R. C. MANKAD, S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER is the owner of Survey No. 1137/3-4 and Survey No. 1138/1-2 of village Vadthal in Nadiad taluka of Kaira district. On 11th May 1958 he agreed to sell the land in question to the respondent for a sum of Rs. 2 501 The respondent paid to the petitioner Rs. 1501. 00 i. e. Rs. 1 0 less than the consideration for the transaction of sale. The sale deed could not be executed because the respondents house was gutted and he could not pay the balance to the petitioner. It is the petitioners case that he thereupon returned to the respondent the amount which the latter had paid to him and took back possession of the land in question. It is the respondents case that the possession of the lands was forcibly taken by the petitioner. Under these circumstances the respondent filed the present suit before Mamlatdar Nadiad under sec. 70 (b) read with sec. 29 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (here inafter referred to as the Tenancy Act for the sake of brevity) for a declaration that he was a tenant of the petitioner in respect of the lands in question and for recovering possession thereof from the petitioner. He also set up in that suit the plea that his tenancy commenced much earlier than the agreement of sale executed in his favour by the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE Mamlatdar disbelieved the respondents case of anterior tenancy and held that no tenancy resulted from the agreement of sale. He therefore dismissed his suit on 30th November 1964. The respondent appealed against that order to the Deputy Collector who upheld the findings recorded by the Mamlatdar and dismissed the appeal. ( 3 ) THE respondent challenged the appellate order in a revision application which he filed before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal did not deal with the respondents plea of anterior tenancy but held that since the respondent had been cultivating lawfully the lands in question under an agreement of sale he was deemed to be the tenant in respect of the lands in question by virtue of the provisions of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act. The Tribunal did not deal with the respondents plea of anterior tenancy but held that since the respondent had been cultivating lawfully the lands in question under an agreement of sale he was deemed to be the tenant in respect of the lands in question by virtue of the provisions of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act. The Tribunal therefore allowed the revision application granted to the respondent a declaration which he sought and ordered the petitioner to deliver the possession of the 13nd in question to him. ( 4 ) IT is that order which is challenged by the petitioner in this petition. ( 5 ) THIS petition came up for hearing before Mr. Justice M. P. Thakkar on 5th July 1977. The decision of Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta in Gemalsing Vakhatsing v. Abhesing Kabhai Special Civil Application No. 1535 of 1967 decided on 5th August 1969 (unreported decision) was cited before him. In that judgment Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta has taken the view that a person who enters into possession of a land under an agreement of sale is lawfully cultivating that land and must therefore be deemed to be the tenant in respect thereof by virtue of the provisions of sec. 4 of Tenancy Act. It was argued before Mr. Justice M. P. Thakkar that the unreported decision of Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta rendered nugatory several provisions of the Tenancy Act and that therefore it did not lay down the correct law. This argument appealed to Mr. Justice Thakkar who by his order dated 5th July 1977 referred the case to a Division Bench. It is under these circumstances that this petition has been placed before us for decision. ( 6 ) BEFORE we refer to the unreported decision of Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta it is necessary to have a quick glance at two sections in the Tenancy Act. It is under these circumstances that this petition has been placed before us for decision. ( 6 ) BEFORE we refer to the unreported decision of Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta it is necessary to have a quick glance at two sections in the Tenancy Act. Sec. 4 provides:a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not (A) a member of the owners family; or (B) a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share or a hired labourer cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner or any member of the owners family; or (C) a mortgagee in possession it is not necessary for the purposes of this decision to reproduce the two Explanations which are appended to sec 4. The entire controversy which has arisen before us turns upon the expression lawfully cultivating. Sec. 2 (18) defines the expression tenant so as to mean a person who holds land on lease and includes amongst others a person who is deemed to be a tenant under sec. 4. It has been argued be Mr. Peerzada that a person who has entered into possession of a land under an agreement of sale is lawfully cultivating it and that therefore he must be deemed to be a tenant. In other words the attempt which he has made is to divide persons who cultivate lands belonging to others into two categories. The first category consists of those who are lawfully cultivating them arid the other category consists of those who are not lawfully cultivating them. So far as the first category of persons is concerned there are only three exceptions to it. Those three exceptions are specified in sec. 4. Therefore the argument which Mr. Peerzada has raised is that all persons lawfully cultivating lands belonging to others are tenants or deemed tenants in respect of those lands except those who are members of the owners family servants of the owner engaged on wages payable in cash or kind and mortgagees in possession. In support of his argument Mr. Peerzada has relied upon two decisions if this Court. The first is in Ghemalsing Vakhalsing v. Abhesing Kabhai Special Civil Application No. 1535 of 1967 decided by Mr. In support of his argument Mr. Peerzada has relied upon two decisions if this Court. The first is in Ghemalsing Vakhalsing v. Abhesing Kabhai Special Civil Application No. 1535 of 1967 decided by Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta on 5th August 1969. It was a case in which agreement of sale was executed by the respondent in that case in favour of the petitioner and possession was delivered. The petitioner did not enforce than agreement of sale but claimed that he had been holding possession of the land under an agreement of sale and had therefore been cultivating it lawfully. He therefore contended that he had acquired the status of a deemed tenant under sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act. Two decisions were cited before Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta. One was in Gulabrao M. Wani v. Hema Kushirum Gajare 59 Bom. L. R. 194 and another was in Jasvantrai Tricumlal Vyas v. Bai Jivi 59 Bom. L. R. 168. After having examined both those decisions he expressed the opinion that the principle laid down in Gulabraos case (supra) could no longer hold the held because what was laid down in the Full Bench decision in Jasvantrais case (supra) and by the Supreme Court in Dahya Lala v. Rasul Mahomed Abdul Rahim 65 Bom. L. R. 328 ran contrary to it. We are shortly examining all these three decisions. He drawer distinction between the presumption which according to the Division Bench in Gulabraos case (supra) arose from sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act and the legal fiction which according to the Full Bench decision and the decision of the Supreme Court arose from that section. We will shortly point out that there is not much difference in what the Division Bench calls in Gulabraos case (supra) a presumption and what the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above call a legal fiction Relying upon the said two decisions he expressed the opinion that the relevant conditions imposed by the statute which confers status of a deemed tenant were that the person claiming the status of a deemed tenant must be cultivating the land of another lawfully and nothing more. He has further observed that sec. He has further observed that sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act did not require that the person claiming the status of a deemed tenant must be cultivating the land of another with the consent or the authority of that person. It has been further observed in that decision that to import a condition that a person who claims the status of a deemed tenant must be cultivating the land with the consent of the owner is to rewrite the section and to destroy its practical utility Referring to the licences he has observed that they would also fall within the class of persons lawfully cultivating the lands belonging to others even though the owners might have just permitted them to eater the land and cultivate it Therefore according to Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta to exclude the persons holding the lands under agreements of sale and cultivating them from the category of deemed tenants would amount to unduly restricting the intention of the Legislature to limit the benefit of sec. 4 to persons who derive the authority to cultivate from the owner. Indeed while expressing this view he has drawn heavily upon what the Supreme Court has slated in Dahya Lalas case (supra ). In his opinion a person who enters into the possession of the land under an agreement of sale and cultivates it certifies all the ingred ients of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act and therefore he falls under the category of a deemed tenant. After having referred to the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Jasvantrais case (supra) and the decision of the Supreme Court in Dahya Lalas case (supra) he has further stated that sec. 4 does not create a rebuttable presumption but creates an artificial class of deemed tenants. ( 7 ) THE next decision upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. Peerzada is Ranchhod Fakir Halpati v. Govanbhai Bhikhabhai and Others I. L. R. 1968 Gujarat 1007=ix G. L. R 473. It was a case in which land was given to one Jogi Purshottam for cultivation on condition that he would render service to the community by filling water trough in the village. The dispute between the parties arose in regard to that land The claim to tenancy made to that land was examined by Mr. Justice Bhagwati. In that context he examined the implications of sec. The dispute between the parties arose in regard to that land The claim to tenancy made to that land was examined by Mr. Justice Bhagwati. In that context he examined the implications of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act and observed that it does not enact a presumption of tenancy which can be rebutted by the landlord. According to him the section does not lay down that if a person is lawfully cultivating the land belonging to another he shall be presumed to b: a tenant unless the contrary is proved by the other side. What sec. 4 lays down it has been further observed is to enact a legal fiction whereby a person who would not otherwise be a tenant is by fiction of law deemed to be a tenant for the purpose of the Act. Proceeding further he has observed that once the conditions specified in sec. 4 are fulfilled the legal fiction must arise and the person who is lawfully cultivating the land of another must be deemed to be the tenant of the land even though the land is not let out to him as a tenant and under the ordinary law he would not be a tenant. These two decisions which Mr. Peerzada has relied upon indeed lend support to his contention that those who cultivate lawfully either under an agreement of sale or otherwise become deemed tenants by virtue of the provisions of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act. ( 8 ) WE will now proceed to examine the effect of the three decisions upon which Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta has placed reliance. In Gulabraos case (supra) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was considering the case of a person who claimed tenancy after having entered into the possession of the land under an agreement of sale and started cultivating it. It is necessary to point out that Gulabraos case was a direct case in which the effect of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act upon the possession held under an agreement of sale was examined. In this context we may point out that in the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Bombay in Jasvantrais case (supra) and in the decision of the Supreme Court in Dahya Lalas case (supra) the effect of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act upon the possession held under an agreement of sale was examined. In this context we may point out that in the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Bombay in Jasvantrais case (supra) and in the decision of the Supreme Court in Dahya Lalas case (supra) the effect of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act on possession held under an agreement of sale was not examined because that was not the issue before the Court. A Division Bench if the High Court of Bombay in Gulabraos case (supra) held that the expression deemed to be gave rise to a presumption in favour of a person lawfully cultivating the land of his being a tenant. It was further observed in that decision that it was a rebuttable presumption. For making that observation reference was made to Explanation 1 to sec. 4. It was further observed that sec. 4 by itself does not confer any status of tenancy but it only raises a presumption. In the context of an agreement of sale it was fur the observed that it created a special contractual relationship between the parties and that it was not in the nature of tenancy and therefore the presumption raised by sec. 4 was rebutted. In Jasvantrais case the effect of sec. 4 was examined not in the context of an agreement of sale but in the context of the sub tenancy created by the tenant. We may point out that the sub tenancy which the tenant in that case had created was a lawful sub tenancy. It was held that the substantial effect of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act was that on the termination of a contractual tenancy between the tenant and the sub tenant provided the sub tenancy was valid was to bring into existence a statutory tenancy. Therefore a sub tenant would become a statutory tenant of the landlord when the tenancy and the tenant were eliminated. As long as the tenancy and the tenant were there the sub tenant was protected by the contract between mind the tenant. However when the protection came to an end by reason of the elimination of the tenancy the statute gave the protection to the sub-tenant which he did not otherwise have. In that context sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act was construed by the Full Bench. However when the protection came to an end by reason of the elimination of the tenancy the statute gave the protection to the sub-tenant which he did not otherwise have. In that context sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act was construed by the Full Bench. It was rightly observed by the Full Bench in that case that sec. 4 did not deal with the class of contractual tenants alone. It was also dealing with a class of persons upon whom artificial tenancies were conferred. The Full Bench further observed that there was no warrant for reading into sec. 4 the words a person lawfully cultivating with the consent or authority of the owner. Whether the character of cultivation is lawful or not varies from case to case. There is no doubt or dispute about the fact that sec. 4 casts its net wider and brings within its sweep not only the contractual tenancies but tenancies which have been created otherwise than by consent of parties if the terms of sec. 4 are satisfied. In our opinion it is not correct to say that the principle laid down by the Full Bench in Jasvantrais case (supra) applied to the instant case on all fours. Whilst trying to apply the principle laid down in the decision of the Full Bench it is necessary to remember that the transaction between the tenant and the sub tenant was a transaction of lease itself. The landlord had leased out his land to the tenant and the tenant had leased out his interest in the land to the sub tenant The transaction between the tenant and the sub tenant was valid. Therefore though the sub tenancy was created by the tenant without the consent of he owner was it binding upon the owner ? That was the question which arose. Even under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act a valid sub tenancy or under tenancy would bind the owner. The provisions of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act have gone a step further and provided that not only the transaction of sub-lease between the tenant and the sub-tenant is binding upon the owner but with the elimination of the tenant and his tenancy a sub-tenant becomes a deemed tenant by virtue of the provisions of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act. 4 of the Tenancy Act have gone a step further and provided that not only the transaction of sub-lease between the tenant and the sub-tenant is binding upon the owner but with the elimination of the tenant and his tenancy a sub-tenant becomes a deemed tenant by virtue of the provisions of sec. 4 of the Tenancy Act. It is in the context of lease to cultivate and a sub-lease to cultivate that the Full Bench took the view that the sub-tenant was deemed to be the tenant within the meaning of the language used in sec. 4 of the tenancy Act as soon as the tenant and the tenancy were eliminated. ( 9 ) LET us now examine the decision of the Supreme Court in Dahya Lalas case (supra ). There the question of construing sec. 4 arose before the Supreme Court in the context of a tenant of a mortgagee in possession. Sec. 4 which casts its net very wide excludes from its operation mortgagees in possession. Therefore a mortgagee in possession cannot claim the status of a tenant or a deemed tenant. If a mortgagee in possession cannot claim that status can a tenant indited by him into the land claim the status of a deemed tenant as against the original owner or mortgagor ? The Supreme Court took two facts into account. Firstly there was a valid contract of leasing the land between the mortgagee in possession and his tenant therefore so far as the mortgagee in possession was concerned he had created a valid tenancy in favour of the tenant who was by virtue of the consent given by the mortgagee in possession to him had been cultivating the land. Therefore the tenant as against the mortgagee in possession was lawfully cultivating the land. Therefore can it be said that he was lawfully cultivating the land as against the mortgagor or the owner ? The question was answered by the Supreme Court in the affirmative because when the owner mortgagor parted with the possession of the land in favour of the mortgagee he by necessary implication conferred upon the mortgagee in possession the authority to lease out the land if he so chose. The question was answered by the Supreme Court in the affirmative because when the owner mortgagor parted with the possession of the land in favour of the mortgagee he by necessary implication conferred upon the mortgagee in possession the authority to lease out the land if he so chose. Therefore the implied authority given by the mortgagor to the mortgagee to lease out the land if he so thought fit and the act of the mortgagee to lease out the land to the tenant when read together meant that as against the mortgagor the tenant had been lawfully cultivating it. In both these cases there was a contract of lease. In the first case it was between a tenant and a sub-tenant. In the second case it was between a mortgagee in possession and his tenant. Therefore the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay and the Supreme Court held that the persons whose claims they were examining had been lawfully cultivating the lands and had acquired the status of deemed tenants. It was in that context that they laid down that sec. 4 creates a legal fiction. ( 10 ) NOW let us see the distinction between a presumption and a legal fiction. In our opinion a legal fiction is one which is not an actual reality but which the law requires the Court to accept it as a reality Therefore in case of a legal fiction the Court believes something to exist which in reality does not exist. In other words it is nothing but a presumption of the existence of a state of affairs which in actual reality is non-existent. When viewed from this context there is not much difference between a legal fiction and a presumption. However it cannot be said that legal fiction and a presumption are wholly identical in all respects. A presumption may be conclusive or it may be rebuttable. A presumption gives right to a legal fiction. It is conclusive if no evidence can be permitted to be led to deny it. In case of a presumption which is rebuttable unless the contrary is established a fictitious state of affairs is presumed to exist as if it is an actual reality. Indeed the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Gulabraos case (supra) has in terms stated that the presumption which sec. 4 raises is a rebuttable presumption. In case of a presumption which is rebuttable unless the contrary is established a fictitious state of affairs is presumed to exist as if it is an actual reality. Indeed the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Gulabraos case (supra) has in terms stated that the presumption which sec. 4 raises is a rebuttable presumption. The Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Jasvantrais case (supra) and the Supreme Court in Dahya Lalas case (supra) have not stated that the legal fiction which sec. 4 gives rise to is an irrevocable fiction. In our opinion on the language of sec. 4 it cannot be said to be so because the existence of the legal fiction contemplated by sec. 4 depends upon the satisfaction of certain conditions precedent. Inter alia there are two major conditions which must be satisfied. A person must be cultivating a land belonging to another and he must be lawfully cultivating it. ( 11 ) THE question therefore which arises for our consideration is whether merely because a person under an agreement of sale delivers possession of his land to another does the person to whom the possession is delivered cultivate it necessarily lawfully ? In order to decide this question it is necessary to examine the basic character of an agreement of sale and what it gives rise to. An intending vendor enters into an agreement of sale with his intruding vendee with the object of conveying title to the land to him. If the intruding vendee uses the agreement of sale as a spring board to jump at the tenancy the very agreement fails because that agreement becomes unenforceable under the Specific Relief Act. Therefore the transaction which it witnesses also fails. The consideration for which the transaction was entered into also fails. The only known way of enforcing an agreement to sale is by obtaining specific performance thereof under the Specific Relief Act. The moment the person holding possession of a land under an agreement of sale makes a claim to tenancy its enforceability under the Specific Relief Act comes to an end. If an agreement of sale is held to give rise to a tenancy the tenant becomes the owner not obtaining the specific performance of that agreement of sale but by virtue of the provisions of sec. If an agreement of sale is held to give rise to a tenancy the tenant becomes the owner not obtaining the specific performance of that agreement of sale but by virtue of the provisions of sec. 32-0 of the Tenancy Act upon the expiry of one year. The entire scheme of consideration also undergoes a complete transformation. Whereas in case of specific performance of an agreement of sale the intending vendee would pay the consideration to the intending vendor in terms of the agreement of sale by acquiring title through the medium of the provisions of the Tenancy Act he would pay an entirely different consideration as determined by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal in terms of the provisions of the Tenancy Act. In our opinion therefore if an agreement of sale gives rise to a deemed tenancy the offspring in the shape of deemed tenancy which it produces destroys the parent itself viz. the agreement of sale. We are not able to conceive of a case where lawful rights can be claimed upon the destruction of something on the strength of which they are claimed. ( 12 ) NEXT when a person who holds possession of a land under an agreement of sale makes a claim to tenancy which the agreement of sale does not contemplate he goes back upon the agreement and therefore the possession which was delivered to him under the agreement of sale ceases to be lawful. Therefore there is no lawful cultivation by him as and from the date on which he makes a claim foreign to the agreement of sale. Such a foreign claim repudiates the entire agreement of sale and its very basis. Thirdly parties by entering into an agreement of sale create one type of contract. It is difficult to imagine that the Legislature by enacting sec. 4 contemplated a substitution of rural relationship different from one contemplated by the parties. Where there is no such contract or where there is contract which is in conformity with the jural relationship of landlord and tenant different considerations would prevail. But the same considerations cannot prevail where one contract is sought to be substituted for another or where a jural relationship not conceived by the contract is claimed on the ashes of the contract itself. But the same considerations cannot prevail where one contract is sought to be substituted for another or where a jural relationship not conceived by the contract is claimed on the ashes of the contract itself. The situation which obtained in Jasvantrais case (supra) decided by the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay and in Dahya Lalas case (supra) decided by the Supreme Court was in conformity with the first mentioned proposition. The two propositions cannot stand together. They are in conflict with each other. ( 13 ) IN our opinion so far as the agreements of sale are concerned the modus operandi to claim title to the land which can be adopted can only be under the Specific Relief Act. The modus operandi of claiming title to it by invoking the provisions of sec. 4 cannot be adopted because sec. 4 doe s not have an overriding effect upon the provisions of Specific Relief Act. Sec. 4 does not open with any non-obstante clause. Under these circumstances we feel that an agreement of sale which is exclusively enforceable under the Specific Relief Act cannot be enforced by invoking the provisions of sec. 4 read with sec. 32-0 of the Tenancy Act because the provisions of the Tenancy Act do not exclude the provisions of Specific Relief Act. In our opinion therefore though the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Gulabraos case (supra) did not say so much as we have been required to say the view which they took was correctly taken by them in so far as the agreements of sale were concerned. It is therefore wrong to say that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Dahya Lalas case (supra) and by the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Jasvantrais case (supra) militate agains the principle laid down by the High Court of Bombay in Gulabraos case (supra) and that therefore the principle laid down in Gulabraos case (supra) has become inapplicable. On the analysis of the facts of those cases the provisions of secs. 4 and 32-0 of the Tenancy Act and the implications flowing from agreements of sale we are of the opinion that so far as the agreements of sale are concerned they are governed by the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Gulabraos case (supra ). On the analysis of the facts of those cases the provisions of secs. 4 and 32-0 of the Tenancy Act and the implications flowing from agreements of sale we are of the opinion that so far as the agreements of sale are concerned they are governed by the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Gulabraos case (supra ). That decision still holds the field in that class of cases. In other class of cases particularly in cases of tenancies created by the mortgagees in possession and lawful sub-tenancies created by the tenants the decisions of the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Jasvantrais case (supra) and of the Supreme Court in Dahya Lalas case (supra) would hold the field. These two sets of decisions operate in altogether different fields. The areas in which they operate do not overlap. It is therefore wrong to come to the conclusion that there is any conflict between the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Gulabraos case (supra) on one hand and the decisions of the High Court of Bombay in Jasvantrais case (supra) and of the Supreme Court in Dahya Lalas case (supra) on the other hand. We see no conflict between them because as we have stated earlier they operate in altogether different fields. With great respect therefore we are unable to concur in the view expressed by Mr. Justice J. B. Mehta in the unreported decision to which we have been referred. ( 14 ) SO far as the decision of Mr. Justice Bhagwati in Ranchhod Fakirs case referred to above is concerned it also operates in a different field It has no application to the case of an agreement of sale. It also operates in a field where contract of cultivation has been created by one in favour of another. Broadly speaking therefore the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Bombay in Jasvantrais case (supra) the decision of the Supreme Court in Dahya Lalas case (supra) and the decision of Mr. Justice Bhagwati in Ranchhod Fakirs case (supra) operate in one field while the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Gulabraos case (supra) operates in an altogether different field. ( 15 ) IT is necessary in this context to refer to sec. 63 of the Tenancy Act. Justice Bhagwati in Ranchhod Fakirs case (supra) operate in one field while the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Gulabraos case (supra) operates in an altogether different field. ( 15 ) IT is necessary in this context to refer to sec. 63 of the Tenancy Act. It inter alia provides as follows:save as provided in this Act (a) no sale including sales in execution of a decree of a Civil Court for recovery of arrears of land revenue or for sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue gift exchange or lease of any land or interest therein. . . . . shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist. . . . . . The first proviso lays down that the Collector or an officer authorized by the State Government in that behalf may grant permission for such sale gift exchange lease or mortgage on such conditions as may be prescribed. The lease of an agricultural land from an agriculturist to a non-agriculturist is therefore prohibited except in a case in which it has been permitted by the Collector or by an officer authorised by the State Government in that behalf. Now if sec. 4 is to be so construed as to give rise to a deemed tenancy from the possession held under an agreement of sale it would provide an easy way to defeat the provisions of sec. 63. An agriculturist would enter into an agreement of sale with a non-agriculturist without the permission of the Collector hand over possession of his land to him and would inspire the non-agriculturist to make a claim to tenancy. If the claim to tenancy made by a non-agriculturist under the aforesaid circumstances succeeds as it should the provisions of sec. 63 of the Tenancy Act would be defeated. We do not think that the Legislature contemplated that sec. 4 should be used as a medium for defeating any other provision in the Act. The enforcement of one section of an Act must be consistent with the entire scheme of the Act. To interpret one section in a manner which defeated the provisions of another section is in our opinion not a correct canon of construction. Therefore secs. 4 should be used as a medium for defeating any other provision in the Act. The enforcement of one section of an Act must be consistent with the entire scheme of the Act. To interpret one section in a manner which defeated the provisions of another section is in our opinion not a correct canon of construction. Therefore secs. 4 and 63 can well stand together in support of each other if possession of and the consequent cultivation by an intending vendee under an agreement of sale are excluded from the area in which sec. 4 operates. ( 16 ) NEXT sec. 4 is not an instrument for a dishonest person to dupe a simple unwary and honest person. If a dishonest person enters into an agreement of sale with another pays a small amount towards the earnest money enters into possession in anticipation of the conveyance of the. title to him deliberately commits breach of the agreement goes back upon it and claims tenancy when the intending vendor seeks to recover possession of his land from him what happens ? Shall the dishonest person succeed ? Will he be able to achieve his evil design successfully under the protection of law ? Has sec. 4 been enacted to protect the dishonest and to penalise the honest ? Is sec. 4 an instrument to demolish basic moral values of the society ? Is it a perpetrator of found and deceit ? Is it intended to create chaos in society ? As between a small landholder and his intending vendee is it intended to strip the small landholder naked to clothe his dishonest and crooked vendee ? Is it an instrument which creates poverty or distributes it ? Or is it an instrument which levels down the peaks ? If we take the view which Mr. Peerzada has canvassed it will be removed from achieving its last mentioned laudable objective and will operate as a fountain of dishonesty and crookedness creating poverty where there is none without removing it from any other social pocket. We do not think that the Legislature by enacting sec. 4 in a very wide language thought of trapping the honest and the simple for making them prey of the wily and the dishonest. Therefore in our opinion sec. We do not think that the Legislature by enacting sec. 4 in a very wide language thought of trapping the honest and the simple for making them prey of the wily and the dishonest. Therefore in our opinion sec. 4 does not operate in the field of agreements of sale under which possession has been delivered to the intending vendee. [rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ] .