Order.- This is a criminal revision petition against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge of North Arcot Division at Vellore, dismissing Crl.A. No. 357 of 1975 and confirming the order of the Collector of North Arcot, confiscating the lorry MDJ 2104 belonging to the revision petitioner. 2. The Special Tahsildar (P.), Thiruvannamalai, who was on patrol duty on 22nd July, 1975, noticed the lorry MDJ 2104 proceeding along Kilpennathur-Avalurpet road at a distance of one kilometre beyond Kattukulam check post about 1-30 a.m. and intercepted it and found 50 bags of paddy loaded in the lorry. The driver had no permit for transport of the paddy from Tiruvannamalai town to Gingee. The trip sheet of the lorry was not written up. The lorry and the paddy bags were seized by the Tahsildar under cover of a mahazar and the paddy was deposited in Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation godown at Tiruvannamalai. The lorry was kept at Kilpennathur guarded by the police. Subsequently, the lorry was handed over to the revision petitioner on the orders of this Court. A notice under section 6-B of the Essential Commodities Act was issued by the Collector calling upon the revision petitioner to make his representation in writing within seven days from the date of receipt of this notice against the ground of confiscation mentioned in the notice. I must straightway say that this notice has been issued by filing up the gaps in a cyclostyled form and, therefore, in a mechanical manner and the satisfaction expressed therein does not appear to be a satisfaction arrived at by taking into consideration the facts of the instant case, but a satisfaction pre-existing in the sense that the satisfaction has been expressed in a cyclostyled form kept ready for use in all such cases irrespective of the merits and demerits of each case. After issue of the notice, the owner of the lorry made a representation in writing contending that he had no knowledge of the transport of the paddy, that the driver was employed only a week prior to 23rd July, 1975, that he had specifically instructed the driver and the cleaner of the lorry not to transport any essential commodity unless covered by a permit and that he has subsequently terminated their services. The driver of the lorry stated that he joined duty as a driver only on the day prior to the occurrence, that the paddy belonged to one Velu, that he transported paddy from the Bungalow, Mill of Tiruvannamalai town to his village which is at a distance of about four or five miles near Somasipadi village and that the owner of the lorry was not aware of the transport. The cleaner also gave a similar statement. Velu the owner of the paddy, filed a statement contending that the 50 bags of I.R. 8 paddy, were taken for sale at Tiruvannamalai, that at Tiruvannamalai he was informed that money for the paddy bags will be paid only after sale, that as he needed money immediately he proceeded to Ginjee to effect the sales and that he did so because he was made to understand that there was no prohibition against an agriculturist selling his produce anywhere within the State of Tamil Nadu. The Collector, however, was of the opinion that the owner "has not proved that all reasonable and necessary precautions have been taken against the use of lorry for such illicit movements". The version of the driver and the cleaner that it was transported to a village near Somasipadi is purely an afterthought and this version is not supported by the owner of the stock, (who says that the stock was transported to Gingee ‘for sale). Even if it were a fact, then the trip-sheet should have been written for the said movement. But this was not done in the present case. The owner of the paddy bags stated that it is the produce of their lands taken for sale at Tiruvannamalai and then to Gingee as money was not readily available at Tiruvannamalai. But his contention that there was no restriction for sale of paddy anywhere in the State is not correct. Enquiry revealed that Thiru Velu owns 5.42 acres of irrigable dry lands in Durginammiyananda village in a joint family and he cultivated only an extent of 0.80 acre under Navari crop. But he had not tendered the levy due to Government. It is hardly believable that 50 bags of paddy were derived from such a small extent of 0.80 acre. The plea that the seized stock is the produce of Thiru R. Velu is, therefore, rejected. But he had not tendered the levy due to Government. It is hardly believable that 50 bags of paddy were derived from such a small extent of 0.80 acre. The plea that the seized stock is the produce of Thiru R. Velu is, therefore, rejected. In this case, the seized stock was transported from the Rice Mill at Thiruvannamalai to Gingee of South Arcot District at dead of night through circuitous route avoiding the check-post and without making entries in the trip-sheet and also without permit. The Special Tahsildar (Procurement) Tiruvannamalai has rejected that a taxi was going ahead of the lorry lending this lorry upto the level-crossing on the Tiruvannamalai-Tindivanam Road. The Special Tahsildar chased the lorry in his jeep and checked it near the district border check-post at Kattakulam and found 50 bags of paddy in the lorry transported outside this district without transport permit as required under clause 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Movement Control) Order, 1970. It is therefore, evident that this is a preplanned plot to illicitly transport outside this district the stock of 50 bags of paddy unauthorisedly purchased at Tiruvannamalai and stored in the rice mill at Tirvannamalai. "The Collector refused to accept the contention of the owner of the lorry that he had instructed the driver and the cleaner not to transport essential commodity unless covered by permit. He was of the opinion that the owner of the lorry has not proved that, all reasonable and necessary precautions have been taken against the use of lorry for such illicit movements". He therefore, held that the provisions of clause 3 of the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1970, and clause 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Movement Control) Order, 1970, issued under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, had been contravened. Consequently, he directed the confiscation of the lorry. 3. The facts alleged against the revision petitioner and taken into consideration by the Collector themselves show that the revision petitioner had no mens rea and had no control over the movement of the lorry at any relevant time when the alleged offence was committed. The revision petitioner is a resident of Vellore in North Arcot District. 3. The facts alleged against the revision petitioner and taken into consideration by the Collector themselves show that the revision petitioner had no mens rea and had no control over the movement of the lorry at any relevant time when the alleged offence was committed. The revision petitioner is a resident of Vellore in North Arcot District. There is no reason to disbelieve his statement that he had instructed the driver not to contravene the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act or any order promulgated thereunder. After the lorry left Vellore, the revision petitioner had no manner of control over its movement. In the circumstances, the question to be considered is whether, in the absence of mens rea the Collector could pass the order of confiscation now impugned. 4. In Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, Subba Rao, J., as he then was, has in laying down the law, observed as follows: "The law on the subject is fairly well-settled. It has came under judicial scrutiny of this Court on many occasions. It does not call for a detailed discussion. It is enough to restate the principles. Mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence. Doubtless a statute may exclude the element of mens rea, but it is a sound rule of construction adopted in England and also accepted in India to construe a statutory provision creating an offence in conformity with the common law rather than against it unless the statute expressly of by necessary implication excluded mens rea. The mere fact that the object of the statute is to promote welfare activities or to eradicate a grave social evil is by itself not decisive of the question whether the element of guilty mind is excluded from the ingredients of an offence. Mens rea by necessary implication may be excluded from a statute only where it is absolutely clear that the implementation of the object of the statute would otherwise be defeated. The nature of the mens rea that would be implied in a statute creating an offence depends on the object of the Act and the provisions thereof: See Srinivas Mall Bairodiya v. King Emperor1; Ravula Hariprasada Rao v. The State2and Sarjoo Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh3. Most of the relevant English decisions on the subject were referred to in the judgment of this Court in The State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George4. Most of the relevant English decisions on the subject were referred to in the judgment of this Court in The State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George4. How to disprove mens rea has been succinctly stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, volume 10 at page 283, thus: “When the existence of a particular intent or state of mind is a necessary ingredient of the offence, and prima facie proof of the existence of the intent or state of mind has been given by the prosecution the defendant may excuse himself by disproving the existence in him of any guilty intent on state of mind for example, by showing that he was justified in doing the act with which he is charged, or that he did it accidentally, or in ignorance, or that he had an honest belief in the existence of facts which, if they had really existed, would have made the act an innocent one. The existence of reasonable grounds for a belief is evidence of the honesty of that belief.” Having regard to the object of the Act, namely, to control in general public interest, among others, trade in certain commodities, it cannot be said that the object of the Act would be defeated if mens rea is read as an ingredient of the offence. The provisions of the Act do not lead to any such exclusion. Indeed, it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to impose heavy penalties like imprisonment for a period upto 3 years and to impose heavy fines on an innocent person who carries on business in an honest belief that he is doing the business in terms of the law. Having regard to the scope of the Act it would be legitimate to hold that a person commits an offence under section 7 of the Act if he intentionally contravenes any order made under section 3 of the Act. So construed the object of the Act will be best served and innocent persons will also be protected from harassment. 5. After this decision, the words “knowingly, intentionally or otherwise” were inserted in section 7 of the Act by the Amendment Act (XXXVI of 1967). However, by another Amendment Act, viz., Act XXX of 1974, these words have been deleted. 6. 5. After this decision, the words “knowingly, intentionally or otherwise” were inserted in section 7 of the Act by the Amendment Act (XXXVI of 1967). However, by another Amendment Act, viz., Act XXX of 1974, these words have been deleted. 6. In M/s. Mewalal Kapildeo Prasad v. The State of Bihar and others5, the effect of the subsequent of Amendment Act, viz., Act XXX of 1974, has been considered by a Bench of the Patna High Court, and it has been observed as follows: “To appreciate the reasons given by the two authorities, some legislative history of section 7 of the Act has to be mentioned. Prior to the amendment of section 7 of the Act by the Essential Commodities (Second Amendment) Act (XXXVI of 1967), sub-section (1) of section 7 was as follows: ‘If any person contravenes any order made under section 3 then he shall be punishable for different periods mentioned in that section’”. Questions arose before different Courts as to whether the contravention referred to in this sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act covers cases of only intentional contraventions with the requisites mens rea or will also cover cases where contraventions are made unintentionally. However, in the case of Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, the Supreme Court had to deal with the case of a dealer who had been convicted for an offence under section 7 of the Act, as he had been found to be carrying on business in foodgrains without a proper licence, although it had been found that he had made an application for licence under the Madhya Pradesh Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958, and had also deposited the requisite licence fee; no intimation to him was sent that his application was rejected. Under the impression that licence had been granted to him, he purchased food-grains from time to time and submitted returns to the licensing authority. His godowns were also checked. In that situation, it was held by the Supreme Court that although no licence had been granted to the accused concerned, mens rea which is an essential ingredient, had not been proved and on that finding the accused was acquitted holding that he was not guilty. By the aforesaid amending Act, the Act was amended. His godowns were also checked. In that situation, it was held by the Supreme Court that although no licence had been granted to the accused concerned, mens rea which is an essential ingredient, had not been proved and on that finding the accused was acquitted holding that he was not guilty. By the aforesaid amending Act, the Act was amended. The words “if any person contravenes any order made under section 3” were substituted by the words and figure “if any person contravenes, whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise, any order made under section 3”. Perhaps the object of introducing this amendment was to cover even the cases where the mens rea was not established, i.e., if the contravention was unintentional. The respondent District Magistrate and the respondent Commissioner have held that even if the assertion made on behalf of the petitioner is accepted, still he will be deemed to have contravened the provisions of the Licensing Order because of this amendment in sub-section (1) of section 7 saying that even if the contravention was unintentional, the petitioner will be made liable to punishment because of the change in law. I must, however, pointed out that on the relevant date, i.e., on 30th October, 1974, when the raid was made the amendment which had been introduced in sub-section (1) of section 7 by Act XXXVI of 1967, itself was deleted by the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974, which was published in the Central Gazette, dated 22nd June, 1974. This Ordinance was replaced by the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act (XXX of 1974), which received the assent of the President on 29th August, 1974. The relevant portion of sub-section (1) was restored as it was prior to its amendment by Act: XXVI of 1967. The words whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise, were deleted. In my opinion, the effect of this amendment will be that since that date the position was restored as it was when the said sub-section was considered by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid Nathulal’s case1. In view of this amendment before an accused person can be held to be guilty for having contravened any provision of the licensing order, it must be established that he had the necessary mens rea. If on the other hand, it is found that the contravention was unknowingly and unintentionally, he cannot be held guilty for contravention of any such provision.“ 7. If on the other hand, it is found that the contravention was unknowingly and unintentionally, he cannot be held guilty for contravention of any such provision.“ 7. In considering the question whether the principles which are applicable to a criminal trial are also applicable to a proceeding for confiscation under section 6-A of the Act, the Bench of the Patna High Court has observed: ”By a reference to section 6-A it will appear that the condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Collector is that there has been a contravention of the order made under section 3 of the Act and the Articles in question have been seized in accordance with the previsions of any such order. Sub-section (1) of section 7, which is the penal provision, also says that a person shall be punishable if he has contravened any order made under section 3. Therefore, for confiscation as well as for conviction it must be established that the person concerned has contravened any order made under section 3. It is well-settled rule of interpretation that a word occurring in the same Act is usually to be given the same meaning unless a different intention is expressed by the provisions of the Act. As such, the word ‘contravention’ has to be interpreted in section 6-A and in section 7 to mean that the provision of any order framed under section 3 of the Act has been contravened intentionally. On the other hand, if it is found that the contravention was unintentional and the person concerned had taken all reasonable care and was carrying on the business in a bona fide manner, then, in my view, even for section 6-A of the Act, it has to be interpreted that in the eye of law there has been no contravention so as to visit the dealer with the consequences of confiscating the articles which had been seized. A similar view has been expressed by a learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in the case of Kishore Lal Bihani v. Additional Collector and District Magistrate, Kanpur1. The learned Judge has rightly pointed out, if I can say so with respect that section 6-A and section 7 are in pari materia, and as such, the same meaning is to be given to the words used in the two sections. The learned Judge has rightly pointed out, if I can say so with respect that section 6-A and section 7 are in pari materia, and as such, the same meaning is to be given to the words used in the two sections. The result is that it has to be held that the order of confiscation passed by the respondent. District Magistrate, which has been affirmed by the respondent-Commissioner is illegal because the necessary ingredient of section 6-A has not been established." 8. Again this question has been considered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Mahdav Keshavmirashi v. The State of Maharashtra2, and it has been observed thus: "It is therefore, clear whether a person is to be prosecuted for the imposition of any of. the penalties under section 7 or any proceedings are to be taken for the confiscation of the goods under section 6-A before the Collector, requirement to be proved is that there has been a contravention of any order issued under the Act. In other words, the same set of circumstances must be established before an order of conviction is passed or confiscation of property is directed by the Collector under section 6-A. This being so, it would appear to us that mens tea would be a accessary element to be proved before confiscation could be ordered." Again the Bench has observed that there was no reason why the element of mens rea should not form part of the breach of the rules alleged under section 6, if the provision of section 6-A are in pari materia with the provisions of section 7. 9. I am in respectful agreement with the Division Bench of the Patna High Court and the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and extending the same to any contravention of the provisions of section 7 of the Act and to the proceedings resulting in the confiscation of the vehicle or other commodity on the ground that there was a contravention of an order passed under section 3 of the Act. 10. In the absence of any of evidence or circumstance to prove that the petitioner had any mens tea in the commission of the offence, no offence could be deemed to have been committed by him. 10. In the absence of any of evidence or circumstance to prove that the petitioner had any mens tea in the commission of the offence, no offence could be deemed to have been committed by him. The petitioner had done all that he could do as the owner of the lorry by giving specific instructions to the driver to refrain from contravening the provisions of any Act. After the lorry left the place where the petitioner is residing, the petitioner had no control over the activities of the lorry driver. This fact ought to have been taken into consideration by the Collector in penalizing the petitioner. If he deserved to be penalized, section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act has vested the discretion in the Collector to confiscate or not to confiscate the essential commodity, package, covering or receptacle in which such essential commodity is found, and any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance used in carrying such essential commodity. The Collector has not been mandated to direct confiscation of the aforesaid commodities or movables, evidently because the circumstances in which the offence, if any, was committed, the nature of the offence etc., had to be taken into consideration in directing such confiscation. As the liability sought to be fastened upon the owner of the vehicle is merely a vicarious liability, a more compassionate approach and lenient penalty would have sufficed to meet the ends of justice. If the petitioner cannot be attributed with mens rea in the commission ‘of the offence the Collector was not bound to direct the confiscation of the vehicle. As no mens rea can be attributed to the revision petitioner, he cannot be deemed to have committed any offence or abetted the commission of any offence under the Essential Commodities Act or any order issued under the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Movement Control) Order. Therefore, the order of the Collector directing the confiscation of the lorry MDJ 2104 and the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge confirming the same are set aside. The Criminal Revision case is allowed. The lorry which is now said to be in the custody of the petitioner may be retained by him. The bond executed by the petitioner and his sureties will stand cancelled.