Judgment M. P. Singh, J. 1. This writ petition challenges the order of the Additional collector, Muzzaffarpur, dated 13th November, 1976 at Annexure 2 in Ceiling case No.25 of 1973-74 passed under Sec.5 (1) (iii) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceilling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (briefly the Act ). By that order the Additional Collector held that the transfers of 943.76 acres of land on 31 August, 1970 by the petitioner with the shareholders of the Sugar Factory, Motipur were made with the object of defeating the provisions of the Act. He accordingly annulled those transfers and declared that the said land shall be deemed to be held by the petitioners for the purposes of determining the ceiling area. The petitioners went in appeal against that order and it is pending before the Collector, Muzaffarpur while persuing this statutory remedy available to the petitioners, they have also invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution for quashing the said order of the Additional Collector. 2. By order of this Court dated 18th January, 1978 the petitioners were allowed to amend the writ petition by addition a new paragraph 32-A containing additional grounds of Annexure 6 challenging the vires of the Act. In the writ petition no such ground has been taken. In the counter-affidavit the respondents have stated that after due enquiry, it transpired that the sale of 943.75 acres of land was made on only one day, i. e. on 31 August, 1970, just eight days before the commencement of the revised Land Ceiling Act with the shareholders of the sugar factory who were either members of the same family or relatives. It is alleged that the transactions were sham or benami, the land having been found in physical possession of the sugar factory. As these transactions were held to be made with the object of defeating the provisions of the Act and to keep more land than the ceiling limit, they were annulled under Section 5 (1) (iii) of the Act. It is also stated that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the new constitutional provisions without exhausting the alternative remedy of appeal provided in Sec.30 of the Act which is already pending. 3. It is also stated that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the new constitutional provisions without exhausting the alternative remedy of appeal provided in Sec.30 of the Act which is already pending. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Act is unconstitutional, ultra vires and void because it affects the basic structure of the Constitution. Reliance has been placed upon the case of Kesvananda bharati, ( AIR 1973 SC 1461 ) known as the Basic structure case. The core of his submission is this : According to the preamble to the Cocstitution the people of India have adopted, enacted and given to themselves the Constitution and that people are sovereign, the constition was enacted by the people and it is for the people. Sovereignity, therefore, rests in the people. People of India are an entity and they cannot be disintegrated. The Act under challenge offends the basic structure by ignoring the existence of a large number of women and children who form integral part of the Indian people. Sovereignity of the people cannot be touched by the Legislature. The Act treats as non tst a vast majority of people belonging to the female sex and children whose rights have been ignored in the act. The Act, therefore, annihilates them of the capacity cf being individuals having their civic rights and it does not simply deprive them of their property rights. The existence of the individual is denied, his civic rights inherent in his existence are being denied and an individual as such is not recognised under an artificial concept of the word "family". Individual member of the society are treated as civilly dead under the device of their artificial merger in clear disregard of social and lexicographic connotation of the term. Learned counsel also submitted that there was lack of legislative competence to enact the Act and fixing the ceiling for the family of an artificial concept. He docs not dispute that fixing of ceiling limit is within the competence of the Legislature but he argued that the manner in which the land reform was being sought was not within the legislative competence. A power to reform, learned counsel says, cannot exterminate or efface the existence of the people or a large section thereof from their legal and factual existence. A power to reform, learned counsel says, cannot exterminate or efface the existence of the people or a large section thereof from their legal and factual existence. It was further submitted that according to the explanation to Sec.2 (ee) of the Act defining "family" the word "person" included a Company, but a company cannot have a spouse. On these grounds it is urged that the Act offends the basic structure of the Constitution and it is not protected by Article 31-B of the Constitution even if it was insert id in the ninth Schedule of the Constitution. We, however, find no substance in the point. The basic structure principle cannot be applied for determing the validity of an Act of the Parliament or a State Legislature. It can be used only` for challenging the law amending the Constitution. In V. U. Uttawar V/s. State, (AIR 1977 Bombay 99) it was held that ordinary law either made by Parliament or by the State Legislature cannot be challenged on the ground of the basic structure or constitutional frame work or principle. This case was affirmed by the Supreme Court in D. G. Mahajan V/s. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1977 SC 915 ). The same view was taken in Smt. Indira Nahru Gandhi V/s. Raj Narain, ( AIR 1975 SC 2299 ). I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Act which was put in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution cannot be questioned on the ground of the Basic Structure theory. Had there been any merit in the contention we might have considered the question of referring this case to a larger Bench as provided in Article 228 (3) of the Constitution which provides : "the minimum number of Judges who shall sit for the purpose of determining any question as to the constitutional validity of any state law shall be five. . . . . . . . . " 4. For these reasons I do not think that this case requires to be referred to a larger Bench. 5. It is to be noticed that the Act has been held constitutional by this Court in Mahabir Prasad V/s. State (1975) BBCJ 701) ; Nalni Ranjan V/s. State of Bihar, ( 1977 BBCJ 283 , In Purtabpore Co. . " 4. For these reasons I do not think that this case requires to be referred to a larger Bench. 5. It is to be noticed that the Act has been held constitutional by this Court in Mahabir Prasad V/s. State (1975) BBCJ 701) ; Nalni Ranjan V/s. State of Bihar, ( 1977 BBCJ 283 , In Purtabpore Co. V/s. State, (AIR 1977 Patna 283), section.5 (1) (iii) of the Act was held to be constitutional in view of Article 31-B, the act having been included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. I do not find any reason to think that these decisions require reconsideration by a larger bench. 6. It will not be out of place to mention that the concept of land reforms has a national history and it is a part of national policy following from considerations of social and economic justice. The State policy as envisaged in Article 39 of the Constitution was to promote the welfare of the people as a whole by building a new social order by securing to all citizens justice social, economic and political. It was thought that simple and effective means for ensuring a measure of social and economic justice will be a redical re-distribution of land. Agriculture had a dominant position in the Indian economy and attributed nearly 50% of the national income. Over 70% of the population depended upon agriculture. It was, therefore suggested that the fixing of ceiling on agricultural holdings at a low level, will lift those at the bottom of the social ladder, namely, the share-croppers and the landless labourers to a higher status. Under such measures the ownership and control of the material resources of the country shall be held not by a new by the community a whole. The distribution of the resources could then be broadly based and the common good would better be served. Bhagwati, J. in D. J. Mahajan V/s. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1977 SC 915 ) at page 922 observed : "the necessity for wide ranging radical land reforms in order to improve our rural economy was actually realised when on attaining independence, we became free to mould our destinies What that end in view, immediately after independence, the legislatures of the country started enacting laws for bringing about agrarian reform as a part of the process of socio-economic reconstruction. The imposition of ceilling agricultural holdings was found necessary as a part of the scheme of agrarian reform because it was calculated to remove undue balance in society resulting from landless class on the one hand and concentration of land in the hands of a few on the other. The concept of socio-economic justice embodied in the Constitution in fact rendered the imposition of ceiling inevitable, as this step was symbolic of new social ideas. [india Progress of Land Reforms, 1955 p.19]. The growth of monopolistic tendencies in land ownership had to be arrested, if the optimum area was to be made available to the largest number of people. The Penal on land Reforms set up by the Planning Commission in 1955, therefore, unanimously accepted the principle that there should be an absolute limit to the amount of land which any individual might hold and observed that the policy of imposition of ceiling would be able to make contribution towards achieving the following objectives (i) meeting the widespread desire to possess land ; (ii) reducing glaring inequalities in ownership and use of land ; (Hi) reducing inequalities in agricultural income, and (iv) enlarging the sphere of self-employment. The Second Five Year Plan also pointed out ; in the conditions of India large disparities in distribution of wealth and income are inconsistent with economic progress in any sector. This consideration applied with even greater force to land. The area of land available for cultivation is necessarily limited. In the past rights in land were the principal factor which determined, both social status and economic opportunity for different grounds in the rural population. For building up a progressive rural economy, it is essential that disparities in the ownership of land should be greatly reduced and added that this step would go a long way ". . . . . . . . . to afford opportunities to landless sections of the rural population to gain in social status and to feel a sense of opportunity equally with other sections of the community. . . . . . . . . The policy of imposing ceiling on agricultural holdings, therefore, initiated in the country with the twin objectives of changing the skewed distribution of agricultural land ownership in the country and making some land available for distribution among the landless". . . . . . . . . The policy of imposing ceiling on agricultural holdings, therefore, initiated in the country with the twin objectives of changing the skewed distribution of agricultural land ownership in the country and making some land available for distribution among the landless". It is, thus, clear that it was in the implementation of this policy that the principal act was passed by the Bihar Legislature in 1961. Not only that, the Parliament put it into the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and in order to protect it from litigative assaults on constitutionality, enacted Article 31-B which lays down : - "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A, none of the Act and Regulations specified in the Ninth schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, regulation or provision is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force. " From the above it is obvious that the Act as amended conforms to the directive principles of the State policy. Under these circumstances, I think that no prima facie point has been made out for referring the case to a larger Bench to decide the question of the constitutionality of the Act on the ground of the basis structure principles.6. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the following cases, godavari Sugar Mills V/s. S. B. Ramble, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1193), Malkhan singh V/s. State of U. P. (AIR 1974 Supreme Court 443) and Hasmukhlal V/s. State of gujarat, (AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2316), but none of these cases supports him. They are not of much assistance for the purpose of deciding the controversy involved in the present case. I do not, therefore, think it necessary to discuss them. 7 Mr. They are not of much assistance for the purpose of deciding the controversy involved in the present case. I do not, therefore, think it necessary to discuss them. 7 Mr. Lal Narain Sinha contended that since the petitioners had an alternative remedy by way of appeal to the Collector under section 30 of the Act, the writ petition is not maintainable by reason of the fetter of clause (3) of the amended Article 226 of the Constitution and by operation of section 58 of the constitution Amendment Act, 1976. It was brought to our attention that an appeal was filed and it is pending. It is urged that if a litigant has an alternative remedy in law available to him to get redress against an order and if he does not seek to enforce any of the fundamental rights, then the writ petition will not be maintainable in view of the amended Article 226 (3) which provides : "no petition for the redress of any injury referred to in sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c)of clause (1) shall be entertained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for any or under any other law for the time being in force. " It is also pointed out that, according to section 58 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment)Act, 1976 which has amended Article 226 and which so far as Article 226 is concerned, came into force on 1st February, 1977, even pending petitions under article 226 are to be governed and dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that Article as it stands after amendment. Such writ petition shall abate by virtue of the provisions of the said section 58 (2 ). In my opinion the contention has merit. In the present case the petitioners do not claim any relief under clause (a) for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights. The relief, if at all, may come either under clause (b) or (c ). The petitioners have an alternative remedy by way of appeal provided by statute for the redress of any such injury. The writ petition, therefore, is not maintainable and must abate. Mr. Balbhadra singh learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the cases of Ahmedabad cotton Mfg. Co, Ltd. , AIR 1977 Gujarat 113 (F. B.) and also on the case of the government of India V/s. National Tobacco Co. The writ petition, therefore, is not maintainable and must abate. Mr. Balbhadra singh learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the cases of Ahmedabad cotton Mfg. Co, Ltd. , AIR 1977 Gujarat 113 (F. B.) and also on the case of the government of India V/s. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. , Calcutta (AIR 1977 a. P.250 F. B.) and contended that the alternative remedy must be equally, speedy, adequate and efficacious. In my opinion, these two cases do not help him. In the Gujarat case an outsider like the Deputy Collector of Central Excise who was not an original assessing authority, had issued a direction in the form of a trade Notice to all cotton textile units manufacturing blended yarn which, if in force, would have changed the entire basis of assessment. The writ petitioners in that case challenged that Trade Notice as being illegal and without jurisdiction. The order was held to be without jurisdiction and a nullity. There was no provision for appeal against the Trade Notice. It was observed that even if an appeal was filed against such order, the order confirmed in appeal would also be a nullity. Hence it would be a futile remedy. Therefore, the question of exhausting alternative remedy could hardly arise in that case. It was observed that the petitioner could straightway seek that remedy of judicial review under article 226. It is clear that the Gujarat case was a case of ultra vires order. Moreover, the writ petitioners in that case were enforcing fundamental rights to hold property under Article 31 (1 ). That case, therefore, is not of any assistance to the petitioners. In Andhra Pradesh case (1977 Andhra Pradesh 250 F. B.)the question for consideration was to find out the writ jurisdiction of the high Court under the amended Article 226 of the Constitution and in that connection the full scope of the amended Article 226 and of section 58 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 was considered. It was held that the provisions of section 58 of the Amendment Act did not apply to pending appeals or applications for leave to appeal to Supreme Court. It was also observed that the other remedy contemplated in clause (3) of Article 226 must be truly and really capable of giving such redress as is postulated under sub-clauses (b) and (c ). It was also observed that the other remedy contemplated in clause (3) of Article 226 must be truly and really capable of giving such redress as is postulated under sub-clauses (b) and (c ). If the other remedy is not capable of giving to the aggrieved person similar redress as is contemplated by sub-clauses (b) and (c) then it cannot be considered to be a bar. This case also, therefore, is not of any help to the petitioners. Quite clearly in the present case there is an alternative remedy by way of appeal to the petitioners, provided by statute. The writ petition, therefore, is not maintainable and it shall abate by virtue of the provisions of section 5.8 of the Amendment Act. Reference regarding non-maintainability of the writ petition, on the ground of availability of alternative remedy may be made to the cases of M/s. V/s. Shriram Beariugs Ltd. V/s. E. S. I. Corporation ( 1977 bbcj 265 at 269) and Jai Hanuman Trading Co. V/s. I. T. Commissioner, Pattala (AIR 1977 Punjab and Haryana 314 at 320 ). 8. It was contended by Sri Lal Narain Sinha, for the respondents that the petitioners have no locus Siandi because after transfer of the land, they cannot be said to be "persons aggrieved". He submits that in the present case the transferees have not invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Only the transferor has moved. It is urged that there is no invasion on the right of the petitioners and that the invasion, if any, is of the right of the transferees and hence the writ petition cannot be maintained by the petitioners. In the view which I have taken about this case, it is unnecessary to decide this point. 9. On merits, it was contended by the patitioners that the finding of the additional Collector that the transactions were sham or benami, was not based on evidence, rather it was based on the verification report of the Circle Officer, which is not a statutory report and possession cannot be determined on such a report only, as held in Shiv Narain Khawaray V/s. State of Bihar, ( 1977 BBCJ 452 ). I have already said that the appeal is pending before the Collector, Muzaffarpur in which any point on merits of the case can be raised. 10. I have already said that the appeal is pending before the Collector, Muzaffarpur in which any point on merits of the case can be raised. 10. In the result, therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, I hold that in view of the provisions of clause (3) of the amended article 226, the writ petition is not maintainable. It is dismissed as having abated. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. 11. I agree with my learned brother M. P. Singh that this application should be dismissed on the ground that the petitioners have been pursuing an alternative remedy of appeal, but in view of the long and learned arguments advanced before us, would add a few words of my own. 12. Mr. Balbhadra Pd. "singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, eon-tended that the alternative remedy could not be held to be a bar to the maintainability of this writ application inasmuch as the constitutional validity of the Act could not be challenged before the authority acting under the Act. It is difficult to accept this argument and permit the petitioners who have already availed of the alternative remedy, which is pending disposal, to prosecute two remedies simultaneously, ultimately for the same relief, namely, that the order of the revenue authorities should be quashed, particularly when in the writ application also, they challenge it on all possible grounds, besides constitutional validity of the Act. They cannot be permitted to argue the appeal on merits before the appellate authority and again raise the question of vires of the Act in this court. 13. In view of the repeated decisions of this Court that the Act in question is intra vires, learned counsel contended that those decisions were not correctly decided. It may be mentioned that this Court has held in Mahabir Prasad V/s. State of Bihar, 1975 BBCJ 701 ), Nalini Ranjan V/s. State of Bihar ( 1977 BBCJ 283 ) ; Purtabpore Co. V/s. State, (MR 1977 Patna 283)and a recent Bench decision in C. W. J. C. No.1562 of 1977 (Ram Sewak Das V/s. The State of Bihar and others) decided on 17.1.1978, that the Act is intra vires and its validity cannot be challenged on account of it being placed under the ninth Schedule. The contention of Mr. Balbhadra Pd. V/s. State, (MR 1977 Patna 283)and a recent Bench decision in C. W. J. C. No.1562 of 1977 (Ram Sewak Das V/s. The State of Bihar and others) decided on 17.1.1978, that the Act is intra vires and its validity cannot be challenged on account of it being placed under the ninth Schedule. The contention of Mr. Balbhadra Pd. Singh was that as the provisions of the Act infringe the basic structure of the Constitution, it was still open to the Courts to examine its constitutional validity. In support of his proposition he placed reliance upon the case of Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi V/s. Sri raj Narain, ( AIR 1975 SC 2279 ). While examining the provisions of the representation of the People (Amendment Act 54 of 1974) and the Election laws (Amendment) Act (40 of 1975), the Supreme Court observed, in view of the decision in Kesavananda Bhartis case ( AIR 1973 SC 1461 ), that notwithstanding the fact that any statute was placed in the Ninth Schedule, it was open to challenge either on the ground of damage to or destruction of basic features, basic structure or basic framework or on the ground of violation of fundamental rights. Mr. Singh, accordingly, contended that the provision of the Act ignore the existence of an individual citizen and annihilates the basic character of the corporate bodies, for which there was complete lack of legislative competence to enact the pivotal provision for fixing the ceiling for an artificial subject. In other words, learned counsel contended that he did not intend to challenge the propriety and intent of the Act, namely, to carry out the directive principles and agrarian reforms, but the manner in which the said reforms are purported to be persued was violative of the constitutional guarantee afforded to each and every citizen. In order to illustrate his contention, he contended that a company cannot have a spouse like a land-holder and, therefore, to include by fiction of law, a company in the difinition of land-holder, would be erroneous. 14. It is not necessary to enter into any long discussion on these questions as somewhat similar arguments were raised before the Supreme Court in duttatraya Govind Mahajan and others V/s. The State of Maharashtra and another, ( AIR 1977 SC 915 ). 14. It is not necessary to enter into any long discussion on these questions as somewhat similar arguments were raised before the Supreme Court in duttatraya Govind Mahajan and others V/s. The State of Maharashtra and another, ( AIR 1977 SC 915 ). The learned Judges of the Supreme Court, after consideration of a large number of authorities on the subject, overruled all such contentions. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that the provisions of the Act are ultr a vire. 15. In order to answer the argument of Mr. Singh that the Act was likely to cause injustice in some cases I may refer to an observation of Krishna Iyer, J. in the case of Fatehchcmd Himmatlal and others V/s. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1977 SC 1825 at 1841) which is as follows : "every cause claims its martyr and if the law, necessitated by practical considerations, makes generalisations which hurt a few, it cannot be helped by the Court. Otherwise, the enforcement of the Debt Relief act will turn into an enquiry into scrupulous and unscrupulous creditors, frustrating, through endless litigation, the instant relief to the indebted which is the promise of the legislature. " the Supreme Court was considering the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra debt Relief Act (3 of 1976 ). ft is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention of Mr Singh that the Act is ultra vires on the ground that it offends the basis structure of the Constitution in any way. The other contentions raised by him on the merits of the impugned order are not being considered as the same am very well be raised and considered by the appellate authority where the appeal of the petitioners is pending. Writ Petition dismissed.