JUDGMENT Chittosh Mookerjee, J. 1. J.B. Williams Company Inc. was a company incorporated in the State of New York, United States of America and it was the registered proprietor of the trade marks bearing Registration Nos. 517, 518, 103429, 137240 and 137241. L.D. Seymour and Company, which was a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, jointly with the said J. B. Williams Company Inc. had filed in the office of the Trade Marks Registry at Calcutta five applications for registration of the said L.D. Seymour and Company Pvt. Ltd. as the sole registered user under Section 49 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and Rule 82 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959 in respect of the said five registered trade marks. The Registrar of Trade Marks, forwarded the applications to the Central Government. Thereafter, the Registrar of Trade Marks gave the petitioners notice under Rule 86(1) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959 to show cause why the Central Government shall not issue directions to refuse the aforesaid applications on the ground that the use of foreign brand names in the field of soaps, cosmetics and toilet preparations was not being encouraged now, more so, when there was foreign exchange expenditure involved in any form, as the same was sure to affect the sale of indigenous brands and thus affect the growth of indigenous industry. Thereupon, the petitioners showed cause and they were also given a hearing. The Deputy Registrar (Co-ordination), Government of India, Trade Marks Registry, Bombay, by a letter dated 23rd August 1966 informed the representatives of the petitioners that in pursuance of Section 49(3) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 read with Rule 86(4) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959, the Central Government had directed the Registrar to refuse the said applications in respect of Registered Trade Marks Nos. 518, 103429, 137240 and 137241 of J.B. Williams Company Inc. Accordingly, the said four applications had been refused in pursuance of Section 49(4) of the said Act. 2. THE petitioners J.B. Williams Company Inc. and L.D. Seymour and Company India Pvt. Ltd. filed a writ petition challenging the aforesaid refusal order and thereupon Civil Rule No. 89(w) of 1967 was issued. THE respondents to the writ petition by filing affidavits in opposition opposed the said Rule. His Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. 2. THE petitioners J.B. Williams Company Inc. and L.D. Seymour and Company India Pvt. Ltd. filed a writ petition challenging the aforesaid refusal order and thereupon Civil Rule No. 89(w) of 1967 was issued. THE respondents to the writ petition by filing affidavits in opposition opposed the said Rule. His Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pradyot Kumar Banerjee by his judgment dated 20th February, 1973 made the said Rule absolute and quashed the impugned order. THE respondents to the writ petition were given liberty to proceed again in accordance with law. THE appellants, being aggrieved by the said judgment, have preferred this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. After the appeal was heard in part, Mr. Maloy Kumar Ghose, the learned Junior Advocate on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, submitted that he has been instructed to state that the respondents were no longer interested to defend the appeal and to proceed any further in the matter. Mr. Ghose accordingly submitted that he may be exempted from further appearing in the matter. In the circumstances, we did not think it necessary to issue administrative notices upon the respondents who had already signified their intention not to defend the appeal or to proceed any further in this matter. Thus, the respondents to the appeal who filed the writ petition are no longer willing to press their case. 3. WE are also satisfied that this appeal at the instance of the Registrar of Trade Marks and others has merit and should, therefore, be allowed. The learned Single Judge himself found that it was not true that no ground or reason for rejection of the four applications filed by the petitioners of the writ case was given. But, according to the learned Single Judge, the reasons given by the Central Government were not germane to the object and reasons for the enactment of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. The short point in this appeal is whether the reasons given by the Central Government for rejection of the four applications for registration were within the scope of Section 49 of the said Act. This court exercising its writ jurisdiction cannot obviously examine the sufficiency of the reasons. But this Court is entitled to consider whether the Central Government had given reasons which were germane or relevant and not extraneous. This court exercising its writ jurisdiction cannot obviously examine the sufficiency of the reasons. But this Court is entitled to consider whether the Central Government had given reasons which were germane or relevant and not extraneous. The learned Single Judge in his judgment under appeal had himself referred to several decisions which laid down that the Government was the sole judge and that the court will not interfere with its policy decisions. It is difficult for the Court to obtain adequate material for coming to a proper decision whether a particular policy would be in the interest of the general public. 4. THE Central Government, under sub-section (3) of Section 49 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 having regard to all the circumstances of the case and to the interest of the general public and the development of any industry, trade or commerce in India may direct the Registrar to refuse or to accept conditionally or unconditionally an application for registration as a registered user of a trade mark. THE learned Single Judge in his judgement under appeal has referred to the preamble of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act which inter alia states that the Act has been enacted to provide for registration and better protection of trade marks and for prevention of the use of fraudulent marks on merchandise. The learned Single Judge has also referred to the statement of objects and reasons of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Bill, 1958. According to the learned Single Judge, in the matter of consideration of an application for registration of a registered user of a trade mark under Section 49(1), the meaning of the expression "public interest" should be limited to the objects and reasons or the purpose for which the Act was promulgated or, in other words, for the registration and better protection of trade marks and for the prevention of the use of fraudulent marks on merchandise. The learned Single Judge further observed that the interest of general public cannot be enlarged to any public interest under the sun in which the general public may be interested. In the instant case, no question of foreign exchange was admittedly involved. The petitioner No. 2 was, in fact, a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. The learned Single Judge further observed that the interest of general public cannot be enlarged to any public interest under the sun in which the general public may be interested. In the instant case, no question of foreign exchange was admittedly involved. The petitioner No. 2 was, in fact, a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. Therefore, it cannot be contended that registering the petitioner No. 2 as a registered user will affect the sale of indigenous brands and effect the growth of indigenous industry. Therefore, the learned Single Judge held that the impugned order of the Central Government under Section 49(3) was not sustainable in law. 5. IN our view, the learned Single Judge has not approached the points in controversy in this Rule from a correct legal stand point. It is settled law that while it is permissible to look at the preamble for understanding the import of the various clauses contained in a Bill, full effect should be given to the express provisions of the Bill even though they appear to be beyond the terms of the preamble. Where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble must be disregarded. Where the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear the preamble may be resorted to explain it. Again where very general language is used in an enactment which, it is clear must be intended to have a limited application, the preamble may be used to indicate to what particular instances the enactment is intended to apply. The courts cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of the Act, though they would be justified in resorting to it, may they will be required to do so, if they find that the language used by Parliament is ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact Parliament intended that it should have a limited application (vide the observations of the Supreme Court in M/s. Burrakur Coal Company. Ltd. v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1961 SC 954 , paragraph 5, approving the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court in Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956 at 967. We may also refer to similar observations in paragraph 6 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 540 . 6. We may also refer to similar observations in paragraph 6 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 540 . 6. THERE is no ambiguity in Section 49(3) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act and the said provision in clear language empowers the Central Government to take into consideration all circumstances of a case and the interest of general public and the development of any industry, trade or commerce in the matter of giving directions to the Registrar. Therefore, it is not permissible to construe Section 49(3) in the light of the preamble of the Act and the statement of the objects and reasons for enacting the said legislation. The Registrar of Trade Marks in his letter dated 19th July, 1965 addressed to M/s. DePenning and DePenning the representatives of the petitioners set out the following three reasons for the proposed refusal of the application in question:- (1) the use of foreign brand names in the field of soaps, cosmetics and toilet preparations was not being encouraged; (2) foreign exchange expenditure was involved; (3) the sale of indigenous brands may be affected and thereby the growth of indigenous industries may be affected. In this case, in fact, no foreign expenditure was involved and to that extent one out of the three grounds for refusal of the application of the petitioners was non- existent. But, the court exercising writ jurisdiction cannot determine whether the Central Government was justified in formulating a policy discouraging the use of foreign brand names in the field of soaps, cosmetics and toilet preparations. Similarly, whether the granting of the registration application would in fact affect the sale of indigenous brands and thereby affect the growth of indigenous industries were matters for consideration by the Central Government. But, at the same time we will be constrained to hold that a policy decision by the Central Government for discouraging use of foreign brand names or for promoting growth of indigenous industries are not irrelevant to the interest of the general public and the development of any industry, trade or commerce in India. It was for the Central Government to consider what particular policy was likely to promote the interest of the general public or encourage the development of any industry trade or commerce in India. 7. THERE is another aspect of the matter. It was for the Central Government to consider what particular policy was likely to promote the interest of the general public or encourage the development of any industry trade or commerce in India. 7. THERE is another aspect of the matter. A direction issued under Section 49(3) involves exercise of quasi-judicial powers. The Central Government under the said sub-section is required to Act upon the objective consideration of the matters mentioned therein. A direction issued under Section 49(3) has civil consequence and may affect right to property. For all these reasons, it would not be correct to contend that Section 49(3) involves exercise of administrative powers and the Central Government upon subjective satisfaction may issue directions either to refuse or to accept an application for the registration of a registered user. Therefore, even assuming that one of the three grounds, namely spending of foreign exchange, was non-existent this court cannot strike down the said directions of the Central Government and the consequent order of the Registrar of Trade Marks, refusing the application of the petitioners. The two other reasons, namely, discouraging user of foreign brand names and promotion of growth of indigenous industries were neither non-existent nor irrelevant. Therefore, this court exercising writ jurisdiction cannot interfere. We may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Zona Singh v. J.M. Tandon and Others, AIR 1971 SC 1937. Shelat J. delivering the judgment of the Court had observed that the decision of a Tribunal would be vitiated if some of the reasons relied on by it for its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable applied to cases in which the conclusions is arrived at on subjective satisfaction. For, in such cases, it would be difficult for a Superior Court to find out which of the reasons brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, if it is found that there was legal evidence before the Tribunal, even if some of it were irrelevant, a Superior Court would not interfere if the finding can be sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason is that in writ petition for certiorari the Superior Court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction and therefore, does not enter into the question of sufficiency of evidence. The reason is that in writ petition for certiorari the Superior Court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction and therefore, does not enter into the question of sufficiency of evidence. See also the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa and Others v. Baidyabhushan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779 , paragraph 9. 8. FOR all these reasons, we hold that the petitioners of the writ petition cannot succeed and the impugned orders and directions under Section 49 of the Act were not liable to be quashed and/or set aside. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment appealed against and dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondents without any order as to costs.