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1978 DIGILAW 678 (ALL)

L. M. Bhatt v. I. M. Abraham

1978-07-12

K.C.AGARWAL

body1978
JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J.:- Dr. (Smt.) I.M. Abraham, respondent No. 1, was the owner of a house situate at Haldwani. The house was known as "Benson Lodge." The ground floor of this building had been let out to Haldwani Club (briefly referred to as 'the Club'), which was an unregistered body. 2. Smt. Abraham filed an application under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for release of the ground floor in the tenancy of the Club on the ground that she wanted to start a Clinic cum Maternity Centre and Nursing Home at Haldwani, and that she required the portion in the tenancy of the Club for the said purpose. She claimed that she was a doctor and had retired from the Government service, and that as there was no good private Nursing Home at Haldwani for the poor she intended to open a Nursing Home in the premises in dispute so that the poor could get cheap medical treatment. The application was filed impleading all the 29 members of the Club as respondents. 3. The application was contested by Gauri Shanker Maheshwari, petitioner No. 2, alone. He claimed that the need of Respondent No. 1 was not bona fide, and that she had ample accommodation at her disposal where she could start the clinic. He also asserted that there were already a number of good Nursing Centres available at Haldwani where treatment was being given. It was contended by him that the Club carried on cultural and educational activities for its members who were drawn from the educated class and gazetted officers, and that the Club would suffer greater hardship in case the application filed by the respondent no. 1 was allowed. The petitioner no. 2 also claimed that respondent not had a compound and a number of other buildings available to her where she could open a clinic. Both the parties filed affidavits in support of their respective cases. 4. By the order dated 12.8.1976, the application filed by the respondent no. 1 was allowed on the finding that her need was genuine and bona fide, and that she would suffer greater hardship in case the application was rejected. In appeal, the findings of the prescribed Authority were confirmed. Aggrieved by the judgment of the two courts below, the present writ petition was filed in this Court. 5. 1 was allowed on the finding that her need was genuine and bona fide, and that she would suffer greater hardship in case the application was rejected. In appeal, the findings of the prescribed Authority were confirmed. Aggrieved by the judgment of the two courts below, the present writ petition was filed in this Court. 5. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the finding about the need of respondent No. 1 given by the two courts below was erroneous Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the accommodation already available with the respondent No. 1 was sufficient for her to start a Nursing Home. The question whether the need of a landlord is genuine and bona fide is one of fact inasmuch as a finding on the question of genuineness of need of a landlord is to be given on the evidence adduced by the parties. In the instant case, the two courts below looked into the evidence and found that the accommodation available in her possession on the first floor was insufficient for opening a clinic cum maternity centre and Nursing Home. The courts below also held that the disputed accommodation was most eminently suited for the need for which the application had been filed by the respondent no. 1. 6. The next submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that a number of other buildings were available to the landlady, and that she could instead of filing the application for the release of the premises under Section 21 of the Act as against the Club could eject the tenants occupying those premises. It was suggested that the application filed by the Respondent No. 1 was liable to be rejected being not bona fide on this ground. The submission cannot be accepted. It is true that the respondent No. 1 was the owner of some other properties situated at Haldwani apart from the one in dispute. But, after investigation, the two courts below concurrently found that those other buildings firstly had been let out and were not readily available to the respondent no. 1, and, secondly, the same were wholly insufficient and were not suited for the purpose of a clinic cum maternity centre and Nursing Home. This is again a finding of fact. 7. But, after investigation, the two courts below concurrently found that those other buildings firstly had been let out and were not readily available to the respondent no. 1, and, secondly, the same were wholly insufficient and were not suited for the purpose of a clinic cum maternity centre and Nursing Home. This is again a finding of fact. 7. The third submission made was that the courts below committed an error in not considering the need of the Club and comparing it with that of respondent no. 1. According to the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the Club, as the collective need of all the members, outweighed the individual need of respondent no. 1, the application filed by respondent No. 1 was liable to be rejected. After hearing counsel for the parties, I am not prepared to accept the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners. In this case it would be noticed that the application was filed by respondent no. 1 as against all the members who were 29 in number. Out of these 29 members, only Gauri Shanker Maheshwari contested the application. The other members did not file any written statement contesting the claim of respondent no. 1 to get the premises released. The Club being not a juristic entity, had no right. The right subsists in the members personally during the continuance of their membership. Accordingly, it was not the need of the Club, but those of individuals who were its members that could be considered and taken into account while deciding the application filed under Section 21. In the instant case, the two courts below have done the same. The two courts found that the need of respondent no.1 was bona fide and thereafter, as required by the proviso to Section 21(1) (a), compared it with that of the members of the Club. The Courts below held, on comparison, that the respondent no.l was likely to suffer greater hardship in case the application filed under Section 21 was rejected. The court also observed that as it could not be denied that the members of the Club had got sufficient accommodation in their personal house which could be used by them, they would not suffer any loss in case the application was decided against them. 8. The court also observed that as it could not be denied that the members of the Club had got sufficient accommodation in their personal house which could be used by them, they would not suffer any loss in case the application was decided against them. 8. It may further be mentioned that out of 29 members of the Club, only one had contested the application filed by Respondent No. 1. This would show that other members were not interested in contesting the application filed by the Respondent No. 1. Gauri Shanker Maheshwari was only a member of the Club like any other. He could contest the application filed by the respondent no. 1 on his own behalf alone. As already observed, since the club as a body could not establish a right, as it was not a juristic entity, no one, including Gauri Shenker Mrheswari could represent the collective right of all the members. Accordingly, other members apart from Gauri Shanker Maheshwari, did not contest the application, the interest of those member in the tenancy could be ignored lawfully. 9. Apart From the above the finding of the two courts below that the need of the respondent no. 1 was greater than that of the petitioners being not illegal in law, the judgments given by them cannot by set aside and they have to be sustained. 10. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. They stay order is discharged. The petitioners are granted two months time to vacate the premises.