JUDGMENT J M.L. Sinha, J. :- There is a writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India praying that the order of the District Judge dated 20th October, 1975 and the subsequent orders dated 6th December, 1975 and 10th December, 1975 be quashed. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition, shorn of unnecessary details, can be stated as follows : The petitioner is the land-lord of premises No. 113, Meerganj, Allahabad, having purchased the same through a case deed dated 19th March, 1974. It was in the tenancy of Shankar prasad Chaddha. The latter died on 31st January, 1975 leaving behind Smt Laxmi Devi, respondent no. 3 and his minor children as his heirs. On the same day, on which Shankar prasad Chaddha died, i.e., 31st January, 1975, the petitioner moved an application under section 16 of Act No. XIII of 1972 praying that Shankar prasad having died on 31st January, 1975, the premises in question had fallen vacant and may he released in favour of the petitioner. During the pendency of the proceedings under Section 21, it was further alleged that after the death of Shankar Prasad Chhaddha Smt. Laxmi Devi and other heirs left behind by him had withdrawn their possession from the accommodation in question and had handed over it to one Moolchand, and for that reason too, the accommodation had fallen vacant. 3. The application was opposed by Smt. Laxmi Devi, respondent no. 3. It was, inter alia, denied by her that she had withdrawn her possession from the accommodation in question or that she had handed it over to Moolchand. 4. The Prescribed Authority accepted that Shankar Prasad Chaddha was the sole tenant of the accommodation in suit. He, however, did not accept that the respondent no 3 had withdrawn her occupation from the accommodation in question or that she had delivered over the possession of the accommodation in question to Mool Chand as was alleged on the side of the petitioner. In consequence of these findings, the prescribed Authority dismissed the application under section 16 of the Act No. XIII of 1970. 5. Aggrieved against the order of the prescribed Authority, the petitioner filed an appeal in the Court of the District Judge. In consequence of these findings, the prescribed Authority dismissed the application under section 16 of the Act No. XIII of 1970. 5. Aggrieved against the order of the prescribed Authority, the petitioner filed an appeal in the Court of the District Judge. The learned III Additional District Judge, who heard the appeal, held that the shop was originally in the tenancy of Jagdish Narain and on his death, the tenancy had devolved on all the sons of Jagdish Narain. The learned District Judge further held that Smt. Laxmi Devi, respondent no. 3 and her minor sons and daughters were in occupation of the accommodation in question as its tenant. In consequence of these conclusions the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal. 6. Feeling dis-satisfied with the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, the petitioner has come up before this Court. 7. The first contention relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that, on the material on record, it was clearly made out that the shop had been given over to Mool Chand who was an outsider and, consequently, the Prescribed Authority and the learned Additional District Judge should have held that it was a case of deemed vacancy. Elaborating his argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred me to the report of the Rent Control Inspector dated 14th February, 1975, (Ann. I to the writ petition). Which states that when he went to Inspect the accommodation in question, two witnesses of the locality told him that the shop was being run by Mool Chand of Khushbal parwat and Sheo Prasad Chaddha. The learned counsel then referred me to that part of the order of the Prescribed Authority which deals with this report and it was urged that the Rent Control Officer refused to rely on the report of the inspector because, in the opinion of the Rent Control Officer, the shop could not have been open on the date on which the inspector visited the same because of 13th day ceremony not having been performed till then, Learned counsel stressed that the Prescribed Authority missed to notice the fact that the 13th day ceremony should have taken place on or before 13th February, 1975 while the inspection had been made on the 14th of February, 1975. The learned counsel urged that the order passed by the Prescribed Authority thus suffers from an obvious error. The learned counsel urged that the order passed by the Prescribed Authority thus suffers from an obvious error. 8. I have given my carefully thought to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner but I regret my inability to accept the same. First of all, it is worthy to notice that while the report is dated 14th February, 1975, it does not anywhere state that the inspector had made inspection on that date or that the statements, referred to in the report, were recorded by him on that date. It is quite likely that the inspection had been made before 14th February, 1975 end the report was prepared on that date. The Rent Control Officer could locate that fact from the statements of the witnesses that were recorded by the Rent Control Inspector and were annexed by him with his report. Inspector and were annexed by him with his report. It would thus appear that there is no firm basis for the contention that the Rent Control inspector has made his inspection on 14th February, 1975 and since on that date it was reported to him that the shop was being run by Mool Chand, the Rent Control Officer committed a mistake in ignoring that evidence on the ground that 13th day ceremony had not taken place till then, and, consequently, the shop could not be open. That apart, in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 3, it has been said that the shop remained close till 17th day ceremony had been performed. There is no material before me. On the basis of which it may be held that the 17th day ceremony was not observed in the family of the respondent no. 3 and the averment made by Smt. Laxmi Devi in that connection is untrue. Now, if the shop remained closed till 17th day ceremony, there was no occasion for any witness having seen Mool Chand running the shop in between the death of Shankar Prasad Chaddha and the date on which the aforementioned statements were recorded by the Rent Control Inspector. In the above view of the matter, I do not think that the Prescribed Authority committed any error in refusing to act on the report of ,the Rent Control Inspector. 9. In the above view of the matter, I do not think that the Prescribed Authority committed any error in refusing to act on the report of ,the Rent Control Inspector. 9. After the report of the Rent Control Inspector was excluded from the consideration, there remained two sets of affidavits, one for the petitioner and the other for the respondent no. 3, the former stating that the shop had been let out to Mool Chand while the latter stating that it was not so. It was perfectly open to the Prescribed Authority or the Additional District Judge to accept either of them. If the Prescribed Authority and the Additional District Judge have preferred to rely on the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent no. 3, this Court cannot interfere with the discretion so exercised by them. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner also urged that an application had been moved on behalf of the petitioner on 21st April, 1975 praying that since various affidavits had been filed which were false and vague, an opportunity may be given to cross-examine those who had sworn the said affidavits. The learned counsel stressed that looking to the principles of the natural justice, it was necessary for the Prescribed Authority to have permitted the cross- examination and that the Prescribed Authority committed grave illegality in rejecting that application, According to the learned counsel for the petitioner this has caused a serious prejudice to the petitioner. 11. Now, it is a matter of common knowledge that cases of this nature are generally decided on affidavit. Each party files affidavit in support of its case and thereafter it is for the authority concerned to make appraisal of those affidavits and conclude as to whether reliance should be placed on the affidavit a filed by one party or the affidavits filed by the other party. No party has a right to enforce attendance of the person, who may have sworn the affidavit, for cross-examination. This contention, in fact, was also raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the Additional District Judge at the time of hearing of the appeal and having considered the same, he had rejected the same. I see no reason to disagree with the learned Additional District Judge on that point. 12. This contention, in fact, was also raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the Additional District Judge at the time of hearing of the appeal and having considered the same, he had rejected the same. I see no reason to disagree with the learned Additional District Judge on that point. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner also urged before me that the finding given by the Learned Additional District Judge to the effect that the shop was originally in the tenancy of Jagdish Narain and on his death it devolved on all the heirs of Jagdish Narain is incorrect. I do not think this question can have any importance, once it is accepted by this Court that Smt. Laxmi Devi, respondent No. 3 continued to remain in occupation of the premises in suit and did not part with its possession. That apart the question as to whether the accommodation in suit was in the tenancy of Jagdish Narain and on his death it devolved on all the heirs left behind by him or it was under the sole tenancy of Shankar Prasad Chaddha is a question of fact and it is not open to this court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, to interfere with that finding. 13. In the above view of the matter, I find that this petition is devoid of any substance and must fail. 14. The petition accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed, but in the particular circumstances of this case, I make no order as to costs.