JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. :- Ashok Kumar son of Chandrabhan respondent No. 3 filed an application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of a shop number 13/1097/2 Moreganj. Saharanpur, Respondent 3 purchased this shop and two others in 1965 at the time when he was 14 years of age. In March, 1970 respondent 3 filed an application under section 3 of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for permission to bring a suit for eviction against Gurdasmal, the petitioner on the ground that he required the shop for his own use. Before the proceedings of section 3 of old Act could be finalised the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) came into force. Consequently, the application filed under section 3 was converted into 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 2. Giving the reasons for the need of the said shop Ashok Kumar stated that as his relations with his father had become strained and he had started living with his maternal grandfather he wanted to start an independent business in the shop in question. 3. The application was resisted by the petitioner on the ground that the shop was not bona fide required by respondent No. 3 for his own use or occupation. The petitioner denied that the relations of respondent 3 were strained with his father and that he was living with his maternal grandfather and not with his father. The petitioner alleged that respondent 3 was carrying on business of the joint family along with his father in another shop which was adjacent to the shop in dispute. 4. Being of the view that the need of respondent 3 was not genuine, the Prescribed Authority rejected the application. Against the aforesaid order respondent No. 3 went up in appeal. The appellate court allowed the appeal on 27-2-1970 partly and directed for the release of a portion of the shop in favour of respondent No. 3 specified by letters A B C D. As a result of this order, the respondent No. 3 was entitled to get the back portion of the shop which was 12 feet in length and 9.6 feet in width. Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Court, the present writ petition was filed by Gurdasmal, the tenant. 5. Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Court, the present writ petition was filed by Gurdasmal, the tenant. 5. It would be noticed that the learned District Judge did not accept the case of respondent 3 that he was having strained relation with his father. The appellate Court disbelieved that the shop in question was purchased by respondent No. 3 in 1965 with his own funds as at that time the said respondent was a lad of 14 years, and that he was not possessed of money to purchase it. The learned District Judge also found that after the shop was purchased in the name of respondent 3 the same was let out to the petitioner on the basis of a rent note which mentioned that Chandrabhan the father of respondent No. 3, was managing his property. 6. The appellate court thereafter proceeded to deal with the question of requirement of the premises by respondent No. 3. Dealing with that question it found that respondent No. 3 was carrying on business with his brother and father in another shop adjacent to the shop in dispute. This was found to be the joint Hindu Family business of respondent No. 3. The learned District Judge, however, still held that as the business of the joint family was not such in which respondent No. 3 could be absorbed, the need of the said respondent was genuine. 7. Challenging the aforesaid finding of the appellate court the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner urged that as the main basis on which the application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed had not been accepted by the appellate court, the application filed by respondent No. 3 was liable to be rejected. It may be recalled that the main ground on which the application was founded was that the said respondent had strained relations with his father and that he was unemployed and sitting idle. Respondent No. 3 alleged that he wanted to employ himself to earn his livelihood. The appellate Court disbelieved this case of respondent No. 3 and I have no reason to differ with the finding of the appellate court on that point. It was found that the relations of respondent 3 with his father were not strained. Respondent No. 3 alleged that he wanted to employ himself to earn his livelihood. The appellate Court disbelieved this case of respondent No. 3 and I have no reason to differ with the finding of the appellate court on that point. It was found that the relations of respondent 3 with his father were not strained. In this background it appears to me that as the appellate court did not accept the main ground on which the application was founded as existing the proper course for him was either to reject the application filed under section 21 or to have permitted the respondent No. 3 to amend the application, if he felt that interest of justice required it. In the absence of the pleadings on the line on which the application was allowed by the appellate court, the petitioner definitely suffered. He had no occasion to show and prove that the business of the respondent No. 3 was of such magnitude that respondent No. 3 could have been easily accommodated. The entire evidence filed by the petitioner, was directed towards the fact that since the relations of respondent 3 were strained with his father, the application was liable to be rejected. The learned counsel for the petitioner was right in contending that as the Additional District Judge decided the appeal on a point on which there was neither any pleading nor evidence, his judgment was liable to be set aside. 8. Sri Sudhir Chandra counsel appearing for the respondents, however, contended that as the application filed by the said respondent was allowed only in respect of part of the shop and that the petitioner having been permitted to retain a larger portion of the shop in dispute, this court should not interfere under Article 226 of the constitution. He placed reliance on clause (3) of Article 226 of the constitution and contended that interference is called for by his court only if substantial injustice has not been to the party aggrieved. It is not possible for me to accede to the submission of the learned counsel. 9. An application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 can succeed only if a landlord established his need for occupation of the premises in dispute. If he does not do so, the application is liable to be rejected. It is not possible for me to accede to the submission of the learned counsel. 9. An application under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 can succeed only if a landlord established his need for occupation of the premises in dispute. If he does not do so, the application is liable to be rejected. In the instant case, as indicated above, on the ground on which the application was filed, the same having fallen through was liable to be rejected. In this view of the matter substantial injustice would be done to the petitioner, if the powers conferred by Article 226 of the constitution are not exercised in his favour. In this connection we cannot ever looked to consider the conduct of respondent No. 3. He made false and incorrect allegations against the petitioner and developed a theory of his relations being strained with his father only with a motive to succeed. In this view of the matter, the judgment of the appellate court cannot be sustained but on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, as agreed to by the learned counsel for the parties it appears appropriate that the appeal be remanded to the learned Additional District Judge to decide it afresh. 10. Sri Sudhir Chandra, was, however, right in his submission that since the long lapse of time during which the application remained pending it has now become necessary that the respondent No. 3 was given an opportunity to amend the application filed under section 21 of the Act. The learned Additional District Judge who will decide the appeal now on remand will give an opportunity to the respondent 3 to amend the petition. The parties may also be given opportunity to lead evidence, if they so desire. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it also appears expedient to give a direction to the District Judge to decide the appeal within four months from the date of the receipt of the intimation of this order. 11. For these reasons the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the Additional District Judge, Saharanpur dated 22nd October, 1976 is quashed and the case is sent back to him to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment.