Judgment :- 1. The petitioner seeks a Writ of Prohibition or any other appropriate Writ to prohibit the respondent from proceeding with an enquiry initiated by him under S. 7-A of the Employees Provident Funds and Family Pension Funds Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), till the disposal of the petitioners application under S. 19-A of the Act to the Central Government. 2. The petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of hand-woven textiles of various varieties. The petitioner wanted to cover its employees under the Act, and, for that purpose, had a dialogue with the Provident Funds Inspector, Tirupur who visited its factory. The said officer noticed that the regular employees engaged by the petitioner were less than the minimum number prescribed by the Act for coverage and opined that the petitioner can opt for coverage of its employees under the Act on a voluntary basis. In accordance with that advice the petitioner has been making contributions under the Act for its employees on a voluntary basis with effect from 1st August 1972. While so, the Provident Funds inspector, Tirupur, informed the petitioner on 8th April 1976, that weavers engaged in producing hand-woven textiles for the petitioner should also be considered as employees and they should also be covered under the Act. In spite of the petitioner pointing out that the weavers were not employees within the meaning of the Act and this position had all along been accepted by the department, the respondent, to whom the matter was referred, issued summons to the petitioner to produce the records and attend an enquiry under S. 7-A of the Act. At once the petitioner submitted a petition to the Central Government under S. 19-A of the Act to give a finding that the petitioner has not employed the requisite number of employees to attract the operation of the Act. In view of the petition under S. 19-A, the petitioner requested the respondent to postpone the enquiry under S. 7-A till the finding of the Central Government is received, but the respondent has not accepted the representation and, as such, the petitioner apprehended the possibility of the respondent proceeding ex parte with the enquiry under S. 8-A and passing adverse orders. It is in that state of affairs, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for a Writ of Prohibition. It is in that state of affairs, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for a Writ of Prohibition. 3. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent and therein, the various averments of the petitioner are controverted. According to the respondent, the Provident Funds Inspector, Tirupur, inspected the petitioners establishment on 8th April 1976 and found that weavers working therein had not been enrolled as Employees Provident Fund members and therefore, he wanted the petitioner to produce the relevant records for his inspection. Since the petitioner did not produce the records, but raised a contention that the weavers were not employees within the meaning of the Act and as such, they were not entitled to coverage under the Act, the Provident Funds Inspector referred the matter to the respondent and it was in terms of the reference, the respondent has called upon the petitioner to attend an enquiry under S. 7-A of the Act. The enquiry under S. 7-A would take within its ambit the question of liability of the petitioner under the Act in respect of wearers and as such, the pendency of petitioner under S. 19-A to the Central Government will not be a bar for determining their dues under S. 7-A of the Act. The counter then proceeds to say that according to the ratio laid down in New Street Textiles v. Union of India 1976 1 L.L.J. 238 and Hindustan Durry Factory, Ambala City v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Chandigarh C.W. No. 3005 of 1972, (High Court of Punjab and Harayana), the term ‘employee’ as defined in S. 2(f) of the Act is wide enough to embrace even casual and piece-rate employees. Reference is also made in the counter to the dictum of the Supreme Court in Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments 1974 1 L.L.J. 367 as to the criteria to be applied to find out the existence of an employee-employer relationship in an establishment. It is then stated that the respondent has no doubt or difficulty whatever in treating the weavers as employees of the petitioner establishment and, as such, the respondent feels no necessity to approach the Central Government for a decision under S. 19-A of the Act. It is then stated that the respondent has no doubt or difficulty whatever in treating the weavers as employees of the petitioner establishment and, as such, the respondent feels no necessity to approach the Central Government for a decision under S. 19-A of the Act. The respondent has also quoted the decision in Bajrangalal Padia v. State of Orissa 1975 L.I.C. 830, to support his stand. Lastly, it is stated that the holding of an enquiry under S. 7-A during the pendency of a petition under S. 19-A it not interdicted in any manner, and, furthermore, as laid down in Chockan Palani Vilas Snuff Factory v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madras 1978 1 L.L.J. 139, in an enquiry under S. 7-A, there can not only be determination of dues payable by the employer, but there can also be a determination of the basic question of the applicability of the Act to the particular employee or particular industry. The respondent has therefore, prayed for the dismissal of the Writ petition and the enquiry proceedings being continued. 4. Mr. M. R. Narayanaswami, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that since the weavers who produce hand-woven textiles for the petitioner are not employees within the meaning of the Act, the petitioner cannot be called upon to provide provident fund coverage for them and it is this crucial matter which is being agitated before the Central Government, that authority being the competent authority under the Act, to solve the doubt raised by the petitioner. He pointed out that the bona fides of the petitioner in filing a petition under S. 19-A cannot be disputed, because the petitioner had voluntarily introduced the provident fund contribution scheme to its regular employees even though they are below the minimum number prescribed by the Act. Another plea advanced by the petitioners counsel is that an enquiry under S. 7-A and an enquiry under S. 19-A are on different planes and as such the respondent cannot raise a defence that the enquiry under S. 7-A will not conflict with an enquiry under S. 19-A. 5. Miss. Another plea advanced by the petitioners counsel is that an enquiry under S. 7-A and an enquiry under S. 19-A are on different planes and as such the respondent cannot raise a defence that the enquiry under S. 7-A will not conflict with an enquiry under S. 19-A. 5. Miss. Radha Srinivasan, learned Central Government Junior Standing Counsel, submitted for the respondent that the Act in question is a welfare measure intended to benefit the poor and helpless employees, that several employers are not only refusing to make provident fund contributions justly and lawfully due to the employees, but are resorting to various practices to thwart their employees deriving benefit under the Act and that filing of petitions under S. 19-A to the Central Government is also being freely resorted to forestalling the operation of the Act and therefore, the courts should not exercise their discretionary powers in favour of such employers and order postponement of the enquiry under S. 7-A on account of the pendency of proceedings under S. 19-A. Miss. Radha Srinivasan then urged that for the purpose of determining the quantum of provident fund contributions payable by an employer, the basic question of the liability of the employer or the establishment, as the case may be, will also have to be gone into in proceedings under S. 7-A and, as such, the petitioner can agitate the question of its non-liability to pay contributions under the Act before the respondent himself. The learned counsel stated that the enquiry under S. 7-A will constitute a preliminary enquiry for the further enquiry to be held under S. 19-A, and, therefore, in the absence of an enquiry under S. 7-A, a successful and effective enquiry under S. 19-A cannot be held. As authority for her contentions, the respondents counsel referred to certain decisions mentioned in the following paragraphs. 6. This is not the first time that a controversy as the one on hand has been raised before courts. Before referring to some of the pronouncements of courts, it will be useful to refer to the relevant provisions in the Act. Sub-S.(3) of S. 1 of the Act refers to the establishments which will attract the application of the Act. This is not the first time that a controversy as the one on hand has been raised before courts. Before referring to some of the pronouncements of courts, it will be useful to refer to the relevant provisions in the Act. Sub-S.(3) of S. 1 of the Act refers to the establishments which will attract the application of the Act. Sub-clause (a) says that subject to the provisions contained in S. 16, the Act will apply to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in schedule I and in which 20 or more persons are employed. Sub-clause (b) says that the Act will also apply to any other establishment employing 20 or more persons or class of such establishments which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. There is a proviso to sub-clause (b) which grants power to the Central Government to notify every establishment employing less than 20 persons, provided the Government gives not less than two months notice of its intention to do so. Thus, it may be seen that it is not all establishments that will attract the operation of the Act. Under sub-clause (a), the establishment must be a factory engaged in any industry specified in schedule I and, secondly, 20 or more persons must be employed therein. Under sub-clause (b), the establishment need not fall within one of the industries specified in Schedule I, but it should be an establishment employing 20 persons or more and secondly it must be notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette to attract the operation of the Act. In S 2 of the Act, the words ‘employer’ and employee’ are inter alia defined. Then we come to S. 7-A which is a newly introduced section. The heading given to the section is, ‘Determination of moneys due from employers, S. 7-A(1) is in the following terms— “7-A(1): The Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Deputy Provident Fund Commissioner, or any Regional “Provident Fund Commissioner may, by order, determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act, the Scheme or the family pension scheme, as the case may be, and for this purpose, may conduct such enquiry as be may deem necessary.” Sub-s,(2) deals with the powers available to officers conducting the enquiry, for completing the enquiry successfully. Sub-S.(3) enjoins the officer conducting the enquiry not to pass an order against the employer determining the contribution amount payable by him, without giving, him an opportunity to represent his case. Sub-S.(4) lays, down that an order made under S. 7-A shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law Seeing the terms of the section, it can be easily gathered that the enquiry contemplated is only for determination of the quantum of amount payable by an employer under any provision of the Act, Scheme or Family Pension Scheme. In other words, the enquiry is to start on the basis that the establishment in question fails within the purview of S. 1 (3)(a) or 1(3)(b) as the case may be and the only matter which needed enquiry and determination is the quantum of contribution payable by the employer. 7. On the other hand, if we take S. 19-A, the scope of enquiry therein is entirely different. The section says that if any doubt arises as to: (i) whether an establishment which is a factory is engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I, (ii) whether any particular establishment is an establishment under the Act by virtue of a notification under S. 1 (3) (b). (iii) the number of persons employed in an establishment, (iv) the number of years which have elapsed from the date of commencement of the establishment, and (v) whether the total quantum of benefits due to an employee has been reduced by the employer, the Central Government may pass an order or give direction or make provision in such a manner as will remove the doubt or difficulty and such order of the Central Government shall be final. Thus, S. 19-A deals with the more fundamental question of the liability of an establishment to take contributions under the Act, whereas S. 7-A is only confined to the determination of the quantum of contribution payable by an employee. Thus, S. 19-A deals with the more fundamental question of the liability of an establishment to take contributions under the Act, whereas S. 7-A is only confined to the determination of the quantum of contribution payable by an employee. It may be, in some cases an enquiry under S. 7-A will reveal that no contribution is payable by an employer, but that cannot be construed to mean that an enquiry under S. 7-A runs on parallel lines with an enquiry under S. 19-A, Any finding arrived at in an enquiry under S. 7-A, that an establishment will not be covered by the provisions of the Act, should not be mistaken for the nature and scope of the enquiry under S. 7-A, because the finding is attributable to the wrong premises on which the enquiry was started. Therefore, it follows that the enquiry under S7-A and the enquiry under S. 19-A operate in different fields and planes. As a matter of fact, an enquiry under S. 7-A cannot be given parity of scope with an enquiry under S. 19-A, for, if the contrary position is conceded, then conflicting decisions are likely to occur and, in such a event, having regard to the wording of S. 19 A, the finding rendered in an enquiry under that section with prevail over the finding rendered in an enquiry under S. 7A. Therefore, to read into S. 7-A something more than what is contained and hold that the ambit of the enquiry will no be confined merely to determination of the quantum, of amount payable by an employer, but also determination of questions falling within the purview of an enquiry under S. 19-A, does not commend itself to my acceptance, for, as I said earlier, an enlarged enquiry under S. 7-A is bound to prove an exercise in futility whenever a contrary finding is given by the Central Government under S. 19-A. 8. Turning now, to some of the decided cases, the respondents counsel invited my attention to Chokan Palani Vilas v. R.P.F. Commissioner 1973 1 L.L J. 139. That was a case where, without holding an enquiry under S. 7-A. the R.P.F, Commissioner called upon the petitioner to pay certain amounts on the basis of certain particulars giver by him from which he subsequently retracted. That was a case where, without holding an enquiry under S. 7-A. the R.P.F, Commissioner called upon the petitioner to pay certain amounts on the basis of certain particulars giver by him from which he subsequently retracted. It was in that context, Palaniswami, J. held that though it is not explicitly stated in S. 7-A that at is open to the authorities specified therein to determine the liability of the employer, still the pre-requisite for determining the amount of contribution is the liability of the employer, and therefore, in deciding the amount of contribution payable, it is necessary to decide the question of applicability of the Act also. Moreover, that was a case where a petition under S. 19-A had not been filed and therefore, it was thought that the question of liability can also be gone into in the enquiry under S. 7-A. Such special features do not exist in the present case and, therefore, that decision cannot be of assistance to the respondent in this case. In a later unreported case, Moneys Textiles, rep. by Partner Subramaia v. Regional Commissioner, Employees Provident Funds, Tamii Nadu and Pondicherry, Madras W.P 803 of 1970 Madras High Court, judgment, d. 23rd June 1971. Palaniswami, J. has; followed the view consistently taken by this Court in similar cases, viz, Annamalai Mudaliar and Bros. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 387 and Raghava Iyengar and Co. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner A.I.R. 1963 Mad 378=76 L.W. 123, and held that whenever a dispute is raised about the liability of an employer to make contributions under the Act, the machinery provided under the Act has to be invoked and therefore, the employer should move the Central Government under S. 19-A for determination of the dispute and, once a petition under S. 19-A is filed, further action under S. 7-A should be deferred. 9. Miss. Radha Srinivasan relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Estcblishments 1974 1 L.L.J. 367 to argue that the wesvers employed by the appellants in the abovesaid reference and, therefore, as held by the Supreme Court in that case. 9. Miss. Radha Srinivasan relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Estcblishments 1974 1 L.L.J. 367 to argue that the wesvers employed by the appellants in the abovesaid reference and, therefore, as held by the Supreme Court in that case. I must hold in the present case, that the workers are ‘employees’ and as such, the petitioner is bound to participate in the enquiry under S. 7-A. I am not persuaded by this arguaient, because the competent authority under the Act to decide the dispute is the Central Government and, before he Central Government has given its decision in the reference made to it, this Court will not be justified in rendering a finding on the disputed question, especially when there is no evidence about the nature and character of the employment given to the weavers by the petitioner. The learned counsel then referred to the other authorities mentioned in the counter affidavit, namely, New Street Textiles v. Union of India, 1976.1 LL.J. 238 and Bajrangalal Padia v. State of Orissa 1979 L.I.C. 830. But the ratio in these cases is also a matter to be considered by the Central Government with reference to the facts of the petitioners case. In the absence of factual material, the petitioners contentions cannot be rejected merely on the basis of legal dictum. 10. Miss. Radha Srinivasan vehemently pleaded that too often employers resort to petitions under S. 19-A to thwart implementation of the Act and it should, therefore, be held that an enquiry under S. 19-A cannot be a bar to other proceedings under the Act going on. If the department has any grievance in the matter, it is for the Legislaure to set it right by amending the provisions of the Act. As things now stand, an enquiry under S. 7-A cannot be proceeded with when an employer disputes his liability to make contributions under the Act and has made a reference to the Central Government under S. 19-A to reader its decision on the dispute. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition will stand allowed and the rule nisi will be made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.