JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - The original plaintiff Nadir Raza Naqvi since dead and now substituted by his legal heirs filed a suit for declaration that the resolution of the Executive Council of the Aligarh Muslim University. Aligarh, dated 27-1-1969 purporting to terminate his services as the University Engineer was illegal and that he was still in the employment of the University, for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant-appellant No. 1, her authorities, officers and servants from interfering with the working of the plaintiff as University Engineer, and also for payment of his regular salary with emoluments from month to month whenever they fell due. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court. The plaintiff preferred an appeal which was partly allowed by the lower appellate court and a decree for declaration was passed as prayed by the plaintiff, but the remaining claims for injunction and salary were dismissed. Aggrieved by the same the defendants have come up in second appeal to this Court. 2. Briefly stated the case of the plaintiff was that he was appointed by the Executive Council of the University defendant-appellant No. 1, by a resolution dated 17-8-1967 as University Engineer on probation for one year. He discharged his duties to the entire satisfaction of Sri S. A. Abbas, who was the Head of the Department (Member-in-Charge) of the Building & Electricity Department of defendant-appellant No. 1 to which the plaintiff was attached. The plaintiff tried to liquidate the monopoly of the big contractors and penalised some small contractors as well and also checked and warned the members of his staff for negligence of duties on various occasions. This annoyed those persons and various anonymous complaints against the plaintiff were sent to the Vice-Chancellor who grew suspicious against him. Further, the plaintiff declined to oblige one Dr. Majid Siddiqi, son-in-law of the Vice-Chancellor and consequently Dr. Siddiqi started making false propaganda against his integrity and influenced the Vice-Chancellor also who began to bear a grudge against the plaintiff. That is why it was alleged that he obtained a termination order dated 27-1-1969 from the Executive Council. The probationary period of the plaintiff had expired on 20-10-1968 but the Executive Council had extended it for three months in the first instance and thereafter by further seven days but ultimately the Vice-Chancellor got the plaintiff ousted by the above mentioned resolution of the Executive Council. 3. The probationary period of the plaintiff had expired on 20-10-1968 but the Executive Council had extended it for three months in the first instance and thereafter by further seven days but ultimately the Vice-Chancellor got the plaintiff ousted by the above mentioned resolution of the Executive Council. 3. The plaintiff challenged the validity of the termination order on the ground that on the expiry of the probationary period he should have been automatically confirmed by the Executive Council on 20-1-1968, that in any event he could not be removed without notice to him and full opportunity to explain his conduct, that the order of termination contravened the Regulations and the provisions of the Statutes and the Act of the Aligarh Muslim University and the principles of natural justice and that the Executive Council had no jurisdiction to pass the aforesaid resolution. 4. The defendants filed a joint written statement denying the allegations made by the plaintiff. It was stated that the plaintiff being merely a probationer had no right to the post, that he did not stand automatically confirmed, that the allegations of malice were deliberately false, that the resolution dated 27-1-1969 was one of termination `simpliciter and was not a punitive order, that the plaintiff was not entitled to any opportunity as alleged, that no question arose of the infringement of any principle of natural justice and that the plaintiffs suit was misconceived and liable to be dismissed. 5. It is not necessary to deal with the various pleadings mentioned above as in the appeal before me learned counsel for the parties have confined themselves to a few aspects which alone merit consideration. The central point which has been canvassed at the bar relates to the legality of the order of termination keeping in view the competence of the University authorities to take such action. It would, therefore, be necessary to examine the various provisions contained in the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as amended from time to time, the Statutes of the University framed under the Act, the Ordinances, if relevant, and the Regulations framed under the provisions of the Act. The impugned resolution was passed by the Executive Council which is the executive body of the University. Section 24 of the Act provides : "The Executive Council. - The Executive Council shall be the executive body of the University. The impugned resolution was passed by the Executive Council which is the executive body of the University. Section 24 of the Act provides : "The Executive Council. - The Executive Council shall be the executive body of the University. Its constitution and the term of office of its members and its powers and duties shall be prescribed by the Statutes." Section 27 gives the power to make Statutes and so far as relevant for the purposes of this case it provides as follows: "Subject to the provisions of this Act the Statutes may provide for all or any of the following matters: (a) the constitution, powers and duties of the authorities of the University; (b) ..................... (c) the appointment, powers and duties of the officers of the University. (d) to (j) .............. (k) all other matters which by the Act are to be or may be provided by the Statutes." Section 22 of the Act enumerates the authorities of the University which are : "(1) The Court (2) The Executive Council (3) The Academic Council (3-A) The Finance Committee (3-B) The Faculties, and (4) Such other authorities as may be declared by the Statutes to be authorities of the University." Section 16 sets out the officers of the University as follows : "(1) The Chancellor (2) The Pro-Chancellor (3) The Vice-Chancellor (3-A) The Pro Vice-Chancellor, if any (3-B) The Treasurer (3-C) The Registrar (3-D) The Deans of the Faculties and (4) Such other officers as may be declared by the Statutes to be officers of the University." Statutes 4-A enumerates other officers of the University, namely :- "(1) Librarian, (2) Dean, Students Welfare (3) Provosts (4) Proctor" . The powers of the Executive Council are provided by Statute 16. The material part of the same is reproduced below : "Powers of the Executive Council. - (1) The Executive Council shall, subject to the control of the Visitor, have the management of administration of the whole revenue and property of the University and the conduct of all the administrative affairs of the University. The material part of the same is reproduced below : "Powers of the Executive Council. - (1) The Executive Council shall, subject to the control of the Visitor, have the management of administration of the whole revenue and property of the University and the conduct of all the administrative affairs of the University. (2) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances, the Executive Council shall, in addition to all other powers vested in it, have the following powers, namely - (i) to appoint, from time to time, the Registrar, Librarian, Principals of Colleges and institutions established by the University and such Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff as may be necessary, on the recommendation of the Selection Committees constituted for the purpose. Provided that no action shall be taken by the Executive Council in respect of the number, qualifications and the emoluments of teachers, otherwise than after consideration of the recommendations of the Academic Council. (ii) to appoint members of the administrative staff; (ii-A) to (xii) ................ (xiii) to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be conferred or imposed on it by the Act or the Statutes." The Executive Council is invested under S. 28 of the Act with the power of making new Statutes. Likewise S. 29 confers on the Executive Council the power to make Ordinances which may cover, inter alia, "........................ (k) the emoluments and the terms and conditions of service of teachers of the University." (n) all other matters which by the Act or the Statutes are to be or may be provided for by the Ordinances." The authorities of the University are also empowered under S. 31 of the Act to make Regulations consistent with the Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances. A series of "Regulations have accordingly been framed but only two of them deserve mention in the present case. Regulation 3 reads as follows: "Every officer and servant of the University shall be appointed on probation for one year unless it is provided otherwise in the contract, after the expiry of which period he may be confirmed in his post. If he is not so confirmed, the Executive Council may, if it deems fit, dispense with the services or extend period of probation, but in no case/11 the period of probation be extend-beyond two years. If he is not so confirmed, the Executive Council may, if it deems fit, dispense with the services or extend period of probation, but in no case/11 the period of probation be extend-beyond two years. Provided that if a person in the permanent service of the University is appointed to a higher post in the same department, he shall not lose his lien on his substantive post, nor shall he be deprived of the benefits of leave rules and Provident Fund Statutes during the period of his probation " Regulation 5 runs as under: "No officer or servant of the University shall be confirmed in his post, unless he has fulfilled the conditions laid down in the contract of his appointment, and unless the Vice-Chancellor, on the recommendations of the Head of the Department concerned in the case of appointments on the executive side, and of the Dean of the Faculty concerned in the case of appointments on the academic side of the University testifies to his efficiency, ability and good work." It will be noticed that the Executive Council is authorised under Regulation 3 to dispense with the services of a probationer if it deems fit. Another important provision which is relevant in connection with the removal and dismissal etc. is contained in Statute 25-A which is quoted below: "Removal of Members and Officers. - (1) Any member of the Court, the Executive Council or the Academic Council may be removed by a resolution of the Court, the Executive Council or the Academic Council, as the case may be, passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of its members on either of the following grounds namely - (1) the member has become incapable of performing his duties; (ii) the member has been convicted by a Court of Law of an offence which, in the opinion of the Court, the Executive Council or the Academic Council, as the case may be, involves moral turpitude. (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the terms of the contract of service or of his appointment, any officer of the University, salaried or otherwise, may be removed from that office by the authority which is competent to fill the vacancy on either of the following grounds namely - (i) the officer has become incapable of performing his duties; (ii) the officer has been convicted by a Court of Law of an offence, which, in the opinion of the Court, the Executive Council, or the Academic Council, as the case may be, involves moral turpitude. (3) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in the terms of his contract of service or of the appointment, the Executive Council shall be entitled to dismiss a teacher on grounds of misconduct, but save as aforesaid, the Executive Council shall not be entitled to determine the employment of a teacher save for good cause and after giving three months notice in writing or payment of three months salary in lieu of such notice. (b) The determination of a teachers employment shall require a two-thirds majority of the members of the Executive Council present and voting. (c) The Vice-Chancellor may suspend a teacher against whom any misconduct is alleged and shall report the case to the next meeting of the Executive Council, but before any orders for dismissal are passed, the teacher shall be informed of the allegations made against him and shall be given a reasonable opportunity of making such representations to the Executive Council or to any Committee thereof appointed for the purpose, as he may desire to make. (d) any dismissal on the ground of misconduct shall take effect on the date on which the teacher was first suspended. (e) Before a notice is given or payment is made to the teacher under sub-clause (a), he shall be informed by the Executive Council of the cause of the action proposed to be taken against him and shall be given a reasonable opportunity of making such representations to the Executive Council or to any Committee thereof appointed for the purpose, as he may desire to make. (f) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Statutes, the teacher may at any time terminate his employment by giving the Executive Council three months notice in writing." It is necessary to mention that originally Statute 25-A consisted of only two clauses, namely, (1) and (2) but cl. (f) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Statutes, the teacher may at any time terminate his employment by giving the Executive Council three months notice in writing." It is necessary to mention that originally Statute 25-A consisted of only two clauses, namely, (1) and (2) but cl. (3) was added by the Aligarh Muslim University Amendment Act, 1965 (Act 19 of 1965) by S. 9 thereof. Even cl. (3) when added in 1965, as it will be seen, consisted of only six sub-clauses namely (a) to (f) but with effect from 31-8-1968 sub-clause (g) was added and it reads as follows: "Termination of services of any person in the employment of the University who is still on probation or is holding a temporary appointment shall be regulated by Ordinance." It is the above sub-clause on which alone the entire controversy in the present case hinges and on its interpretation will depend the conclusion to be drawn with regard to the competence and scope of the power of termination of services. 6. It is the parties case that no Ordinance as contemplated by cl. 3 (g) quoted above has been framed on the subject i.e. termination of services of the members of the administrative staff. Admittedly the plaintiff being a University Engineer was a member of the administrative staff of the University mentioned in sub-cl. (ii) of cl. (2) of Statute 16 dealing with the powers of the Executive Council. 7. Sri S. N. Varma, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has strongly relied on cl. 3 (g) and contended that since no Ordinances have been made on the subject of termination of services of the members of the administrative staff the Executive Council was not competent to terminate the plaintiffs services by its resolution. He submitted that when the law requires a thing to be done in a specified manner, that act must be done precisely in that manner and not otherwise. Hence, the simple argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent was that the Executive Council was bereft of the power to terminate the services of the plaintiff-respondent. The argument is only specious and cannot be accepted on a closer scrutiny of the scheme of the Act, the Statutes and the Regulations etc. Hence, the simple argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent was that the Executive Council was bereft of the power to terminate the services of the plaintiff-respondent. The argument is only specious and cannot be accepted on a closer scrutiny of the scheme of the Act, the Statutes and the Regulations etc. It is true that the University is a statutory body and must act in accordance with the statutory rules and provisions but the question arises whether by taking the action of termination of services of the plaintiff-respondent any statutory rule was violated. Before scrutinising the scheme minutely it is necessary to consider the validity of the preliminary argument urged by Sri S. J. Haider, counsel for the appellants. According to him cl. 3 (g) of Statute 25-A, though widely worded, should be given a narrow construction and the word "person" occurring therein must according to the exigencies be given a restricted meaning. He submitted that the already existing sub-cls. (a) to (f) in cl. (3) of Statute 25-A dealt with the cases of teachers alone and consequently according to the well-established rules of construction sub-cl. (g) of cl. (3) of Statute 25-A also must be deemed to relate to the matters of teachers only. He referred to the rule generally known as `ejusdem generis which says that where there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words following particular and specific words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified. In other words, the doctrine of `ejusdem generis means that where particular words are followed by general, the general words should not be construed in their widest sense but should be held as applying to objects, persons or things of the same general nature or class as those specifically enumerated. It will, however, be necessary to emphasise that `ejusdem generis is not a rule of law but merely a rule of construction and a contrary principle may be adopted whether there is manifestation of a contrary purpose. The (legislative history of sub-cl. (3) (g) in my `opinion reflects such a contrary purpose. As already indicated sub-cls. (a) to (f) of cl. (3) of Statute 25-A were introduced {by the Amending Act of 1965 whereas `sub-cl. (g) was added on 31-8-1968. The (legislative history of sub-cl. (3) (g) in my `opinion reflects such a contrary purpose. As already indicated sub-cls. (a) to (f) of cl. (3) of Statute 25-A were introduced {by the Amending Act of 1965 whereas `sub-cl. (g) was added on 31-8-1968. If all the sub-clauses had been brought into existence simultaneously and by one and the same authority, the appellants, contention might have carried some force and the rule of `ejusdem generis might have applied but the facts of the present case run counter to the applicability of that doctrine. It cannot be denied that the Executive Council possessed the power of making statutes. Under S. 28 (2) of the Act the Executive Council is competent to make new or additional statutes with the previous approval of the Visitor. Sub-cl. (g) was added by the Executive Council in 1968 with the approval of the Visitor and by complying with the procedure prescribed by Section 28 (2). Since the competence of the Executive Council to make such Statutes cannot be challenged, it is wholly immaterial that this newly added sub-cl. was incorporated in cl. (3) of Statute 25-A. The Executive Council could adopt any of the two courses, either it could make an independent Statute on the subject i. e. members of the administrative staff or other employees covered by the general term `person or it could include that provision 111 the already existing Cl. 3 of Statute 25-A. This process should not make any difference in the substantive interpretation of that provision, particularly when it was added by a different body, namely, the Executive Council as distinguished from the Legislature which by S. 9 of the amending Act, 1965 added sub-cls. (a) to (f) and at different points of time. The principle is akin to the one stated by Craise on Statute Law at page 217 that whether an enactment be printed as part of one section, or contained in another section, it can make no difference in the construction of the statute. An endorsement of the same may be found in the dictum of Mellish L. J. in Cohen v. S. E. Rly., (1877) 2 Ex. D. 253, 260, I am not aware "that there is any such rule of construction of an Act of Parliament. An endorsement of the same may be found in the dictum of Mellish L. J. in Cohen v. S. E. Rly., (1877) 2 Ex. D. 253, 260, I am not aware "that there is any such rule of construction of an Act of Parliament. If some absurdity or inconvenience followed from holding it to apply to the whole Act, it might be reasonable to confine the incorporation to clauses relating to some particular subject-matter, but if there is no inconvenience from holding that the incorporation includes S. 7 as well as the other sections we ought to hold that it does". In my opinion it savours of absurdity and is certainly inconvenient to hold that the Executive Council, when it expressly and advisedly used general and wide phraseology in sub-cl. (g), which action was perfectly within the ambit of its power, its intendment could be construed as anything different from making the power of termination so wide as to cover the case of the members of the Administrative staff such as the University Engineer. It would be{ manifestly incorrect to destroy that intention of the Executive Council by bringing sub-cl. (g) within the strait-jacket of the rule of `ejusdem generis. Since a contrary purpose is manifest in the scheme of addition of that sub-clause; read along with other sub-clauses added much earlier, it must be given its plain grammatical meaning. Thus, I am inclined to hold that the Executive Council was competent to avail of the provisions of sub-cl. (g) for terminating the' services of a member of the Administrative staff of the University. 8. I now revert to deal with the other question argued by the learned counsel for the respondent, namely, that where an act is required by law to be done in a particular manner that manner must be strictly adhered to and that since the Executive Council did admittedly fail to make any Ordinance with respect to the termination of the services of the members of the administrative staff, sub-cl. (g) of cl. (3) was a dead letter and could not be pressed into service for terminating the plaintiffs services. (g) of cl. (3) was a dead letter and could not be pressed into service for terminating the plaintiffs services. It is true that the above provision contemplates (making of an Ordinance for that purpose, nevertheless, I am unable to hold that until such Ordinance is framed, the power of termination of services with regard to such staff cannot be exercised, even though such power may be culled from other existing provisions. It is a statutory principle that law abhors a vacuum and in order to make the practical working of institutions feasible Jail necessary and incidental actions must be discharged by the authorities concerned if the power with regard to them can be traced to some valid source. A literal or doctrinaire approach to the interpretation of such provision must be eschewed. This principle was approved by the Supreme Court in the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Gopinath Gundachar Char, AIR 1968 SC 464 . Dealing with the provisions of the Road Transport Corporations Act their Lordships observed in para 3 of the Reports as follows: "The conjoint effect of Sections 14 (3) (b). 34 and 45 (2) (c) is that the appointment of officers and servants and their conditions of service must conform to the directions, if any, given by the State Government under S. 34 and the regulations, if any, framed under S. 45 (2) (c). But until such regulations are framed or directions are given, the Corporation may appoint such officers or servants as may be necessary for the efficient performance of its duties on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. There is necessarily a time lag between the formation of the Corporation and the framing of regulations under S. 45 (2) (c). During the intervening period, the Corporation must carry on the administration of its affairs with the help of officers and servants. There is necessarily a time lag between the formation of the Corporation and the framing of regulations under S. 45 (2) (c). During the intervening period, the Corporation must carry on the administration of its affairs with the help of officers and servants. In the absence of clear words, it is difficult to impute to the legislature the intention that the Corporation would have no power to appoint officers and servants and fix the conditions of service unless the regulations under S. 45 (2) (c) are framed." On an overall consideration of the provisions of the Act, Statutes and Regulations I do not find it possible to hold that merely because no Ordinance had been made with respect to termination of services of members of the administrative staff, the power was otherwise non-existent. 9. Applying the above principle to the facts of the present case it must be ruled that the Executive Council could exercise the power of termination of services of the University Engineer by virtue of the relevant Regulations already existing. I have already referred to Regulations 3 and 5. Regulation 5 indicates that there is nothing like an automatic confirmation and Regulation 3 expressly empowers the Executive Council to dispense with the services of a Probationer if it deems fit. It is true that in the hierarchy of the Act, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations, perhaps Regulations rank the last and have to be consistent with the former and if there is a clash between the two, the last must stand out. See Dr. Akshaiber Lal v. Vice Chancellor, Benaras Hindu University AIR 1961 SC 619 (paras 12 and 28). The same conclusion is borne out by examining Sections 28, 29 and 31 of the Act. S. 27 opens with the words `Subject to the provisions of this Act the Statutes may provide". S. 29 also says "Subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes, the Ordinances may provide". S. 31 says "The authorities of the University may make Regulations consistent with this Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances". It is a corollary from the above proposition that if the authorities of the University had made an Ordinance relating to the termination of services of the members of the administrative staff, that would have prevailed over the Regulations. S. 31 says "The authorities of the University may make Regulations consistent with this Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances". It is a corollary from the above proposition that if the authorities of the University had made an Ordinance relating to the termination of services of the members of the administrative staff, that would have prevailed over the Regulations. But in the absence of any such Ordinance a pragmatic view dictates that all other existing provisions of law must be utilised to make the practical working of administration possible. The contingency of vacuum cannot be countenanced unless the entire gamut of the existing provisions of law also compels us to submit to such a situation. Hence, I am satisfied that the University authorities could take resort to Regulations in order to terminate the services of a probationer and take an action which they were required to take in the interest of1 administration. 10. I am also inclined to accede to another submission of the learned counsel for the appellants in this regard. In order to plug the holes created by the absence of a specific provision of law all other sources of power may be usefully gleaned from the scheme of Statutes. I have already adverted to Statute 16 of the Statutes of the University, cl. 2 (ii) of which empowers the Executive Council to appoint members of the administrative staff. The plaintiff was admittedly appointed by the Executive Council. Unless there is some provision to the contrary, normally the authority having the power to make an appointment has also the power to dismiss the person so appointed. In other words, the power of appointment by necessary implication, and unless a different intention appears, carries with it also the power of termination of the same. This is in conformity with the principle enshrined in S. 16 of the General Clauses Act. 11. Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the respondent that from the facts of the case it was established that the resolution dated 27-1-1969 was one of punishment and it was vitiated inasmuch as it violated the principles of natural justice and was passed without giving any opportunity to the plaintiff to show cause to explain his position. 11. Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the respondent that from the facts of the case it was established that the resolution dated 27-1-1969 was one of punishment and it was vitiated inasmuch as it violated the principles of natural justice and was passed without giving any opportunity to the plaintiff to show cause to explain his position. In the first place, it is a concurrent finding of the courts below that the impugned order was one of termination of services `simpliciter and was not an order of punishment. Nothing has been shown to me which may persuade me to disagree with the finding recorded by the courts below. Hence, the question of giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to explain his position did not arise. In the second place, the argument of the plaintiff-respondent is based on the assumption that the plaintiff-respondent was a confirmed Engineer. This point again is concluded by the finding of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff-respondent was a probationer. As provided by Regulation 3, the Executive Council was competent to terminate the services of a probationer without requiring it to give any opportunity of defence to the servant of the University which is imperative in case of punishment. It is well settled that a probationer can be discharged if it is found that he is not suitable for the post which he is holding and this can be done without complying with the provisions of Art. 311 (2) unless the services are terminated by way of punishment. (See Dr. T. C. M. Pillai v. Indian Institute of Technology, Guindi, Madras, AIR 1971 SC 1811 . 12. For these reasons I am constrained to hold that the decree passed in the plaintiffs favour was erroneous and contrary to law and must be set aside. 13. In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed.