JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS second appeal is at the instance of the plaintiff-landlord whose claim for eviction of the respondent-tenants from the suit shop has been dismissed by both the Courts below by holding that the plaintiff could not establish the ground of bona fide need of the suit-shop lor the purposes of his business. ( 2. ) APPARENTLY, the aforesaid finding on which the suit has been dismissed by the Courts below is a finding on a pure question of fact. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, raised the following contentions and made an effort to show that the aforesaid finding was vitiated due to various errors of law committed by the Courts below. ( 3. ) THE first contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant needs to be mentioned for simply being rejected. The contention put forth was that once plaintiff landlord mentions any one of the grounds as specified in clauses (e) and (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (here-in-after referred to as the act), the Civil Court should pass a decree for eviction if it is otherwise satisfied that the tenancy has been properly determined and need not proceed to try and record a finding on the existence of the grounds referred to above. The seemingly ingenuous argument further put forth in support of this astounding contention was that Section 17 of the Act provides a check on the misuse of claiming eviction by falsely raising such grounds of bona fide need inasmuch as according to the provisions of the said section a plaintiff landlord who secures a decree on the ground of bona fide need of the suit accommodation either for residential purposes or for non-residential purposes if does not occupy the suit accommodation for the purposes in question after securing vacant possession, is liable for action and the tenant has also been given a right to claim re-entry. Shri B. D. Gupta pointed out that his contention finds support from the language of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act which simply prohibits entertaining a suit which does not disclose a ground specified in the various clauses of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. Shri B. D. Gupta pointed out that his contention finds support from the language of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act which simply prohibits entertaining a suit which does not disclose a ground specified in the various clauses of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. The argument was that it does not prohibit the court from making a decree in the absence of any such ground having been established. But as seeming ingenuity does not pay elsewhere it does not pay in the Court of law. For the purposes of interpretation, the language used in sub-section (1)of section 12 of the Act is at par with the words that no decree shall be passed unless any one of the grounds specified in the various clauses of sub-section (1) is established. Once the institution of the suit is prohibited, it is clear that before proceeding to make a decree for eviction the Court must be satisfied that any one of the grounds as specified in sub-section (1)6f section 12 of the Act is established. If the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, it will lead to an anomalous situation. Large number of tenants will be uprooted merely on the say of the landlords and will be required to claim re-entry when it is found that the plaintiff-landlords did not occupy the accommodations for their own need. The purpose of the Act is to protect the interest of the tenant against eviction merely at the will of the landlord. ( 4. ) THE second contention urged was that the Courts below wrongly relied on certain circumstances, which were extraneous according to the learned counsel, for holding that the need as put up in the plaint was not genuine. On going through the record it is apparent that the courts below have taken into consideration the circumstance that the plaintiff at the relevant time did construct two more shops opening on the same road in the close vicinity of the suit accommodation and let them out on a higher rent instead of himself occupying any one of them for his business. In order to meet this situation, first an attempt was made to show that the suit-shops newly constructed were not on the road side but were actually inside the house opening on the court-yard and were suitable for using as godowns only and not suitable for the need of Kirana shop. But when the location of the shops was pointed out in the map as being situate on the road side and the statement of the plaintiffs witnesses to the effect that prior to reconstruction the said shops were used by the plaintiff himself for the Kirana shop, the learned counsel for the appellant did not press the said point. The learned counsel, however, thereafter contended that despite the aforesaid fact, the case of the plaintiff about his genuine need was not affected because the plaintiff-landlord was entitled to earn more rent by letting out shops which he had constructed instead of keeping the same for himself and could insist on getting the tenant occupying another shop on a lasser rent evicted. In my opinion, this contention too cannot be accepted. In order to assess the genuineness of the need the aforesaid circumstance relied by the Courts below cannot be said to be extraneous. It was absolutely relevant and more or less clinched the issue. If the plaintiff had a reasonably suitable accommodation of his own and if his need is genuine, the natural conduct on his part will be to occupy the said shop for satisfying his need. The fact that the available vacant accommodation could fetch more rent, if let out, is not a relevant explanation in the context of assessing genuineness of the need. The language used in clauses (e) and (f) of section 12 (1) of the Act makes it clear that what is relevant is the availability of the alternative reasonably suitable accommodation and not its capacity to fetch less or more rent. ( 5. ) APART from the aforesaid circumstance, there was one more undisputed circumstance which was rightly relied by the Courts below. Admittedly, the plaintiff obtained a decree for eviction in respect of one more adjacent shop on the similar ground of his own need. After obtaining the said decree and securing the vacant possession of the said shop in execution of the said decree, the plaintiff, instead of himself keeping the same, let it out to one of his relations. Admittedly, the plaintiff obtained a decree for eviction in respect of one more adjacent shop on the similar ground of his own need. After obtaining the said decree and securing the vacant possession of the said shop in execution of the said decree, the plaintiff, instead of himself keeping the same, let it out to one of his relations. Shri Gupta, however, contended that the aforesaid shop was let out because it was not suitable. This argument is being advanced for the first time during the course of hearing before this court. When in the trial Court this circumstance was put to the plaintiff, he did not come with plea that the shop the possession of which he secured by obtaining a decree for eviction, was not suitable. As a matter of fact, such a contention could not be raised because while claiming the decree for eviction of the said shop, the plaintiff himself accepted the same to be suitable for his purposes. ( 6. ) UNDER these circumstances, the finding concurrently arrived by the courts below on a pure question of fact about the genuineness of the need and bona fide requirement of the plaintiff is not open for interference at this stage in second appeal. It is based on sufficient material on record and cannot be said to be arbitrary or perverse. ( 7. ) NO other point was pressed. ( 8. ) THIS appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower-appellate Court are affirmed. Counsels fee according to schedule, if certified appeal dismissed.