Judgement BHATTACHARJEE, J. :- The appellant has filed an application stating that the matter in dispute in this appeal between her and her son, the respondent, has been compromised out of Court and praying that she may be allowed to withdraw the appeal and may also be allowed a refund of the Court-fees paid by her on the memorandum of appeal. The question that has arisen for our consideration is whether the prayer of the appellant relating to refund of Court-fees can and should be allowed. 2. I have no hesitation in my mind that we should allow this prayer, if we can. Chagla, C.J., and Gajendragadkar, J. (as his Lordship then was) have observed in Karfule Ltd. v. A.D. Varghese (AIR 1953 Bom 73 at 95), about "the very great desirability of encouraging the litigants not to indulge in unnecessary litigation and of putting an end to such litigation as soon as possible" and their Lordships have further pointed out that "one of the ways of doing this is to induce litigants to withdraw suits or appeals or to compromise suits or appeals" and that "one way of helping them to do so is by tempting them by the return of Court-fees." According to this view, therefore, when a suit or appeal is withdrawn or *****omised a refund of Court-fees should be ordered, if such a course is permissible under and not prohibited by law. In Tarachand versus State (AIR 1955 Cal 258) Chakrabarty, C.J. and Lahiri, J., have observed that by levying Court-fees State in fact sells justice and "court-fees are the price levied by the State from persons litigating before it for the service rendered to them in connection with their causes". It may, therefore, be urged that in a case where a suit or appeal has been withdrawn before the Court is required to hear the parties and as such there has been no occasion for rendering any service to the parties in respect of their causes, the Court-fees, which are levied as price for rendering services in respect of litigation, should be returned as no service or no appreciable service has been required to be rendered in such a case and the judicial machinery, which functions when a case is pressed for hearing has not functioned. 3. 3. But in that Bombay case, where also the appeal was withdrawn and refund of Court-fees was prayed, it was held that the Court has no power under the law to order the refund of Court-fees in such a case. In fact there are weighty authorities in favour of the view that except when the Court-fees have been illegally or erroneously assessed or collected, the Court, in cases governed by the Court-fees Act, 1870, has no inherent power to order the refund of Court-fees and save as aforesaid, the power of the Court to order refund of the Court-fees is confined within the provisions of Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Court-fees Act and reference in this connection may be made to the Full Bench decisions of the Punjab High Court in Jawahar Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1958 Punj 38), to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Munna Lal v. Abir Chand (AIR 1958 All 766) and to the Calcutta and the Bombay decisions noted above. In Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (AIR 1955 SC 600) the plaintiff who was a civil servant, had claimed several reliefs including damages and when he subsequently realised that he had no right to sue for damages he gave up that claim and prayed for refund of Court-fees paid in respect of that relief. The trial Court and the High Court refused the prayer and when in appeal before the Supreme Court the prayer was renewed, the Supreme Court observed as hereunder : "He invoked the inherent powers of the High Court. The Court Fees Act contains certain provisions for refund of Court-fee paid by a party but admittedly the present case is not covered by any of those provisions. It seems, therefore, that the High Court in the circumstances of the present case rightly refused to order a refund of the excess Court-fees paid by the appellant. It also does not appear that the Civil Judge acted illegally in refusing to order a refund" (Emphasis supplied). 4. The view of the Supreme Court, therefore, appears to be that as the "Court-fees Act contains certain provisions for refund of Court-fee paid by a party", there is no power in the Court to travel outside those express provisions and to order refund of Court-fee dehors those express provisions. 4. The view of the Supreme Court, therefore, appears to be that as the "Court-fees Act contains certain provisions for refund of Court-fee paid by a party", there is no power in the Court to travel outside those express provisions and to order refund of Court-fee dehors those express provisions. One can, if I may say so with respect, understand, the principle behind this view which is expressed in the legal maxim "expressum facit cessare tacitum", meaning that what is expressed makes what is silent to cease or the legal maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alteris", meaning that the express mention of one thing implies exclusion of another. But is it the position that when a law provides for the exercise of a power in certain specific cases, the exercise of such a power in any other case is impliedly barred ? The Civil Procedure Code expressly provides for the grant of a temporary injunction in cases specified in Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 and yet it has been held by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal v. Hira Lal (AIR 1962 SC 527) that in spite of the express provisions in Section 94 and Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code, providing for the cases in which a temporary injunction can be granted, the Court has inherent power to issue temporary injunction even in cases not covered by those express provisions. Again, the Civil Procedure Code expressly provides for the issue of a commission in Section 75 read with Order 26 and yet it has been held by the Supreme Court in Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (AIR 1961 SC 218) that in spite of such express provisions conntained in Section 75 and Order 26 of the Civil Procedure Code, providing for the issue of commission, the Court has inherent power to issue commission in cases not covered by such express provisions. Be that as it may, I do not think that it is necessary for me to consider as to whether the principle applied by the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Gupta's case (AIR 1955 Supreme Court 600) to the effect that the Court does not have any inherent jurisdiction to exercise a power when the cases for the exercise of such power are specifically provided for, has in any way been relaxed in the later cases. Because in my view, even if I strictly go by the principle applied by the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Gupta's case, I do no think that I am required to hold that the exercise of the inherent power to order refund of Court fees by the Courts in Sikkim is barred under the laws relating to Court-fees in Sikkim. 5. The law relating to Court-fees in Sikkim is to be found in a set of Rules as "Sikkim State Rules - Re -Court-fees and Stamps on Document" assented to by the then Maharaja of Sikkim on 30th March, 1928, as subsequently amended, and there is no provision in the said Rules for the refund of Court-fees paid. If this Sikkim Law made specific provisions for refund of Court-fees in certain cases, then it could have been urged on the authority of the Supreme Court decision in Om Prakash Gupta's case that the Courts do not have any inherent power to order refund of Court-fees in other cases not covered by those specific provisions. But, as already noted, the Sikkim Law does not make any provisions for refund of Court-fees. In any case and that being so, there is no scope for applying the principle contained in the maxim "expressum facit cessare tacitum" or "expressio unius est exclusio alterius", or for applying the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Om Prakash Gupta's case that the relevant law having expressly provided for refund of Court-fees in certain cases, refund of Court-fees in other cases is impliedly barred. I am therefore, of opinion that under the provisions of law in Sikkim, the Courts have inherent power to order refund of Court fees in appropriate cases and that an order of the refund of Court fees should be made in this case in exercise of that power, because such a course would, as noted in the aforesaid Bombay case, encourage and induce litigants to compromise their litigations out of Court and thus to put an end to litigations. 6. In my view, therefore, the appellant should be allowed to withdraw this appeal and her prayer for refund of Court-fees should also be allowed. Both the prayers are, therefore, allowed. Let the appellant be granted a certificate authorising her to receive back from the State Bank of Sikkim the full amount of Court-fees paid by her on the memorandum of appeal. Both the prayers are, therefore, allowed. Let the appellant be granted a certificate authorising her to receive back from the State Bank of Sikkim the full amount of Court-fees paid by her on the memorandum of appeal. MAN MOHAN SINGH GUJRAL, C.J. :- I agree.