JUDGMENT G.S. Sial, Member. - This is a reference made by the learned Commissioner, Varanasi Division, in a revision arising out of the order of the trial court setting aside the ex parte decree and restoring the suit under Sec. 229-B of the UPZA and LR Act, recommending that the revision be dismissed. 2. The facts of the case are narrated in the orders of the Commissioner and are, therefore, being not reiterated here. 3. The learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that at any event the ex parte decree could not be set aside in view of the amendment of the Allahabad High Court in Order 9, Rule 13, CPC on the ground of irregularity in service of summons. He further submitted that the trial court must give a finding on sufficiency of cause and knowledge. He referred to 1977 A.W.C., page 698 in support of his contention. He further challenged that in view of the latest amendment of the law, a Sirdar acquires rights of Bhumidhar and, therefore, the transaction gets validated and, therefore, no injustice has been caused to the State. He referred to 1957 R.D., page 426 to contend that the Board should decide the matter taking in view the enquiry of the matter. Lastly, he argued that the District Government Counsel had no power to file a restoration application unless he has been so authorised by the Collector. He referred to Order 27, Rule 4, CPC in this behalf. He also filed an application alongwith the certified copies of the consolidation courts, stating that the matter has since been finalised by the consolidation authorities and the State has not filed any objection during these proceedings and, therefore, they have no right to contest. 4. The learned counsel for the State pointed out that the ex parte decree was passed on the basis of the compromise decree to which the State was not a party and, therefore, such compromise decree would not be binding on the State and if the decree has been set aside, rightly or even wrongly, the revisional court will not interfere with the orders of the trial court. As regards the point that the District Government Counsel has no right to file the restoration, he stated that this is a fresh point which was not raised before the courts below and cannot be allowed to be raised here for the first time. As regards the point that the District Government Counsel has no right to file the restoration, he stated that this is a fresh point which was not raised before the courts below and cannot be allowed to be raised here for the first time. 5. I have considered the arguments and gone through the record of the case. 6. The facts of the case are rather peculiar. A suit was filed under Section 229-B on December 26, 1969. On January 19, 1970, a compromise was entered into between the petitioner and opposite party No. 3 and an ex-parte decree was passed in terms of the compromise without notice to the State. Thus, the State is not a party to the compromise and, therefore, the decree cannot be binding on the State. The Collector made an application in the court of Sub-Divisional Officer, vide paper No. 28/9 that the summon of the State was issued for January 12, 1969 and, therefore, on the due date, i.e. January 12, 1970 the State could not appear and ex-parte orders came to be passed on the basis of the compromise. It was further alleged that the ex-parte decree came to the knowledge of the State on August 3, 1970 by an inspection of the file, and that since the suit was collusive and the ex-parte decree had been obtained by practising fraud, it should be set aside. The trial court after considering all the circumstances came to the conclusion that summons to the State of U.P. was not properly served and accordingly set aside the ex-parte decree. 7. From the above facts, it appears that it is not merely a case of irregularity in the service of summons but that the summons gave a misreading of the date which prevented the State from putting in their appearance. The ruling cited by the learned counsel for the revisionist, referred to above, is certainly a good law on the point, but it appears to me that the facts of the present case are somewhat different and the service of summons cannot be considered to be a mere irregularity. The learned counsel's further argument is that since a Sirdar has now acquired rights of Bhumidhar and accordingly the transaction has got validated may have merit in it, but this point can be urged before the trial court when the ex-parte decree is set aside. The learned counsel's further argument is that since a Sirdar has now acquired rights of Bhumidhar and accordingly the transaction has got validated may have merit in it, but this point can be urged before the trial court when the ex-parte decree is set aside. This cannot be a consideration for maintaining the ex-parte decree. As regards the equity of the matter, the ruling referred to by him, in my view, the balance of equity is in favour of setting aside the ex-parte decree. Therefore, this contention has also little force. The point regarding filing of the restoration application by the District Government Counsel is not well-taken since the restoration application has been moved by the Collector himself as mentioned above. Moreover, this is a fresh point which was not raised before the courts below and cannot be allowed to be raised at this late stage. Hence, I am of the view that the orders of the courts below are correct and do not call for any revisional interference. 8. The learned counsel has filed certain papers which show that the village has come under consolidation operation and the proceedings are going on in the village. Accordingly, the suit shall abate under Sec. 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act.