Short Note : 1. The facts relevant for the purposes of this appeal are that the respondent plaintiff was employed as a teacher in the Balak Mandir (as type of K.G. School). The said school is run by Gwalior Mahila Mandal a Society registered under the Provisions of the Societies Act. It is not disputed, that the aforesaid society i.e., the appellant No. 1 defendant was the employer and the plaintiff respondent, was its employee. On certain allegations i.e. loss of some brass Ghung-ghurus and also that of misbehaviour etc. the plaintiff respondent was served with a notice calling her explanation on the aforesaid allegations. The plaintiff replied to the same. Thereafter, the appellant Society terminated the services of the plaintiff by giving one month's notice as contemplated by the terms and conditions of the order other appointment which was terminable by one months notice by either side. The plaintiff instituted a Civil suit claiming the relief of declaration to the effect that the order of termination of her service was void and illegal and, therefore, she be deemed to be in service. She accordingly claimed the relief of reinstatement and also a decree for the amount of arrears of salary from the date of termination upto the date of the suit and also for the future period till she was reinstated. 2. The trial Court decreed the suit on the ground that since the meeting of the Managing body of the Society was not held on a proper notice with the margin of days, the resolution directing termination of the service of the plaintiff passed in the said meeting was illegal and ineffective, and therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement and also for arrears of salary as claimed. The lower appellate Court also affirmed this decree of the trial Court. Being aggrieved by the same the defendants have preferred this second appeal. Held : The short point on which the fate of this litigation depends is apparently about the maintainability of such a suit. It is not disputed that the appellant No. 1 Society is a private body registered under the provisions of the Societies Act. It is also not disputed that the plaintiff-respondent was it's employee in accordance with the terms and conditions as stated in the order of appointment, Ex. P-1, whereby the services were liable the termination by one month's notice by either side. It is also not disputed that the plaintiff-respondent was it's employee in accordance with the terms and conditions as stated in the order of appointment, Ex. P-1, whereby the services were liable the termination by one month's notice by either side. There is nothing in the plaint to show that the employer Society was either a public authority or a statutory body. There is similarly nothing to indicate that there was any statutory duty cast upon the society in the matter of termination of the service of it's employees. It was purely a subject matter covered by the law of master and servant. The only allegation made in the plaint, is an effort to show that the termination of the service; of the plaintiff was illegal, was that since the Institution ‘Balak Mandir; receives grant in aid from the State Government and according to the rules framed by the Education Department of the State Government for regulating the subject matter of grants to private institutions, the service of an employee of such institution receiving grant in aid could not an terminated without holding an enquiry. This contention was not accepted by the lower appellate Court on the ground that the grant-in-aid rule, referred by the plaintiff, were confined for the purposes of regulation the grant or withdrawal of financial assistance and did not confer any right on the employees. 3. During the course of arguments before this Court, it was rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that the aforesaid rules were not statutory rules and did not form part of any legislation governing the service conditions of the employees of the institution. They were nothing but circulars issued by the State Government for the specific purpose of regulating the grant-in-aid. The learned counsel appearing for plaintiff-respondent could not point out anything from which it could b inferred that the aforesaid rules created any statutory obligation on the society or any corresponding legal right in the plaintiff. From the perusal of the judgment for the lower appellate Court, it is apparent that the claim of the plaintiff has been decreed only on the ground that the meeting of the Managing body of the society, in which the resolution for terminating the services of the plaintiff was not held on a notice of clear 5 day's margin. From the perusal of the judgment for the lower appellate Court, it is apparent that the claim of the plaintiff has been decreed only on the ground that the meeting of the Managing body of the society, in which the resolution for terminating the services of the plaintiff was not held on a notice of clear 5 day's margin. The learned counsel for the defendant-society however, pointed out that the first resolution passed by the Governing Body of the Institution was itself sufficient and there was no necessity for getting any further resolution from the Governing Body of the Society. He also pointed out that even if there was any irregularity in the meeting, the same did not affect the validity of the order of termination and the plaintiff could not rely on the alleged irregularity, even if any, as a ground for attacking the validity of the order of termination of her services which was strictly according to the terms and conditions of her appointment. 4. In my opinion, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case put by the parties regarding the alleged irregularity of the meeting of the Managing Body or the Governing Body on the ground of defective notice because the first and foremost thing which is to be considered is about the maintainability of such a suit at the instance of an employee against the private employer for claiming declaration of the order of termination to be illegal and the consequential relief of reinstatement. As discussed above, the plaintiff-respondent could not point out any material on record from which it could be inferred that there was any statutory obligation imposed on the society in the matter of termination of the services of its employee and that the order of termination has been made in violation of the same. Once it is not so, the claim put up in the plaint was actually for the enforcement of the contract of personal service for which a Civil suit is undoubtedly not maintainable. It may be true that there might be a contract of service between the society and its employee, which apart from its terms and conditions, might also be governed by the statutory provisions. It may be true that there might be a contract of service between the society and its employee, which apart from its terms and conditions, might also be governed by the statutory provisions. In such a case, it may be open to the Court to declare that the order of termination from service was in contravention of the statutory provisions and, therefore, the employee, so removed from service, still continues to remain in employment. In such cases the Court actually does not enforce the contract of service but simply declares the statutory invalidity of the act, done by the employer, by holding that the said act being in contravention of law, was ineffective. In that event, the order of termination itself being ineffective, there is no question of termination of services and the repudiation of the contract of service being null and void, does not have the effect of putting an end to the services of the employee. 5. But, in the present case, it is not so. It is purely a case in between a private employer and its employee. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that it was not necessary that the employer must be a public official or official body. Be referred to certain observations made by their lordships of the Supreme Court in para 6 of the decision. In the case of Praga Tools Corpn. V. C.V. Imanual (AIR 1969 Supreme Court 1306). It is true that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that where there is a public duty or statutory obligation cast even on a person or corporation to perform a legal duty. In that context, it was observed that it may, however, be not necessary that the person or authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed must be a public official or a official body. In the present case, as discussed above, there is nothing to show that any statutory duty has been imposed on the defendant Society which could create a legal right for claiming the performance of such duty in favour of the plaintiff. This legal position is now well settled by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain (AIR 1976 Supreme Court 888). This legal position is now well settled by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain (AIR 1976 Supreme Court 888). The present case does not fall within the ambit of any of the categories as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court so as to make the claim of the plaintiff maintainable before a Civil Court. Appeal allowed.