Short Note : This is defendant's appeal against judgment and decree dated 28-8-1972 confirming the decree of ejectment passed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff-respondent Municipal Council. 2. In this appeal Shri K.N. Gupta, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has raised only one contention which is to the effect that on the facts stated by the plaintiff himself, the plea of invalidity of the notice for purposes of termination of tenancy can be raised and the notice to quit (Ex.P.3) is invalid inasmuch as it does not terminate the tenancy giving one month's notice as stipulated between the original defendant and the predecessor in title of the plaintiff-respondent. Shri B.D. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent argued in support of the impugned judgment and contended that (1) the rent note required to be registered compulsorily. Therefore, its terms cannot be looked into and (2) notice to quit is invalid. 3. The lease within contemplation of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act must be a bilateral document and it should also be a lease of the character prescribed by it. In other words besides being bilateral document in order to be hit by the provision of section 107 of Transfer of Property Act it should be a lease of any of the following categories:- (a) from year to year. (b) for any term exceeding one year, or (c) reserving yearly rent. 4. If a lease fulfils such description, then, it can, be made only by a registered instrument. The rent note (Kabuliyat) Ex.P-1 does not fulfil such description, because it is not a bilateral document, a document executed by both lessor and lessee as contemplated by section 105 read with section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and also because it does not fall in any of the forgoing categories of leases. As such it does not fall within the mischief of section 107 of T.P. Act. 5. So far as the Indian Registration Act goes, by virtue of the definition contained in section 2(7) thereof, the meaning and concept of lease has been extended to include, even a document which is unilateral, within the meaning of the word 'lease'. Therefore, Ex.P-1 is a lease within the meaning of the definition contained in section 2(7) of Indian Registration Act, being a Kabuliyat. Therefore, Ex.P-1 is a lease within the meaning of the definition contained in section 2(7) of Indian Registration Act, being a Kabuliyat. It does not require to be compulsorily registrable under section 17(1)(d) of the Act because it does not also fulfil the character of the lease falling within the mischief thereof. Therefore, Ex.P-1 is a document which does not require to be compulsorily registered and can be looked into to ascertain the terms thereof. 6. The other point put forth by the learned counsel for the plaintiff is that in absence of plea about invalidity of the notice to quit in the written statement, the question as to termination of tenancy by valid notice to suit, cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. Whatever may have been the position of law prior to the pronouncement by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case reported in AIR 1972 SC 2526 J.C. Chatterjee and others v. Shri Sri Kishan Tandon and another, the position of law thereafter, is as under :- "Where in a suit for rejectment of a tenant the plaint allegation as to termination of tenancy by a valid notice is neither denied nor any issue demanded thereon by defendant, the point as to termination of tenancy being essentially one of law can be raised in second appeal and decided by the High Court without remanding the case." 7. Accordingly, where a plea about termination of tenancy by a valid notice to quit is tried to be raised on the basis of allegations made in the plaint and/or admitted by the plaintiff, the point about invalidity of notice is essentially one of law only and can be permitted to be raised in second appeal. Therefore, failure of the defendant to raise the plea in the written statement and rejection of his application for amendment of the written statement to raise the plea at the first appellate stage, is also of no adverse consequence. On the contrary, is shows that the defendant made an attempt to urge the point about invalidity of the notice before the learned District Judge. Accordingly, the point relating to termination of the tenancy by a valid notice to quit can be raised in this appeal. 8. The brings me to the further question about invalidity of the notice to quit. The rent note dated 4-10-1975 is Ex.P-1 in the case. Accordingly, the point relating to termination of the tenancy by a valid notice to quit can be raised in this appeal. 8. The brings me to the further question about invalidity of the notice to quit. The rent note dated 4-10-1975 is Ex.P-1 in the case. It contains a terms with regard to notice to quit which is as under :- "Mahakmeko Awashyakata Hone Ke Dasha Me Ek Mas Ka Notice Milne Par Rikta Kar Di Jawegi". 9. Thus there is a contract between the parties with regard to notice to quit. Therefore, the provisions of section 106 of Transfer of Property Act do no apply to the case and the notice in order to be effective and valid for purposes of termination of tenancy must comply with the aforesaid term. The provisions of section 106 of Transfer of Property Act are object to the contract to the contrary and as such in presence of the contract to the contrary, it does not apply. 10. Notice to quit is admittedly issued by registered post on 19-9-1960 and served on the defendant on 21-9-1960 vide Ex.P-3 acknowledment receipt. The notice does not contain an option clause which may be of indefeatable character. It puts the last date to vacate as 9-10-1960. Thus the notice does not comply with the stipulation between the parties contained in Ex.P-1. Accordingly notice to quit cannot be said to be valid notice. 11. In view of tile position of facts and law as stated by me earlier, the plea about invalidity of the notice merits acceptance and it is held that notice to quit was ineffective for purposes of termination of tenancy. As such, it is invalid. Accordingly the decree for ejectment cannot be allowed to stand. AIR 1972 SC 2526 relied on. Appeal partly allowed.