JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a revision by the defendant aggrieved by order dated 29-4-1978 passed by Civil Judge, Class II, Guna over-ruling the objection of the defendant-applicant about valuation and court-fee paid on the suit. ( 2. ) FACTS essential for purposes of this revision and which are not disputed before me, are as under :- (i) That the defendant was tenant in certain premises belonging to abrichand at a rental of Rs. 200 p. m. (ii) The tenanted premises were sold by three separate sale-deeds on 3-4-1975. One out of the three equal portions was purchased by Binodilal and Kashibai under one sale-deed. The second portion was purchased by Sumatchandra and Kshamabai under another sale-deed and the other third portion was purchased by Nemichand and Kamalabai under separate sale deed. (iii) These three sets of purchasers, as stated above, have brought three different suits in the Court of Civil Judge, Class II, Guna for ejectment and realisation of rent, claiming out of annual rental of Rs. 2400 one-third of the rent i. e. Rs. 800 for one year and all the suits like the present one have been valued for purposes of ejectment and recovery of rent accordingly. (iv) The plaintiff-non-applicants herein have valued the suit as under:- Copies of plaint and written statement were made available to me by the counsel for the plaintiffs, veracity of which was not disputed by the learned counsel for the applicant. (vi) On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings the trial Court framed issue No. 6 (a) and (b) which are to the following effect:- (a) Whether valuation put by the plaintiffs is not correct and the court-fee paid is inadequate ? (b) If so, whether the valuation of the plaint should be at Rs. 2,400 and court-fee should be paid on the basis of it. This issue has been decided against the defendant-applicant. Hence this revision. ( 3. ) SHRI Ramji Sharma, learned counsel for the applicant, has contended that the valuation put on the plaint is arbitrary and court-fee paid is inadequate because section 7 (xi) (cc) is not applicable to such a suit. Shri R. C. Lahoti, learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-applicant contended that revision is barred by provisions of section 12 of the Indian Court Fees Act and on merits also is devoid of force. ( 4. Shri R. C. Lahoti, learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-applicant contended that revision is barred by provisions of section 12 of the Indian Court Fees Act and on merits also is devoid of force. ( 4. ) AFTER having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the revision deserves to be dismissed. ( 5. ) AS to the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff non-applicants, suffice it to state that the finality declared by section 12 of the Court Fees Act is limited only to the question of valuation pure and simple, and does not relate to the category under which certain suit falls. This is what has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nemi-chand and another v. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd and another, AIR 1953 SC 28 . the relevant ratio whereof runs as under: "the provisions of section 12 have to be read and construed keeping in view the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Order 7, Rule 11. There is an apparent conflict between the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure and the provisions of section 12, Court Fees Act, which make the order relating to valuation final and efforts to reconcile the provisions of the Court Fees Act, and the Code have resulted in some divergence of judicial opinion on the construction of the section. The finality declared by section 12 is limited only to the question of valuation pure and simple and does not relate to the category under which a certain suit falls. The difference in the phraseology employed in sections 5 and 12, Court fees Act, indicates that the scope of section 12 is narrower than that of section 5. Section 5 which declares decisions on question of court-fee whenever they arise in the chartered High Courts as final makes a decision as to the necessity of paying a fee or the amount thereof final. Whereas section 12 makes a decision on every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee payable under Chapter 3 on a plaint or memorandum of appeal final. Whereas section 12 makes a decision on every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee payable under Chapter 3 on a plaint or memorandum of appeal final. When the two sections in the same Act relating to the same subject-matter have been drafted in different language, it is not unreasonable to infer that they were enacted with a different intention and that in one case the intention was to give finality to all decisions of the taxing officer or the taxing Judge, as the case may be, while in the other case it was only intended to give finality to questions of fact that are decided by a Court but not to questions of law. Whether a case falls under one particular section of the Act or another is a pure question of law and does not directly determine the valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee. The question of determination of valuation or appraisement only arises after it is settled in what class or category it falls. " ( 6. ) IN this case, the challenge of the defendant is with regard to class or category under which the suit ought to be valued. The plaintiffs contend in reply that they have correctly valued the suit according to the provisions of section 7 (xi) (cc) of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870. Accordingly, the revision is maintainable and section 12 of the Act does not bar its consideration on merits. Consequently the preliminary objection is overruled. ( 7. ) THIS brings me to the merits of the revision. Section 7 (xi) (cc) of the Court Fees Act runs as follows: - "7 (xi) In the following suits between landlord and tenant- (cc) for the recovery of immovable property from a tenant, including a tenant holding over after the determination of a tenancy, according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers, payable, for the next year before the date of presenting the plaint. " (Italics is mine)The use of the words "immovable property to which the suit refers" occurring an the said provision is significant. They are of amplitude wide enough to cover present type of case. On the happening of event of sale of the entire lease-premises by different sale-deeds, tenancy get splitted into number corresponding to the sale-deeds. " (Italics is mine)The use of the words "immovable property to which the suit refers" occurring an the said provision is significant. They are of amplitude wide enough to cover present type of case. On the happening of event of sale of the entire lease-premises by different sale-deeds, tenancy get splitted into number corresponding to the sale-deeds. The purchaser under each sale deed is clothed with the status of landlord of the sitting tenant qua the portion purchased by him thereunder. As a consequence of sale, a single obligation of the tenant to pay rent also gets divided and converted into several obligations. This is brought about by operation of law as contained in section 37 of the Transfer of Property Act which runs as under:- "37. Apportionment of benefit of obligation on severance-When, in consequence of a transfer, property is divided and held in several shares and thereupon the benefit of any obligation relating to the property as a whole passes from one to several owners of the property, the corresponding duty shall, in the absence of a contract to the contrary amongst the owners, be performed in favour of each of such owners in proportion to the value of his share in the property, provided that the duty can be severed and that the severance does not substantially increase the burden, of the obligation; but if the duty cannot be severed; or if the severance would substantially increase the burden of the obligation, the duty shall be performed for the benefit of such one of the several owners as they shall jointly designate for that purpose; provided that no person on whom the burden of the obligation lies shall be answerable for failure to discharge it in manner provided by this section, unless and until he has had reasonable notice of the severance. Nothing in this section applies to leases for agricultural purposes unless and until the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette so directs. Illustration. (a) A sells to B, C and D a house situate in a village and leased to e at an annual rent of Rs. 30 and delivery of one fat sheep, B having provided half the purchase money, and C and D one quarter each, E, having notice of this, must pay Rs. 15 to B, and Rs, 7 1/2 to C, and Rs. 30 and delivery of one fat sheep, B having provided half the purchase money, and C and D one quarter each, E, having notice of this, must pay Rs. 15 to B, and Rs, 7 1/2 to C, and Rs. 7 1/2 to D, and must deliver the sheep according to the joint direction of B, C and L. " Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act does not apply to the present case. It applies to the case of sale of part of the tenanted premises, landlord retaining, the other. It does not apply to a case where the entire lease premises are transferred by the landlord. In the present case, with the sale of the entire premises by the original landlord in three different moieties on 3-4-1975, each of the three sets of the purchasers became landlord of the defendant qua portions of lease premises purchased by them. Thus the plaintiffs became landlord of the defendant in respect of the suit premises and the single obligation of the defendant to pay rent, got converted into a several obligation with liability to pay the proportionate rent to the plaintiffs. It is a divisible obligation unlike that of delivery of a fat sheep necessitating a joint direction by all the purchasers. By the service of notice dated 1-10-1976, the single obligation of the defendant of paying rent got himself converted into a several obligation to any proportionate rent to them i. e. one-third of the monthly rent of Rs. 200. So far as rent due upto 30-11-1976 is concerned, the plaintiffs claim to have appropriated the rent, paid by the defendant to all the purchasers (including plaintiffs) jointly, at the aforesaid rate. ( 8. ) BY use of the words "rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers" in section 7 (xi) (cc), the cases of ejectment after splitting up of tenancy consequent to the sales of entire lease premises are brought, and can legitimately be considered to fall, within its ambit. In such a case the rent of the portion so purchased by the plaintiff will be considered to be the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers and the same will afford basis of valuation and payment for court-fee in respect of the relief of ejectment. ( 9. In such a case the rent of the portion so purchased by the plaintiff will be considered to be the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers and the same will afford basis of valuation and payment for court-fee in respect of the relief of ejectment. ( 9. ) BESIDES this, the use of the words "rent payable" instead of the words "rent paid" in the taxing clause of section 7 (xi) (cc) is also meaningful. The meaning of the word "payable" according to Websters New International dictionary, Vol. 2 Second Edition at page 1797 is: "that may, can or should be paid; justly due. " Thus the word "payable" occurring in the aforesaid section does not connote only the rent actually paid but is comprehensive enough to cover the case of rent that may be claimed to justly and reasonably due. ( 10. ) ACCORDINGLY, in this case, it is the proportionate rent i. e. one-third of rs. 200 p. m. or Rs 800 a year, that will afford proper and reasonable basis for valuation of the relief claimed in the plaint. ( 11. ) TO insist on the valuation of the plaint in the present case, on the basis of the rent agreed with the ex-landlord i. e. at the rate of Rs. 200 P. M. , will virtually amount to compel the plaintiff to value the suit on the basis of rent inclusive of that payable for those portions of the lease premises which have not been purchased by the plaintiffs and rent of which they do not claim. This will be true also of suit for ejectment of other portions of lease property. This is not and cannot be the intention of law makers in enacting section 7 (xi) (cc ). Such an interpretation is likely to lead to anomalous results. As such, it has to be avoided and cannot be regarded as true and correct construction of the law. ( 12. ) VIEWED from another angle, the relief of ejectment in situation like the present one, is either not valuable at all and therefore, falls within the purview of Clause 17 (vi) of Schedule 2 or if it can be valued, it is not unreasonable to value it at 12 times of the monthly rent which the suit portion of the lease premises would yield. To same effect is the ratio of Mt. Mulibai v. Mt. Vasiibai, s2 which came to be decided in some what analogous situation, and the same can be usefully extended and applied to the present case. This is what the plaintiffs have done here. The suit, therefore, does not appear to have been improperly valued. ( 13. ) ACCORDING to the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order appears to have been correctly passed and the revision deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the revision is dismissed. No order as to costs. Revision dismissed.