JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal by Mst. Gyana wife of Dojiya is directed against the judgment dated April 29, 1972 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Baran, whereby he convicted the accused appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. for committing the murder of her two daughters and sentenced her to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 100/-; or in default of the payment of fine to further suffer one month's rigorous imprisonment. She was also convict under Section 309 I.P.C. and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. Both the substantive sentences, of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that Mst. Gyana appellant had some quarrel with her sister in law (Jethani on December 26, 1971 in village Bentha and as her life became unbearable on account of the family discord she along with her two daughters Kumari Rampyari aged one and a half year and Kumari Sabo aged 4 years rushed to the well and jumped into it. Mst Samandi PW 1 and Mst Kanti PW 4, who were drawing water from the well, saw the accused jumping into the well. They raised hue and cry, which attracted Badri Kumar on the scene of occurrence, who rushed to the well and with the help of Mangilal and others, took out Mst. Ghana from the well alive but the two daughters of Mst. Ghana Rampyari and Sabo died in the well. A first information report Ex. P/7 of this occurrence was lodged at the Police Station Shahbad. The post mortem on the dead bevies of Rampyari and Sabo were performed by Dr. S.N. Chakrabarti. The post mortem reports are Ex. P/1 and Ex. P/3. The police after usual investigation submitted a challan against the accused-appellant under Sections 302 and 309 I.P.C. She was ultimately tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Baran. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and the prosecution examined seven witnesses in support of their case. The accused denied her complicity in the crime & stated in her statement recorded under Section 312 Cr. P.C. that her daughters slipped into the well and in order to rescue them she jumped into the well but could not save them. The accused denied her complicity in the crime & stated in her statement recorded under Section 312 Cr. P.C. that her daughters slipped into the well and in order to rescue them she jumped into the well but could not save them. She further stated that nobody will kill his or her own child but if by chance the child fell down into the well, there is no alternative for the parents except to jump into the well and bring him out and the allegations made against her were false. She did not examine any witness in support of her defence. 3. The, learned Additional Sessions Judge found that the prosecution case against the accused appellant was proved beyond doubt. He accepted the ocular evidence of the eye witnesses. He held the accused appellant guilty and sentenced her as mentioned above. 4. Aggrieved with the above mentioned judgement, the convicted accused-appellant has challenged her conviction and sentence by this appeal. 5. It cannot be disputed and has rightly not been disputed that the two girls Rampyari and Sabo died of drowning. Dr. S.N. Chakarbarti, who performed postmortem on the dead bodies of both the girls, clearly stated that the cause of death was drowning. He further, opined that the death must have occurred about three hours prier to the performing of the post mortem. Learned counsel, Mr. Goyal, appearing on behalf of the appellant urged that there are certain outstanding features of case, which, according to him, are sufficient to throw doubt on the entire Prosecution case. The witnesses have not stated the whole truth and their evidence is not reliable P W. 1 Mst Samandi, who was drawing water from the well at the relevant time, has stated that there is one well in the village and all the villagers draw water from the same well. On the date of the occurrence Mst Gyana came with her two daughters and jumped into the well with both the small children. She further stated that at that time Mst. Kanti was also drawing water. Seeing the woman falling into the well she raised hue and cries and rushed towards her house. Hearing her noise Badri Kumar arrived on the scene of occurrence, who brought the accused out of the well. To the same effect is the statement of PW 4 Mst Kanti. Kanti was also drawing water. Seeing the woman falling into the well she raised hue and cries and rushed towards her house. Hearing her noise Badri Kumar arrived on the scene of occurrence, who brought the accused out of the well. To the same effect is the statement of PW 4 Mst Kanti. We have car fully gone through the statements of both these witnesses. Inspite of lengthy cross-examination nothing has appeared in their statements on the basis of which the venacity, of their testimony can be doubted. Their presence on the scene of occurrence was most natural. There is no reason why they should make a false statement implicating the accused-appellant. The statement of these two witnesses further stand corroborated by the statement of PW 3 Motilal and the post mortem reports. We are satisfied that the version given by the prosecution witnesses is correct and that the accused jumped into the well herself along with her two children being enraged of the harassment at the hands of her sitter-in-law. 6. On these facts the only question that arises for consideration is whether the appellant is guilty of offence of murder of the two children and of attempted suicide. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has found her guilty under section 302 IPC, but has not stated under which clause of section 300 Indian Penal Code the act of the appellant in jumping down into the well together with her two children is murder. We think this act of the appellant clearly falls under the 4th clause of 300 IPC, which defines murder. On the facts it is clear that appellant Mst. Gyana had no intention to cause the death of any of her children and she jumped into the well not with the intention of killing her children but with the intention of committing suicide. That being so clauses (1),(2) & (1) of S. 300 IPC, which apply to casts in which death is caused by an net done with the intention of causing death or cawing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of the person or sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death cannot be applied to the present case. The only clause of Section 00 Indian Penal Code which then remains for consideration is the 4th clause Clause (4) of section 300 Indian Penal Code reads as under : " If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and commits such at without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid." 7. It will be seen from this clause that if death is caused merely by doing an act with the knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, then the act is not murder as is defined in clause (4), but is mere culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In order that an act done with such knowledge should constitute murder; it is essential that it should have been committed "without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such bodily injury". The question, therefore, is whether when the appellant jumped into the will together with her two children she had the knowledge that her act was so imminently dangerous, as to cause in all probability the death of her children & further whether she had such knowledge that her act in jumping into the well with her children was "without any excuse for incurring the risk of cawing death or such bodily injury as is mentioned in clause (4) of section 300 IPC." Now we think it cannot be said in the present case, with any degree of certainty that when the appellant jumped into the well with her children she had not the knowledge that her act was so imminently dangerous as to cause the death of her children. Her life might have become unbearable owing to domestic troubles and perhaps on account of these troubles she decided to take her own life. We are also prepared to hold that on account of the discord in the house, the appellant was subjected to severe exasperation & to a long course of conduct cawing suffering and anxiety. But when she jumped into the well it cannot be said that she was in such an abnormal state of mind that could not have any knowledge of the nature of her act. But when she jumped into the well it cannot be said that she was in such an abnormal state of mind that could not have any knowledge of the nature of her act. There is no admissible evidence on record to prove what kind of quarrel took place between the accused-appellant and her sister-in-law. First information report in itself cannot be read as substantial piece of evidence. PW 3 Motilal only stated that on his asking Mst, Gyana told him that her sister-in-law had quarrelled with her and as such she jumped into the well. This evidence, even if relied in toto, is not sufficient to hold that the appellant at the time of jumping into the well had reached such an abnormal state of mind that she could not have any knowledge of the nature of the act, which she was Going. 8. Every sane person is presumed to have some knowledge of the nature of the act. This knowledge is not negatived by any mental condition short of insanity. In our opinion, the act of the appellant in jumping into the well with her two children is clearly one dine by the appellant knowing that it must in all probability cause the death of her two children. We do not find any direct or circumstantial evidence on record to come to the conclusion that the appellant had some legal excuse for incurring the risk of causing the death of her children. The fact that there was quarrel between the appellant and her sister-in-law which enlarged her cannot be regarded as a valid justification for appellant's act of jumping into the well with her children. 9. The words used in clause (4) of section 300 Indian Penal Code are "without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid." These words indicate that the imminently dangerous act is not murder if it is done to prevent a greater evil. If the evil can be avoided without doing the act, then there can be no valid justification for doing the act which is so imminently dangerous that must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. If the evil can be avoided without doing the act, then there can be no valid justification for doing the act which is so imminently dangerous that must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. There is no material, whatsoever, to come to the conclusion that the appellant could not have escaped the alleged harassment at the hands of her sister in law except by lumping herself into the well with her two children. We, therefore, are inclined to hold that the appellant's act is clearly murder under clause (4) of section 300. 10. The case Emperor v. Dhirajia, ILR 1940 ALL 647 is of no avail to the appellant. In that case a village woman left her home with her six months old baby in her arms on account of her husband's ill treatment; after she had gone some distance from the home, she turned round and saw her husband pursuing her. She became panicky and jumped down into a well nearby with the baby in her arms. The baby died, but the woman survived. On these facts, the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court held that an intention to cause the death of the child could not be attributed to the woman, though she must be attributed with the knowledge that such an imminently dangerous act as jumping down the well was likely to cause the child's death. 11. But the learned judges held that considering the state of panic she was in, the culpable homicide did not amount to murder as there was an excuse for incurring the risk of causing death. Mst. Dhirajia was thus found guilty under section 304 IPC. It is not necessary to consider whether upon the facts of that case, the conclusion that the woman was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder was justified. But it must be observed that the learned judges of the Allahabad High Court thought that the fear of her husband and the panic into which she was thrown could be an excuse for incurring the risk of causing death. Here there is no question of any panic or fright of the appellant. But it must be observed that the learned judges of the Allahabad High Court thought that the fear of her husband and the panic into which she was thrown could be an excuse for incurring the risk of causing death. Here there is no question of any panic or fright of the appellant. It is, no doubt, true as the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court say that in assessing what is excuse or is not excuse, we must consider the state or mind in which the appellant was. But we think in considering the question, we must take into account the state of mind of a reasonable and legally sane person and then determine the risk of causing death could have been avoided. On this test there can be no room for thinking in the present case that the appellant was justified in jumping into the well with her two children merely on account of her sister-in-laws attitude towards her. 12. The other decision is of the Bombay High Court Supadi Lukoda v. Emperor . In that case too a girl of about 17 years of age who was carrying her baby on her back jumped into a well, because her husband had ill treated her and had prevented her from returning to her parents. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court held that when the girl attempted to commit suicide by jumping into a well she could not be said to have been in a normal condition and was not, therefore, even aware of the child's presence and that as she was not conscious of the child, there was not such knowledge as to make Section 300 (4) applicable the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court found the girl guilty under Section 304-A IPC. The Bombay case is clearly distinguishable on the facts. 13. Lastly it was urged that the appellant before jumping into the well was charged to such an extent that she lost all reasoning power; and entertained delusion and as such was entitled to the benefit of Section 34 I.P.C. 14. We find ourselves unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. It is only unsoundness of the mind, which materially impairs the cognitive faculties of the mind. We find ourselves unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. It is only unsoundness of the mind, which materially impairs the cognitive faculties of the mind. That can form a ground of exemption from criminal responsibility, the nature and the extent of unsoundness of mind must be such as would make the offender incapable of knowing the nature of the act or what he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law. There is no evidence worth the name of insane delusion. It is not every kind of frantic humour of something unaccountable in an accused's action that points him out to be such a mad person as is to be exempted from punishment, it must be proved that the appellant was totally deprived of her understanding and memory and did not know that she is doing, not more than an infant, than a brute of a wild beast. A person cannot be said to be insane wit re all that is established is that she was irritable or was under a rage or her behaviour was peculiar. Want of any motive for doing an act cannot be taken to be an act of insanity. The legal conception of insanity differs considerably from the medical conception and it is not every form of insanity or unsoundness of mind that is recognised by law as a sufficient excuse under section 84 IPC. As regards insanity there is not even a semblance of evidence on record and the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of Section 84 I.P.C. 15. Thus none of cases cited by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant are of an, avail to the accused-appellant and there is nothing to hold that the appellant was justified in jumping into the well with her two children. 16. The net result of the above discussion is that the conviction and sentence awarded to the accused-appellant under sections 302 & 309 I.P.C. are upheld We think that she has been rightly convicted under both the counts and the appeal is hereby dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******