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1978 DIGILAW 70 (GUJ)

MAGANBHAI MADHAVBHAI PATEL v. PATEL DHULABHAI CHUNIBHAI

1978-06-29

M.K.SHAH, S.H.SHETH

body1978
S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) ). These two appeals arise out of Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 1967 decided by the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Baroda. The facts of the case briefly stated are as under. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff filed the present suit against the defendants for recovery of possession of agricultural lands on the allegation that prior to 1st April 1957 he was the tenant in respect of those lauds and had become their deemed purchaser under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricul- tural Lands Act 1948 He further alleged that in 1965 he was disposse- ssed. In defence it was contended that the plaintiff was not the tenant prior to 1st April 1957 and that therefore he had not become the deemed purchaser under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. It was next contended that he had surrendered the lands to the landlords on 1st April 1957 and had been working on the land since then as the landlords servant. The learned trial Judge held that the plaintiff was the tenant prior to 1st April 1957 and that he had become the deemed purchaser on that date under sec. 32-G of the Tenancy Act. It was also held that he was wrongfully dispossessed by the defendant-landlords. He therefore passed in favour of the plaintiff decree for possession. ( 3 ) THAT decree is challenged by defendants Nos. 7 and 9 to 12 in First Appeal No. 3 of 1972 and by defendants Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 in First Appeal No. 717 of 1976. The learned trial Judge raised the issues. Later on he amended the issues and raised Issue No. 5-A relating to the past tenancy of the plaintiff. By his order Ex. 12 dated 18th November 1968 he referred that issue to the Mamlatdar under sec. 85a of the Tenancy Act. On 30th August 1969 the Mamlatdar made the order returning the reference to the Civil Court without deciding it because according to him he had no jurisdiction to decide whether plaintiff was a tenant prior to 1st April 1957. The order of the Mamlatdar was received on 20th November 1969 The Mamlatdar relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in MUSSAMIYA IMAM HAIDER BAX RAZVI V. RABARI GOVINDBHAI RATNABHAI AND OTHERS 10 G. L. R 421 to which we shall shortly refer. The order of the Mamlatdar was received on 20th November 1969 The Mamlatdar relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in MUSSAMIYA IMAM HAIDER BAX RAZVI V. RABARI GOVINDBHAI RATNABHAI AND OTHERS 10 G. L. R 421 to which we shall shortly refer. Thereafter the trial Court proceeded with the suit and decided it in favour of the plaintiff. ( 4 ) SEC. 70 (b) of the Tenancy Act before it was amended in 1973 by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 provided:"70 For the purposes of this Act the following shall be the duties and functions to be performed by the Mamlatdar : (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) to decide whether a person is a tenant or a protected tenant (or a permanent tenant ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . This unamended section was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mussamiyus case (supra ). It was held that there was nothing in the language of sec. 70 or sec. 85 of the Tenancy Act to suggest that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was expressly or by necessary implication barred to decide the question whether a person was a tenant and had become the statutory owner of lands in his possession. Therefore according to the Supreme Court upon the true construction of sec. 70 (b) as it was prior to its amendment in 1973 the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by virtue of the provisions of sec. 85 of that Act was barred in cases where the tenant claimed present tenancy and not where the claim made by the tenant was based upon past tenancy. Now the trial Court decided the suit on 27th September 1971. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mussamiyas case (supra) the trial Court had then the jurisdiction to decide whether the plaintiff was the tenant prior to 1st April 1957. ( 5 ) HOWEVER by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 sec. 70 (b) and sec. 85a were amended. Amended sec. 70 (b) reads as follows:"70 For the purposes of this Act the following shall be the duties and functions to be performed by the Mamlatdar. (a ). . . . . . . . . . . ( 5 ) HOWEVER by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 sec. 70 (b) and sec. 85a were amended. Amended sec. 70 (b) reads as follows:"70 For the purposes of this Act the following shall be the duties and functions to be performed by the Mamlatdar. (a ). . . . . . . . . . . (b) to decide whether a person is or was a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant". It is clear that amended sec. 70 (b) confers upon the Mamlatdar jurisdict- ion to decide the question relating to the past tenancy of a tenant also. Therefore by virtue of sec. 85 jurisdiction of the Civil Court even in controversies relating to past tenancies of the tenant is barred. Sec. 85a which enables a Civil Court to refer an issue as to tenancy when it arises in a civil suit to the Mamlatdar is also amended. Amended sec. 85 provides as follows: "85 (1 ). If any suit instituted whether before or after the specified date in any Civil court involves any issues which are required to be settled decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle decide or deal with such issues under this Act (hereinafter referred to as the competent authority) the civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination. (2 ). . . "the words which are inserted in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 85a by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 are as follows: instituted whether before or after the specified date in any Civil Court. Therefore the cumulative effect of the amended sec. 70 (b) read with sec. 85a is that if in a civil suit a question relating to the past tenancy of a tenant arises the jurisdiction is conferred upon the Mamlatdar to decide it and an issue has got to be referred to the Mamlatdar by the Civil Court. By virtue of amended sec. 70 (b) read with amended sec. 85a the Civil Court cannot try an issue relating to the past tenancy of the tenant. ( 6 ) THE expression specified date used in amended sec. 855 has been defined by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973. Sub-sec. (16c) has been inserted in sec. 2. By virtue of amended sec. 70 (b) read with amended sec. 85a the Civil Court cannot try an issue relating to the past tenancy of the tenant. ( 6 ) THE expression specified date used in amended sec. 855 has been defined by Gujarat Act 5 of 1973. Sub-sec. (16c) has been inserted in sec. 2. It defines specified date so as to mean the date of the coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act 1972 Gujarat Act 5 of 1973 came into force on 20th April 1973. ( 7 ) MR. Desai who appears on behalf of the plaintiff has contended that the trial Court had the jurisdiction to pass the decree on the day on which it passed it and that such a decree cannot be affected by subsequent amendment made by Legislature to sec. 70 (b) and sec. 85a of the Tenancy Act. We are not impressed by this argument for two reasons. Indeed the amended sec. 85a uses the word suit and it does not use the word appeal. But it is well-settled that appeal is a continuation of the suit. When the highest Court of appeal decides an appeal what the highest Court does is to conclusively and finally decide the suit and nothing more. Secondly with the deprivation of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in matters relating to the past tenancy of tenants we exercising the jurisdiction of the Civil Court do not have the jurisdiction now to confirm or set aside the decree for possession on merits. It is therefore clear that even though the trial Court had the jurisdiction to pass the decree when it passed it the subsequent amendment to legislation which governs the pending suits renders that decree null and void. We must go to the extent of saying that in view of the fact that amended sec. 85a governs the pending suits the decree passed by the trial Court must be deemed to have been passed without jurisdiction even though the trial Court had the jurisdiction to pass it when it did. ( 8 ) SINCE the suit filed by the plaintiff is pending in appeal before us it becomes imperative for us to refer the issue relating to the plaintiffs past tenancy to the Mamlatdar under sec. 85a. Mr. Desai has tried to invite our attention to Ex. ( 8 ) SINCE the suit filed by the plaintiff is pending in appeal before us it becomes imperative for us to refer the issue relating to the plaintiffs past tenancy to the Mamlatdar under sec. 85a. Mr. Desai has tried to invite our attention to Ex. 187 with the object of showing us that in proceedings under sec. 32-G of the Tenancy Act the controversy relating to the plaintiffs past tenancy was decided by the Mamlatdar. Ex. 187 relates to Vasai lands. The suit lands are Dabhoi lands. Therefore Ex. 187 has no application to the suit lands. It cannot therefore be taken into account. It is therefore clear that there is nothing on the record of this suit which shows that the controversy which is now required to be referred to the Mamlatdar under sec. 85a was never decided in proceed- ings under the Tenancy Act. ( 9 ) IN that view of the matter we must remand the suit to the trial Court for referring the issue to the Mamlatdar. ( 10 ) IN the result we allow the appeal set aside the decree passed by the learned trial Judge remand the suit to him with a direction that Issue No. 5a shall be referred by him to the Mamlatdar for decision. Upon the receipt of the finding on the issue by him he shall proceed with the suit and decide it according to law. Until issue 5a is finally decided the learned trial Judge shall stay the suit. ( 11 ) IT appears that in execution of the decree passed by the trial Court the plaintiff-tenant recovered possession of the suit lands from the defendants. He is therefore in possession now. Since we set aside the decree for possession it is quite probable that the defendants might institute restitution proceedings and take back the possession from him. That is the apprehension which is expressed by Mr. Desai who appears on behalf of the plaintiff. Mr. S. R. Shah who appears on behalf of the defendants expressly states to us that during the pendency of the suit they shall not take back the possession of the suit lands from the plaintiff. This assurance given by Mr. Shah to the Court protects the plaintiff- tenants interest. There shall be no order as to costs throughout. Appeal allowed: Case remanded. .