Short Note : 1. That material facts giving rise to this appeal briefly are as follows. The appellant had obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 38,426.25/- against respondent No. 1 Mohammad Shafi. In execution of that decree, a warrant for attachment of moveable property belonging to the judgment-debtor respondent No. 1 was issued. When the Nazir went to execute that warrant the warrant was not executed on the undertaking given by respondent No.1 judgment-debtor to pay the decretal amount by 5th January 1973 and on respondent No.2 agreeing to become liable as a surety. A Panchanama dated 6th December 1972 was prepared by the Nazir reciting the fact that respondent No.2 had agreed to discharge the liability of the judgment debtor. The Panchanama dated 6th December 1972 was also signed by the surety, respondent No.2, acknowledging his liability as a surety. As the judgment-debtor and the surety failed to make any payment, the appellant decree-holder moved an application before the executing Court for proceeding against the surety i.e. respondent No.2 under the previsions of section 145 CPC. The application was resisted by the surety mainly on the ground that respondent No.2 had not agreed to act as surety under the directions of the Court. This objection was upheld by the lower Court and the decree-holder's application under section 145 CPC was dismissed. Hence the decree-holder has preferred this appeal. Held: The fact that the surety signed the Panchanama dated 6th December 1972 prepared by the Nazir, guaranteeing the payment of decretal amount and acknowledging his liability as a surety in that behalf is not disputed before me. It is also not disputed that a warrant for execution of the decree, which was for a sum of Rs. 38,426.25/- was issued by the executing Court and that the said warrant was not executed in view of the undertaking given by the judgment debtor to pay the amount by 5th January 1973 and in view of the undertaking given by the surety to pay the decretal amount. The short question for consideration in this case is whether the surety could be made liable under the provisions of section 145 CPC. 2. A bare perusal of section 145 CPC shows that it applies when a person has become liable as a surety for the performance of any decree. The short question for consideration in this case is whether the surety could be made liable under the provisions of section 145 CPC. 2. A bare perusal of section 145 CPC shows that it applies when a person has become liable as a surety for the performance of any decree. Learned counsel for the surety contended that he had acted to become liable as a surety under an order of the Court as contemplated by section 145 (c) CPC, but the clause 'under an order of the Court in any suit or in any proceedings, consequent thereon, occurring in section 145 (c) CPC is attracted when the case falls under clause (c) of section 145 CPC. If a case is governed by the provisions of section 145(a) CPC, then all that is required for its applicability is that the person against whom proceeding under section 145 CPC are commenced should be proved to have become liable as a surety for the performance of any decree. In the instant case, the fact that respondent No.2 had become liable as a surety for the performance of the decree passed against respondent No. 1 is evident from the Panchanama dated 6th December 1972 signed by respondent No.2, agreeing to pay the decretal amount which respondent No. 1, the judgment-debtor was liable to pay. In this connection. 3. I may usefully refer to the decision of a Division Bench, consisting of Madhavan Nair and Cornish. JJ. in Abdul Basi v. Sundaramayya ( AIR 1935 Mad. 209 ). In that case. the correctness of the decision in Subbarya v. Sathanatha (AIR 1919 Mad 813) holding that section 145 CPC was in applicable to surety ships undertaken for the performance of decrees entered outside the Court. was doubted and it was held that the language of section 145 (a) CPC was wide enough to apply to any contract of surety ship, whereby a personal liability had been undertaken for the performance of a decree. I respectfully agree with the observations in that decision. The impugned order passed by the lower Court, therefore, deserves to set aside. Appeal allowed.