JUDGMENT M. M. Gupta, J. :- This writ petition has been filed by one Purshottam under Article 226 of the Constitution for writ of certiorari for quashing order of the Prescribed Authority dated 27-3-1976 and for confirmation of the order of the District Judge dated 11-11-1976. By that order the Prescribed Authority had leased the premises in question house. No. 1394 of Town Padraun, Tahsil Padrauna, district Deoria in favour of respondent no. 3 Landlord Sri Surya tap Narain Singh. 2. The application under section 21(i)(b) of U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 was made before the scribed Authority, Deoria. The property originally belonged to Sri Jagdish Arain Singh. After his death there was partition of the entire property, longing to Jadish Narain Singh between his sons Laxmi Pratap Narain Singh and Surya Pratap Narain Singh through a decree in partition suit No. 1050 of 51. It was claimed that the house in question fell into the share of Sri Surya Partap Narain Singh. The petitioner was continuing as a tenant of the house in question for a very long period, Since the house had become dilapidated the Landlord wanted its release for reconstruction under section 21(i)(b) of U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act. 3. The defence of the petitioner was that Sri Surya Partap Naraia Singh was not the Landlord or owner of the property. He had got the land in question from Sri Jagdish Narain Singh by means of document dated 21-9-1948 after paying a sum of Rs. 450/-. Thereafter he had made constructions over it. He is a permanent licence and, therefore, could not be evicted. He disputed of his being tenant of the premises in question and also disputed ownership of the respondent no. 3. 4. The Prescribed Authority did not rely on the document dated 21-9-1948. He was of the opinion that it could be manufactured and the appellate court also upheld his finding. Both the prescribed authority and the appellate court after considering the evidence came to the conclusion that relationship of Landlord and tenant exists, between the parties. The house in question was in a dilapidated condition and could be released. Accordingly, order for releasing the house was ' passed which was also confirmed by the Additional District Judge. 5. Both the prescribed authority and the appellate court after considering the evidence came to the conclusion that relationship of Landlord and tenant exists, between the parties. The house in question was in a dilapidated condition and could be released. Accordingly, order for releasing the house was ' passed which was also confirmed by the Additional District Judge. 5. In this writ petition it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the finding of the Prescribed Authority was based on surmises and conjectures and on irrelevant matters. It could not ignore the documents and as such the order was perverse. 6. In writ jurisdiction the High Court exercises its supervisory powers. We have, therefore, to consider the scope of the writ jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited a Full Bench case of this High Court reported in Nanha and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Kanpur and others, A.W.C. 1975 P. 1. In that case it was observed by the Full Bench as follows :- "If it appears that a court of fact has in substance based its finding on no evidence or that its finding is perverse in the sense no reasonable person could possibly come to that conclusion or that it erroneously ignores a vital plea or material evidence which affects the result, a manifest error of law apparent on the record leading to failure of justice can be said to be established. But if a court or a tribunal bases its findings on a consideration of all relevant evidence, but an appellate or revisional court of tribunal while affirming the finding does not refer to some material or contrary evidence in its order it cannot be said that it has been ignored from consideration so as to entitle the High Court to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution." 7. The Supreme Court in M/s. Parry and Co., Ltd. v. P.C. Pal and others, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1334 observed as follows :- "The grounds on which interference by the High Court is available in such writ petitions have by now been well established. In Basappa v. Nagappa, 1955 SCR 250 (AIR 1954 SC 40) it was observed that a writ of certiorari is generally granted when a Court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. In Basappa v. Nagappa, 1955 SCR 250 (AIR 1954 SC 40) it was observed that a writ of certiorari is generally granted when a Court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. It is available in those cases where a tribunal, though competent to enter upon an enquiry, acts in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or violates the principle of natural justice where no particular procedure is prescribed. But a mere wrong decision cannot be corrected by a writ of certiorari as that would be using it as the cloak of an appeal in disguise but a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings based on a clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law or absence of or excess of jurisdiction, when shown, can be so corrected. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1957 Supreme Court 264 this Court once again observed that where the tribunal having jurisdiction to decide a question comes to a finding of fact, such a finding is not open to question under Article 226 unless it could be shown to be wholly unwarranted by the evidence. Like- wise in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Ram Rao, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1723 this Court observed that where the Tribunal has disabled itself from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or where its conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person can ever have arrived at that conclusion interference under Article 226 would be justified." 8. In Ganpati v. Shashikant, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1955 the Supreme Court observed by relying on Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta and another, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1297 as follows :- "It is a litigation between landlord and tenant and as is usual with this type of litigation, it has been fought to a bitter end. Much of the agony to which the tenant has been subjected in this litigation would have been spared if only the High Court had kept itself within the limits of its supervisory jurisdiction and not ventured into fields impermissible to it under Article 226 or 227 of the constitution." 9. Much of the agony to which the tenant has been subjected in this litigation would have been spared if only the High Court had kept itself within the limits of its supervisory jurisdiction and not ventured into fields impermissible to it under Article 226 or 227 of the constitution." 9. It was further observed: "It would, therefore, be seen that the High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 interfere with findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or tribunal. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority." 10. Now after having noticed the nature of writ jurisdiction proceed to examine the argument of the learned counsel regarding the findings. He claims that the case of the petitioner was based on the fact a document dated 8.9.1948 purporting to be a licence was executed in his favour by Laxmi Pratap Narain Singh who is the brother of the respondent. After the grant of the licence he made a permanent construction over it. This document has been ignored by the Prescribed Authority on the ground that it could easily manufactured and the appellate authority has held that it required registration. However, so far as Prescribed Authority is concerned, it has given other reasons also for holding that the petitioner is the tenant of respondent no. 3. He has relied on the extract of Khasra of Nagar Palika and extract of assessment list of Municipal Board, Badrauna and also on the statement of the petitioner's wife given in suit no. 20 of 1972. Since the Prescribed Authority had taken a number of factors into account, I do not think that it is open to this Court to say that the finding is entirely perverse and not warranted by the evidence on record. I am, therefore not prepared to quash the order in quash the order in question. I do not think that any ground for interference in this writ petition has been made out. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. The petitioner shall be allowed 4 month's time to vacate the house.