JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS second appeal is at the instance of the plaintiff whose claim for possession of certain agricultural lands has been dismissed except for one Khasra No. 8/2 which has, however, been decreed in her favour against the defendant-respondents by the lower appellate Court. ( 2. ) THE trial Court, however, decreed the claim of the plaintiff for the following five Khasra numbers out of nine Khasra numbers as claimed in the plaint, viz. , Khasra Nos. 8/1, 8/2, 6/2, 9/2 and 15/2. The trial Court decreed the claim for possession of the aforesaid five Khasra numbers by holding that those Khasra numbers were the Khudkasht land of the husband of the plaintiff, who was, admittedly, the Zamindar of the village and, on his death, the plaintiff held the same as a pucca tenant and the defendants had no right, title or interest on the same by virtue of the Patta which they claimed to have got from the mother-in-law of the plaintiff. The Courts below have found that the Patta issued by the mother-in-law of the plaintiff in favour of the defendants in respect of the suit lands was absolutely unauthorised and illegal and, as such, was not binding on the plaintiff. It was also found as a fact that the defendants did not bring the lands under cultivation in pursuance of the said Patta before the abolition of Zamindari. This position was not disputed even before the lower appellate Court and the defendants ultimately conceded that they did not get any right, title or interest by virtue of the said Patta issued by the mother-in-law of the plaintiff and the same was not binding on the plaintiff. The defendants, however, contended that since the suit-lands were not recorded as Khudkasht before the date of abolition of Zamindari, i. e. 2-10-1951, the plaintiff had no locus standi to claim possession of the same because the lands in question had vested in the State and the State alone could evict them. The defendants, however, contended that since the suit-lands were not recorded as Khudkasht before the date of abolition of Zamindari, i. e. 2-10-1951, the plaintiff had no locus standi to claim possession of the same because the lands in question had vested in the State and the State alone could evict them. This argument found favour with the lower appellate Court and on finding that since only one Khasra No. 8 j2 was recorded as Khudkasht in the Khasra papers for the samvat year 2007, which according to the lower appellate Court, was the khasra of the relevant year for the purposes of satisfying the requirements of sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Zamindari Abolition Act, the plaintiff could get possession of the said Khasra No. 8 j2 alone from the defendants and was not entitled to a decree for possession of the remaining Khasra numbers despite the fact that the defendants had no right, title or interest in the same. ( 3. ) THUS, the following points arise in the present case :- (1) Whether the entries in the Khasra prepared for the Samvat year 2008 are relevant and sufficient to satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) of section 4 of the Zamindari Abolition Act, or, as held by the lower appellate Court, the entries in the Khasra for the Samvat year 2007 alone are relevant ? (2) Whether the statement prepared by the Compensation Officer showing the aforesaid five Khasra numbers along with other such lands to be Khudkashi lands Male to be retained by the outgoing proprietor in pucca tenancy rights and fixing assessment of land revenue over the same payable to the State by the outgoing proprietor as a Pucca tenant, is sufficient for the purposes of the present suit to entitle the plaintiff to claim possession from the defendants, who undisputedly had no right, title or interest ? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession even after the abolition of the Zamindari on the ground that the defendants had dispossessed her in the year 1952, and since they had no right, title or interest, the plaintiff was entitled to get back possession irrespective of any defect in her own title ? ( 4. (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession even after the abolition of the Zamindari on the ground that the defendants had dispossessed her in the year 1952, and since they had no right, title or interest, the plaintiff was entitled to get back possession irrespective of any defect in her own title ? ( 4. ) IN order to decide the first question, it would be relevant to reproduce sub-section (2) of section 4 of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act, which is as below :- "4. Consequences of the vesting of an estate in the State:-* * * (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the proprietor shall continue to remain in possession of his Khudkasht land, so recorded in the annual village papers before the date of vesting. " From the perusal of the language used in the above-quoted sub-section (2)of section 4 of the Act, it is apparent that apart from actual cultivation of the land as Khudkasht in favour of the Zamindar in the annual village papers before 2-10-1951, i. e. , the date of vesting. ( 5. ) ACCORDING to the comparative almanac, the period after February-March 1951, i. e. , Chaitra onwards which covers the period before 2-10-1951, falls in Samvat year 2008. The agricultural year also starts from 1st July every year and ends with 30th June of the next year according to the English calendar. What has to be seen for the purposes of sub-section (2) of sec-tion 4 of the Zamindari Abolition Act is the record of the suit lands as khudkasht in the annual village papers before 2-10 1951. Khasra is one of the annual village papers in which a record of lands brought under cultivation as Khudkasht by the Zamindar along with the details in cases of cultivation also is kept and maintained every year. ( 6. ) ACCORDING to the provisions contained in the land Records Manual of Gwalior State which was undisputedly in force at the relevant time and the preparation of the annual papers, like Khasra, etc , governed by the same, it is apparent that the Khasra for the Samvat year 2008 covering the period in between July to October 1951 comes into existence only after 30th April 1952. Section 65 in Chapter V of Land Record Manual, as reproduced below along with the English translation makes it specifically clear that the annual khasra becomes complete after 30th April every year containing the details of the fact of cultivation by persons concerned and the details of crop, etc. , for the agricultural year commencing from July of the previous year. The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 4 of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act contemplate the fact of record of cultivation as Khudkasht in the annual paper before 2-10-1951. Since the aforesaid date falls in the Samvat year 2008, the annual papers which are in existence immediately before the said period are undisputedly of the Samvat year 2007, and, therefore, the entry contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 4 of the said Act can find place in Samvat year 2007. ( 7. ) FROM the perusal of the record it is apparent that the plaintiff could not produce the Khasra of Samvat year 2007 showing the suit lands as secorded as Khudkasht. It is true that the State Government despite there being no entry of the land as Khudkasht in the Samvat year 2007 did treat the suit lands as the Khudkasht land as is evident from the assessment Parcha prepared by the Compensation Officer in the year 1954. The said Parcha included in the list all those five Khasra numbers which were treated as khudkasht in the year 2007 and assessment was made over them in favour of the plaintiff as a Pucca Krishak as contemplated by section 38 of the Act. The lower appellate Court was, however, of the opinion that since the entries in the Khasra of the relevant year, i. e, Samvat 2007, did not disclose the suit lands recorded as Khudkasht lands, the second requirement of section 4 (2) was not satisfied and, despite the State Government having treated the aforesaid lands as Khudkasht the same could not be treated as Khudkasht and, as such, was the land liable to vest in the State. The lower appellate Court, accordingly, came to the conclusion that since the land was liable to vest in the State, the plaintiff, who was the proprietor, lost all her rights title and interest in the said land and could not maintain the suit claiming the relief of possession. ( 8. The lower appellate Court, accordingly, came to the conclusion that since the land was liable to vest in the State, the plaintiff, who was the proprietor, lost all her rights title and interest in the said land and could not maintain the suit claiming the relief of possession. ( 8. ) IT would be significant to mention that the lower appellate Court did not disturb the findings recorded by the trial Court to the effect that the plaintiff Savitri Bai was in possession of the suit-lands in the year 1952 and that the defendants forcibly dispossessed her. As a matter of fact, these findings were not challenged before the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court has specifically mentioned that these findings recorded by the trial Court while deciding issue No. 6 were not challenged before it. The lower appellate Court has made a clear statement in para 6 of its judgment that the findings on the aforesaid issue were not challenged. It has also been specifically mentioned that the defendants conceded that the alleged patta on the basis of which they claimed title to the suit lands was not binding on the plaintiff. Actually the stand of the defendants was that despite the fact that they have no right, title or interest in the suit land, the plaintiff could not get the decree for possession because she too had no right, title or interest to hold the aforesaid suit lands as they were not recorded as the khudkasht lands of the plaintiff in the Khasra of the Samvat year 2007. ( 9. ) FROM the discussion made above, it is apparent that for deciding the controversy in between the parties at this stage in second appeal, the following two aspects of the case are to be decided : - (1) Whether despite there being no entry in the Khasra of Samvat year 2007 showing the suit lands as the Khudkasht lands and the legal requirement of sub-section (2) of section 4 thereby being not satisfied, the plaintiff could be treated as Pucca Krishak on the basis of the assessment parcha issued by the Compensation Officer treating the suit-lands as her khudkasht lands allowed to be held in the rights of a Pucca Krishak on the assessment disclosed in the said Parcha ? (2) Whether, irrespective of the fact that the record prepared by the compensation Officer recognising the plaintiff as Pucca Krishak of the suit lands by treating the same as her Khudkasht lands being against law, the plaintiff could get a decree for possession against the defendants on the ground that according to the concurrent findings of fact she was in possession of the suit lands and was dispossessed by the defendants who now admittedly have no right, title or interest in the suit lands ? ( 10. ) IN my opinion, it is not necessary to consider and express any opinion regarding the first aspect of the case because for the purposes of this appeal the determination of the second aspect alone is sufficient and the same clinches the issue. According to the findings of the trial Court, which has not been challenged before the lower appellate Court and has not been disturbed, the plaintiff was dispossessed by the defendants in the year 1952. The plaintiff has brought the suit claiming possession on the specific plea that she was dispossessed in the year 1952. The defendants have been found to have no right, title or interest in the suit lands The patta which they got executed in their favour by Munga Bai, the mother-in-law of the plaintiff, was, admittedly, unauthorised and, as conceded by the defendants neither the same was binding on the plaintiff nor it had conferred any right, title or interest in the respect of the suit lands on them. A person who is in possession even under a defective title, is entitled to a decree for possession against everybody except the true owner. The lower appellate Court erred in law in observing that despite the fact that the defendants were not the owner and the suit lands belonged to the State, the plaintiff could not get a decree for possession against the defendants also. The lower appellate Court further erred in law in allowing the defendants appeal who had no right, title or interest in the suit lands and who had actually dispossessed the plaintiff who has been found to be in prior possession. As a matter of fact, the proper course should have been to decree the claim for eviction against the defendants and leave the plaintiff and the State, which, according to the lower appellate Court, was the true owner, to deal with the matter. As a matter of fact, the proper course should have been to decree the claim for eviction against the defendants and leave the plaintiff and the State, which, according to the lower appellate Court, was the true owner, to deal with the matter. Actually speaking, the State had always treated the suit lands even after the abolition of the Zamindari as the lands not vested in it. ( 11. ) DURING the course of arguments, when the learned counsel for the respondents was asked as to how the defendants could avoid the decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff on the aforesaid reasoning that she, being in prior possession, and having been dispossessed by the defendants, who had no right, title or interest, was entitled to a decree for possession, the learned counsel contended that this legal position cannot be applied to the present case. The reason given was that the right to obtain possession had already been taken away by virtue of the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act. As stated in the statement of the case filed before this Court by the respondents, the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Gurucharan Singh v. Kamlu Singh ( AIR 1977 SC 5 .) has also been referred. On going through the aforesaid decision and the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act, it is apparent that there is nothing either in the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme court or in the Act to create any exception to the grant of a decree for possession in favour of a person who has been admittedly in prior possession of certain lands and was dispossessed by others who had no right, title or interest in the same after the abolition of the Zamindari. It is true that the right to claim possession as a propietor has been taken away by the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act. In the present case, the plaintiff was recognised as a pucca tenant by the Compensation Officer who enforced the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act, and was allowed to retain possession of the same. It may be that the aforesaid order of the Compensation Officer might be incorrect, being not in accordance with the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act, but the fact remains that the plaintiff was in prior possession at the worst, with a defective title. It may be that the aforesaid order of the Compensation Officer might be incorrect, being not in accordance with the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act, but the fact remains that the plaintiff was in prior possession at the worst, with a defective title. But, since the defendants themselves had no right, title or interest, they had no authority to dispossess the plaintiff. It was for the State to take up the matter, if it was found that the decision of the Compensation Officer was wrong or the suit lands were wrongly left from being included in the lands which were liable to vest in the State in pursuance of the Zamindari Abolition Act. In the year 1952 the plaintiff was in possession and was dispossessed by the defendants, who had no right, title or interest in the suit lands. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff is definitely entitled to evict everybody except the true owner. ( 12. ) FOR the reasons stated above, this appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and that of trial Court are restored however for different reasons. Counsels fee according to schedule, if certified. Appeal allowed.