JUDGMENT J M L. Sinha, J. :- This writ petition has been filed by Shanker Lal (hereinafter called the (petitioner') praying that the order dated 1st February, 1978, passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr, respondent No. 1, may be quashed. 2. The facts leading to this writ petition, briefly stated, were as follows. On 27th of August, 1976, Satya Dev Kaushik, respondent no. 3, moved an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer praying that the shop situate in Mohalla Moti Chowk, Shikarpur, district Bulandshahr, belonging to respondent no. 4, be allotted to him. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer directed the Rent Control Inspector to inspect the shop in dispute and to submit a report. After the report had been received and pasted on the notice board, objection were filed against it by the petitioner stating that he was a tenant in occupation of the shop in question since 15.9.1974 on behalf of respondent no. 4, who was the owner thereof. As opposed to this the stand taken by respondent no. 3 before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was that the shop was in possession of respondent no. 4 till August 1976 and it was there after that he let out the shop in question to the petitioner. Both the parties adduced evidence before the Rent Control Officer. After taking into consideration the evidence adduced by both parties, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order on 3rd of September, 1977, allotting the shop in dispute in favour of respondent no. 3 Aggrieved against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the petitioner as well as respondent no. 4 filed revision before the District Judge. The II Additional District Judge, who heard the revisions, came to the conclusion that the revisions were devoid of substance and, accordingly dismissed the same vide his order dated 15.2.1978. Hence this writ petition. 3. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before me was that Rule 8 of the Rules framed under Act No. XIII of 1972 was not complied with in this case and that the rule being mandatory. the order of the prescribed Authority allotting the accommodation to respondent No. 3 was illegal. Hence this writ petition. 3. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before me was that Rule 8 of the Rules framed under Act No. XIII of 1972 was not complied with in this case and that the rule being mandatory. the order of the prescribed Authority allotting the accommodation to respondent No. 3 was illegal. Relevant part of Rule 8 reads as follows : "8 (1) The District Magistrate shall, before making any order of allotment or release in respect of any building which is alleged to be vacant under section 12 or to be otherwise vacant or to be likely to fall vacant, obtain a report from the Rent Control Inspector. "(2) The Inspector shall inspect the building so far as possible, in the presence of the landlord and of the tenant or any other occupant, and submit his report after eliciting the facts wherever practicable by at least two respectable persons residing in the locality, and the conclusion in the report of the Inspector shall be pasted on the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate for the information of the general public, and an order of allotment may be passed not before the expiration of three days from the date of such pasting, and if in the meantime any objection is received, not before the disposal of such objection." From a perusal of the above rule it would appear that it enjoins: (i) That the accommodation to be allotted should be got inspected and that inspection, so far as possible, made in the presence of the landlord. (ii) That the inspector should elicit facts from two respectable persons of the locality. (iii) That conclusions of the inspection report shall be pasted on the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate for the information of the general public. (iv) That an order of allotment will not be passed before the expiry of three days from the date of such pasting, and if in the meantime any objection is received, not before the disposal of that objection. 4. It is not disputed in the instant case that the Rent Control Inspector had made an inspection of the shop in question. It is also not disputed that he elicited facts from two persons in the locality. 4. It is not disputed in the instant case that the Rent Control Inspector had made an inspection of the shop in question. It is also not disputed that he elicited facts from two persons in the locality. It is also not denied that the conclusion of the inspection report was pasted on the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate. the petitioner also did not controvert that the allotment order was not made before the expiry of three days from the date of such pasting. All that was controverted before me was that the Rent Control Inspector did not make the inspection in the presence of the occupant of the shop. Now, sub-section (2) of section 8 itself states that the inspection shall be made in the presence of the landlord as far as may be possible. The Rent Control Inspector reported that when he reached the shop, it was closed. It was in these circumstances that he made the inspection in the absence of the occupant of the shop. I do not think the requirement of sub-section (2) of section 8, that the inspection should be made in the presence of the landlord, is so mandatory as to vitiate the order of allotment. In my opinion, if an allotment order is made without obtaining a report from the Inspector or without getting that report pasted on the notice board for the information of the general public or without waiting for three days after the report is pasted, it would violate the mandates contained in section 8(2). The provision regarding making the inspection in the presence of the occupant, however, appears to be directory and the breach thereof cannot always vitiate the allotment order. The contention raised is accordingly rejected. 5. Learned counsel next urged that non of the affidavits filed on behalf of respondent no. 3 were properly verified and hence those affidavits should not have been read in evidence. My attention in this connection was invited to pars 18 of the petition. According to the averments contained therein the verification clause in the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent reads as under : "I laghyet 10 sub theek ha?" Learned counsel vehemently urged that this aspect of the matter was placed before the learned District Judge, but he has not noticed that argument. According to the averments contained therein the verification clause in the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent reads as under : "I laghyet 10 sub theek ha?" Learned counsel vehemently urged that this aspect of the matter was placed before the learned District Judge, but he has not noticed that argument. On a perusal of the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, however, I find that the argument raised before him was that the verification clause in the affidavits was defective inasmuch as the contents thereof were sworn on personal knowledge which it was not possible to do. It is not mentioned in the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge that any argument was raised before him to the effect that the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent were defective because all that was said in the verification clause thereof was "I laghayet 10 sub theek hai". Learned counsel for the petitioner insisted that an argument to that effect was raised but the learned District Judge omitted to notice it. 6. In the first instance it is not possible to accept that, even though a contention to the effect alleged was raised on behalf of the petitioner before the Rent Control Officer as well as before the District Judge, but neither of then noticed the argument in the shape in which it was presented and instead a different argument was invented by them as indicated earlier. In any case, if the petitioner for the success of this case intended to rely on the contention that all the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent no. 3 were defective because of the verification clause contained therein, and could not be taken into account, the least that was expected of the petitioner was that he should have annexed with the present petition copies of at least one of two affidavits to substantiate the allegation. That was all the more necessary because the allegation to that effect made in the petition was converted by the respondent no. 3 in the counter affidavit filed by him. Even if the petitioner failed to annex any copy of these affidavits along with the writ petition, he should have done so when, in reply to the counter-affidavit sworn by respondent no. 3 he filed the rejoinder-affidavit. Even this was not done. 3 in the counter affidavit filed by him. Even if the petitioner failed to annex any copy of these affidavits along with the writ petition, he should have done so when, in reply to the counter-affidavit sworn by respondent no. 3 he filed the rejoinder-affidavit. Even this was not done. I called upon the learned counsel for the petitioner at the time of argument to show me any copy of the affidavit, certified or uncertified, in support of his contention that the affidavits filed by the respondents were verified in the manner alleged in the petition. Learned counsel for the petitioners could not, however, show me copy of any such affidavit. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent referred me to some affidavit sworn and filed on his behalf the verification clause in those copies are very much different from that alleged in paragraph 18 of the writ petition. In the above context, I find that no firm foundation has been laid by the petitioner in support of the allegation contained in paragraph 18 of the writ petition. Consequently that cannot be accepted. 7. Learned counsel next referred me to section 14 of Act XIII of 1972 as it stands after the amendment which came into force on 5th of July, 1976. Because of this provision of law the possession of a person, who was in occupation of a shop on 5th of July, 1976, stood regularised. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that, since the petitioner was in possession stood regularised and he should have been held to be a tenant of the shop in question. The argument fails to impress me. It is true that the case of the petitioner before the Rent Control and Eviction officer, as also before the District Judge, was that he was in possession the shop in question since 1974. The case of respondent No. 3 however, was that the petitioner entered into possession of the shop on 27th of August, 1976. The learned Additional District Judge, on a consideration of the evidence on record, has accepted that the petitioner entered into the possession of the shop in question on or about 27th of August 1976. It is not open to me to reappraise the evidence to come to a different conclusion in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this court. The learned Additional District Judge, on a consideration of the evidence on record, has accepted that the petitioner entered into the possession of the shop in question on or about 27th of August 1976. It is not open to me to reappraise the evidence to come to a different conclusion in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this court. Since, according to the finding recorded by the learned Additional District Judge, the petitioner entered into possession of the shop in question after the commencement of section 14 of Act, XIII of 1972, it cannot be successfully invoked by him. 8. It was then urged that the Prescribed Authority committed an error in not compelling the attendance of Tejpal and Prem Prakash, Bakshi of town Area, who has sworn affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 3 for cross-examination by the petitioner. Now, the question as to whether any person should or should not be made to attend the court to submit for cross-examination rest within the discretion of that court or Tribunal. In respect of Tej Pal Singh it has been remarked that had filed one affidavit on behalf of another party and he thus stood self-condemned. The Prescribed Authority did not propose to take into consideration his affidavit and it was for this reason that he did not consider it necessary to summon him for being cross-examined by the petitioner. In respect of the Bakshi, Town Area, the remark made is that his affidavit was based on certain documents and the petitioner could inspect those documents in order to obtain the necessary information and could file a counter affidavit under the circumstances it cannot be said that the Prescribed Authority exercised his discretion in an arbitrary manner while refusing to summon the afore- mentioned two witnesses for cross-examination. This cannot, therefore, constitute a ground for interference by this court. 9. Learned counsel lastly invited my attention to sub-section (9) of section 16 which states that while making an order of allotment the District Magistrate shall also require the allottee to pay to the landlord an advance equivalent to one month's presumptive rent and, on his failure to make or offer the payment within a week thereafter, rescind the allotment order. Learned counsel lastly invited my attention to sub-section (9) of section 16 which states that while making an order of allotment the District Magistrate shall also require the allottee to pay to the landlord an advance equivalent to one month's presumptive rent and, on his failure to make or offer the payment within a week thereafter, rescind the allotment order. It was alleged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the District Magistrate not having passed any order under sub-section (9) of section 16, the allotment order was rendered null and void. I am unable to agree. An order allotting an accommodation stands separate from the order requiring the tenant to pay to the landlord an advance equivalent to one month's rent, to pass an order in that regard cannot render the allotment order invalid. Learned counsel for the petitioner failed to refer to me any authority in support of his contention in that connection. 10. In the result, therefore, I find that this petition has no force and must fail. 11. The petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. The stay order, if any, shall stand vacated.