committed, and any other article in the premises which he has reason to believe has been or is intended to be used in connection with such contravention." 28B. - Power to debar any person from receiving iron or steel or scrap :- (1) The Controller may, by order, for reasons to be recorded in writing debar any person for any period not exceeding five years, from receiving iron or steel or scrap from a registered producer or a registered stock holder or a controller stockholder or from any other source either directly or through any committee, body or authority set up under clause 17B or otherwise. (a) if the said person uses iron or steel or scrap for any purpose other than the purpose for which any such material is acquired by, or sold to him or uses any such material in contravention of any condition subject to which the material is acquired by or sold to him; or (b) if he is found to have violated any condition laid down under any clause of this order or any direction issued thereunder; or (c) if he is found to have submitted any false documents or to have made any representation in acquiring any such materials; Provided that before any such order is made, the person concerned shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Controller under sub-clause (1) may, within a period of thirty days of the date of the communication of the order, prefer an appeal to the Central Government. (3) On receipt of an appeal under sub-clause (2) the Central Government shall, after giving the person aggrieved a reasonable opportunity of being heard, dispose of the appeal." 4. It was stated by the said Company and the other petitioner that for the purpose of carrying on their business as mentioned hereinbefore, they at all material times required and still require as basic material, pig iron and steel and as such basic materials are purchased from organisations like Hindusthan Steel, Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited and Indian Iron & Steel Company Limited and Bokaro Steel Limited' These apart, it has been stated by the petitioners that they have in the past, executed many Government contracts and in fact, even now, they are executing contracts for supplying of cast iron slippers to various Railways owned by the Government of India. That apart, they have contended to be exporters of pipes fittings and manhole covers to various foreign countries including United States of America, Far Eastern Countries and countries in Middle East. It has been contended that the petitioners have also a wide market all over India for its products and they not only have a huge turn over, but they, also make provisions for employment of many employees in these days of unemployment. 5. From the statements in the petition. It has been contended that the petitioners have also a wide market all over India for its products and they not only have a huge turn over, but they, also make provisions for employment of many employees in these days of unemployment. 5. From the statements in the petition. it appear that the said Company has a sister concern known as Victory Iron Work's Private Limited which has its registered office at p 26, Benaras Road, Howrah, and the business carried on by the said works, is similar to that of the slid Company and in fact there are several common directors and shareholders of the two. 6. The petitioners have contended that on or about 15th June, 1974, one Shri P.C. Mohanto, respondent No.4, Officer on Special Duty (Vigilance), Iron and Steel Control, with certain officers, belonging to the said office, visited the factory of the said Company and asked for production of stock book of raw materials, register of finished goods, invoices and other documents relating to pig iron. It has been stated by the petitioners that on the same day, those officers also visited the factory of the sister concern of Victory Iron Works Private Limited and demanded production of similar books and records as referred to hereinbefore. It has been stated that since the said Director is a common Director of both the Companies as aforesaid, he pursuant to the direction of the said Shri Mohanto produced on 17th June, 1974, all documents and papers as required. It has also been stated that a Katcha receipt acknowledging receipt of those records in respect of the concerned Companies was also given by the said Shri Mohanto. It appears that the said Director was again called by the said Shri Mohanto on 21st June, 1974, and then, he purported to seize the documents and papers which were produced before him. on preparation of a seizure list. It has been alleged in the said seizure list that the books and papers and documents as mentioned therein, were produced before the Officer concerned on 17th June, 1974 and that he had seized them formaly from the said Director on 21st June, 1974. A copy of the seizure list is to be found in Annexure B to the main petition. 7. A copy of the seizure list is to be found in Annexure B to the main petition. 7. The petitioners have stated that those books, documents, records and papers which have been so seized were and are required by them for the purpose of carrying on their day to day business and in the absence of them, they have suffered much in the past and they are still suffering. This fact, appears to have been made known by the said Company to the Deputy Iron & Steel Controller by the letter of 22nd June, 1974 and in fact, inspection of certain records and documents were asked for. It has been alleged that such inspection has not been granted and strangely enough, the letter as referred to hereinbefore, has not also been replied to by the concerned respondents. 8. Thereafter, on 4th July. 1974, the petitioners were served with an order dated 1st July, 1974, issued by the Deputy Iron & Steel Controller, respondent No.1, whereby, in exercise of his powers conferred under clause 28 of the said order, he informed the said Company that it should show the physical stock of pig iron as indicated in the notice and/or furnish particulars of consumption of the same, if at all, within 3 days from the receipt of the order and to show cause why it should not be debarred under clause 28(B) of the said order. This order, the petitioners have stated to have contained various false, incorrect and misleading statements• and they have also contended that the order was bad, void and inoperative as the same, although a penal one, was issued without hearing them, or without any corresponding opportunities to them to make their representation. It has been contended that the seizure of documents being illegal, that would not empower any seizure of books under the said order and these apart the petitioners have also contended that since they were admittedly in the custody of the respondents concerned, the respondents well knew and it was within their knowledge that without those documents, it was not humanly possible for the petitioners or anyone of them, to make any representation, in terms of the requirements as mentioned in the order dated 1st July, 1974 and as such also the entire action was a motivated and malafide one. On the above grounds, amongst others, the petitioners admittedly obtained Civil Rule No. 4049 (W) of 1974 against the order dated 1st July, 1974. At the time of the issuing the rule, it was also directed that all further proceedings would be stayed till the disposal of the rule provided the petitioners give explanation to the show cause notice. This order was, however, made without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. It appears from the statements in the petition that a similar application was also moved by Messrs Victory Iron Works Private Limited on the same day and against the concerned order and similar rule was issued. 9. The said Civil Rule, No. 4049 (W) of 1974 on completion of the pleadings appeared before P.C. Borooah J. and the same was at first discharged, as nobody appeared. Such order was made on 25.11.1976 against the said order of discharge, an application for restoration was also made but that application was also rejected on 9.3.1978. I have made a reference to the said Civil Rule No. 4049 (W) of 1974 and the state of affairs therein, because a preliminary point was taken by Mr. Chakravartti, that in view of the order as made threin, the present rule has become infructuous or at least the same rule cannot proceed. This preliminary point has of course been contested by Mr. Gupta, who was assisted by Mr. Pal. 10. The petitioners in this rule, have given particulars of various sale orders which had been issued to them by different organisations and that too, perhaps for the purpose of establishing the fact that because of the action as taken, they have suffered and are suffering much. In fact, they have stated that after 12th July, 1974, they in order to obtain the materials covered by the several orders, applied for delivery thereof to the different Companies, issuing the said orders and they have been informed by each of the Companies that they have received order dated 2nd June, 1974, issued by the Deputy Iron & Steel Controller, respondent No.1, informing them about the fact of suspension of supplies of raw materials to the said Company. It has been alleged that no such order has of course been communicated to the said Company. It has been alleged that no such order has of course been communicated to the said Company. The said company has stated that accordingly on 18th July, 1974 it had written a letter to the respondent No.1, asking for a copy of the order in question and in reply, on or about 22nd July, 1974 the said Company, received an order dated 22nd June, 1974, from the said Sri P.C. Mohanto. The said order dated 22nd June, 1974 has been quoted in extenso in paragraph 20 and full particulars thereof is also quoted hereunder for ready reference. "No Vig. 1(20)/74 Dated June 22, 1974 Order Whereas there has been a credible information that M/s. Paharimata Iron Works (P) Ltd. having their office at 48, Biplabi Rash Behari Bose Road, Calutta-l and their works at Das Nagar, Howrah have misutilised Pig Iron received by them for consumption in their foundry in contravention of clause 7 of the Iron & Steel (Control) Order, 1956 (as amended with effect from March 29, 1971). I do hereby order, in exercise of my powers under clause 11-A, ibid, that an supplies of raw materials shall be forthwith suspended to the said Company". 11. As stated hereinbefore, the petitioners in their averments in the petition have also made it categorically clear that this order was never served on them earlier than the letter from the said Sri P. C. Mohanto, with which the same was forwarded to them. From a reference to the order impeached, it appears that the allegations against the petitioners are that they have mis-utilised pig iron received by them for consumption in their factory, in contravention of clause 7 of the said order and to the following effect:- "... ... ... Use of Iron and Steel to conform to conditions governing acquisition. A person acquiring iron or steel shall not use the iron or steel otherwise than in accordance with any conditions contained or incorporated to the document which was the authority for the acquisition or otherwise than for the purposes mentioned by him in the application for such acquisition." The petitioners have contended that the allegations as made or contained in the order dated 22nd June, 1974, are false, mischievous, malafide and incorrect. They have asserted that they have not used any pig iron in contravention of clause 7 as aforesaid and in fact they have given full explanation to the Inspectors concerned, who had visited their factory, as to how Pig Iron as received by them, was consumed in the factory. They have also alleged that there could not be credible Information that any Pig Iron, had been mis-utilised by the said Company in its foundry in contravention of clause 7 of the said order and furthermore no such allegation was made in the subsequent order of 1st July, 1974 as passed by the Deputy Iron and Steel Controller concerned. It has further been contended that even if an action is taken under clause 11A of the said order particulars whereof have been quoted hereinbefore, it was incumbent upon the Controller to record the reasons for suspension in writing, before passing any order of suspension and such reasons not having been recorded or disclosed in the order itself, the same was void, bad and irregular. The petitioners have further contended that in the 22nd June 1974 order, merely a rubber stamp reason has been given mechanically for issuing the order of suspension and such order was made without application of mind. In fact, it has been contended that no reason, in fact, as required under the said order, has been disclosed or recorded in the order, or anywhere else. It is the categorical case of the petitioners that it was incumbent on the respondent No. 1 to disclose in the order what information he had about the contravention by the said Company of any of the conditions laid down in the said order and what reasons the said respondent No. I had, for holding that such information was credible. It has also been contended that it was further incumbent upon the respondent No. 1, to disclose the materials on which he ordered suspension of supplies to the said Company and the impugned order should have reavealed the rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. In fact the order impeached lacked any such qualifications. These apart the petitioners have also contended that the 22nd June, 1974, order, was passed without application of mind by the respondent No.1 and the same was not incompliance with the provisions of the clause 11(A) of the said order. 12. In fact the order impeached lacked any such qualifications. These apart the petitioners have also contended that the 22nd June, 1974, order, was passed without application of mind by the respondent No.1 and the same was not incompliance with the provisions of the clause 11(A) of the said order. 12. These apart, the petitioners have alleged that the impugned order to be not disclosing duly, either any reason for the order of suspension of supplies or the materials. In fact, it was contended that the concerned order must disclose the materials, on the basis whereof, the determination has been made or the action is taken and that having been absent in the order itself, the same was void and inoperative. It was also argued that it was incumbent on the authorities concerned to give and disclosed reasons, adequate and necessary for the formation of the opinion, which was the basis for the impugned action. In addition to al1 these the petitioners also argued that mere quoting of the section or for that matter, by merely stating that there has been credible informations that the petitioners may have misutilised the pig iron, received by them for consumption of their foundry, in contravention of clause 7 of the said order would not be giving the or any reasons in terms of clause 11A of the same. In fact, the petitioners have denied the validity of the allegations' or the existence of the alleged credible informations that the said Company had mis-utilised pig iron. They have contended that even if there be any such information, the same was without any basis, foundation and substance. In fact, it was contended that no reasonable man could have placed any reliance on any such alleged information and there could be no basis or materials on which, the required information could have been given or acted upon or which could have been considered by the Deputy Iron & Steel Controller concerned, to be credible and the order impeached was passed, as mentioned hereinbefore, without the condition precedent being satisfied. The power, authority, competence and jurisdiction of the said Deputy Iron & Steel Controller, to direct suspension under clause 11A of the said order has been doubted, disputed and denied. It was also contended that such blanket order, directing suspension of supplies of all raw materials, was not bonafide. The power, authority, competence and jurisdiction of the said Deputy Iron & Steel Controller, to direct suspension under clause 11A of the said order has been doubted, disputed and denied. It was also contended that such blanket order, directing suspension of supplies of all raw materials, was not bonafide. In fact, such exercise of power, was contended to be malafide, arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of the said order, more particularly clause 11A. The order of suspension has been stated to have affected the fundamental rights of the petitioners to carryon their trade and business and such order, has been contended, could not have been passed without hearing the petitioners or without due and reasonable opportunities to them. As such, the impugned order has also been contended to have been made or passed in braeach of principles of natural justice. The seizure of the relevant books, papers and documents has been contended not only to be illegal but wrongful and void and the action as taken has also been stated to be violative of Article 19(1)(b) and (g) of the Constitution of India. 13. The answering Respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition, which has been affirmed on 7th December 1974 and has been filed through Shri Animesh Chandra Ray, Deputy Iron and Steel Controller, Calcutta, have accepted the statements of the petitioner about their business and dealings and the said Company to be a registered producer within the meaning of the said order. They have stated that for the purposes of their Iron Foundary. the petitioners were allocated Pig iron from regulated sources for the purposes of being utilised in the foundary for manfacturing process. Such allocation of Pig iron, those Respondents have stated to be made at a subsidised rate for the purposes as aforesaid and for public utility concerns. It is their specific case that tile said petitioners got the regular supply of Pig iron from the source as mentioned above, for consumption in its foundary as a registered producer under the said order. In fact, it has been stated that on 14th and 15th June 1974 the total receipt of Pig iron by the said Company was 162.9 metric tonnes. 14. In fact, it has been stated that on 14th and 15th June 1974 the total receipt of Pig iron by the said Company was 162.9 metric tonnes. 14. It has been alleged that on receipt of secret information about the sale of some Pig iron by the said Company, a group of officers headed by Shri P.C. Mahanto, Respondent No.4, enquired into the matter and detected that the said Company had indulged in misusing the quota of Pig iron allotted to them. The several particulars of such misuse or irregular use of the Pig iron have been categorically mentioned in the return to the Rule and it has also been stated that neither the said Company nor its officer could duly account for the quota of Pig iron as granted and received by it. Those circumstances, it has been contended, gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Pig Iron was sold by the said Company in contravention of clause 7 of the said order. 15. In those circumstances, it has further been stated that the said Company was asked to produce the statutory records and in fact they were delivered by the officer of the said Company on 17th June 1974 and they were retained for the purposes of necessary scrutiny. On further scrutiny of those records, after the necessary check up by the Respondent No.4, it appeared that at the time of filing the Registers, certain entries were either made or manipulated for the purpose of and/or in the purported attempt by the said Company to account for the consignments of Pig iron, as received. But even inspite of such attempt, it has been alleged that the said Company failed to account for duly the entire consignments of Pig iron as received. It has of course been admitted by the answering Respondents that in respect of the demand to produce certain documents' under clause 12 of the said order, necessary compliance was made by the said Company. 16. It has of course been admitted by the answering Respondents that in respect of the demand to produce certain documents' under clause 12 of the said order, necessary compliance was made by the said Company. 16. It is the catergorical assertions by the answering Respondents that the books were duly detained by the competent authority in exercise of powers under clause 28 of the said order and there was no illegality or any irregularity in such detention and in fact such detention was for the purposes of said order and that too for ascertaining the real and true state of affairs viz, whether the said Company was carrying on business in compliance with the said order and was correctly maintaining the necessary records. The interpotations as were detected in the records of the said Company, when they came to the custody of the Respondent No.4, were found to have been made between 15th, 16th and 17th June 1974, in order to give a prima facie appearance of genuineness, but even inspite of that, it has been stated that the said Company failed to account for the 6 wagons of Pig iron received on its account in May 1974 and in such state of affairs in the records, the said Company was not entitled fu get back the records even for their own use and utilisation. It should be noted that at the time of checking, on the dates as mentioned above, there was no heading as "Export Castings". But such entries, as mentioned above, appeared on 17th June 1974, when the books were produced. 17. The Respondents have stated further that the said Company was allowed opportunities to inspect and take copies of the books in the possession of the authorities concerned and the authorities concerned, in due and lawful exercise of powers, issued the show cause notice dated 1st July, 1974. The notice in question has also been contended to be clear, explicit, due, bonafide and legal. The allegations of malafide use of power in the matter of issuing the notice have been categorically denied. It has further been repeated that proper opportunities under clause 28B of the said order were afforded to the said Company and that apart, the said Company was also given due hearing. The allegations of malafide use of power in the matter of issuing the notice have been categorically denied. It has further been repeated that proper opportunities under clause 28B of the said order were afforded to the said Company and that apart, the said Company was also given due hearing. It has been alleged further that the suspension order under clause 11A of the said order was also passed duly, bonafide and properly, as it appeared that the materials that were allotted and received by the said Company for manufacture of finished products, required for supplies essential to the community viz., for manufacture of slippers for the Railways, on the face of the facts, proved that the confidence which was so reposed on the said Company was betrayed. The copy of the order has also been stated to have been duly served. It has been admitted by the Respondents that the impugned order dated 22nd June 1974 was passed under clause II A of the said order and they have denied the allegations that the same was illegal, or irregular and not duly passed. It has been contended by them that the-said order was justified, as there was credible informations, and thus they have also contended the order of suspension to be legal and justified. It has also been contended that it was reasonable and is possible under the provisions of the said order to act on the basis of such credible information, as in this case and under clause 11A as aforesaid, the authorities concerned are only required to be satisfied as to the contravention of any conditions as laid down under the said order and were and are authorised to act on reasonable suspicion of contravention, if any. The order in question was denied to be in bald and blanket form as alleged or the same was malafide as contended. The seizure of the books, documents, papers and records, was said to be just, genuine and bonafide. It has also been contended that the impugned order under the said clause 11A, was duly sent to the said Company. It has further been contended by the Respondents that it was not incumbent to disclose the existence or the fact of passing of an order under clause 11A in a proceeding under clause 28B of the said order. 18. Mr. It has further been contended by the Respondents that it was not incumbent to disclose the existence or the fact of passing of an order under clause 11A in a proceeding under clause 28B of the said order. 18. Mr. Gupta, appearing in support of the Rule contended firstly, that since there was no reason in writing and the impugned order under clause 11A of the said order merely quoted the terms of the order only, the same cannot be sustained or considered to be a proper or legal one. It was secondly submitted by him that in view of the provisions in note (4) to clause 11A as quoted hereinbefore, the suspension should be deemed to have been withdrawn as the necessary follow up action was not indicated or initiated by the Controller within the prescribed time. Thirdly Mr. Gupta contended that the impugned order was bad, void and inoperative for non-compliance of principles of natural justice and as there was violation of the same. It was fourthly contended by him that the impugned order under clause 11A was bad and ultra vires said provisions as by the same the supply of raw materials was sought to be suspended. Fifthly and lastly, Mr. Gupta contended the order of suspension to be bad as the same did not specify the period of such suspension. 19. In reply to the preliminary point as raised by Mr. Chakravartti viz., that the present application is not maintainable, because the suspension order has now merged in the order under clause 28B, which has not been impeached. Mr. Gupta has stated that in the proceedings in Civil Rule No. 4049(W) of 1974, which as stated hereinbefore, has admittedly been discharged, only the show cause by the notice dated 1st July 1974 was challenged and no challenge was thrown to the order under clause 28B, as no such order was passed, but the concerned impugned order only mentioned about detaining the petitioner and in fact at that time no such order was in operation or contemplated. In view of the above, Mr. Gupta contended that the preliminary objection as raised, should not be entertained. It should also be noted that Mr. In view of the above, Mr. Gupta contended that the preliminary objection as raised, should not be entertained. It should also be noted that Mr. Chakravartti contended that the interim order as made and which has been impeached, has been duly followed by an action under clause 28B and as such, the said interim order having merged, the follow up, order should have been challenged and that not having been done, the interim order as made and which is not subsisting, cannot now be challenged or interferred with. It should be noted that Mr. Chakravartti contended that the order under clause 11A was made on 22nd June 1974, the show cause under clause 28B was on 1st July 1974, the Rule was obtained on 19th August 1974 and the earlier Rule being Civil Rule No. 4049(W) of 1974, without challenging the order under clause 11A was obtained on 12th July 1974 and as such there was or has been abandonment of the said action, as taken, by the petitioners. It has also been contended by him, after placing the prayers in Civil Rule No. 4049(W) of 1974, that the matter in issue in this case, which was known to the petitioners in time, should have been added or agitated in the said earlier Rule and that not having admittedly been done, and more particularly when the prayers in this case have been made on interim order and not on or against the final order, which has subsequently been passed, no interference should be made at this stage. He contended further that the interim order being non est now, and as the follow up action has been duly taken and the more so when the earlier Civil Rule No. 4049(W) of 1974 has failed, the present one is also not maintainable. 20. In support of his first submission that mere mentioning in the order that the action of the said Company was in contravention of the concerned Rules, will not do or would not be a case of due compliance and for that the breach, if any, should be specified. Mr. Gupta, after placing the impugned order dated 22nd June 1974 for the terms and scope, placed reliance or the Supreme Court's determinations in the case of (1) M/s. Ajantha Industries & Ors. Mr. Gupta, after placing the impugned order dated 22nd June 1974 for the terms and scope, placed reliance or the Supreme Court's determinations in the case of (1) M/s. Ajantha Industries & Ors. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes New Delhi & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 437 , which was a case under section 127(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dealing with transfer of case from one area to another. In that case, a point arose whether non-communication of reasons for such transfer to the assessee, was a serious infirmity and the same, if constituted violation of principles of natural justice and if for such act of transfer, reasons are to be recorded. It has been observed by the Supreme Court that the requirement of recording reasons under section 127(1) is a mandatory direction under the law and non-communication thereof is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file although not communicated to the assessee or that the reasons were given in the prior show cause notice issued to the assessee against the proposed transfer. law requires reasons to be recorded in a particular order affecting prejudicially the interests of any person, who can challenge the order in court, it ceases to be a mere administrative order and the vice of Violation of the principles of natural justice on account of omission to communicate the reasons is not expiated. On the analogy of the aforesaid determinations, Mr. Gupta •contended that even if reasons are recorded in the records in the instant case, that would be no compliance with the provisions of the said order, which are also mandatory. This argument was advanced by Mr. Gupta as Mr. Chakravartti, on production of the records contended that reasons have been duly recorded. It was also contended by him after comparing the languages of section 121 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, clause 11A of the said order and reading the determination of the Supreme Court as aforesaid, that "reasons to be recorded" would mean and include a duty and obligation to communicate the due reasons and it was his contention that the reasons as disclosed in this case, were and are not only no reasons at all, but they are not also the reasons as required. On the question of the necessary obligations to have the reasons recorded, Mr. On the question of the necessary obligations to have the reasons recorded, Mr. Gupta also relied on the determinations of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) The Textile Commissioner of the Government of India & Ors., v. Shri Jagadish Process (Pvt) Ltd., & Anr., (1977) 2 SCC 519 . On the basis of the determinations in that case, it was submitted that when the said order or the action as taken thereunder, has affected the petitioners, so all directions were required to be given or issued after strictly and duly complying with the requirements of the same, the more so, to have the necessary reasons recorded in writing when clause 11A of the said order, require the same. On the question of "reasons to be recorded", reliance was also placed by Mr. Gupta on the determinations of the Supreme Court in a case under section 33B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 being the case of (3) Associated Electrical Industries (India) Private Ltd., Calcutta v. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 284 . In that case it has been observed that the requirements of section 33B would not be satisfied by merely stating that the withdrawal of the case was expedient and it has also been observed that since no reason was given, the order was not a proper one. On the basis of such determination, it was contended that the requirements under clause 11A of the said order were not fulfiled for not recording the reasons. 21. Apart from the above, it was submitted by Mr. Gupta that since Part II of the order deals with "Iron and Steel of Prime quality" and part III of the same deals with "Defective and Scrap" and contains provisions for supply of those categories, so for the purpose, of finding out or to know the supply of which quality was suspended, reasons were required to be recorded in writing and the more so when clause 11A of the said order has no application to quality of articles in Part III and as such also Mr. Gupta contended that effective application of mind, which was conspicuously absent in this case, was required on a further reference to the Schedule under the said order, which specifically applies to specified class or quality of articles and not "Scrap", which could have been suspended under clause 23A of the said order, it was also contended by Mr. Gupta that the purported attempt or action to suspend supply of scrap even, in this case was improper, unauthorised and also proved and established non-application of mind. In fact, it was sought to be argued and pointed our by Mr. Gupta that either in the affidavit-in-opposition or in the proceedings, the Respondents have made no such claim to suspend the supply of scrap, yet they have in fact and effect suspended such supply, also unauthorisedly. 22. Mr. Chakravartti submitted, on a reference to the notice dated 22nd June 1974 under clause 11A of the said order, that there was no vagueness in the same, as the same mentioned about the mis-utilisation of Pig iron, which was the specific requirement of the petitioners. Then, he referred to the notice under clause 28B, which also indicated misutilisation of Pig iron. It was contended by him in particular that when the specific requirement of the petitioner was Pig iron and that was sanctioned to them on necessary application. there could be no, as mentioned hereinbefore, vagueness in the notices initiating the proceedings or the orders as made and furthermore since the petitioners were aware of the specific requirements of Pig iron, so there was no prejudice to them in the matter of making any representation and as such, on that score, there was no violation of any principle of natural justice and furthermore, in fact since misutilisation of Pig iron. which was the requirement of the petitioners was mentioned, that was the reason which was duly and in terms of clause 11A of the said order recorded or at least must be deemed to be so. It was also contended by him that the impugned notice was neither bad nor ultra vires and in fact the same was appropriately issued in due, proper and lawful exercise of power, competence and jurisdiction. It was also contended by him that the impugned notice was neither bad nor ultra vires and in fact the same was appropriately issued in due, proper and lawful exercise of power, competence and jurisdiction. He submitted that there is no doubt that clause 11A as aforesaid would mean and include Pig iron and is included in Part 11 of the said order and it was contended by him that the petitioners cannot be said to be successful in establishing, non-application of mind as alleged, because the notices as referred to hereinbefore, speak of Pig iron and nothing else. Mr. Chakravartti further contended that since the records as produced, do establish that reason was recorded the said fact read with the reason in the notice would mean the present case, to be one which was not a case of not recording of any reasons and that would take the case out of the mischiefs of the determinations in M/s. Ajanta Industries & Ors. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi (supra), which again, as mentioned hereinbefore, was a case under section 127 of the Income tax Act, 1961, which according to Mr. Chakravartti further required the recording of the reasons specifically. The said case, according to Mr. Chakravartti was distinguishable, not only on the facts but also on the specific provisions of the respective statutes, it was also submitted by him that the determinations in the case of The Textile Commissioner of the Government of India & Ors. v. Shri Jagadish process (Pvt.) Ltd., & Anr, (supra) have also no application in this case, because here admittedly, reasons have been recorded. It was then submitted by him that reasons are ordinarily required to be recorded where the normal procedure is departed from or is deviated or in case of omissions and since the facts of the case do not establish such contingencies or anyone of them, so the determinations in the cases of (4) Collector of Monghyr & Ors. v. Kashev Prasad Goenka & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1694 and (5) Union of India v. M.L. Capoor & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 87 on which the petitioners also relied in support of their submissions on recording of reasons, would have no application. 23. v. Kashev Prasad Goenka & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1694 and (5) Union of India v. M.L. Capoor & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 87 on which the petitioners also relied in support of their submissions on recording of reasons, would have no application. 23. From the intrinsic evidence as available and disclosed in this proceedings it appears that 'the requirements of the petitioner was for Pig iron and the orders as disclosed and impeached also mention about the alleged violation or improper dealings of the petitioners with Pig iron, so in agreement with the submissions of Mr. Chakravartti, I hold that there was no vagueness in the order of suspension and since the petitioners asked or applied for Pig iron only, the orders as made could not have created or caused any prejudice so far they are concerned and on the grounds as alleged. Thus, there is also no substance in the arguments of the petitioners that either there was non-application of mind or reasons were not appropriately recorded. In appropriate cases (this case comes within such exceptions), the records can certainly be looked into and the Court can get itself satisfied about the bonafides or otherwise of those reasons. The reasons, in my view are not required to be elaborately depicted in the order. What is required, is that reading the reasons as communicated the party involved, must be in a position to know or follow the basis or the background, for which the order has been made. Such contingency, in my view, has been duly served and satisfied from the terms of the impugned notices and when they speak of the specific violation viz, mis-utilisation of Pig iron, the allotment whereof was the petitioners only prayer and which was granted. The cases as cited by Mr. Gupta are really distinguishable on the facts of this case. I am further of tile view that reasons may be claimed to be recorded in the order itself in cases where there has been deviation from or omission to follow the normal procedure and since the present case do not come within those exceptions, there was no illegality or any irregularity in the notices or the procedure as alleged. I am further of tile view that reasons may be claimed to be recorded in the order itself in cases where there has been deviation from or omission to follow the normal procedure and since the present case do not come within those exceptions, there was no illegality or any irregularity in the notices or the procedure as alleged. In view of the above and in the facts of this case, I hold that the petitioners could claim no difficulty in realising the purport and effect of the impugned notices or the action as taken and as such there is no substances in the arguments of Mr. Gupta, for not recording the reasons in the notice itself. 24. On his third branch of submissions viz. that the suspension order was bad as the same was in violation of principles of natural justice. Mr. Gupta firstly relied on the determinations in the case of (6) M/s. Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd., v. The State of West Bengal & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 266 , which was a case on blacklisting and the Supreme Court has observed that : "blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective standard. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist. He secondly relied on the determinations in the case of (7) Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner & Ors, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , for the proposition that be it administrative or quasi-judicial determination, principles of natural justice, will have to be followed and complied with. The above submissions were sought to be supplemented by Mr. Gupta with further reference to the determinations in Collector of Monghyr & Ors v. Kashav Prasad (supra) and Union of India v. M.L. Cappor (supra). 25. So far the determination in M/s. Erusian Equipement and Chemicals Ltd. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors, (supra), Mr. The above submissions were sought to be supplemented by Mr. Gupta with further reference to the determinations in Collector of Monghyr & Ors v. Kashav Prasad (supra) and Union of India v. M.L. Cappor (supra). 25. So far the determination in M/s. Erusian Equipement and Chemicals Ltd. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors, (supra), Mr. Chakravartti contended that the determinations made therein or the rule as laid down, would have no application or cannot be applied in this case be6ause that was a determination after the final order, which admittedly is not the position in the instant case. In the case of Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner New Delhi & Ors. (supra) it has been observed that : "when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. In view of the above findings and observations, Mr. Chakravartti contended that the determinations as made in the case would be of no avail or any assistance to the petitioners, as no case contrary to the records or the orders as made has been made out either in the affidavit or on the production of the records. That apart, it was contended by him that since the reasons as recorded and disclosed should be deemed to be due, proper and appropriate and has not caused any injustice or prejudice to the petitioner so the determinations as made by the Supreme Court, would also be of assistance to Mr. Gupta. Overt and above these, on the determinations of the Supreme Court, Mr. Chakravartti further contended that Article 329B of the Constitution, would be a bar to the maintainability of the application. The reason as recorded and which are the basis of the action as taken in the instant case being known to the petitioners, J find there was no prejudice or any injustice caused to them and that too on the face of the special features and specific facts of the case and as such agreeing with the submissions of Mr. The reason as recorded and which are the basis of the action as taken in the instant case being known to the petitioners, J find there was no prejudice or any injustice caused to them and that too on the face of the special features and specific facts of the case and as such agreeing with the submissions of Mr. Chakravartti, I further find that there has been no violation of principles of natural justice. The determinations in the cases as referred to hereinbefore have been appropriately contended by Mr. Chakravartti to be of no avail or any assistance to the petitioners, specially in the facts of this case. 26. In view of the findings and determinations as above, the fourth submissions of Mr. Gupta viz, the impugned order was bad and ultra vires Rule 11A as the same has sought to suspend the supply of raw materials, appears to be without substance, the more so when, the specific application of the petitioners was admittedly for Pig iron and not other raw materials. If their application was for other raw materials and not Pig iron alone then perhaps there would have been some justification in the concerned submissions of Mr. Gupta and that not being the position, his arguments in my view have lost all force. 27. The fifth submissions of Mr. Gupta viz.. the concerned order was bad for non specification of any period as to how long the restriction as imposed would continue, appear to be without any substance. When the order as has been found, was passed duly, legally, properly and with jurisdiction, then the restriction as imposed thereunder, may continue for ever and when no specific period is mentioned, the order must be deemed to be operative for ever. This of course would cause great hardship to the petitioners. But that is no ground for setting aside the order when the same has been duly passed and no period is required to be specified under the said order. 28. With regard to the second submissions of Mr. Gupta that in view of note (4) under clause 11A of the said order, the order of suspension, in the instant case should be deemed to have been withdrawn as the follow up action, was not initiated within three months or within the time as extended, Mr. 28. With regard to the second submissions of Mr. Gupta that in view of note (4) under clause 11A of the said order, the order of suspension, in the instant case should be deemed to have been withdrawn as the follow up action, was not initiated within three months or within the time as extended, Mr. Chahavartti pointed out that the order under clause 11A was made on 22nd June 1974 and the follow up action under clause 28B was initiated by the show cause notice on 1st July, 1974 and the present Rule was obtained on 14th August 1974. Thus the follow up action, according to him was really initiated within time. It was Mr. Chakravartti's specific contention that action under clause 28B was really the follow up action and that having been initiated duly and in time, note (4) under clause 11A of the said order has no concern in this case. In view of the admitted dates as mentioned above, there are substance in this arguments of Mr. Chakravartti and I find that note (4) under clause 11A as aforesaid bad or has no application in this case. 29. These apart, the preliminary point as raised and argued by Mr. Chakravarti, appears to be of substance and as such the present petition, in view of the order in Civil Rule No. 4049(w) of t974, would not be maintainable, unless the final order is challenged and that too after exhausting the other remedies under the statute. 30. Thus, the application is dismissed, the same fails so also the Rule and the same is discharged. There will however be no order as to costs. 31. This order will not however prejudice the petitioners from moving afresh against the appropriate order at the appropriate stage. Civil Rule No 4891(w) of 1974 32. Since the points involved in this Rule are the same as in Civil Rule No. 4892(w) of 1974, the learned Advocates appearing before me advanced no fresh argument and they agreed that the determinations in Civil Rule No. 4892(w) of 1974 would also govern this case. In fact the representation of the parties were also the same as in the said Civil Rule. 33. Thus after hearing the learned Advocates, I also have it on record that the order which I have proposed in Civil Rule No. 4892(w) of 1974 would also govern this case. 34. In fact the representation of the parties were also the same as in the said Civil Rule. 33. Thus after hearing the learned Advocates, I also have it on record that the order which I have proposed in Civil Rule No. 4892(w) of 1974 would also govern this case. 34. The Rule is thus discharged. There will be no order as to costs. 35. Stay of operation of this order as prayed for, is refused.