JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS second appeal is at the instance of the defendant-tenant against whom the lower appellate Court has passed a decree for eviction along with the claim of arrears of rent and mesne profits, by holding that the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act (here-in-after referred to as the Act) was available to the plaintiff. ( 2. ) A brief calendar of facts relevant for the purposes of this appeal is that Smt. Rukmanibai, the plaintiff, widow of Bhagwandas Shastri, brought the suit out of which this appeal arises claiming arrears of rent and mesne profits. The ground put forth for claiming eviction was the default in payment of rent as contemplated by section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. According to the allegation made in the plaint, the defendant was in arrears of rent after 31-10-1967, and despite the service of notice of demand, he failed to pay the amount of arrears and did not comply with the requirements of the quit notice served on him. The defendant resisted the claim of the plaintiff by contending that originally Bhagwandas undisput-edly being the owner of the suit house his landlord and after his death all his legal representatives became his landlord despite the fact that he has been paying rent of the plaintiffs alone after the death of Bhagwandas. The objection was that the plaintiff alone could not terminate the tenancy and was also not competent to bring the suit for eviction without joining the other legal representatives, i. e. the sons and daughters of the late Bhagwandas, in the suit. It was also contended that the defendant has paid rent up to 31st August 1968 and, therefore, the quantum of arrears of rent was in dispute. The trial Court found that the plaintiff alone was competent to bring the suit. The relationship of landlord and tenant was in between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the quit notice issued by the plaintiff validly determined the tenancy. The trial Court accordingly decreed the claim for arrears of rent but dismissed the claim for eviction on the ground that the default in payment of rent was liable to be condoned and since the entire arrears of rent were deposited during the pendency of the suit, there was no case for granting a decree for eviction. The trial Court accordingly decreed the claim for arrears of rent but dismissed the claim for eviction on the ground that the default in payment of rent was liable to be condoned and since the entire arrears of rent were deposited during the pendency of the suit, there was no case for granting a decree for eviction. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the dismissal of her claim for eviction. The defendant filed cross-objection as against decree directing payment of arrears of lent passed against him by the trial Court holding that there was the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant, however, did not pay proper court-fees on the cross-objection and that was found by the lower appellate Court to be sufficient ground for dismissing the same summarily. However, despite that, the lower appellate Court dealt with the contention about the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the plaintiff and the defendant and the competency of smt. Rukmanibai to bring the suit for eviction after determining the tenancy by service of quit notice. The lower appellate Court after due consideration of the material on record came to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence from which it could be safely inferred that the defendant has been treating the plaintiff alone as his landlady and that the relationship of landlord and tenant was in between the defendant and the plaintiff alone. In the earlier proceedings also, the defendant had admitted the plaintiff Smt. Rukmanibai alone to be his landlady. Nothing could be pointed out to show that the aforesaid finding recorded by the lower appellate Court was bad either in law or on fact. ( 3. ) WHAT was mainly urged before this Court at this stage in second appeal was that since the defendant has raised a dispute in the written statement about the quantum of arrears of rent, the trial Court was bound to make an order provisionlly fixing the amount of arrears of rent liable to be deposited in accordance with the provisions of section 13 (2) of the Act, for securing the compliance of section 13 (1) of the Act. It was contended that since the same was not done, the provisions of section 13 (1) of the Act remained arrested and under these circumstances despite various defaults having been committed in the matter of payment of rent within the prescribed period after service of notice of the suit and month to month deposit, the defendant-tenant did not lose the protection of section 12 (3) or section 13 (5) of the Act and, therefore, no decree could be passed under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. In these premises, it was contended that since eviction was not claimed on any other ground the suit for eviction was liable to be dismissed. ( 4. ) I have gone through the written statement. It is true that the defendant tenant did not raise a dispute regarding the extent of arrears of rent by contending that he had paid the same up to 31st August 1968. It is also apparent that the said claim was found to be baseless and, in the absence of any believable evidence with regard to payment of arrears of rent the claim of the plaintiff for arrears of rent was decreed after full trial with effect from 1-11-1967. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contended that irrespective of the truth or falsehood of the defence raised, the trial Court was bound to make a provisional order for the purposes of section 13 (1) of the Act because the dispute about the quantum of arrears of rent was raised. He placed reliance on the observations of a Full Bench decision of this Court in Chogalal v. Satyanarayan, (1975 M P L J 657.)wherein it has been observed once a dispute is raised by the defendant-tenant even in the written statement and not by way of a separate application, the court is bound to decide the same and make a provisional order and unless the same is done the provision of section 13 (1) of the Act creating an obligation on the defendant-tenant to deposit the rent, remain arrested. ( 5. ) IN my opinion, there is no dispute with the proposition laid down above. Once a dispute is raised naturally the trial Court will be bound to make a provisional order as provided in sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act. ( 5. ) IN my opinion, there is no dispute with the proposition laid down above. Once a dispute is raised naturally the trial Court will be bound to make a provisional order as provided in sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act. The same is necessary because sub section (2) of section 13 of the Act lays down that in case of dispute, the defendant-tenant will deposit the amount of rent in compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the act according to the provisional order made by the Court under sub-section (2)of section 13 of the Act. But in order to attract the applicability of section 13 (2) of the Act and the suspension of the operation of the provision of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act, continuance of the existence of the dispute for the said purpose is necessary. If a tenant raises a dispute about the quantum of arrears of rent or the rate of rent and wants that the same should be provisionally decided for enabling him to comply with the provisions of section 13 (1) of the Act, the dispute must remain in existence for the said purpose. If after raising such a dispute the defendant-tenant waives the same and approaches the Court saying that he was prepared to deposit the arrears of rent in compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the act as claimed by the plaintiff-landlady though he does not admit the quantum of rent and seeks extension of time, to deposit the amount as claimed by the plaintiff, he cannot be, later on, allowed to resile and state that even if he has committed any default in compliance with the provisions of sub section (1) of section 13 of the Act he was not deprived of the protection because the trial court did not make a provisional order. A party which can raise a dispute can always waive it. The aforesaid conduct on the part of the tenant will be nothing but waiving the dispute for the purposes of sub sections (1) and (2)of section 13 of the Act. The litigant cannot take advantage of his default of misleading the Court and the opposite party alike. A party which can raise a dispute can always waive it. The aforesaid conduct on the part of the tenant will be nothing but waiving the dispute for the purposes of sub sections (1) and (2)of section 13 of the Act. The litigant cannot take advantage of his default of misleading the Court and the opposite party alike. Claiming extension of time by saying that he is ready to deposit the amount according to the rate claimed by the plaintiff despite the same having been not admitted, the tenant creates a clear impression on the Court as well as the opposite party that he does not want a provisional decision, and this conduct amounts to waiver of the dispute for the limited purpose of section 13 (1) and (2) of the Act. ( 6. ) SHRI Katare, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that there was no question of any waiver in the matter of statutory duty of the court. He contended that according to the observations of the Full Bench in the case cited above, it was the statutory obligation on the trial Court to make an order provisionally fixing the quantum of the arrears of rent. This argument cannot be accepted for the reason that the obligation of the trial Court to make the provisional order under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act is always dependent on the existence of the dispute which the tenant raises for the said purpose. It is apparent that the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act are of provisional nature for the limited purpose of securing compliance of section 13 (1) of the Act without any injustice to the tenant by compelling him to make payment of any amount claimed as arrears at an imaginary rate of rent by the landlord. If the tenant in the present case would not have come up before the trial Court that he should be given further time for making payment in compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act according to the rate and quantum of arrears of rent, as claimed by the plaintiff, the trial Court would have naturally made the provisional order. Having not done so, now the tenant-defendant cannot be heard that despite his aforesaid conduct there was no waiver of the dispute already by him for the purposes of section 13 (1) (2) of the Act. This contention therefore, fails and is rejected. The fact that there was default on the part of the defendant in compliance with the provisions of section 13 (1) of the Act and the challenge being confined only to the absence of a provisional order the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court directing eviction of the tenant under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act cannot be assailed and is liable to be confirmed. ( 7. ) ON behalf of the respondent, a decision in Roopchand v. Mst. Premibai, ( (civil Second Appeal No. 266/1973) 1976 M P W N Note 81.) was referred. On going through the decision, I find that similar view has been taken by the learned Single Judge in that case also. In the said case also, the defendant tenant despite having denied the quantum of arrears of rent as claimed by the plaintiff moved an application seeking extension of time by offering to deposit under protest the entire arrears of rent, as claimed by the plaintiff and it was held that even if the dispute was earlier raised but later on waived due to the aforesaid conduct as there was no necessity for fixing provisional rent. While observing so, the learned single Judge has also referred to the decision of the Full Bench referred to above. I do not find any reason to take a different view of the matter. ( 8. ) SHRI Katare, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that in the aforesaid decision, there was no dispute about the rate of rent but the dispute was about the quantum of arrears of rent only. He tried to show that in the present case there was a dispute about the rate of rent also. On going through the pleading, it is apparent that there is no dispute about the rate of rent. It was not disputed that the defendant tenant was liable to pay Rs. 18 towards tent and Rs. 2 towards charges total Rs. 20 P. M. to the landlord. The defendant had admitted this fact by saying that he was liable to pay Rs. 18 as rent plus Rs. 2 as water charges. It was not disputed that the defendant tenant was liable to pay Rs. 18 towards tent and Rs. 2 towards charges total Rs. 20 P. M. to the landlord. The defendant had admitted this fact by saying that he was liable to pay Rs. 18 as rent plus Rs. 2 as water charges. Under these circumstances, in substance, there is no dispute about the rate of rent. In any case, whatever may be the dispute, the question involved is about its waiver and as the same has been waived there was no necessity of making any provisional order either about the rate of rent or of the quantum of arrears of rent for the purposes of subsection (1) read with sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act. I am respectfully in full agreement with the view expressed in the case cited above Roopchand v. Mst. Premibai. ( 9. ) NO other point was pressed. ( 10. ) THIS appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are affirmed. Counsels fee according to schedule if certified. Appeal dismissed.