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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1978 DIGILAW 7 (MP)

Ambika Prasad Panday v. State of M. P.

1978-01-04

J.P.BAJPAI, K.K.DUBE

body1978
Short Note : 1. The petitioner who was the councilor of the Municipal Council, Panagar was given a show cause notice under section 41 (l) (a) of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 to show cause why he should not be removed from the office as his continuance in the office was found to be not in the public interest and not in the interest of the Municipal Council. The specific charges against him were that he had temporarily misappropriated a sum of Rs. 14,111 13 and had been using this amount for his benefit; that to serve his own ends that he should not be exposed, he did not get the accounts of the Municipality audited; that despite express direction) to deposit all sums in the Bank he had not done so, and lastly that he was keeping the files of the council at his house in violation of the direction in that regard. The State Government by the impugned order dated 26-4-1977 (Ex P-1) removed the petitioner from the councilor of the Municipal Council and further directed that he shall be disqualified for further election for a period of 4 years from the date of removal. 2. Held: It is well settled that the removal of a member of the Municipal Council by the Government necessitated an appropriate enquiry before the councilor could be removed. The Government, must supply to the Court the necessary material upon which they formed their opinion for removing the member from the council. The learned Government Advocate has produced the file before the Court On going through the file, it has been established that the petitioner had kept large amount of the municipality with him and appears to have used them for his own purposes. The petitioner is thus clearly guilty of the first charge. Bhagat Ram Patanga v. State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 151 , relied on 3. It is further settled that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules and the question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given Case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of the Tribunal and the rules under which it functions. It cannot be gainsaid in the present case that the petitioner was informed of the charges against him. It cannot be gainsaid in the present case that the petitioner was informed of the charges against him. The matter entirely pertains to the record and the main charges appears to have been satisfactorily proved in the case The petitioner merely pleaded that he had no guilty intention to misappropriate the amount but the keeping of the money with him was a mistake. Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala and others, AIR 1969 SC 198 , relied on. 4. The only question that survives for consideration in this case is whether on the basis of the charges proved the Government could form an opinion that the continuance of the petitioner as a councilor was not in the public interest and in the interest of the Council. Here again, the Court is not to substitute its own opinion for that of the Government. This Court is only concerned to see that the opinion has been formed on the basis of matter not extraneous to section 41 of the Act. An action could undoubtedly be taken against the petitioner if the State Government at any time was of the opinion that the continuance as a councilor was not in the interest of the public or of the council, it would appear that though a particular conduct may not come in the way as a disqualification from being chosen as a councilor yet, it was open to the Government to consider such past conduct to remove a councilor if in its opinion the continuance of such councilor, because of such previous conduct, was not in the interest of public or of the council. It cannot be said that the previous conduct could not at all be taken into consideration for the purpose of section 41 and what the Government could examine was his conduct during the tenure of his office, the continuance of which could be put to an end in the interest of public. This Court does not think that it could limit the consideration of the conduct during the subsistence of the tenure only. Petition dismissed.