JUDGMENT J.M L Sinha, J.:- This writ petition has been filed challenging the validity and correctness of the order dated 26.2.77 passed by the respondent no. 1 (Annexure IV of the petition) and praying that a writ or direction in the nature of certiorari may be issued quashing the said order. 2. The facts leading to this writ petition can briefly be stated as under The respondent no. 3 is the land-lord of a shop no. 4/660 Mitla Mahal, Saharanpur and the petitioner was its tenant. The respondent no. 3 moved an application under section 21 of the U.P. Act No XIII of 1972 for the shop being released. The application was opposed by the petitioner,. The prescribed Authority rejected that application Aggrieved against the order of the Prescribed Authority, the respondent no. 3 filed an appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Saharanpur. The learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, having disagreed with the Prescribed Authority, allowed the application for the release of the accommodation. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the ]earned Additional District Judge, the tenant has filed the present petition. 3. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before me was that the learned Additional District Judge did not take into consideration the comparative hardship of the petitioner. This argument does not bear scrutiny for it transpires from a perusal for the judgment delivered by the learned Additional District Judge that he did take into account to comparative hardship, but came to the conclusion that since the shop was not in the occupation of the petitioner but was in the occupation of her son-in-law, she would not suffer any hardship warranting the application for the release of the accommodation being rejected. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the learned Additional District Judge has not considered the provisions contained in Rule 16 (2) (a), (b) and (c) of the Rules while allowing the application for the release of the accommodation and the order, therefor, suffers from an obvious error. 5. Now so far as sub-clause (a) of Rule 16 is concerned, it states that : The greater the period since when the tenant opposite party has been carrying on his business in the building the less the justification for allowing the application. 5. Now so far as sub-clause (a) of Rule 16 is concerned, it states that : The greater the period since when the tenant opposite party has been carrying on his business in the building the less the justification for allowing the application. As already indicated earlier, the learned Additional District Judge, on the basis of the admitted facts, came to the conclusion that the shop was in the occupation of the son-in-law of the tenant opposite party and it was he who was carrying on the business therein Clause (a) therefore, did not have any application. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in regard to sub-clause (a) of Clause (2) of Rule 16, therefore, is untenable. 6. So far as sub-clause (b) is concerned, it states that : Where the tenant has available with him, suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss, there shall be greater justification for allowing the application. In fact, the provision contained in sub-clause (b) of clause (2) of Rule 16 has been incorporated for the advantage of the land-lord and not for the advantage of the tenant. Further, since the learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that the accommodation in question was not in the possession of the tenant opposite party but was in the possession of her son-in-law and it was her son-in- law who was doing business there, sub-clause (b) of clause (2) of Rule 16 also was inapplicable. Coming now to sub-clause (c), it states that the greater the existing-business of the land-lord apart from the business proposed to be set up in the leased premises, the less the justification for allowing an application for the release of the accommodation. It was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent no. 3 had other existing business and, consequently, in view of the provision contained in sub-clause (c) there was no justification for the application being allowed and the learned Additional District Judge has committed an illegality in ignoring this provision. 7. It was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent no. 3 had other existing business and, consequently, in view of the provision contained in sub-clause (c) there was no justification for the application being allowed and the learned Additional District Judge has committed an illegality in ignoring this provision. 7. While considering this above contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it cannot be ignored that there is another sub-clause (d) to clause (2) of Rule 16 which states that : Where a son or unmarried daughter or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter of the land-lord had, after the building is originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in Government service and wants to engage in Self employment his or her need shall be given due consideration. To my mind, sub-clause (c) of clause (2) of Rule 16 does not render sub-clause (d) nugatory. In other words, even if a land-lord has existing business apart from the business proposed to be set up but be had a son who, after the building was originally let out, completed his technical education and is not employed in the Government service, and wants to engage in self employment, his need has to be given due consideration. Learned Additional District Judge has placed reliance on this sub-clause of clause (2) of Rule 16 in passing the impugned order, It cannot, therefore, be said that the impugned order suffers from any illegality or obvious error. 8. At the fag of his argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that there was other accommodation available to the respondent no. 3 in which automobile workshop could be started and this circumstance has not keen taken into consideration by the learned Additional District Judge as a result of which, the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge is rendered illegal. I am once again unable to agree. If the petitioner intended to raise the objection that the respondent no. 3 had other suitable accommodation, in which the automobile Industry could be started he should have disclosed either in the affidavit filed in this Court as to what was the extent of that accommodation. Unless this was done, that fact could not be taken into consideration. If the petitioner intended to raise the objection that the respondent no. 3 had other suitable accommodation, in which the automobile Industry could be started he should have disclosed either in the affidavit filed in this Court as to what was the extent of that accommodation. Unless this was done, that fact could not be taken into consideration. On a perusal of the affidavit filed in this Court and also on a perusal the objection filed by the petitioner before the prescribed Authority I find that it was not disclosed as to what was the extent of other accommodation available to the respondent no. 3. Learned additional District Judge has, therefore, committed no error in refusing to take into consideration which circumstances. 9. No other contention having been raised. I find that this petition has no merit and must fail. 10. The petition accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed but in the particular circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.