Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioners and the respondents are parties to a partition suit which was pending on 11 1970. The respondents (defendants) contended in the final decree proceedings that the finding in the suit that they were not tenants was no longer valid in view of S.125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, as amended by Act 35 of 1969, which came into force on 111970 and that the question of tenancy had to be reagitated before a Tribunal by means of a reference under S.125(3). Accordingly at the instance of the defendants the question of tenancy was referred by the trial court to the Land Tribunal for its determination in terms of S.125(3). This was rightly done, or at least it then appeared to be so, in view of the decision in Anantha Narayana Iyer v. Paran, 1976 KLT. 403 (FB.). Subsequently the Supreme Court laid down in Eapen Chacko v. Provident Investment Co. (P) Ltd, 1977 KLT.1 that in respect of a suit which was pending on 111970 the civil court had jurisdiction to determine questions of tenancy and that reference under S.125(3) of the Act would arise only in suits or proceedings instituted after 111970. On 30 71977 the Tribunal returned its finding that the defendants were not tenants. The defendants who were by that time armed with the decision of the Supreme Court in Eapen Chacko's case moved the court to ignore the finding of the Tribunal as a nullity for the reason that the Tribunal was not competent to examine the question of tenancy which arose in a pending suit. This submission was accepted by the trial court by its impugned order. 2. Sri T. L. Viswanatha Iyer appearing for the revision petitioners contends before me that the reference to the Tribunal was made at the instance of the defendants in the suit, and those who submitted to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal cannot be later on beard to say that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction and the decision rendered by it was a nullity. Counsel further submits that in any case what is enacted under S.125(3) of the Act is an ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court and not a conferment of jurisdiction on the Tribunal. Prior to 1 11970 both the civil court and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide questions of tenancy. Counsel further submits that in any case what is enacted under S.125(3) of the Act is an ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court and not a conferment of jurisdiction on the Tribunal. Prior to 1 11970 both the civil court and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide questions of tenancy. S.101(3) of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder show that even prior to 111970 the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy in various proceedings. With the amendment which came into force on 1-1-1970 the civil court lost its jurisdiction. Therefore a decision rendered by a competent Tribunal cannot be regarded as a nullity. 3. Counsel for the respondents (defendants) Sri Appa Nair submits that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal for the purpose of determining the question of tenancy arising in a suit was conferred only with the amendment of S.125(3) which came into force as on 111970. He therefore argues that submission to jurisdiction does not confer jurisdiction upon the Tribunal which it otherwise did not have. 4. It is unnecessary for me to consider the question whether by submission to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal the defendants are estopped from contending that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction. A reading of S.101(3) shows that the Tribunal always had jurisdiction to consider the question of tenancy. So did the civil court in regard to a question which arose in civil proceedings. The civil court lost the jurisdiction as from 111970 to determine questions of tenancy in a suit which arose after that date. In respect of the present suit which was pending on 1 11970 the civil court did have jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy. However the decision of the Tribunal on the question of tenancy in a matter pending before it cannot be regarded as a nullity. The matter became pending before the Tribunal on account of a reference which was made at the instance of the defendants. The defendants having invited a reference to the Tribunal (although the reference itself was unnecessary) and the Tribunal having had jurisdiction to consider the question which became pending before it, the decision of the Land Tribunal cannot therefore be regarded as a nullity or void. The decision is effective and is in full force. 5. The question however is whether the decision of the Tribunal is binding on the civil court. The decision is effective and is in full force. 5. The question however is whether the decision of the Tribunal is binding on the civil court. My answer is 'no', for the jurisdiction of the civil court can only be ousted by a specific provision to that effect. The jurisdiction of the civil court was not ousted in respect of matters pending on 111970. Consequently the decision of the Tribunal which is effective and in full force has no binding character insofar as the civil court is concerned. But the decision is certainly not a nullity in the sense that it can be ignored as if it never existed. It is, although not conclusive, a good piece of evidence. It will have to be considered by the trial court on its merits, but it is not binding on the court. The trial court is free, and in fact obliged, to consider the question of tenancy on its merits. In doing so the trial court will of course take into account, and have due regard to, the decision of the Tribunal along with other evidence which may be available to it. 6. In my view the impugned order whereby the learned Munsiff disclaimed jurisdiction is unsustainable. It is set aside and the matter is remanded to the trial court to proceed with the trial of the issue regarding tenancy as indicated above. 7. The CRP. is accordingly allowed. The parties will bear their respective costs.