ORDER George Vadakkel, J. 1. The revision petitioner sought to evict the respondent herein invoking sub-s.(2) and (3) of S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. During the course of evidence it turned out that the respondent, as contended by him, was in continuous occupation of the building in question from a date prior to 1st April 1940, Therefore the provision governing eviction was understood by the lower courts to be sub-s.(17) of S.11. The case was considered on that basis also by all the three courts, the Rent Control Court, the Appellate Court, and the Revisional Court. While the Rent Control Court and the Revisional Court agreed that the bar under sub-s.(17) is attracted, the Appellate Authority took the view that the revision petitioner is entitled to evict the respondent despite sub-s.(17) of S.11. Hence this revision impugning the revisional order passed by the learned District Judge. 2. The learned District Judge relying on the decision' of this court in Meannan v. Venkatarama Chettiar 1966 KLT 116 said that " occupation of a rented building does not imply dire need as laid down by the High Court in the ruling reported in 1966 KLT 116 ". This, I suppose, has blurred the view of the revisional court in that that decision says something different, namely, that the landlord seeking eviction has a rented house where he resides and can continue to reside without imminent danger of eviction, is not a relevant answer in deciding whether he " is in dire need of a place of residence and has none of his own". This is clear from paragraph 7 of the decision aforesaid wherein Govindan Nair, J., as he then was said as follows:- "Both these authorities proceeded on the basis that the fact that the respondent was staying with his family in a rented house would be a relevant consideration for determining the question whether eviction can be had. So the appellate authority took the view that the landlord seeking eviction must establish that his landlord is entitled to evict him (the landlord seeking eviction) from the building which he is occupying on rent before it can be said that there is 'dire need '. So the appellate authority took the view that the landlord seeking eviction must establish that his landlord is entitled to evict him (the landlord seeking eviction) from the building which he is occupying on rent before it can be said that there is 'dire need '. The revisional authority has come to a different conclusion, I do not think that the occupation of a building on rent is a relevant consideration in determining the question of 'dire need'. The last part of S.11(17), which I have held must stand separately, states the conditions that should be established as 'dire need ' and the lack of a building of 'his own '. So the occupation of a building on rent is not material. But ' dire need ' being defined something in the nature of a ' pressing necessity ' or a 'compelling need ' must be proved on material on the basis of which it k possible to come to such a conclusion". This passage means, as I understand it, simply that it is no answer to an eviction petition based on the ground of ' dire need of a place for residence and has none of his own', to say that the petitioner landlord has a rented building where he is residing and can continue to reside there without any fear of eviction. The second requirement of which the Rent Control Court is to be satisfied before ordinary eviction in such a case is that the landlord has no place of residence of his own, and so, that he has a place of residence though not of his own but taken on rent, is no defence to such an eviction petition. It appears that the statute proceeds on the basis that to constitute 'dire need' it is essential that the landlord should have no place of residence which is his own. Therefore, what is relevant in regard to the second requirement mentioned above is an enquiry as to whether the landlord is occupying any place of residence of his own or not and as regards the availability of a place of residence of his own. Therefore, what is relevant in regard to the second requirement mentioned above is an enquiry as to whether the landlord is occupying any place of residence of his own or not and as regards the availability of a place of residence of his own. Therefore, while occupation by the landlord of a building taken on rent by him is not a material or relevant defence it can be averred and shown by the landlord that he is residing in a rented house since he has no place of residence of his own other than the building occupied by the tenant. The landlord can, for example, establish that he is in imminent danger of being evicted from the rented building he is occupying wherefore he is in need or dire need of a place of residence for him, but the tenant cannot contend that since the landlord in not under any threat of eviction from a rented house he is occupying he is not in need or dire need of a place for residence. 3. Sub-s.(17) prohibits eviction of a tenant who has been occupying the building continuously from 1st April 1940 for bona fide occupation by the landlord or by any member of his family dependent on him except in two instances, and in both cases, unless the building in question is a residential building. The first is, where a landlord who has been living outside the city, town or village in which the building is situated for more than five years before he applies for eviction, 'requires' the building bona fide for his own permanent residence or for the permanent residence of any member of his family; and the second, if the landlord is' in dire need of a place for residence and has none of his own'. The provisions controlling eviction for own occupation or occupation by a member of the landlord's family dependent upon him are leaving out sub-s.(17) of S.11 which as per the ruling in Y.W.C. Association v. Jacob ( 1969 KLT 919 ) is not subject to S.11(17) of the Act, sub-s.(3) and (8) of S.11, Under the former provision the landlord can seek eviction, subject to the other limitations mentioned therein, 'if he bona fide needs the building' and under the latter,' if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use' -- sub-s.(8) relates to eviction of a tenant occupying part of a building by a landlord occupying the remaining portion. Note the expressions 'requires', 'needs' and 'in dire need '. It is in this setting that the scope of the second exception to the prohibition contained in sub-s.(17) has to be considered. 4. Construing the word 'required ' in the following provision in the Rent Act, 1968: "Where a person who occupied the dwelling house as his residence (in this case referred to as 'the owner occupier ') let it on a regulated tenancy and (a) not later thin the relevant date the landlord gave notice in writing to the tenant that possession might be recovered under this case, and (b) the dwelling house has not, since December 8, 1965, been let by the owner occupier on a protected tenancy with respect to which the condition mentioned in paragraph (a) above was not satisfied, and (c) the court is satisfied that the dwelling house is required as a residence for the owner occupier or any member of his family who resided with the owner occupier when he last occupied the dwelling house as a residence ". in Rennenly v. Dunne 1177 (I) Q-B 37 C. A. at 850 Stephenson L.J., said "For these reasons, the judge was in my opinion wrong in saying that ' requires' means more than 'wants' and more than bona fide 'intention', and in saying that there was 'something objective as well '. There is nothing more objective about this provision than that it must be a genuine requirement and there must be a present intention; and, if the landlord proves that, he is entitled to possession under case 10". There is nothing more objective about this provision than that it must be a genuine requirement and there must be a present intention; and, if the landlord proves that, he is entitled to possession under case 10". In the same case Browne L.J. held: "I am driven to the conclusion that 'required ' in case 10 puts on the landlord the burden of proving no more than that he genuinely desires to have the house as a residence for himself or for the specified members of his family, and genuinely has the immediate intention of using it for that purpose if he does get possession". The same view was taken by Megaw L. J. also who said: "I also agree. It is to my mind clear that the legislature has deliberately omitted the word 'reasonably' in case 10, and has deliberately inserted it in case 8. It may well be that there are good reasons of policy within the general policy of the Rent Act 1968 why that distinction should have been drawn. Whether that be so or not, the result of it I have no doubt, is that in order to comply with paragraph (c) of case 10 what has to be proved by the person who had previously occupied the dwelling house as his residence and now desires to occupy it again is that he desires to occupy it and that he intends so to do. I need scarcely say that the desire must be a genuine desire: the intention must be a genuine intention: but no more than that". 5. The Court Appeal pointed out in the above mentioned decision that the word ' requires ' does not mean ' reasonably requires ', an expression which postulates that before ordering eviction the court must consider whether the requirement is reasonable. In my view it is in the same sense that the word ' required ' is used in sub-s.(8) and (17), namely, that the landlord ' desires to occupy' it (the buildings or part of the building, as the case may be) and has a present intention to occupy it. In my view it is in the same sense that the word ' required ' is used in sub-s.(8) and (17), namely, that the landlord ' desires to occupy' it (the buildings or part of the building, as the case may be) and has a present intention to occupy it. The Rent Control Court is not, in determining the question whether the landlord 'requires' the remaining portion of the building as additional accommodation for his personal use under sub-s.(8), or 'requires' the building for his own permanent residence or for the permanent residence of any member of his family under sub-s.(17), called upon to embark upon an enquiry as to why he so ' requires' and whether it is reasonable for him to so require part of the building for additional accommodation for personal use, or, the building, for his permanent residence or for the permanent residence of any member of his family. However, the Court, under the 1st proviso to sub-s.(10), has, when additional accommodation is sought under sub-s.(8), to compare the advantage the landlord will get by evicting the tenant occupying a portion of the building therefrom with the hardship caused to the tenant by such eviction, and if the tenant's hardship will outweigh the landlord's advantage, the landlord will not be entitled to evict the tenant. To this limited extent the Court will have to address itself as to whether it would be reasonable to make an order for possession of the premises in favour of the landlord but as pointed out in woodfall on landlord and Tenant (1960-26th Edn.) Vol. I at p. 1202 the reasonableness of the landlord's desire or requirement is a different matter from the question whether it is reasonable to make an order, and the two must not be confused. 6. In the Kennedy case the Court of Appeal referred to and relied on an earlier decision of that Court, Ireland v. Taylor 1949 (1) KB 300. Construing the words 'the premises are required for occupation by himself Tucker, L. J. in that case observed (at p. 311):- "The referee had interpreted the word 'required' as If it meant needed', somewhat on the lines of the words 'reasonably required' in the Rent Restriction Acts. Construing the words 'the premises are required for occupation by himself Tucker, L. J. in that case observed (at p. 311):- "The referee had interpreted the word 'required' as If it meant needed', somewhat on the lines of the words 'reasonably required' in the Rent Restriction Acts. The country court judge rightly rejected this construction, but appears to have interposed his own judgment as to the landlord's 'requirements', whereas, in my opinion, in this part of S.5 the landlord must be the sole arbiter of his own requirements, provided that he proves that he in fact desires possession and genuinely intends to occupy". In the same case Somervell, L. J. pointed out (at p. 316-317): - "The referee in his report construed Requires' as meaning 'needs', and came to the conclusion that the landlords did not need this large house. It is unnecessary to refer to the evidence in detail, but neither in the referee's findings nor, as far as I can see, in cross examination was any doubt thrown on the intention of the landlords to go and live in the house if they got the chance. The judge did not regard 'requires' as meaning 'reasonably requires' or 'needs', but as a somewhat stronger word than 'intends'. * * * * * 'Requires' may, of course, have different senses in different contexts. In its present context it is, I think, satisfied if a landlord establishes, as the landlords here did, that he wants and intends to occupy the premises". And Cohen, L. J. said (at p. 320-21) as follows:- "Before turning to the evidence on this point, it is necessary to decide what is meant by the word 'required'. The referee came to the conclusion that this word meant 'needed', and that as (1) the landlords' allegation, so far as the son and daughter inlaw was concerned, was unsupported by evidence, and (2), so far as the landlords themselves were concerned, the) had a other house which they could retain under the Rent Restriction Acts, it could not be said that they needed the premises for their own occupation. * * * * * I think that it was not for the country court judge to decide on the reasonableness of the landlords' intention. In my opinion, provided that their intention was genuine, the landlords were entitled to rely on the proviso to S.5, sub-s.3". 7. * * * * * I think that it was not for the country court judge to decide on the reasonableness of the landlords' intention. In my opinion, provided that their intention was genuine, the landlords were entitled to rely on the proviso to S.5, sub-s.3". 7. The passages quoted above would be of great assistance to understand the meaning and scope of the words 'bona fide needs' in sub-s.3 of S.11 of the Act which expression appears to have been used and understood in Rent Acts in the same sense as 'reasonably required', To the same effect is the following passage from woodfall on Landlord and Tenant (1960-26th Edn. Vol. I p. 1202):- "Perhaps the best definition of reasonable requirement is one that has been given in the Sheriff Court: A genuine present need, something more than desire, although something much less than absolute necessity". Stephenson, L. J. has extracted this passage approvingly in Kennedy case. Hallett J. also understood the words 'reasonably required' as 'reasonably needed' in Nuthall Ltd. v. Entertainments Ltd, 1947 (2) AER 384 where (at p. 392) the learned Judge stated:-- "I have used the word 'wish' in order not to beg to the remaining question which arises on clause (b) (i), viz., the true meaning to be given to the word 'required'. The word 'required' by itself is certainly ambiguous. It may mean in some context no more than 'desired', and an instance of this can be found in S.5(5): 'every lease granted under this section shall, if the landlord so requires', etc. It may mean, on the other hand, in other contexts 'indispensable', as when one says 'human beings require adequate nourishment to maintain proper health'. I agree with counsel for the applicants that the first meaning is too narrow in the present context, but I agree, on the other hand, with counsel for the respondents that the second meaning is too wide. * * * * I therefore, think that what the landlord has to prove under (i) is that he intends to use the premises for occupation by himself, just as under (iii) he has to prove that he intends to use the premises to carry out a scheme of redevelopment. If that be correct, O.A.T.S. undoubtedly intended at the material time, and still intend, to use the premises for occupation by themselves. If that be correct, O.A.T.S. undoubtedly intended at the material time, and still intend, to use the premises for occupation by themselves. If, contrary to my opinion, the word 'required' in (i) should be interpreted more favourably to the plaintiffs as meaning 'reasonably needed', I should still be of opinion that O.A.T.S. have proved what is necessary to bring the case within that provision". 8. That the expression 'bona fide needs' in sub-s.3 means: 'a genuine present need, something more than desire, although something much less than absolute necessity' is clear from the provisos following that sub-section and sub-s.(12) of S.11. Here the Rent Control Court will have to make an objective inquiry as to whether the need alleged is reasonable so that it is reasonably necessary to put the landlord in possession of the premises. 9. Now, it can easily be said that the 'dire need' of the landlord 'of a place for residence' which would entitle him to evict a tenant in continuous occupation of his (landlord's) residential building from 1st April 1940 in such need as would amount to 'absolute necessity', or a 'pressing or compelling need', but still it is neither possible nor feasible to define what 'dire need' or 'absolute necessity' is. That is a matter for determination by the court objectively taking into account all the circumstances of the case and the situation in which the landlord is placed. What the Rent Control Court has to determine on the basis of proved facts of hardships of the landlord in each case (greater the hardship more the need), is as to whether it would be reasonable or unreasonable to make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of his building for his occupation. It is a matter of justice, equity and good conscience as decided, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, by the court rather than of any doctrinaire approach. It is a matter of justice, equity and good conscience as decided, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, by the court rather than of any doctrinaire approach. It may in one sense, be said that what the court has to decide is as to who is in greater need of the house in question, the landlord who requires it or the tenant who is occupying it for the past several years, and this decisions would depend upon an assessment of all the circumstances, including the question of availability of other alternate accommodation both for the landlord and the tenant, and as to who would be put to greater hardship, the landlord by rejection of his application or the tenant, by an order of eviction. The following passage from Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant (1960-26th Edn.) Vol. I p. 1202-3 though said in an entirely different context would best illustrate what all matters would be relevant in considering the question of greater hardship. "Circumstances which may be considered will include the financial means of both parties, the tenant's failure to seek alternative accommodation, and hardship to third parties, such as the landlord's daughter, other members of the family, relatives and dependants, and even (to a lesser extent) lodgers, guests and the [stranger within the gate, due regard being had to their status and proximity to the landlord or tenant, and to the extent to which hardship to them would be hardship to the landlord or tenant". Thus for example the need of an impecunious landlord who cannot afford to pay the rent of the building he is occupying or of a landlord who had rented out his big building years ago when he had a small family and had moved to a small rented house himself but whose family has now grown so that the small rented house is absolutely insufficient judged by reasonable standards would be dire need, and it is not necessary in either of the illustrations mentioned above, that the landlord himself should have been evicted before he can approach the Rent Control Court on the ground of 'dire need'. It is not necessary to multiply illustrations nor is it possible since each case will have to be decided with reference to the particular facts obtained in it except to caution that the initial onus is on the landlord to establish a case of dire need or absolute necessity. 10. Though the parties during the evidence stage attempted to place some materials on the question as regards the ground envisaged by the last sentence in sub-s.(17) of S.11, it appears to me, that there were no sufficient materials placed before the court to decide upon the two requirements mentioned therein. Moreover, the lower courts appear to have proceeded on the basis of conjectures and that too, as regards whether it would be possible for the landlord to go on residing in a building which as found by the lower courts was the family building allotted to the landlord's brother and subsequently given over by that brother to his son. The lower courts also seem to have been influenced by the fact that though subsequent to the filing of the application the landlord had to leave the aforesaid house he had taken another house on rent. The revisional court spent sometime in discussing as to who may be the owner of the house. All these, according to me, were only exercises in futility, in so far as the question arising for decision in the case was not correctly understood by the lower courts. 11. As already stated the question as regards the dire need will have to be decided with reference to the particular facts and circumstances of each case and it is neither feasible nor possible to lay down any guidelines in that regard except to the extent indicated hereinbefore. In view of the fact that the parties were not fully aware that the question of eviction has to be considered with reference to sub-s.(17) of S.11, it appears to me that, as was done in Meannan v. Venkitarama Chettiar 1966 KLT 116 , they have to be given a further opportunity to agitate the question before the lower courts. In view of the fact that the parties were not fully aware that the question of eviction has to be considered with reference to sub-s.(17) of S.11, it appears to me that, as was done in Meannan v. Venkitarama Chettiar 1966 KLT 116 , they have to be given a further opportunity to agitate the question before the lower courts. I therefore set aside the orders of all the courts, the Rent Control Court, the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Court, except as regards the finding entered by these courts concurrently that the tenant was occupying the building from a date prior to 1st April 1940 and remit the case back to the Rent Control Court for fresh disposal with reference to S.11(17) of the Act, The parties will be free to adduce further evidence if they are so advised. This revision petition is allowed to the above extent. There will be no order as to costs.