JUDGMENT J. M. L. Sinha, J. :- This appeal and the cross-objection are directed against the judgment and decree dated 19-4-1967 passed by III, Additional Civil Judge, Meerut in C.A. No. 675 of 1966. 2. The facts leading to the present appeal and cross-objection can briefly be stated as follows :- Smt. Munwari Begum, Abdul Hai and Masoom llahi are owners of the accommodation in suit while the defendants appellants are the tenants thereof. The rent of accommodation till 1-7-1961 was at the rate of Rs. 7/- per mensem and thereafter, it was alleged, the rent was enhanced to Rs. 20/- per mensem. The appellants not having paid rent for the period from 1-7-1961, the plaintiffs respondents served a notice on the appellants making a demand for the payment of the arrears of rent and terminating their tenancy. The appellants did not comply with it and hence a suit was filed for recovery of rent and for ejectment. 3. The suit was resisted, a inter alia, on the ground that the notice was invalid ; that Lal Chand carried out constructions at the expense of Rs. 780/- and the appellants were entitled to adjust those expenses in the payment of rent which was not allowed ; that the rent was never enhanced to Rs. 20/- per month. 4. The trial court on a consideration of the evidence on record accepted the plaintiff's case in toto and, in the result, decreed the plaintiff's suit for recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits as also for ejectment. Feeling aggrieved against it, Lal Chand appellant filed an appeal in the court of the District Judge, Meerut. The learned III Additional Civil Judge, who heard the appeal, formulated four points for decision viz ; (i) Whether new constructions were made by the plaintiffs, and in consideration thereof rent was enhanced to Rs. 20/-? (ii) Whether there was an agreement that the expenses of the constructions made by the defendants would be adjusted from the rent ? (iii) Whether the tenancy has committed wilful default in the payment of rent ? (iv) Whether the tenancy was for manufacturing purpose and the notice of six months for the termination of the tenancy was necessary ? The point no. 1 was decided against the plaintiffs respondents. On point no. (iii) Whether the tenancy has committed wilful default in the payment of rent ? (iv) Whether the tenancy was for manufacturing purpose and the notice of six months for the termination of the tenancy was necessary ? The point no. 1 was decided against the plaintiffs respondents. On point no. 2, the lower appellate court held that the defendants appellants had failed to prove that there was an agreement for the cost of constructions being adjusted from the rent. On point no. 3, the lower appellate court held that the appellant was in arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 7/-, per month which came to Rs. 140/- and the appellant committed default is not paying the same despite the service of notice. 5. On point No. 4, the lower appellate court held that the tenancy was for manufacturing purpose but since there was a stipulation between the parties that the tenancy would be from month to month, the notice did not suffer from any invalidity. 6. In consequence of the above findings, the lower appellate court reduced the claim of the plaintiffs respondents for rent and mesne profits to Rs. 160.80P The lower appellate court, however, maintained the decree passed by the trial court in so far as the relief regarding ejectment of the appellants was concerned. 7. Feeling dissatisfied with the decision of the lower appellate court, the defendants Lal Chand has come up in appeal before this court. 8. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants before me was that an application had been moved on behalf of the appellants with the request that the plaintiffs respondents be directed to file lease deed in court but the plaintiff's respondent did not file the same and, consequently, an inference adverse to the plaintiffs respondents, should have been drawn regarding the nature of the tenancy. Assuming, however that an application was moved on behalf of the appellants with the request that the plaintiffs respondents be directed to produce the lease deed and also assuming that the lease deed was not filed by the plaintiffs respondent, the fact remains that Shiv Charan Lal D.W. 3, who was one of the partner in the firm, admitted in his cross-examination that the tenancy was from month to month. Normally, a manufacturing lease is on yearly basis but there can be an agreement to the contrary. Normally, a manufacturing lease is on yearly basis but there can be an agreement to the contrary. In the instant case. it was established by the evidence of the appellants themselves that there was an agreement to the contrary. That admission could not be ignored merely because the plaintiff's respondents did not file the lease deed The contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that the tenancy was yearly and the notice was invalid cannot accordingly be accepted. 9. Learned counsel next urged that since the accommodation in question was situate within the limits of the cantonment Board, it was necessary for the plaintiffs respondent to prove that the appellants were guilty of a wilful default. It is, however, significant to find that no plea was taken in the written statement to the effect that even if the appellants were guilty of any default that default was not wilful. It also does not appear that such an objection was taken at any other stage during the pendency of the suit in the trial court. The question whether or not the default was wilful is a mixed question of law and fact and the appellants cannot be permitted to raise this question now in second appeal before this court. 10. Learned counsel next urged that the firm could not be a tenant and the suit was not maintainable having been filed against the firm. My attention was also invited in this connection to an admission made on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents that it was Shiv Charn Lal who was in fact, tenant of the accommodation in question. I have carefully considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant but I regret my inability to accept it. It is true that a firm is not juristic person and provision has been made in the Code of Civil Procedure only for the partners of the firm suing and being sued in the firm name. It cannot, however, be ignored that no plea was taken on behalf of the appellants in the written statement that the suit was not maintainable having been filed against the firm. No such objection was taken even in the lower appellate court. It cannot, however, be ignored that no plea was taken on behalf of the appellants in the written statement that the suit was not maintainable having been filed against the firm. No such objection was taken even in the lower appellate court. If an objection had been taken in the written statement that the suit was bad having been filed on behalf of the firm, the plaintiff could have got the plaint amended in order to remove the defect, if any. Even if the objection had been taken in the lower appellate court, the appellant could be called upon to amend the written statement and that would have afforded an opportunity to the plaintiffs respondents to get their plaint amended. It in now in second appeal that the appellant wants to raise this objection and thereby take the plaintiffs respondents by surprise. This cannot be permitted. I can also not ignore the fact that Shiv Charan Lal, who according to the admission made on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents was the tenant of the accommodation in suit, was a partner of the firm and not an outsider. The contention raised accordingly stands negatived. 11. This disposes of the appeal. 12. Coming to the cross-objection. It has been filed against that part of the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court by which the court rejected the plaintiffs case regarding enhancement of rent. The question as to what the rent of the accommodation in suit was a question of fact and the finding thereon cannot be assailed in second appeal. The cross-objection is therefore, obviously devoid of substance: 13. Learned counsel for the appellants requested that in case his appeal is dismissed, he may be granted some time for vacating the accommodation. The learned counsel for the respondents has no objection to three month's time being granted. 14. In the result, the appeal and the cross-objection are dismissed. The appellants, are however granted three months time to hand over the possession of the accommodation in suit to the plaintiffs respondents. In the event of default it will be open to the plaintiffs respondents to get their decree for possession executed through court. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.