JUDGMENT J M.L. Sinha, J.:- This is a writ petition under Article 26 of the Constitution of India filed by Tara Chand Saxena (hereinafter called the petitioner) praying that a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari by issued quashing the judgment and order passed by the Additional District Judge, Moradabad (respondent no. 1). 2. The facts leading to this writ petition can briefly be stated as under : The accommodation in question was allotted to the petitioner on 14th August, 1974. The petitioner entered into possession thereof on 1st September, 0 74. A dispute having arisen between the petitioner and the respondent no. 3, the owner of the accommodation in question, petitioner moved an application for the determination of the standard rent. The Control & Eviction Officer vide his order dated 22nd August, 1975 determined the standard rent at Rs. 28.12p per mensem. Aggrieved against that order, the respondent no. 3 filed an appeal it the Court of the District Judge, Moradabad. The learned Additional District Judge Moradabad, who heard the appeal, came to the conclusion, that there was an agreement between the parties, under which the petitioner was to pay Rs. 70/- per month as rent. In consequence of this finding, the learned Additional District Judge set aside the order passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer and declared that the rent payable was Rs. 70/-per mensem. It is against that order that the present writ petition is directed. 3 The expression 'Standard rent' has been defined in Section 3(11) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The relevant part thereof can be extracted as under : "Standard rent", subject to the provision of sections 6,8 and 10 means- (i) in the case of a building governed by the old Act and let out at the time of the commencement of this Act. (a) where there is both an agreed rent payable therefor at such commencement as well as a reasonable annual rent, the agreed rent or the reasonable annual rent plus 25 per cent thereon, whichever is greater." The case of the respondent no. 3 since outset was that there was an agreed rent between him and the petitioner. According to the submission made before me on behalf of the petitioner the reasonable annual rent plus 25 per cent thereon was lesser than the alleged agreed rent. 4. 3 since outset was that there was an agreed rent between him and the petitioner. According to the submission made before me on behalf of the petitioner the reasonable annual rent plus 25 per cent thereon was lesser than the alleged agreed rent. 4. The principal question, therefore in this case in whether there was an agreed rent as alleged by the respondent no. 3 for. If there was an agreed rent, and even if it was greater than the reasonable annual rent plus 25 per cent thereon, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The agreed rent will prevail. 5. Annexure I to the writ petition is the copy of the application that was submitted by the petitioner for the allotment of the accommodation in question to him. In para 9 thereof, he stated that the accommodation already in his possession carried a rental of Rs. 100/- per mensem which was beyond his capacity and that it was insufficient and was situate in a locality not fit for the family. In para 14 he said that he was prepared to pay in the maximum Rs. 70/- as rent. Clause (f) of para 15 of the application reads as under : "Rate of rent payable by the present (or the case may be, the last) occupant and whether the applicant is willing to pay rent at the same rate." Against that column, the petitioner mentioned 'old rent plus 25 percent plus 10 per cent repair cost". The total of these three figures comes to Rs. 70/- The effect of the entry against clause (f) of column 15 of the application, therefore, was that the petitioner expressed his willingness to pay rent at that rate. 6. Below the application, there was an endorsement of the respondent no. 3 which reads as follows ; I nominate Sri T.C. Saxena for the portion vacated by Sri B L. Gupta Ex. S.I. police as first preference please." It was in consequence of the entries against column no. 14 and column no.15 (f) and the endorsement made by the landlord at the bottom of the application, that the learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that there was an agreement between the petitioner and the land-lord, under which the applicant had agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 70/- per mensem. 14 and column no.15 (f) and the endorsement made by the landlord at the bottom of the application, that the learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that there was an agreement between the petitioner and the land-lord, under which the applicant had agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 70/- per mensem. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged before that the conclusion recorded by the learned Additional District Judge was wholly perverse and consequently, this court can in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction in terfere with the impugned order. I regret my inability to accept that argument. As already stated earlier, the learned Additional District Judge relied on the entries contained in the application submitted by the petitioner for the allotment of the house and the endorsement thereon to reach a conclusion that there was an agreement between the parties about the rent. It cannot, there fore, be said that the conclusion recorded by the Additional District Judge is either perverse or based on no evidence. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also urged that if there was an agreed rent between the parties, an application under section 9 of Act No. 13 of 1972 was not maintainable because the agreed rent was to constitute the standard rent and there was noting left to be determined thereafter. That may be so but the fact remains that the factum of there being agreed rent was disputed between the parties. According to the petitioner, there was no agreed rent between him and the respondent no. 3 while according to the latter the rent was agreed between them. It was under these circumstances that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer assumed jurisdiction to decide the dispute. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not accept the contention raised by the respondent no.3 that there was an agreed rent and he accordingly determined the standard rent. Aggrieved against it, the respondent no. 3 went in appeal. The learned Additional District Judge, had jurisdiction to decide whether or not there was an agreed rent. It cannot, therefore, be said that the learned Additional District Judge exceeded his jurisdiction or unlawfully assumed jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. 8. In the above view of the matter, I find that this petition is wholly devoid of substance and must fail. 9. It cannot, therefore, be said that the learned Additional District Judge exceeded his jurisdiction or unlawfully assumed jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. 8. In the above view of the matter, I find that this petition is wholly devoid of substance and must fail. 9. The petition accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed but in the particular circumstances of the case, 1 make no order as to costs.