Judgment 1. In this application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the prayer of the petitioner Management of Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., Jamshedpur, are two. The first prayer is to quash the order, dated the 26th November, 1973 passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, in Reference No. 36/72, 28/73 copy of which is Annexure-6 and the second prayer is to prohibit the aforementioned Labour Court from proceeding with the hearing of the reference. 2. Before stating the facts of the case, it would be useful to state that respondent No. 6, Sri Arjun Uraon died during the pendency of this application and has been substituted by his heirs by an order, dated the 17th May, 1977, who are now respondents Nos. 6 (a) to 6 (f). 3. The relevant facts for the decision of this case are that Sri Sudarshan, Sri K. Rama Rao and Sri Arjun Uraon. respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 6, respectively, were employed in the Electrical Department, Merchant Mill Department and the Transport Department, respectively, in the factory of the petitioner at Jamshedpur and were removed from service on the basis of misconduct after issuance of charge- sheet. Respondent No. 3 was removed by an order, dated the 13th December 1968 while respondent No. 4 was discharged from service by an order, dated the 28th September, 1970. The services of respondent No. 6 were terminated by an order, dated the 3rd February, 1971. Sri Chokro, respondent No. 5, was employed in the Accounts Department of the petitioners factory on probation and his work during the probationary period having not been found satisfactory, he was not confirmed and his services were also terminated with effect from the 3rd February, 1971. These four workmen individually complained to the Assistant Labour Commissioner cum Conciliation Officer, Jamshedpur, against their termination of services on different dates on which conciliation proceedings were started separately with regard to the individual complaints. Thereafter, it seems, the conciliation proceedings in all the four cases failed. By notification dated the 31st October, 1972, copy of which is Annexure-1, the Governor of Bihar referred the dispute of the four workmen to the Labour Court, Ranchi. Thereafter, it seems, the conciliation proceedings in all the four cases failed. By notification dated the 31st October, 1972, copy of which is Annexure-1, the Governor of Bihar referred the dispute of the four workmen to the Labour Court, Ranchi. In the annexure appended to that reference, the dispute with regard to the removal from services of the aforesaid four workmen was referred for adjudication and it was provided that the Labour Court would determine if the termination of their services were legal and justified and if not whether the workmen concerned were entitled to reinstatement or any other relief. While the matter was pending in the Labour Court, Ranchi, it was registered as Ref. Case No. 36 of 1972. Before the matter could be taken up before the Labour Court, Ranchi, on the basis of a Notification, dated the 28th April, 1973, bearing No. III/DI-1203/73 L & E 1539 (3), copy of which is Annexure 2, all the proceedings relating to the district of Singhbhum in Chotanagpur Divsion, which were pending before the Labour Court, Ranchi, were transferred to the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, for disposal from the stage at which they were transferred. By the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, this reference was renumbered as Ref. No. 28 of 1973, where on the 27th June, 1973, the petitioner filed an application to the effect that it was not in a position to file its written statement as the statement of demand had not been received by it. The petitionee accordingly prayed for time; copy of this application is Annexure-3. By an order of that very date the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, rejected the prayer of the petitioner and directed to file its written statement by the 30th July. 1973. The petitioner received a copy of the written statement filed by Sri Rama Rao and Sri Chokro, respondents Nos. 4 and 5 respectively, and filed a reply. Thereafter, on the 27th September, 1973, the petitioner filed an application before the Labour Court raising certain preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the reference, copy of which has been appended to the writ petition and marked as Annexure-4. In this, it was stated that the reference by the State Government was bad as it was not an industrial dispute. Thereafter, on the 27th September, 1973, the petitioner filed an application before the Labour Court raising certain preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the reference, copy of which has been appended to the writ petition and marked as Annexure-4. In this, it was stated that the reference by the State Government was bad as it was not an industrial dispute. The reference was also attacked on the ground that it was not espoused by a registered union of the establishment of the petitioners management or supported by a substantial number of workmen. Objection was also taken to the effect that four separate disputes, which were being conducted by four different workmen belonging to different departments having no relation with each other, could not be heard together. On the 20th November, 1973. the petitioner still filed another petition before the Labour Court, copy of which is Annexure-5, raising further objection to the maintainability of the reference. In this petition, one of the pleas raised was that the necessary "statement of demand" as required under Rr. 13 & 14 of the Industrial Disputes (Bihar) Rules 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules) had not been received by the petitioner either from the Labour Court or from the State Government in the absence of which the Labour Court could not proceed with adjudication of the reference. The transfer of the case from the Labour Court, Ranchi to Jamshedpur was also challenged as being not in accordance with- the provisions of S. 33B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). The Labour Court heard the parties on the preliminary objections raised by the petitioner and by the impugned order rejected them and directed the petitioner to file a written statement. With regard to the petitioners objection that instead of making four separate references in respect of each of the workmen, the appropriate Government could not make a common reference in respect of their individual dispute it was held that there was no bar to the making of such a common reference and, hence, the reference was not invalid on that score. The second objection of the petitioner that the dispute did not constitute an industrial dispute, as it was neither espoused by any union nor had been supported by a substantial number of workmen was also negatived by the Labour Court in view of S. 2A of the Act. The Labour Court also rejected the contention of the petitioner that the transfer of the case from Ranchi to Jamshedpur was in violation of S. 33B of the Act. With regard to the objection of the petitioner that the "statement of demand" having not been sent to it as required by R. 14 of the Rules, the Court could not proceed with the reference, it was held that the non- supply of the statement of demand would not render the reference itself invalid and the statement of demand could be sent to the petitioner after the reference. It was further held by the court below that it had written to the Government for sending the statement of demand. In such circumstances, even this objection of the petitioner was rejected. 4. Mr. Ranen Roy in support of this petition has urged the following points. The first contention of Mr. Roy is that the transfer of the reference from the Labour Court, Ranchi, to the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, is illegal, inasmuch as the notification by which the transfer has been made, copy of which is Annexure 2 is not in accordance with S. 33B of the Act. This very notification was challenged on the above mentioned ground in C. W. J. C. No. 1221 of 1973. On a consideration of S. 33B and of certain decisions cited by Mr. Roy himself, a Bench of this Court by a judgment, dated the 22nd August, 1974 in the aforesaid case held that it could not be said that the reasons given for the transfer as given in the notification, copy of which is Annexure-2, cannot constitute a reason which will fulfil the requirements of S. 33B of the Act. ...In other words, it was held that the reason given in the notification that consequent upon the constitution of the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, all cases pending before the Labour Court, Ranchi, relating to the district of Singhbhum in Chotanagpur Division are transferred to the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, for disposal is good reason within the meaning of S. 33B. ...In other words, it was held that the reason given in the notification that consequent upon the constitution of the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, all cases pending before the Labour Court, Ranchi, relating to the district of Singhbhum in Chotanagpur Division are transferred to the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, for disposal is good reason within the meaning of S. 33B. As we are bound by the above mentioned Bench decision of this Court this submission of Mr. Roy must fail. 5. The next contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that S. 2A read with S. 10 (1) of the Act is ultra vires inasmuch as S. 2A widens the scope of industrial disputes and no guidelines are provided under which the State Govt, may refer individual dispute raised by an individual workman to adjudication. This submission on behalf of the petitioner had been raised again by Mr. Roy himself in two other cases in this Court. The first is C. W. J. C. No. 8 of 1975 (R) decided on the 18th March, 1976 (Pat). On a consideration of S. 2A of the Act and two decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Chemicals and Fibres of India Limited v. D. G. Bhoir ( AIR 1975 SC 1660 ): (1975 Lab IC 1199) and Ruston and Hornsby Ltd. (I) v. T. B. Kadam (AIR 1975 SC 2025): (1975 Lab IC 1455) it was held by K. B. N. Singh, J. as he then was with whom B. P. Sinha J. agreed that by implication the Supreme Court has held that the provision as to S. 2A is a legally valid provision and there is no question of delegation of unbridled power to the Govt, to make a reference. He further concluded that there was no substance in the submission that S. 2A of the Act is ultra vires and it suffers from the vice of delegation of unbriddled power to the Government to make a reference nor it is discriminatory in its application. We are in respectful agreement with those observations. He further concluded that there was no substance in the submission that S. 2A of the Act is ultra vires and it suffers from the vice of delegation of unbriddled power to the Government to make a reference nor it is discriminatory in its application. We are in respectful agreement with those observations. Thereafter, again by a judgment, dated the 24th of January, 1978 in C.W.J.C. No. 32 of 1974, R. P. Sinha J. with whom my learned brother agreed, held that there was no substance in the submission that Section 2A read with S. 10 (1) of the Act is ultra vires as it confers unbriddled power to the Government to make reference and, therefore, suffers from excessive delegation and is discriminatory. In both the aforesaid Bench decisions of this Court as also in the case before us, Mr. Roy has referred to the decision in Jute and Jute Goods Buffer Stock Association v. The Second Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal (1972 Lab IC 503 (Cal)) and Industrial Cases. As pointed out in the aforesaid decisions of our Court, this judgment of a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court was overruled by a Bench decision of that Court itself in appeal and the appellate decision is to be found in 1973 Lab IC 1243 (Cal). For the reasons given in those two Bench decisions by which we are bound, we find no substance in this submission of Mr. Roy as well. 6. Under CI (1) of Art. 131A of the Constitution, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Constitution, the Supreme Court has to the exclusion of any other court, the jurisdiction to determine all questions relating to the constitutional validity of any Central Law. It might, however, at this stage be noted that the aforesaid decision in C. W- J. C. No. 8 of 1975 (R) was given on the 18th March 1976, that is, before Article 131A was incorporated into the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment. Under CI. It might, however, at this stage be noted that the aforesaid decision in C. W- J. C. No. 8 of 1975 (R) was given on the 18th March 1976, that is, before Article 131A was incorporated into the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment. Under CI. (2) of Art. 131A, where a High Court is satisfied that a case pending before it or before a court subordinate to it involves questions as to the constitutional validity of any Central Law or, as the case may be, of both Central and State Laws the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, the High Court shall refer the questions for the decision of the Supreme Court. Relying upon this provision, Mr. Roy has urged that as in the instant case, a question of validity of S. 2A read with S, 10 (1) of the Act is involved, this Court is bound to make a reference to the Supreme; Court. As I have already said above, in C. W. J. C. No. 8 of 1975 (R), a Bench of this Court has already held that there is no question of any constitutional validity with regard to the submission raised on behalf of the petioner, there is no substance in this; submission of Mr. Roy and there is no occasion to refer the matter to the Supreme Court. In this view, this sub- mission of Mr. Roy also fails. 7. The third submission on behalf of the petitioner is that the reference having been made to the Labour Court without the statement of demand made by the workmen clearly indicates that there was no such demand and hence, the reference made by the Government was without anv basis. It has not been disputed that the word demand is not used in the Act. It has. however, been used in the Rules and we shall hereinafter make a detailed consideration of those rules. It would, however, suffice to say at the moment that there is no dispute between the parties that the word demand as referred to in the rules means any claim made by the workmen or it relates to some enforcement of a right within the framework of the Act which the workmen claim to be enforced. It would, however, suffice to say at the moment that there is no dispute between the parties that the word demand as referred to in the rules means any claim made by the workmen or it relates to some enforcement of a right within the framework of the Act which the workmen claim to be enforced. In the instant case, it is the petitioners own case that on complaints being lodged by the four respondents-workmen, the Assistant Labour Commissioner cum Conciliation Officer started conciliation proceedings and subsequently thereafter, a reference has been made by the State Government to the Labour Court. Although it is not specifically stated in the writ petition that the conciliation proceedings failed and the Conciliation Officer accordingly submitted a report as contemplated in sub-s. (4) of S. 12 of the Act, Mr. Roy in his submission has said that the conciliation proceedings failed and report to that extent was sent by the Conciliation Officer to the State Government. In any view, there is no material on which it could be held that no report has been submitted by the Conciliation Officer to the appropriate Government stating the failure of the conciliation proceedings. Sub-section (4) of S. 12 of the Act provides that at the conclusion of conciliation proceedings, the Conciliation Officer shall send to the appropriate Government a full report setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof together with a full statement of such facts and circumstances and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, a settlement could not have been arrived at. There is no material before us to hold that a report in accordance with the above provision has not been sent to the State Government. We have already indicated above that the word demand as used in the rules would include in complaint or grievance lodged by the workmen within the framework of the Act and that such complaints had been filed by the respondents-workmen before the Conciliation Officer. Accordingly we are of the view that in the instant case, there was enough material before the appropriate Government to be satisfied that there was a case for reference to the Labour Court and the submission of Mr. Accordingly we are of the view that in the instant case, there was enough material before the appropriate Government to be satisfied that there was a case for reference to the Labour Court and the submission of Mr. Roy made on behalf of the petitioner that as no demand had been sent along with the reference, there was no demand on the basis of which the Government could have made a reference, must fail. 8. It was also urged by Mr. Roy that the Government to form an opinion for making reference must have certain materials. It was urged that as there was no demand made by the workmen concerned, there was no material on which such an opinion could be formed. There is no sub- stance in this submission of Mr. Boy as well, because we have already held that on the basis of the full report sent by the Conciliation Officer as contemplated in sub-sec. (4) of S. 12 of the Act, there must have been materials before the appropriate Government for forming an opinion necessary to make the reference. 9. Lastly, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order directing the petitioner to file written statement must be set aside inasmuch as it was in violation of R.14 of the Rules. The Rules have been made under S. 38 of the Act. Part III of the Rules relates to power, procedure and duties of Conciliation Officers, Boards, Courts, Labour Courts, Tribunals and Arbitrators. Part III consists of various rules beginning from R. 9 to R. 39. Rule 13 (2) reads thus: "13 (2). The party representing workmen involved in a dispute in a nonpublic utility service, shall forward a statement of its demands to the Conciliation Officer of the area and the Labour Commissioner, Bihar, before- such a date as may be specified by him for commencing conciliation proceedings. Rule 13 (2) reads thus: "13 (2). The party representing workmen involved in a dispute in a nonpublic utility service, shall forward a statement of its demands to the Conciliation Officer of the area and the Labour Commissioner, Bihar, before- such a date as may be specified by him for commencing conciliation proceedings. The statement shall be accompanied by as many spare copies thereof as there are opposite parties." Thereafter, the Conciliation Officer proceeds with, the conciliation proceedings as contemplated in S. 12 of the Act and when there is a failure in such proceedings, he has to submit a reportas contemplated in sub-s. (4) of S. 12./ Sub-s. (5) of S. 12 provides that if on consideration of the report referred to in sub-s. (4), the Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Labour Court, it may make such a reference. There is a further provision in this very sub-section that if the appropriate Government does not make such a reference, it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor. In the instant case, we are not concerned with. the before aspect inasmuch as a reference has already been made in the instant case by the State Government. Rule 14 (1) and (2) read as follows: "14. Proceedings before the Labour Court or Tribunal (1) Where the State Government refers any case for adjudication to a Labour Court or Tribunal, it shall send to the Labour Court or Tribunal concerned and both parties concerned in the industrial dispute, a copy of every such order of reference together with a copy of statement of demand received by it under R. 13. (2) Within two weeks of the receipt of the statement referred to under sub- rule (1) both parties shall file their respective written statements with the Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, and simultaneously forward copies thereof to the other party: Provided that where the Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, considers it necessary, it may extend the time-limit for the filing of written statements by any period." By reference to sub-rule (1) of R. 14, it will be seen that when any case is referred for adjudication to a Labour Court, the State Government shall send to the Labour Court and both parties concerned in the industrial dispute, a copy of every such order of reference together with a copy of statement of demand received by it under R. 13. Sub-rule (2) thereafter provides that within two weeks of the receipt of the statement referred to in sub-rule (1), both parties shall file their written statements before the Labour Court and simultaneously forward copies thereof to the other party. The proviso to this sub-rule gives a discretion to the Labour Court to extend the time-limit for filing the written statement by any period. By going through these two sub-rules together, it seems clear to us that parties are called upon to file their written statements only after they have received not only the order of the State Government referring the matter for adjudication but also after receiving a copy of the statement of demand. Such a statement of demand can be, as in the instant case, the complaints filed by the respective respondents-workmen before the conciliation officer. In order to appreciate the submission of Mr. Roy that in the absence of such demand having been sent to the petitioner, the petitioner could not be called upon to file its written statement, the first question that falls for consideration is whether the direction as contemplated in sub-rule (1) of R. 14 of the Rules regarding the fact that a copy of the statement of demand has to be sent by the State Government to the parties is mandatory or directory. In this context, it would be useful to refer to a Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Ram Adhikari Devi v. District Magistrate, Vaishali ( AIR 1974 Pat 19 ). In this context, it would be useful to refer to a Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Ram Adhikari Devi v. District Magistrate, Vaishali ( AIR 1974 Pat 19 ). In that case, one of the questions that arose for consideration was whether the provision for making allotment by the District Maigstrate within a week of the receipt of the information of the impending vacation of a house on rent by a Government servant as provided for in S. 11 (2) (a) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 was mandatory. In dealing with the question, Untwalia C. J. as he then was, referred to a passage from Art. 656 of the Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 36 at page 435, which reads thus: "No universal rule can be laid down for determining whether provisions are mandatory or directory; in each case the intention of the legislature must be ascertained by looking at the whole scope of the statute and in particular at the importance of the provision in question to the general object to bo secured .................. Although no universal rule can be laid down, provisions relating to the steps to be taken by the parties to legal proceedings in the widest sense have been construed with some regularity as mandatory and it has been observed that the practice has been to construe provisions as no more than directory, if they relate to the performance of a public duty, and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice, to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty without at the same time promoting the main object of the legislature." Applying that test, it was held in that case that the time-limit of one week for making the order of allotment cannot be held to be mandatory. Applying the same test, we are of the view that in the instant case, sending of the copy of statement of demand along with the order of reference for adjudication to a Labour Court and to the parties of the Industrial dispute is not mandatory and accordingly, it must be held to be directory. However, in that very case, it was pointed out that a directory provision is not meant to be violated. However, in that very case, it was pointed out that a directory provision is not meant to be violated. It is also meant to be obeyed as far as possible and strictly according to law. But, there can be circumstances for various reasons beyond the control of the State Government under which a copy of the statement of demand might not be sent to the parties concerned along with the order or reference for adjudication. In the instant case, in dealing with this matter, the Labour Court has held that merely because the statement of demand has not been sent to the parties concerned or the Labour Court while making the reference, the reference will not become invalid on account of such non-compliance. It has, however, held that the statement of demand may also be sent to the Management after the reference in this case. As in the instant case, the workmen had submitted their written statement, the Labour Court held that there was no difficulty for the Management to proceed with the case and file the written statement. In concluding portion of para. 7 of the impugned order where this aspect of the matter has been considered by the Labour Court, it has further been stated that the Labour Court had written to the Government for sending the statement of demand. For those reasons, the Labour Court has held . that there is no substance in this objection of the petitioner and had directed it to file its written statement. We have already said above that even directory orders have got to be complied by the authorities concerned unless for some good reasons it could not be complied with. In the instant case, although the State of Bihar through the under-secretary, department of Labour and Employment has been made a party to the proceedings as respondent No. 2, there is no explanation so far by the State Government with regard to the circumstances in which the statement of demand was not sent to the parties and the Labour Court, when the reference was made for adjudication. In the absence of such a demand in view of sub-rule (2) of R. 14 of the Rules, we are inclined to take the view that the Labour Court could not have asked the petitioner to file its written statement. In the absence of such a demand in view of sub-rule (2) of R. 14 of the Rules, we are inclined to take the view that the Labour Court could not have asked the petitioner to file its written statement. Accordingly, the order of the Labour Court to that extent is quashed and set aside. The petitioner will file its written statement within two weeks after the receipt of the statement of demand from the State Government or the Labour Court. Once the statement of demand is received by the petitioner either through the State Government directly or through the agency of the Labour Court, then the petitioner shall file its written statement as contemplated in sub-rule (2) of R. 14 of the Rules. 10 Mr. Dayal, appearing on behalf of the workman had submitted that even in, the absence of the demand, the conciliation proceedings could have been continued. In this context, reliance was placed upon the decision of a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Hindusthan Steel Ltd v. State of West Bengal (1977 Lab IC. 1417). In that case, one of the questions that fell for consideration was with regard to the validity of the conciliation proceeding itself, and it was negatived on the ground that it was not raised before the Tribunal nor even in the writ petition. It was further held that the petitioner Company had appeared before the Conciliation Officer and participiated in the conciliation proceeding and accordingly, it was not open to the petitioner Company to challenge the conciliation proceeding or any report made thereon. It will, therefore, be seen that this decision is not at all relevant to the facts in issue before us and is distinguishable on facts. Mr. Dayal also referred to paragraph 6 of the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in the British India Corporation Ltd. v. Mohd. Sadiq (1974 Lab IC 420). In that paragraph it has been, stated that it was urged on behalf of the petitioner Company that as the individual workman had not issued any demand notice to the petitioner Company, there was no dispute between the workmen and the Company: This was negatived on the ground that although the individual . Sadiq (1974 Lab IC 420). In that paragraph it has been, stated that it was urged on behalf of the petitioner Company that as the individual workman had not issued any demand notice to the petitioner Company, there was no dispute between the workmen and the Company: This was negatived on the ground that although the individual . workman had not issued any demand notice to the Company, such a notice of demand had been issued by the union of the workman concerned and in pursuance thereof, the conciliation proceeding had taken place. In that case, there was no question in regard to the effect of a direction to the party concerned to file written statement without the receipt of the statement of demand as is specifically contained in the Rules here. Accordingly, this decision is also of no assistance to Mr. Dayal. 11. However, for the reasons given above, we are of the view that the impugned order to the extent that it has directed the petitioner to file its written statement must be set aside and the petitioner shall be at liberty to file it in accordance with R. 14 of the Rules after copy of the statement of demand has been served upon it. Thereafter, the Labour Court shall proceed with the hearing of the case as is provided under the Rules. 12. In the result, this application is allowed to the extent indicated above, but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.