( 1 ) THIS second appeal is bro'ught on behalf of the Union of India challenging the validity of the decree declaring that the removal from service of the respondent-plaintiff was illegal and invalid. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts are these: The respondent-Sreenath was a M. T. Driver in the Military Farm, Belgaum. He was a civilian serving in the Defence Department. His duty, inter alia, was to drive the Military farm vehicles for delivery of milk to various Units. There was some allegation against him. The allegation was that he had sold milk to unauthorised persons who were milkmen by trade. In order to investigate his conduct and to pin-point the responsibility for the irregular disposal of milk and dereliction of duty a Court of Enquiry under the Army Act, 1950 was ordered by Col. J. D. Stanley, Station Commander, Belgaum. The Court of Enquiry consisted of the following Members -. (1) Major F. B. Rai, MLIRC, Belgaum, (Presiding Officer): (2) Capt. T. N. Subramaniam, military Farm, Belgaum, and (3) Subedar Ramachandra Jaga- dale, MLIRC, Belgaum. The Court of Enquiry assembled and after examination of some witnesses and interrogating the plaintiff, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff and one delivery man Adavappa sold milk to the civilian milkmen near St. Paul's High School Gate on several days, without any authority and for personal gains. The report of the Enquiry was forwarded to the Station Commander for his remarks ). On 29-6-1969, the station Commander made an order agreeing with the opinion of the Court that the plaintiff and the delivery man Adavappa were guilty of selling milk to unauthorised persons. He further recommended that the said personnel be suspended from duty pending disciplinary action. ( 3 ) THE Deputy Director of Military Farms framed a charge against the plaintiff and appointed Lt. J. S. Sandhu as the Enquiry Officer. The charge framed against the, plaintiff reads as follows :"statement of Articles of charge framed against Shri Srinath, m. T. Driver of Military Farm, Belgaum. Article-I-Gross Misconduct- that the said Shri Srinath while functioning as MT Driver at military Farm, Belgaum during May 69 failed to maintain, absolute integrity and devotion to duty in as much as he connived with delivery man Adavappa in illegal sales of milk to unauthorised civilians during the period from 17 to 27th May 69 to derive wrongful personal gains. Article-I-Gross Misconduct- that the said Shri Srinath while functioning as MT Driver at military Farm, Belgaum during May 69 failed to maintain, absolute integrity and devotion to duty in as much as he connived with delivery man Adavappa in illegal sales of milk to unauthorised civilians during the period from 17 to 27th May 69 to derive wrongful personal gains. He has thereby contravened the provisions of Rule 3 of the central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964. "annexure-II to the Memorandum of charge contained statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of the charge. The imputations were mainly based on the evidence collected by the Court of enquiry. It also referred to the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry and the findings reached thereon. ( 4 ) THE disciplinary proceedings were initiated under the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The Enquiry Officer, in his report, held that the plaintiff was guilty of the charge. He submitted the report to the Director of Military farms who by a notice dated 29-11-69, called uppn the plaintiff to show cause why he should not be removed from service. The plaintiff, in his reply dated 4-12-69, contended, inter alia, that the Court of Enquiry was illegal; that the charge framed against him on the basig of such enquiry was also illegal and that the disciplinary proceedings conducted by the enquiry Officer were contrary to the rules of natural justice. ( 5 ) ON 7-7-70, the Director of Military Farms made an order removing the plaintiff from service with effect from 25-7-70. His order does not give any indication that he had considered the representation submitted by the plaintiff in reply to the show cause notice. He has simply stated that in the light of the charge levelled against the plaintiff and all other evidence on record, the plaintiff was guilty of charge of gross misconduct and failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty inasmuch as he connived with delivery man Adavappa in illegal sale of milk to unauthorised civilians. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff appealed to the Quarter Master General at New delhi. His appeal was dismissed by order dated 6-4-71. Thereafter, he instituted the suit for declaration that the order of removal was illegal. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff appealed to the Quarter Master General at New delhi. His appeal was dismissed by order dated 6-4-71. Thereafter, he instituted the suit for declaration that the order of removal was illegal. The trial Court, after considering the evidence on record, held that the court of Enquiry which was treated as a preliminary enquiry was not in accordance with law; that the Enquriy Officer did not give the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, and 'that the order of removal was not by the competent person. With these findings, the Court decreed the suit. That decree has been affirmed in the appeal. The appellate court has substantially concurred with all the findings recorded by the trial Court and, in addition, it has observed :". . . . the preliminary inquiry started against the plaintiff under the Court of Enquiry as contemplated by the Army Act is an illegal enquiry as such an enquiry by the Court of Enquiry against plaintiff is not authorised by law. So, the report of the Court of Enquiry, which held against the plaintiff is made the basis of starting disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff. So, the plaintiff is justified in saying that such an illegal and unauthorised enquiry held against him by the Court of Enquiry has prejudiced his case and the Enquiry Officer and his superiors were biased and prejudiced against the plaintiff because of the report submitted by the Court of Enquiry against the plaintiff. "hence this second appeal by the defendant. ( 7 ) BEFORE me, it was fairly conceded for the respondent that the older of removal was made by the competent person, and so also the appeal against the said order was disposed of by the competent authority. However, the decree of the Courts below was sought to be justified on the aforesaid conclusion of the appellate Court i. e. , on the ground of bias of the Enquiry Officer in view of the report of the Court of Enquiry under the Army Act. But for the appellant it was urged that there was nothing inherent in the proceedings which would give rige to any suspicion of bias since Lt. J. S. Sandhu made the enquiry in accordance with the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, with adequate opportunity to the plaintiff to defend himself and his finding was! But for the appellant it was urged that there was nothing inherent in the proceedings which would give rige to any suspicion of bias since Lt. J. S. Sandhu made the enquiry in accordance with the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, with adequate opportunity to the plaintiff to defend himself and his finding was! not based on the evidence collected by the Court of Enquiry. It was also urged that there was nothing wrong in treating the proceedings of the Court of enquiry as preliminary enquiry for the purpose of initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. ( 8 ) BEFORE considering the rival contentions, it is necessary to state that it was not the contention of the appellant that the Court of enquiry under the Army Act was a must against the respondent, who was a civilian. The question then is, whether the opinion expressed by the Court of Enquiry which formed the sole basis for framing the charge against the respondent, has led to any likelihood of bias against the plaintiff in the mind of the Enquiry Officer, thereby, rendering the disciplinary proceedings vid, being contrary to the principles of natural justice. Answer to the above question requires a careful analysis of the events and circumstances of the case. Rightly or wrongly, there was a Court of enquiry under the Army Act. It wag ordered by the Station Commander who is always the overall administrative authority to control all the army units and other defence installations in his Station for local administration and discipline. The members of the Court consisted of the top- brass in the local Military Station. They were: (1) Major, (2) Captain and (3) Subedar. The first two and the Station Commander who ordered the court of Enquiry were ranked above the Lt. J. S. Sandhu, who conducted the Departmental Enquiry. They had recorded their opinion that the respondent was guilty. The evidence collected by the Court of Enquiry formed the basis of the charge framed in the disciplinray proceedings. When the higher authorities like Colonel, Major and Captain have held that the respondent was guilty of the accusation, would it be reasonable to imagine that there was no likelihood of bias against the respondent in the mind of Lt. J. S. Sandhu who held the Departmental Enquiry. When the higher authorities like Colonel, Major and Captain have held that the respondent was guilty of the accusation, would it be reasonable to imagine that there was no likelihood of bias against the respondent in the mind of Lt. J. S. Sandhu who held the Departmental Enquiry. Of course, I must state that there was no actual bias or want of good faith on his part; but, having regard to the circumstances, the real likelihood of bias, in my opinion, cannot be ruled out. ( 9 ) WHILE determining the existence of real likelihood of bias, the court must look at the impression of ordinary people against the background of the proved circumstances and need not enquire whether the authority or person was, in fact, biased. In Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v. Lannon; Regina v. London rent Assessment Panel Committee Ex parte Metropolitan Properties co (FGC) Ltd ( (1968) 3 WLR. 694, 707), Lord Denning M. R. observeu :" The Court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the Chairman of the Tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The Court looks at the impression which would be given to other people Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand. . . . . "the learned Judge continued :". . . . The Court will not inquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rodted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: 'the Judge was biased'. "similar view was expressed'by the Supreme Court in S. Parthasarathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR. 1973 SC. 2701 ). Mathew J, speaking for the Court observed:" We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there isl real likelihood of bias. 1973 SC. 2701 ). Mathew J, speaking for the Court observed:" We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there isl real likelihood of bias. The Court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seem to be done. " ( 10 ) HAVING regard to these principles, and looking at the attending circumstances of the case, it seems to me that the appellate Judge was right in his conclusion although not accurate in his wordings that since the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry formed the basis of the charge and also treated as a preliminary enquiry, the Enquiry Officer was biased against the respondent. It appears to me, that Lt. J. S. Sandhu, being a junior Officer, could not have gone against the opinion of guilt expressed by his superiors in the Army notwith standing the evidence adduced before him. Almost a similar question came before this Court in amiruddin v. Divl Supdt, South Central Rly ( (1975) 2 Karlj 88 ). Upon certain accident, there was an inter-departmental enquiry conducted by the ' Superior Officers in the railways followed by disciplinary proceedings against a Railway servant by a Junior Officer. The accused Officer therein was found guilty in the inter-departmental enquiry. Dealing with the contention that the inferior Officer could not have itaken an independent attitude in disciplinary proceedings without the likelihood of bias, this Court observed :". . . . . . He was subordinate to the Officers who conducted the inter-departmental enquiry, and a person who was at the beck and call of the General Manager. He culd not have disregarded (he findings given by the GM to the effect that the petitioner was guilty of the charges'. He could have done so at his own peril. In this state of affairs, and on an over-all consideration of the facts and attending circumstances of the case, it appears to me that the apprehension of the petitioner that his cage was prejudiced or prejudged by the Enquiry Officer was reasonable, and it is sufficient to quash the impugned order. He could have done so at his own peril. In this state of affairs, and on an over-all consideration of the facts and attending circumstances of the case, it appears to me that the apprehension of the petitioner that his cage was prejudiced or prejudged by the Enquiry Officer was reasonable, and it is sufficient to quash the impugned order. It is not necessary for me, as observed by the Supreme Court in Parthasarathi's case to enquire whether the Enquiry Officer was really prejudiced----" ( 11 ) THOSE observations are also applicable to the present case. ( 12 ) IN the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, I make no order as to costs. --- *** --- .