JUDGMENT Mehrotra, J. These two crossappeals arise out of a suit for the eviction filed by the landlord against his tenants after the determination of the latter's tenancy. The plaintiff also claimed a decree for the arrears of rent and for past, pendente lite and future damages for use and occupation. A certain amount was also claimed as Bhumi Bhawan Kar. The suit was decreed in full by the trial court but the lower appellate court, on appeal, dismissed the claim for the eviction of the tenant. In other respects the trial court's decree was maintained. Both the parties felt aggrieved with the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and; have, therefore, come up in the instant two appeals which, as I stated above, are crossappeals one filed by the landlord against the dismissal by the lower appellate court of his claim for the eviction of the tenants; the other filed by the tenants against the decree for damages passed against them by the trial court and affirmed by the lower appellate court. The facts, in brief, are these: The plaintiff landlord, hereinafter described as the landlord, let out to the defendantstenants, hereinafter described as the tenants, a part of an Ahata by a registered lease deed dated 22nd June, 1962 at the rate of Rs. 125/ per month. According to the landlord what was let out was an open piece of land with a temporary tin shed standing thereon for the use of the tenants' Chowkidar and the same, it was alleged by the landlord, had been so constructed on the tenants' own request before the said lease deed was executed. It was further pleaded that after the execution of the lease deed, the tenants constructed a room without the landlord's permission and, therefore, the latter filed suit no. 763 of 1963 which was compromised on 5121963 and in that compromise the tenants were allowed to continue their tenancy on the conditions contained in the aforementioned lease deed dated 2261962. One of the conditions in the said document was that the rent of the premises would be regularly paid by the tenants by the 7th day of the month following the month of which the rent fell due. The landlord alleged that the tenants were irregular in making payment of rent and thus rendered themselves liable for eviction. One of the conditions in the said document was that the rent of the premises would be regularly paid by the tenants by the 7th day of the month following the month of which the rent fell due. The landlord alleged that the tenants were irregular in making payment of rent and thus rendered themselves liable for eviction. A notice dated 6th May, 1966 under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was also served on them determining their tenancy. However, the tenants did not vacate the tenanted portion and hence the suit in question had to be filed seeking their eviction and also claiming other reliefs such as recovery of arreas of rent, Bhumi Bhawan Kar and damages for use and occupation. By an amendment in the plaint para 5(a) was added wherein it was stated that during the pendency of the suit the period of five years fixed by the deed dated 22nd June, 1962 stood expired and the tenancy of the defendants stood determined by efflux of time. The tenants were, therefore, liable to be evicted on the said ground also. The plaintiff asserted in the plaint that the U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 was not applicable inasmuch as what had been let out was open piece of land and not an accommodation. The two defendants, who were described by the plaintiff as joint tenants, contested the suit on various grounds. In the main, it was denied that the tenancy was merely of an open piece of land. It was claimed that the defendants were tenants of an accommodation and hence the tenancy was subject to the conditions contained in U. P. Act 3 of 1947 and the "suit was barred under section 3 of the said Act inasmuch as it had been filed without obtaining any permission from the District Magistrate. It was also denied that there was any default or irregularity in the payment of rent on the part of the tenants. No term of the lease or of the compromise between the parties was violated by the tenants. On the refusal of the landlord to accept the rent tendered to him on two occasions, the tenants were compelled to deposit rent under section 7C of the U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947. No term of the lease or of the compromise between the parties was violated by the tenants. On the refusal of the landlord to accept the rent tendered to him on two occasions, the tenants were compelled to deposit rent under section 7C of the U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947. In the additional written statement which was filed in reply to the subsequently added para 5(a) of the plaint, it was contended............that even though the lease period had expired during the pendency of the suit, the tenants were entitled to continue in possession as statutory tenants by virtue of the protection afforded to them by the U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947. The trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the U. P. Act III of 1947 is not applicable to the property in suit ? 2. Whether the tenancy of the defendants has determined by efflux of time and are the defendants liable to ejectment ? 3. Whether the notice is valid ? 4. Whether the suit is not legally maintainable ? 5. Whether the defendants have committed breach of conditions of rent note as alleged in para 4 of the plaint ? 6. What rent is due ? 7. To what amount of rent, cummesne profits, B. B. K. and relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? Issue no. 1 was decided in favour of the landlord and it was held that the tenancy was not governed by the U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947, hereinafter described as the said Act on two groundsfirstly, because the portion let out was not accommodation within the meaning of the said term as defined in the said Act. Secondly, it was held that the Kotha was built by the landlord in the year 1962, It was, therefore, a post1950 construction and on this ground also the said Act was not applicable. All other issues were also decided infavour of the landlord and against the tenants. Even though the landlord was granted all the reliefs to which he had laid a claim in the plaint, full costs of the suit were not awarded. The lower appellate court set aside the finding of the trial court regarding the nonapplicability of the said Act to the tenancy in question. Even though the landlord was granted all the reliefs to which he had laid a claim in the plaint, full costs of the suit were not awarded. The lower appellate court set aside the finding of the trial court regarding the nonapplicability of the said Act to the tenancy in question. It was held that what had been let out to the tenants was 'accommodation' and not merely an open piece of land. It was further held that the accommodation so let out had been a pre1951 construction. Consequently, the said Act, U. P. Act no. 3 of 1947, was applicable to the facts of the case and the suit was barred by section 3 thereof. As I stated above, both the parties have come up in crossappeals before us and I have heard them in some detail. On behalf of the landlord his learned counsel, Shri V. K. Khanna contended before me that on a proper interpretation of the relevant documents on the record, it should be held that what was let out was an open piece of land and not 'accommodation' and, therefore, the lower appellate court was wrong in holding to the contrary. In this connection it was emphasised that the purpose for which the tenanted accommodation was let out was relevant. In the instant case the tenants wanted to install a weigh bridge for weighing loaded trucks. Therefore, it was the open piece of land which was really needed by the tenants and the tin shed and the small Kotha were really not of much significance for the main purpose of the business. The same aspect was soughtto be emphasised by a submission that the business in question could not be carried on without the big open space but it could certainly be carried on without even if the small Kotha and the tin shed were not there. Learned counsel for the landlord also contended that the trial court's finding that the small Kotha had been constructed in 1962 was reversed by the lower appellate court without jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the landlord also contended that the trial court's finding that the small Kotha had been constructed in 1962 was reversed by the lower appellate court without jurisdiction. On the other hand, Shri K. C. Saxena, learned counsel for the tenants, submitted that in the lease deed which regulated the letting in question, the recitals made it clear that the defendant intention was to let out 'accommodation' and the open space was merely not tenant to the constructed portion and as such, a part of the accommodation. Counsel also referred to the compromise dated 5121963 filed in suit no. 763 of 1963 whereby the extent of the open space let out to tenants was reduced. It was contended that it was for the plaintiff to prove that the land remaining after the compromise was so extensive that the constructed portion was appurtenant to the land and not vice versa. So far as the tenants' appeal was concerned, Shri K. C. Saxena contended that once the suit for eviction was thrown out then the lower appellate court was wrong in affirming the decree for damages for use and occupation. He submitted that only the arrears of rent which had accrued due up to the institution of the suit could have been decreed along with a decree for Bhumi Bhavan Kar, but no decree for illegal use and occupation could be passed as the status of the tenant continued to remain as such and their occupation was not that of trespassers. A reference was also made to section 29A of the new U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. So far as this last contention based on section 29A is concerned, I think the same is misconceived because apart from other aspects of the matter there was no compliance with the conditions laid down in section 29A (vi) (b). I may also here state that apart from section 29A in the new Act, no change has been brought about in the new Act compared to the position as it stood under the old repealed Act no. 3 of 1947 so far as the tenancy of open land is concerned. Under both the statutes, the tenancy of open land is not covered by the said Acts. In the old Act the expression used as 'accommodation' and in the new Act the expression used is 'building'. 3 of 1947 so far as the tenancy of open land is concerned. Under both the statutes, the tenancy of open land is not covered by the said Acts. In the old Act the expression used as 'accommodation' and in the new Act the expression used is 'building'. Open land is neither accommodation as defined in the old Act nor building as defined in the new Act. Therefore, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the instant appeal should be decided in accordance with the old Act or in accordance with the new Act. If the tenancy be interpreted to have been not of accommodation or building then neither of the two Acts would be applicable. In this view of the matter, I feel that the unreported decision of Mr. Justice Banerji in Second Appeal No. 409 of 1971 (decided on 16121974) is not relevant unless it be held that what was let out was accommodation. Indeed, if an accommodation was let out then the suit would be barred either under section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 or under section 20 of the new Act. The preamble to U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 stated that it was an Act "to provide for the continuance, during a limited period, of powers to control the letting and the rent of residential and nonresidential accommodation and to prevent the eviction of the tenants therefrom." In section 2 (a) 'accommodation' was defined to mean "residential and nonresidential accommodation" in any building or part of a building and includes(i) gardens, grounds and outhouse, if any appurtenant to such building or part of a building; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building; (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include any accommodation used as a factory or for an industrial purpose where the business carried on in or upon the building is also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction. In section 3 (1) it was laid down: "Subject to any order passed under subsection (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds;......... Ex. In section 3 (1) it was laid down: "Subject to any order passed under subsection (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds;......... Ex. A/1 is the true copy of the registered lease deed dated 22nd June, 1962 which was executed between the parties to the litigation. It is recited in the deed as follows: "Jo ki hamgi va tamami ek kamra pukhta tin shed va sahan androon Ahata chahar Diwari androon Ejaj market maduda jail jo naksha musalka me barang surkha line dikhaya gaya hai vake shahr Meerut nau makbara Ababu Mohd. Khan Jimanshahr Meerut hakiyat va milkiyat farik doyam ka hai ham farik avval ne Ahata majkoor vatkurr kiraya mublig ek sau pachchis rupaya mahwari jiske nisfa mublig basath rupaya pachas naye paise hote hain aur jiska salana kiraya mublig ek hajar panch sau rupaye hota hai jiska nisfa mublig sat sau pachas rupaye hote hain ba jarurat karobar lagane kanta tol vagaira baray muddat panch sal minebat day 22 June, 1962 kiraye ko liya hai." In clauses (i), (iii) and (iv) the expression used is 'makan' or 'makan wa ahata'. There is a map attached to the said document and as stated in the document itself, the portion marked by red lines in the map was the portion which was let out to the tenants by said document. According to the measurements given in the said map which is on scale it cannot be doubted that the tin shed and the Kotha occupied a very insignificant portion of the open land. Counsel for the landlord worked out the following figures from the said map: Tin shed: 14'x23/6" = 329 sq.ft. Kotha: 12'2'/x10'2'/ = 125 sq. feet. Total 454 sq. feet Ahata: 89 x80'6" = 7165 sq. feet It was contended that the constructed area, including the Kotha and the tin shed was only about 6% and the rest of the open land constituted 94% of the total area let out. It seems that subsequently the tenant erected area of room without the permission of the landlord and therefore, he filed suit No. 763 of 1963 for their eviction. It seems that subsequently the tenant erected area of room without the permission of the landlord and therefore, he filed suit No. 763 of 1963 for their eviction. A compromise was arrived at in the said suit and a certified copy thereof is a part of the record and marked as Ex. 4 (plaintiff's document) or Ex. A16 (defendant's document). According to the terms of the said compromise, the room which was constructed by the tenants in an unauthorised manner was allowed to remain on the spot. The possession of a certain portion of open land was given up by the tenants to the landlord. The tenants were also required to erect on their own costs a separation wall 6 feet high and 13 inches wide running from the east to the west. This separation wall was to be constructed within two months from the compromise and after construction was to become the property of the plaintiff landlord. It was recited that in the future the tenanted portion was to be the open land with the room lying towards the north of the aforementioned separation wall and the tenancy would continue to be governed by the lease deed dated 22nd June, 1962. The tenants were authorised to lay pucca road on the two sides of the open land in their tenancy which was meant for the ingress or egress of the trucks coming on the spot for the purpose of weighment in the weigh bridge of the tenants. One of the questions to be considered in this appeal is whether the initial letting, even if it be held to be of open land, could be said to have changed into a letting of accommodation by the fact that subsequently, as a result of the aforesaid compromise filed in suit No. 763 of 1963, a new room came into existence and some open land was surrendered by the tenants to the landlord. Sri K.C. Saxena argued that it was for the landlord to have filed a fresh map or plan which would have shown the extent of the change brought about by the said compromise. Sri K.C. Saxena argued that it was for the landlord to have filed a fresh map or plan which would have shown the extent of the change brought about by the said compromise. I have not been able to accept the said contention If, on the basis of the initial letting, it be held that it was not a letting of an accommodation, then it was for the tenants to have led evidence that by subsequent acts and transactions, the letting stood converted into a letting of the accommodation. The burden of proof lay on the tenants as defendants. Apart from their failure to discharge such burden, it seems to me that in reality the compromise did not change the natural of the initial letting In other words if on an interpretation of the terms and conditions contained in the lease deed dated 2261962, Ex. AI it be held that it was not a letting of accommodation, then it cannot be held that the said letting stood converted into a letting of an accommodation on account of the terms and conditions contained in the compromise deed dated 5th December, 1963 Ex. 4 or Ex. A16. In their written statement the defendants themselves did not set up any such case that irrespective of the nature of the initial letting, due to subsequent compromise between the parties in the said suit the letting stood converted into a letting of accommodation. In the absence of such a positive case, I do not think that the tenants in the instant appeal should be allowed to set up such a plea. Further, in para 16 of their written statement, the defendants clearly stated that only 'a small portion' of land was taken out of their tenancy. In view of all these aspects of the matter, I have reached the conclusion that for the purposes of deciding the controversy as to whether the tenancy in question was governed by the U.P. Act III of 1947 or not, I have to consider the terms and conditions incorporated in the lease deed dated 2261962, Ex. A1 and my decision thereon need not be effected or influenced by the subsequent compromise entered into between the parties. A reference may also be made to Jaggat Ram Sethi v. Raj Bahadur D.D. Jain and others (A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1727). A1 and my decision thereon need not be effected or influenced by the subsequent compromise entered into between the parties. A reference may also be made to Jaggat Ram Sethi v. Raj Bahadur D.D. Jain and others (A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1727). Sri K. C. Saxena placed reliance on Jai Narain Tandon v. Ram Kishan Dass(1965 A. L. J. 794), to contend that the burden of proof in the instant case was on the landlord. It was observed in this case "If the landlord claims that his accommodation, though situate in an area which is governed by the Control of Rent and Eviction Act, is exempt from the provisions of the Act by virtue of Section 1A, the onus is on him to establish the facts which would make the Act inapplicable." I do not think that the said case is really applicable to the facts of the instant case. Under section 1A of the U. P. Act III of 1947, buildings, constructed on or after 1st January, 1951 were exempted from the operation of the said Act. The date of construction of a building is always in the special knowledge of the landlord and therefore, if I may say so, with respect, it was rightly laid down in the said case that the burden of proof lay on the landlord to establish that the building which was claimed by him to have been constructed after 1st January, 1951 had been so constructed after the said date. In the instant case the question is whether on a proper interpretation of a lease deed, the tenancy should be held to be one of accommodation or not. The question of burden in such a situation is not relevant because the matter depends upon the interpretation of the terms of conditions of the lease deed itself. I do not think that Sri Saxena is right in his contention that the use of the expression 'house in three or four clauses of the lease deed, is decisive in the controversy between the parties. I believe the basic nature of the transaction has to be considered on the basis of the objective data and a particular nomenclature used in the document cannot be allowed to cloud or defeat the real nature of the transaction. I believe the basic nature of the transaction has to be considered on the basis of the objective data and a particular nomenclature used in the document cannot be allowed to cloud or defeat the real nature of the transaction. The parties sometimes use expressions, consciously or unconsciously, but use of such expressions cannot be decisive for appreciating the nature of a transaction. A reference was made to Ram Kishore Lal v. Kamal Narain(A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 890.), where it was laid down "The golden rule of construction, it has been said, is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument after considering all the words, in their ordinary, natural sense. To ascertain this intention the Court has to consider the relevant portion of the document as a whole and also to take into account the circumstances under which the particular words were used. Very often the status and the training of the parties using the words have to be taken into consideration. It has to be borne in mind that very many words are used in more than one sense and that sense differs in different circumstances. Again, even where a particular words has to a trained conveyancer a clear and definite significance and one can be sure about the sense in which such conveyance would use it, it may not be reasonable and proper to give the same strict interpretation of the word when used by one who is not so equally skilled in the art of conveyancing " It will be seen that these very parties who used the expression 'house' in several clauses of the lease deed, described the tenanted portion as the land with a room in the compromise deed dated 5th December, 1963, Ex. 4 or Ex. A16. Again in Para 1 of the written statement the tenants themselves admitted "that the defendants are tenants of the plaintiff of an Ahata bounded by walls and having a room and a tin shed therein by virtue of a lease deed dated 22nd June, 1962 at Rs. 125/ per month." It will thus be seen that the description of the tenanted portion by the parties and the nomenclature or the expression used for the said purpose is really not material. 125/ per month." It will thus be seen that the description of the tenanted portion by the parties and the nomenclature or the expression used for the said purpose is really not material. If the rented portion is really not a building then the use of the expression 'house' in the lease cannot convert the letting into the letting of an accommodation. In brief, what has to be seen is the nature of the lease held and not the use of an isolated expression which has come to acquire some significance in view of the rent control legislation. The substantive rights and obligations of the parties have to be spelled out irrespective of such expression used in the document. I have emphasised this aspect of the matter because, with deep respect to the learned Judges who decided the cases reported in Raj Narain v. S. R. Saran (1969 A.L.J. 358) and Ram Kumar v. Babu Ram Gupta (1975(1) A.L.R. 214), (with whose conclusion I agree), I have felt that too much emphasis was attached to the description of the tenanted position in the documents considered in the said cases. I do not think that the judgments in the said cases would have been any different even if in the documents concerned it would not have been expressly stated that the letting was of open land. The objective factors such as the vast extent of the open area compared to the insignificant roofed structure existing on the open area and the nature and purpose of letting provide the real criteria or the determinate and not the description of the tenanted portion as given in this document concerned. Now taking into consideration the real nature of the property which was let out coupled with the purpose for which it was let out, I feel that Sri V. K Khanna, learned counsel for the landlord, is right in his contention that it was not a lease of an accommodation under the U. P. Act III of 1947. 94% of the total area let out consisted of open land which was needed for the purpose of the business which was to be carried on in the rented portion. The heavy loaded trucks had to come through the open space for being weighed in the weigh bridge which was to be installed by the tenants for the purpose of their business. The heavy loaded trucks had to come through the open space for being weighed in the weigh bridge which was to be installed by the tenants for the purpose of their business. The tin shed and the Kothari were really insignificant for the main purpose of the business. Obviously, the existence of a small kothari or tin shed was of advantage to the tenants but the real purpose of the tenancy was in no way dependent on their existence or nonexistence. The business for which the tenancy was created was capable of being carried on even without the kothari or the tin shed. It seems to me that in deciding the controversy at hand, it should be remembered that, as stated above, in the preamble to the U. P. Act III of 1947. The main purpose of the said rent control legislation was described to regulate and control the letting and the rent of residential and nonresidential accommodation and to prevent the eviction of the tenents from such accommodation. It is the letting of the accommodation which was sought to be protected. The word 'accommodation was defined also and the definition has been reproduced above. The important point in the said definition is that gardens, grounds and outhouses must be appurtenant to a building or a part of a building before they can be treated as accommodation. It seems to me that the central idea underlying the expression 'appurtenance' is that it is meant for a better and more effective use of the main thing let out. If a building is let out and there is some attached ground or open land then such ground or open land is appurtenant to a building. In other words, the ground or open land is meant for a better and more effective use of the building. But something which is appurtenant can never be conceived of as the main thing. If the building is the main thing then the open land or ground is treated as appurtenant. Appurtenance necessarily implies a secondary role to the main thing. When a garden is let out or an open field is let out the main letting is of the garden or the open field. If the building is the main thing then the open land or ground is treated as appurtenant. Appurtenance necessarily implies a secondary role to the main thing. When a garden is let out or an open field is let out the main letting is of the garden or the open field. If in such a garden or an open field there is a small Kothari which is to be utilised by the lessee in connection with horticultural or agricultural operations, then such small room or kothari should properly be deemed to be an appurtenant to the garden or open field. The existence of a small room or a Kothari in the garden or the open land will not bring into existence the letting of an accommodation in terms of the definition of the said word in the U. P. Act III of 1947. Unless the dominant nature of a lease be the letting of an accommodation, the said Act would not be applicable. Where gardens, grounds and outhouses are not in the nature of appurtenance to a building or a part of a building there can be no letting of an accommodation as the latter expression was defined in the said Act. I can emphasis this aspect of the matter in a different manner. To decide the controversy as to whether what was let out amounted to an accommodation or not, the proper approach would not be just to consider a roofed structure in isolation or to consider an open land or plot in isolation. Whenever there is the tenancy of a roofed structure without any garden, ground or outhouses attached to the same, then there is no difficulty in holding that the tenancy is of an accommodation. In the same manner whenever there is a garden or open land which is let out without any roofed structure then there is no difficulty in holding that there is no letting of an accommodation. But very often it happens that the tenanted portion consists of roofed structure as well as open ground or plot. It is in this situation that the real difficulty arises as to whether or the tenanted portion amounts to an accommodation or not. If one merely thinks of the roofed structure to the exclusion of the open ground or land, then one is bound to say that the tenanted portion amounts to an accommodation. It is in this situation that the real difficulty arises as to whether or the tenanted portion amounts to an accommodation or not. If one merely thinks of the roofed structure to the exclusion of the open ground or land, then one is bound to say that the tenanted portion amounts to an accommodation. On the other hand, if one concentrates on the portion to the exclusion of the roofed structure then one is bound to say that the tenanted property is not accommodation. Both the said approaches will, however, be wrong. One has to decide this question taking into consideration whether the tenancy consists of accommodation in any building or a part of a building and whether the open ground or plot is appurtenant to such building or a part of a building. In other words, the attached open plot or ground should have a secondary role to play to the main letting which should be that of a building or a part of a building. Where the open ground or plot does not have to play such secondary role but it is the main objective of letting, then there is no letting of an accommodation even though there may be some roofed structures on such land or ground, such roofed structures shall have to be treated as appurtenant to the open land or ground and the tenancy will not be of an accommodation in terms of the definition of the said expression in the said Act. The word 'appurtenant' has been used in section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Under the said provision the sites of the walls or the buildings which are appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with the existing owners or occupiers thereof by the State Government. The Supreme Court in Maharaj Singh v. State of U. P. (A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2602), affirmed the decision of this Court reported in State v. Ram Sri (A.I.R. 1976 Alld. 121). In both the said decisions the expression 'appurtenant' has been considered as used in section 9 of the said Act. However, the observations will be fully applicable to the use and implication of the same expression in the U. P. Act No. III of 1947. In the Allahabad decision It was observed as follows: The word 'appurtenant' has not been defined in the Act. However, the observations will be fully applicable to the use and implication of the same expression in the U. P. Act No. III of 1947. In the Allahabad decision It was observed as follows: The word 'appurtenant' has not been defined in the Act. The dictionary meaning of the word 'appurtenant' is "usefully occupied". In Tomlin's Law Dictionary, it has been said that the word can import nothing more than the words strictly appurtaining to the subjectmatter of the devise of grant and which would in truth pass without being specially mentioned. Another meaning of this word is ' pertaining or belonging". In Webster's III New International Dictionary, the meaning of this word given is "annexed or belonging legally to some more important thing, incident to and passing in possession". The word "appurtaining" means something which is usually occupied with the main building. All these meaning, therefore, show that the land appurtenant should be something which is needed for the enjoyment of the main building and is enjoyed with it, being part of the same". The Supreme Court decision it was laid down as follows: "What is integral is not necessarily appurtenant. A position of subordination, something incidental or ancillary or dependant is implied in appurtenance. Can we say that the large spaces are subsidiary or ancilliry to or inevitably implied in the enjoyment of the buildings qua buildings ? That much of space required for the use of the structures as such has been excluded by the High Court itself. Beyond that may or may not be necesary for the hat or mela but not for the enjoyment of the chabutras as such. A hundred acres may spread out in front of a club house for various games like golf. But all these abundant acres are unnecessary for nor incidental to the enjoyment of the house in any reasonable manner. It is confusion to miss the distinction, fine but real." 'Appurtenance' in relation to a dwelling, or to a school, college............ includes all land occupied therewith and used for the. purpose thereof (Words and Phrases Legally DefinedButterworths, 2nd Edn.) The word 'appurtenances' has a distinct and definite meaning.........Prima facie it imports nothing more than what is strictly appurtaining to the subjectmatter of the devise or grant, and which would, in truth, pass without being specially mentioned. includes all land occupied therewith and used for the. purpose thereof (Words and Phrases Legally DefinedButterworths, 2nd Edn.) The word 'appurtenances' has a distinct and definite meaning.........Prima facie it imports nothing more than what is strictly appurtaining to the subjectmatter of the devise or grant, and which would, in truth, pass without being specially mentioned. Ordinarily, what is necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building such as easements, alone will be appurtenant. Therefore, what is necessary for the enjoyment of the building is alone covered by the expression 'appurtenance'. If some other purpose was being fulfilled by the building and the lands, it is not possible to contend that those lands are covered by the expression'appurtenances'. Indeed, it is settled by the earliest authority, repeated without contradiction to the latest, that land cannot be appurtenant to land. The word 'appurtenances' includes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised, such as rights of way of common.........but it does not include lands in addition to that granted. (Words and Phrases, supra). In short, the touchstone of 'appurtenance' is dependence of the building on what appurtains to it for its use as a building." I, therefore, feel that in the instant case the tenancy which was created between the parties by the document dated 22nd June, 1962 was not that of an accommodation and, therefore, the U. P. Act III of 1947, did not apply to the said tenancy and the bar to the filing of a suit for the eviction of the tenants, without the permission of the District Magistrate, did not apply to the instant case. I have already emphasised above that I agree with the conclusion of the learned single Judge who decided 1969 A. L. J. 358 (supra) and 1975 A. L. R. 414 (supra). On behalf of the landlord reliance was placed on Chand Lal v. Ram Kishan(A. I. R. 1952 Alld. 607), and Magamony v. S. Thiruchlttambalam(A. I. R. 1953 T. C. 369). In my opinion the TravancoreCochin case can be distinguished on the ground that the definition of the expression "house" was materially different in the Travancore Rent Control Order, 1120. On behalf of the landlord reliance was placed on Chand Lal v. Ram Kishan(A. I. R. 1952 Alld. 607), and Magamony v. S. Thiruchlttambalam(A. I. R. 1953 T. C. 369). In my opinion the TravancoreCochin case can be distinguished on the ground that the definition of the expression "house" was materially different in the Travancore Rent Control Order, 1120. However, it is not necessary to pursue the point because I have reached my conclusion on the examination of the terms and conditions of the lease deed in the light of the definition of the expression "accommodation" in the U. P. Act III of 1947. Here I may also refer to clause (iii) of the third proviso to subsection (a) of Section 2 of the said Act which provided as follows: Provided also that nothing in this Act shall apply "(iii) to any tenancy or other relationship in respect of any plot of land not covered by roofed structure." It might be contended that in the instant case the tenancy was not in respect of a plot of land because there was a roofed structure in the tenancy also. It is not necessary to say anything regarding the said contention because what is material is whether the tenancy was in respect of an accommodation or not. If it was not in respect of any accommodation, then the said Act would not be applicable. It is not material whether the tenancy was in respect of any plot of land as understood in the said Act. Even if the said clause (iii) of the third proviso were not there my decision would have been the same inasmuch as I have held that the applicability of the Act depended on whether the demised property was an accommodation or not as defined in the said Act. In the result, the landlord's second appeal, namely, Khan Bahadur Aijaz Husain v. Ram Kishore and another(Second Appeal No. 930 of 1969), is allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are hereby set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court are restored. The plaintiffappellant shall also be entitled to his costs throughout. The tenants' Ram Kishore and another v. Khan Bahadur Aijaz Khan(Second Appeal No. 822 of 1969), is hereby dismissed with costs.