JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This petition is directed against the order of the appellate authority dated 6-12-1972 modifying the standing orders as certified by the Certifying Authority under S. 5 (2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. 2. The U. P. State Road Transport Corporation runs a central workshop at Kanpur. A large number of workmen are employed in the workshop. The Corporation submitted draft standing orders to the Certifying Officer under S. 3 of the Industrial Development (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). After hearing the representatives of the Corporation and the representatives of the workmen, the Certifying Officer after making certain modifications certified the standing orders. On an appeal preferred by the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation the appellate authority modified the standing orders dealing with age of superannuation and suspension allowance. Aggrieved the Central Workshop Karmchari Sangh, the union which represented the workmen employed in the Central workshop filed this writ petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution. 3. Cl. 30 of the Standing Orders as certified by the Certifying Officer, contained provisions for payment of suspension allowance pending inquiry against a workman and the rate of subsistence allowance was prescribed in the various sub-clauses. According to cl. 30 a workman under suspension pending inquiry was entitled to of the basic wages for first ninety days from the date of suspension in addition to the dearness allowance and other allowances. In the event of suspension period exceeding 90 days due to prolongation of departmental enquiry he was entitled to suspension allowance at the rate of of basic wages but if the enquiry was prolonged for reasons attributable to the workman subsistence allowance would be reduced to . If a workman was placed under suspension on account of criminal proceedings against him he was entitled to receive of his basic wages during the first 180 days of the period of his suspension. In the event of criminal proceedings or inquiry being prolonged beyond 180 days the workman would be entitled to of his wages as suspension allowance and if the criminal proceedings are prolonged for the reasons directly attributable to the workman, the suspension allowance would be reduced to th of such wages. The appellate authority modified clause 30 by reducing the rate of suspension allowance. Under the amended cl. The appellate authority modified clause 30 by reducing the rate of suspension allowance. Under the amended cl. 30 of the Standing Orders as certified by the appellate authority, a workman placed under suspension pending departmental enquiry is entitled to one-fourth of his wages for the first six months of his suspension, in the event of suspension period exceeding six months the workman is entitled to half of his wages as suspension allowance. If the suspension period is prolonged for the reasons attributable to the workman the subsistence allowance shall be reduced to one fourth of his wages. During the suspension on account of pendency of criminal proceedings a workman is entitled to one-fourth of his wages for the first six months and if suspension continues beyond that period he is entitled to half of his wages, in the event of criminal proceedings being prolonged beyond a period of 180 days at the instance of the workman, the subsistence allowance shall be reduced to one-fourth of the wages. The appellate authority thus reduced the rate of suspension allowance approximately by fifty per cent. Cl. 39 of the certified Standing Orders prescribed the age of superannuation of a workman at 60 years, but the appellate authority modified the same by prescribing 58 years as age of superannuation. 4. S. 4 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, confers jurisdiction on the Certifying Officer or appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of any Standing Orders. When the Standing Orders are submitted for certification the Certifying Officer as well as the appellate authority is empowered to hold enquiry to ascertain (1) whether the Standing Orders are in consonance with the model Standing Orders and (2) whether they are fair and reasonable. The findings recorded by the Certifying Officer or the appellate authority that the Standing Orders are in consonance with the model Standing Orders and they are fair and reasonable are final and ordinarily it is not open to this Court to sit in appeal over those findings. But if they record findings on extraneous considerations or under some misconception of law it is always open to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash those findings. service conditions, it would be basically opposed to the settled principle of Industrial law. But if they record findings on extraneous considerations or under some misconception of law it is always open to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash those findings. service conditions, it would be basically opposed to the settled principle of Industrial law. A workman whose service conditions are regulated by Industrial laws cannot be equated with a civil servant. In S. S. Railway Compan v. Workers Union ( AIR 1969 SC 513 ) the Standing Orders prescribing a second show cause notice in case of removal of a workman, on the analogy of Art. 311 of the Constitution was struck down on the ground that there was no justification to equate an industrial workman with a civil servant. 5. Sri V.K. Burman, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the modifications made by the appellate authority were not warranted either on the ground of reasonableness or fairness. The appellate authority modified cls. 30 and 39 of the Standing Orders arbitrarily on irrelevant considerations. We find force in the contention. There is no dispute between the parties that there are two categories of workmen employed in the Central workshop of the Transport Corporation. The first category of workmen includes those employees and workmen who enjoy the protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution and various other benefits and protections available to a civil servant. The second category consists of those workmen who are workcharge employees having no status of a civil servant or protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution or other rules applicable to Government servants. The workmen belonging to the second category are, however, entitled to the protection of Industrial Laws. Normally there should be uniformity in the conditions of service applicable to the workmen employed in an establishment or factory but this could not be possible in the case of Central workshop as prior to the establishment of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation the Central Workshop was owned and managed by the Transport Department of the State Government. The Officers and employees of the erstwhile U.P. Government Roadways were entitled to the protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution and to other various rules with the civil servants for the gulating the service conditions purpose of having uniformity in the Government servants. After the establishment of the Corporation the services of erstwhile Government servants have been retained in the Corporation on deputation. After the establishment of the Corporation the services of erstwhile Government servants have been retained in the Corporation on deputation. In these circumstances the two categories of employees have been working in the Central Workshop. The Standing Orders in question are applicable to workmen included in the second category who are workcharge employees, not entitled to the protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution or other service rules applicable to the Government servants. There is thus difference in the two classes of employees employed in the Central Workshop. The regular employees falling within the first category are better placed and enjoy more privileges and better facilities than the workmen belonging to the second category. The regular employees of the Corporation have the benefit of fourteen days casual leave with wages, earned leave for every eleven working days, eleven festival holidays, restricted holidays, pension after retirement and the benefit of Government Provident Fund Scheme while the workmen whose conditions of service are regulated by Industrial Laws do not enjoy the privileges and facilities to the extent to which the regular employees are entitled. 6. The State of U. P. has framed Model Standing Orders prescribing the rates for payment of subsistence allowance pending enquiry or criminal proceedings or trial. The Certifying Officer incorporated the rates as contained in cl. 22 of the Model Standing Orders in prescribing the rates of suspension allowance in cl. 30 of the Standing Orders. The Certifying Officer rejected the employer's contention that there should be uniformity in the matter of suspension allowance between the two categories of employees employed in the Workshop. The Certifying Officer held that it would not be fair and reasonable to prescribe the same rate of subsistence allowance as applicable to the regular employees because the work charged employees fall into a different class and they are not entitled to a number of privileges which the regular employees were entitled to. The Appellate authority modified cl. 30 of the Standing Orders and prescribed the same rates of suspension allow to the regular employees on the ground that cl. 30 as certified by the Certifying Officer practised discrimination between the two categories of employees. The Appellate Authority observed that if work charged employees are promoted and made regular employees they would be governed by the conditions of service as applicable to the regular employees and in that event a difficulty would arise. 30 as certified by the Certifying Officer practised discrimination between the two categories of employees. The Appellate Authority observed that if work charged employees are promoted and made regular employees they would be governed by the conditions of service as applicable to the regular employees and in that event a difficulty would arise. He further observed that it would be grossly unjust and unfair to provide more generous conditions of employment to the work charged employees than those applicable to the regular employees. In our opinion, the appellate authority committed a patent error in placing the two categories of employees into one class. As discussed earlier, the regular employees are entitled to a number of other benefits and they enjoy protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution and several other facilities and amenities available to a civil servant. There was no justification for treating those regular employees equal to the work charged employees. The appellate authority further failed to appreciate that Clause 27 of the Model Standing Orders as framed by the State Government was intended to apply to the workmen employed in industrial establishments. The rates of suspension allowance as prescribed under cl. 27 of the Model Standing Orders were quite fair and reasonable and the Certifying Officer rightly prescribed those rates for the work charged workmen employed in the Central Workshop. The plea of discrimination was misconceived. Discrimination may arise between equals and not between unequals. Further these Standing Orders are applicable to work charged employees only. They do not apply to regular employees falling into the first category. If and when a work charged employee is promoted or made regular, these Standing Orders could not apply to him. There would be no difficulty and inconsistency. The appellate authority misconceived difficulty. 7. The Appellate authority modified el. 39 of the Standing Orders and reduced the age of superannuation from 60 to 58 years on the reasoning that for other class of employees of the State Road Transport Corporation the age of superannuation was 58 years, consequently in order to maintain uniformity the Standing Orders should also provide 58 years as the age of superannuation instead of 60 years. The appellate authority again committed a manifest error in equating industrial employees with civil servants. As discussed earlier, there was no justification for such equation. The appellate authority again committed a manifest error in equating industrial employees with civil servants. As discussed earlier, there was no justification for such equation. The present day tendency is to fix the age of superannuation of workmen by Industrial laws generally at 60 years unless evidence is produced to show that the work of a particular class of employee is arduous or hazardous on account of which the workmen lose efficiency earlier in age. See Jeewan Lal Ltd. v. Workmen ( AIR 1972 SC 1210 ) . In the absence of any evidence or finding that the work which the work charged employees performed was arduous or hazardous in nature it was unreasonable for the appellate authority to interfere with the certified Standing Orders prescribing the age of superannuation at 60 years. Moreover the appellate authority failed to consider that in similar industrial establishments the age of superannuation was prescribed at 60 for the industrial workmen. As discussed earlier, the appellate authority wrongly treated the work-charged employees in the category of other regular employees who were entitled to protection of statutory rules and Art. 311. The appellate authority again committed manifest error in modifying the age of superannuation. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that memorandum of appeal was not signed by any authorised representative of the workshop, instead it had been signed and filed by the Chief Standing Counsel, consequently the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal or to modify the Standing Orders. We find no merit in this contention. Under Section 6, any person aggrieved by the order of the Certifying Officer may prefer appeal to the appellate authority. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, does not prescribe any manner or procedure for filing appeal before the appellate authority. In the matter of certification of Standing Orders there are only two parties, namely, I the workmen and the employer, Any of these two parties is entitled to prefer an appeal against the order of they Certifying Officer if it is aggrieved by' his order. In the instant case the Certifying Officer made amendments in the draft Standing Orders also submitted by the employer and consequently the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation was the aggrieved party. In the instant case the Certifying Officer made amendments in the draft Standing Orders also submitted by the employer and consequently the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation was the aggrieved party. The memorandum of appeal shows that the appeal was preferred by the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation through Sri U.C. Sharma, Deputy General Manager and the memorandum of appeal was presented before the appellate authority by an officer of the Corporation on 30th Oct. 1970. The memorandum of appeal was not signed by Sri U.C. Sharma, instead it was signed by the Corporation's counsel namely, the Chief Standing Counsel. The appellate authority held that the appeal could not be rejected merely on this technical ground. We find no good reason to take a different view. It was a technical error which did not violate any mandatory provision of the Act or Rules. The requirement that the memorandum of apps must be signed by the authorised officer of the aggrieved party is directory in nature, its non-compliance could not render the appeal non-maintainable. The order of the appellate authority is not liable to be quashed this ground. 9. In view of the above discussion, we allow the petition and quash the order of the appellate authority dated 6-12-1972 modifying cls. 30 and 39 of the Standing Orders as certified by the Certifying Officer. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of this petition.