ORDER Tankha, J.-l This revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed by the petitioners-defendants against an order dated 5-7-1977 passed by the District Judge, Seoni in Civil Suit No.1 of 1977 allowing the respondent plaintiff to sue as an indigent person. 2. Brief facts leading to the present revision are that respondent No.1 plaintiff has filed a suit for partition of joint Hindu family property, claiming to him-self 1/10 share, which is valued at Rs.73,840/-. The Court-fees payable on the evaluation is Rs. 6230/-. The respondent No. 1 plaintiff submitted an application under Order 33, rule I of the Code of Civil Procedure for permission to She as an indigent person. A notice of that application was issued to the Collector, Seoni, in accordance with the provisions of rule 6 of Order 33 of the Code. The Collector declined to make any enquiry into the matter by intimating the Court that the respondent No.1 plaintiff being a resident of village Bargi in Jabalpur district, a notice be sent to the Collector Jabalpur. The petitioner, defendants participated in the proceedings before the trial Court without raising any objection or praying that Court to send notice to the Collector, Jabalpur, by leading their respective evidence. The trial Court in the circumstance without sending a notice to the Collector, Jabalpur on the basis of the evidence adduced before it, allowed the application, that is to say, the respondent No.1 plaintiff had been permitted to sue as an indigent person. The petitioners defendants have now come up before this Court in the present revision challenging that order. 3. Having heard learned counsel of the parties, I am of opinion that this revision has no merit and has to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioner-defendants contended that the trial Court committed a breach of rule 6 of Order 33 of the Code in deciding the application under rule 6 of Order 33 without serving notice of the said application on the Collector, Jabalpur. Therefore, the order permitting the respondent No.1 plaintiff to sue as an indigent person is bad in law. In support of his submission, he referred to two decisions of this Court, viz, Bhaskar Krishnarao Deoray v, State of M.P, Civil Revision no. 311 of 1968. decided on 20 feb. Therefore, the order permitting the respondent No.1 plaintiff to sue as an indigent person is bad in law. In support of his submission, he referred to two decisions of this Court, viz, Bhaskar Krishnarao Deoray v, State of M.P, Civil Revision no. 311 of 1968. decided on 20 feb. 1969=1959 MPLJ Short Note No.69 and Surajmal and others v. Indermal Civil Revision No. 142 of 1969, decided on 5 dec. 1969 1970 MPLJ Short Note No. 46 (D.B.) On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 plaintiff submitted that the impugned order is not revisable at the instance of the defendants as the question relates to payment of Court-fees on the plaint, which matter is primarily between the plaintiff and the State. In support I of his contention, he referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court in Rathnavarmaraia v. Smt. Vimla AIR 1961 SC 1299 , & Samsher Singh v. Rajendra Prasad and others AIR 1973 SC 2384 . Then, learned counsel for the plaintiff also disputed the assertion of the other side that the impugned order is bad in law. According to him the trial Court complied with the provisions of Order 33, rule 6 of the Code by giving notice of the application to the Collector, Seoni. That Court was not required to give notice to the Collector, Jabalpur, who was not within its jurisdiction. The reply of the Collector, Seoni, was an expression of his inability to make any enquiry into the matter and send his report. According to him, nothing further was required to be done on the part of the trial Court 100 far giving of notice was concerned. It was also urged that in any case as the petitioner-defendants did not press the Court for giving notice to the Collector, Jabalpur, and participated in the proceedings, they have no right now to challenge the impugned order on that count. 4. I shall first deal with the point as to whether the petitioners-defendants can challenge the impugned order under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The two decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon in support of his contention by learned counsel for respondent No.1 plaintiff are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. In both the cases before the Supreme Court, the question related to the payment of proper Court.. The two decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon in support of his contention by learned counsel for respondent No.1 plaintiff are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. In both the cases before the Supreme Court, the question related to the payment of proper Court.. fees on the plaint under the Court-fees Act which was subject of challenge by the defendant. In that context it was held that no revision on a question of adequacy of Court-fees lay by the defendant where no question of jurisdiction of the Court is involved. But here the petitioners defendants have not challenged the order of the trial Court on that score. The argument of learned counsel for respondent No.1 plaintiff that even allowing the application to sue as an indigent person amounts to a decision about the adequacy of the Court fees matter is difficult to accept. If that would have been so then their Lordships of the Supreme Court would haw also considered their decision in the case of M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapoor AIR 1972 SC 2379 , which is directly on the point involved here, while deciding the case of Samsher Singh v. Rajendra Prasad and others (supra). The relevant passage of that decision reads as under: "We venture to think that the High Court was labouring under a mistake when it said that the enquiry into the question whether the respondent was a pauper was exclusively a matter between him and the State Government and that the appellant was not interested in establishing that the respondent was not a pauper. Order 33, rule 6 provides that if the Court does not reject the application under R.5, the Court shall fix a day of which at least. 10 days' notice shall be given to the opposite party and the Government pleader for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of pauperism and for hearing any evidence in disproof thereof. Under O. 33, rule 9, it is open to the Court on the application of the defendant to dispauper the plaintiff on the grounds specified therein, one of them being that his means are such that he ought not to continue to sue as a pauper. An immunity from a litigation unless the requisite Court-fee is paid by the plaintiff is a valuable right for the defendant. An immunity from a litigation unless the requisite Court-fee is paid by the plaintiff is a valuable right for the defendant. And does it not follow as a corollary that the proceedings to establish that the applicant-plaintiff is a pauper, which will take away that immunity, is a proceeding in which the defendant is vitally interested? To what purpose does Order 33, rule 6 confer the right on the opposite party to participate in the enquiry into the pauperism and adduce evidence to establish that the applicant is not a pauper unless the opposite party is interested in the question and entitled to avail himself of all the normal procedure to establish it? We can think of no reason why if the procedure of discovery is applicable to proceeding under Order 33 the appellant should not be entitled to avail himself of it." “……………the consequent dismissal of the petition for permission to sue in forma pauperis can hardly be said to sound in jurisdictional error even in its extended sense as already explained................ Therefore, my view point that the decision on an application under Order 33, rule 1 of the Code is not the same as one relating to the adequancy of Court-fees under the Court-fees Act gets strengthened. In fact, the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court is a complete answer to the first contention of learned counsel for respondent No.1 plaintiff and as such it has to be held that a revision is not barred by the defendant against an order of the subordinate Court permitting the plaintiff to sue as an indigent person. Of course, the jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of the Code is a limited one which has been explained by the Supreme Court in the case of The Managing Director (M/G) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway AIR 1973 SC 76 , of which relevant para 5 reads as below: "In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate Court It is not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate Court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate Court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is not the case that the first appellate Court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code ……..” 5. Having decided about the maintainability of the revision, the only other point that remains for consideration is whether the trial Court has committed any jurisdictional error in passing the impugned order. The grievance of the petitioner-defendants is that it was passed by the trial Court without giving notice to the Collector, Jabalpur. The two decisions of this Court, viz, Bhaskar Krisnarao Deoras v. State of MP (supra) and Surajmal and others v. Indermal (supra), have laid down that an order granting permission to sue as pauper with out giving notice to the Collector is bad in law being wholly irregular and contrary to the express provision of law. The latter decision being of a Division Bench is binding upon me. 6. I, therefore, proceed to examine if, in fact, the allegation has any merit or is a futile one. It would be better to reproduce here relevant rule 6 of Order 33 of the Code: "Where the Court sees no reason to reject the application on any of the grounds stated in rule 5, it shall fix a day (of which at least ten days' clear notice shall be given to the opposite party and the Government pleader) for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of his pauperism and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced in disproof thereof." The wordings of the rule postulate giving of notice by the Court to the Government pleader. It was not disputed before me that notice as per practice prevalent if given to the Collector would amount to the compliance of the rule. I, therefore, need not ponder on this aspect. It was also admitted that such a notice was given to the Collector of the local district, who returned the same intimating the Court its inability to act in view of the fact that the respondent No.1-plaintiff resides in village Bargi of another district, namely Jabalpur. I, therefore, need not ponder on this aspect. It was also admitted that such a notice was given to the Collector of the local district, who returned the same intimating the Court its inability to act in view of the fact that the respondent No.1-plaintiff resides in village Bargi of another district, namely Jabalpur. In my opinion, the trial Court complied with the provisions of the rule and it was not supposed to issue another notice to a Collector of the district located outside its jurisdiction. The wordings "the Government pleader" occurring in the rule are an indication in that direction which mean local Government pleader and in the case of Collector also it would mean the Collector of the same district. It this view of the matter, I hold that the notice was served on the Collector and the trial Court did not act contrary to the express provision of law. On this finding, the two decisions of this Court referred to above regarding the consequences for noncompliance of rule 6 have no applicability to the present case. Since here the Collector intimated that he was unable to send his report. there was no question for awaiting the report and if it decided the matter on the material adduced by the parties before it independently of the Collector's report, it cannot be said that the trial Court acted illegally and with material irregularity. There being no jurisdictional error in passing the impugned order, it is not revisable. 7. As I have held that there was no defect in giving notice the consideration of the question of waiver on the part of the petitioners-defendants in that regard, as was submitted on behalf of the other side, does not arise. 8. For the reasons stated above, this revision fails and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case. I direct the parties to bear their own costs of this Court.