JUDGMENT J M.L Sinha, J. :- This is a writ petition filed by Harnam Singh herein after called the 'petitioner', praying that order dated 25.5.1977 passed by respondent No. I be quashed. 2. Respondent no. 2 is the landlord of the premises known as Ganesh Katra situate in Bazar Shaheedganj, Saharanpur. The petitioner was a tenant in a portion of that accommodation consisting of one Zeena, one room and one Kothari. Respondent no. 2 was living in another house belonging to one Smt. Suraj Mukhi. Having been evicted from that accommodation, respondent No. 2 filed an application under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' praying for the eviction of the petitioner from the accommodation in his possession. The accommodation in possession of the petitioner was detailed it. that petition (Annexure 1' to the writ petition). The application was opposed by the petitioner, inter alia, on the ground that the accommodation in question was not genuinely needed by respondent No. 2. The Prescribed Authority, vide his order dated 21st March, 1975, held that the need of respondent No. 2 was not genuine and accordingly, dismissed the application. Feeling aggrieved against it, respondent No. 2 filed an appeal in the court of the District Judge, Saharanpur, The learned VI Additional District Judge, Saharanpur, who heard the appeal, disagreed with the Prescribed Authority and held that the need of the respondent No. 2 was genuine. In consequence of that conclusion, the learned VI Additional District Judge, allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority and directed the eviction of the petitioner. It is against that order that the present petition is directed. 3. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this case was that the accommodation in possession of respondent No. 2, taking along with the accommodation that was in possession of Madan Lal about which proceedings under section 21 had been started, was sufficient for the purpose of respondent No. 2 and, consequently the learned Additional District Judge has committed an error by ordering the eviction of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that, besides the accommodation in possession of Madan Lal, about which proceedings under section 21 were already pending, there was also available to respondent No. 2 the accommodation which was earlier in possession of Kehar Singh and others, tenants who had vacated the same. There is no dispute before me about the fact that Kehar Singh was in possession of one big room one small room and one store room besides the kitchen. It is also correct that proceedings under section 2 1 of the Act had been started by respondent No. 2 against Madan Lal, who had six rooms (2 big and 4 small) in his possession. The application under section 21 filed against Madan Lal was allowed by the Prescribed Authority and an appeal against it before the District Judge resulted in dismissal. A writ petition was filed by him against the order of the District Judge which has been disposed of today and has been dismissed. It should, therefore, be accepted that the accommodation in possession of Kehar Singh and the accommodation in possession of Madan Lal are available to respondent No. 2. The question for consideration, therefore, would be whether the learned Additional District Judge has considered as to whether or not this accommodation was sufficient for respondent No. 2. In case the District Judge has already considered and has come to the conclusion that this accommodation was not sufficient to meet the needs of respondent No. 2 and has in that context also examined and compared the hardship of the petitioner, this Court cannot interfere. 4. On a perusal of the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge I find that the District Judge has dealt at length on the need of respondent No. 2. After having taken into account the number of members in the family of respondent No. 2, the learned District Judge has come to the conclusion that the entire accommodation, which consists of eleven rooms, would be needed by respondent No. 2. Referring to the petitioner, the learned Additional District Judge has observed that he has a flourishing business and can easily get a proper and suitable accommodation for him on reasonable rent elsewhere. It would thus appear that the learned District Judge has considered the need of respondent No. 2 and also the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant. 5. It would thus appear that the learned District Judge has considered the need of respondent No. 2 and also the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant. 5. As has been observed in the case of Manni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 29 a finding on the question of comparative hardship of tenant and landlord is a finding of fact and High Court cannot disturb the same in writ proceedings, nor can it reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion different from that reached by the District Judge or the Prescribed Authority. It is, therefore, not open to me to sit in judgment over the finding of fact recorded by the learned Additional District Judge regarding the need of respondent No. 2 and the comparative hardship of petitioner and respondent No. 2. 6. Learned counsel further urged that it is necessary for an appellate authority to take into consideration subsequent events. It was urged that subsequent to the case being decided by the Prescribed Authority, the respondent No. 2 had made some additional constructions and, in order to establish the same, the petitioner had moved an application, but that application was rejected. The learned counsel stated that the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge rejecting the application for additional evidence is arbitrary and has resulted in gross injustice being caused to the petitioner. 7. I have given my careful thought to the contention raised, but I regret my inability to accept the same. 8. A copy of the application that was moved on behalf of the petitioner before the District Judge for adducing additional evidence is (Annexure 7' to the writ petition). In para 2 thereof it is stated that the applicant landlord applied to the Prescribed Authority on 12th of November 1974 to the effect that 4 rooms were built by the landlord for residential purpose and he started living in a portion thereof with his family. It is, therefore, apparent from the application (Annexure VII of the writ petition itself) that the fresh constructions referred by the petitioner in the application had been made in the year 1974. The Prescribed Authority decided the case on 21st of March, 1975. That makes it crystal clear that the alleged new constructions had been made when the case was still pending before the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority decided the case on 21st of March, 1975. That makes it crystal clear that the alleged new constructions had been made when the case was still pending before the Prescribed Authority. The petitioner had, therefore, the opportunity to adduce all necessary evidence in that connection before the Prescribed Authority. In the application moved by the petitioner before the learned Additional District Judge no explanation had been given as to why this evidence could not be adduced before the Prescribed Authority. It was presumably in this contest that the learned District Judge rejected that application by the following order ; "The question of admitting fresh evidence to be in rebuttal does not arise. Rejected." I do not think in the contest of the foregoing circumstances the learned Additional District Judge committed any obvious error of law in rejecting the application for additional evidence. 9. No other contention having been raised, I find that this petition must fail. 10. This Petition, accordingly, fails and is hereby dismissed. The petitioner is, however, granted three month's time to vacate the accommodation in his possession. As prayed on his behalf, he shall hand over the possession of the accommodation in his tenancy to the respondent on the expiry of the said period of three months. 11. In the particular circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.