JUDGMENT Hari Lal Agrawal, J. The petitioners have filed this writ application against the order of the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna (Respondent no. 2) dated the 10th June, 1975, a copy of which has been attached as Annexure-4 to the application. By the aforesaid order, respondent no. 2 has rejected a preliminary objection of the petitioners challenging the maintainability of the petition filed by respondent no. 1 before him under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The preliminary objection of the petitioners was respondent no. 1 was not a “workmen concerned” within the meaning of Section 33 (3) of the Act, and, therefore, had no right to make a complaint before the Tribunal against the order of his discharge dated the 15th March, 1969, passed by petitioner no. 1. 2. The relevant acts briefly stated are these Petitioner no. 1 is a Road Transport Corporation established by the State Government under the provision of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. Respondent no. 1 was appointed as a Conductor in the year 1965. On 3rd November 1968, when he was serving as a conductor of Bus no. BRA-5194 running on Deoghar-Dumka route, on checking, it was detected that tickets were not issued to 18 passengers and 23 passengers were un booked. He was accordingly discharged by order dated 15th March, 1969 after holding a domestic enquiry Respondent no. 1 filed an appeal to the General Manager of the Corporation, but the same was dismissed on 15th June, 1970. He then filed a mercy appeal to the Chairman of the Corporation. This appeal was initially admitted but later on in May, 1972 was dismissed on the ground that "the system of hearing of mercy appeals in case of discharge has been discontinued by the chairman with effect from 13th March 1972. Respondent no. 1 then filed a complaint under section 33A of the Act, before the Industrial Tribunal Patna with the allegations that petitioner no.1 had passed the order of his discharge in violation of the inhibition contained in Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, inasmuch as, he was discharged from his services during the pendency of an industrial disputes rending in Reference No. 17 of 1968 between the petitioner no. 1 and its workmen before the Tribunal. 1 and its workmen before the Tribunal. The above proceeding arose on a reference made by the State Government on account of an Industrial disputes raised by the union of the workmen of petitioner no. l on account of the dismissal of a number of conductors and drivers on charges in the nature of misappropriation of the money realized as bus fares from the passengers without issuing proper tickets. Responden1 no.1 was no, a party to that proceeding. The Industrial Tribunal upheld the order of dismissal passed by petitioner no. 1 by its award dated the 31st May; 1969 (Annexure-l). 3. The grievance of respondent no. l in his complaint which was registered as Case No. 30 of 1972 was that the order of discharge was an Act, of victimization on account of his trade union activities in the absence of the application of petitioner no. 1 for permission of the Tribunal a breach of the said provisions was committed. Petitioner no.1 in his show-cause took a plea that respondent no 1 could not be said to be a concerned workman in Reference No. 17 of 1968 as that related to specific cases of discharge and dismissal of individual workmen and therefore, there had been no breach of section 33 of the Act. When the case was taken up for hearing, the petitioners raised the above preliminary objection. Respondent no. 2 overruling the objection has held that the application was maintainable. The learned Presiding Officer has held that respondent no. 1 was an active member of the union and, therefore, “there appears to be some link between the dismissal which gave rise to Reference no. 17 of 1968 and the dismissal of the complaint of which he has made complaint under Section 33A. He has, however, not indicated as to what was that common link between the earlier order of dismissal and the dismissal order against respondent no.1. 4. Learned counsel for respondent no. l, however argued that as respondent no. l was an active member of the union actively engaged in the trade union activities the management has passed the order of his discharge as a measure of victimization. It has to be seen as to whether on this account respondent no. 4. Learned counsel for respondent no. l, however argued that as respondent no. l was an active member of the union actively engaged in the trade union activities the management has passed the order of his discharge as a measure of victimization. It has to be seen as to whether on this account respondent no. 1 can be said to be a “concerned workman” within the meaning of Section 33 (3) of the Act, and thereby entitled to Marie a complaint under section 33A. 5. Mr. Ranen Roy appearing on behalf of the management and its Officer, advanced two contentions against orders passed by Respondent no. 2 namely that (i) Respondent no. 2 having become functus-officio on the date on which the complaint under Section 33A was filed before him he had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and (ii) Respondent no. 1 being not a concerned workman, had no right to make a complaint. In other words, learned counsel challenged the authority of the Tribunal to entertain the complaint petition as well as the right of the workman to make the complaint. 6. In order to appreciate the first contention. It would be necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 33 itself. The provisions of this Section are intended for a fair and satisfactory enquiry of an Industrial dispute, the object being that during the pendency of such a dispute, status quo should be maintained and no further elements of discord should be introduced. It deals with three different situations, their scope and object being different. Whereas Sub-section (1) of Seed on 33 contemplates the situation where a conciliation proceeding might be pending, subsection (2) concerns itself with the action that may be taken by an employer against his employees in respect of the matters not connected with the industrial disputes. Subsection (3) on the other hand deals with the protected workmen. Whereas under section 33 (2) only a subsequent approval from a competent authority before which the industrial disputes is pending is required under section 33 (3), the previous permission of the said authority is necessary before passing any order. In this case we are concerned with the provisions of Section 33 (3). Whereas under section 33 (2) only a subsequent approval from a competent authority before which the industrial disputes is pending is required under section 33 (3), the previous permission of the said authority is necessary before passing any order. In this case we are concerned with the provisions of Section 33 (3). I would better quote the provision of Section 33 (3), which reads as follows :- Sec. 33 (3) Not with standing anything contained in Sub-section (2), no employer shall, during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against any protected workman concerned in such dispute- (a) by altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings: or (b) by discharging or punishing, whether by dismissal or other wise such protected workman, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. The above provisions prohibit the employer to take any action against any protected workman during the pendency of any proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, in which he is concerned. The argument of Mr. Ranen Roy is that although when the order of discharge was passed by the management on 15th March, 1969 an industrial dispute was pending between the management and the union on behalf of dismissed workmen… on the date the complaint was filed i.e. on 16th July, 1972, the proceeding in question had already come to an end on the 31st of May, 1969, and, therefore, no proceeding was pending on that date the application was not maintainable. The contention put forward more simply amounts to this that the proceeding in question must be pending also on the date when an application under section 33A is filed i.e. if the authority before whom the proceeding was pending becoming functus-officio he ceases to have the authority to entertain such a complaint. It is difficult to accept this contention on its very face as such a construction is bound to lead to absurd results defeating the very purpose of the provision. What is prohibited under sub-section (3) of section 33 is of taking any action against any concerned workman during the pendency of any industrial dispute. The relevant date being the date when the action against any protected workman is taken. What is prohibited under sub-section (3) of section 33 is of taking any action against any concerned workman during the pendency of any industrial dispute. The relevant date being the date when the action against any protected workman is taken. If on that date any proceeding in respect of an industrial disputes happens to be pending then not-withstanding the fact that the proceeding comes to an end, the said authority will have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the complaint in accordance with provisions of the Act. The provisions of Section 33A contemplate a situation "where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court Tribunal or National Tribunal”. If once this condition is satisfied then the aggrieved employee by such contravention "may make a compliant in writing. In the prescribed manner to such Labaur Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint that Labour Court Tribunal or National Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint." Mr. Ranen Roy, however, contended that by use of the expression "such Labour Court the Parliament meant that the Labour Court was that Court where a proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute is pending on the date when the complaint is filed and if no proceeding is pending then there is no Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which may be competent to entertain the complaint in this regard. In my considered opinion this contention is entirely erroneous and must be rejected and it be held that once any contravention is made of the provision of section 33, then that authority, where the proceeding in question was pending on that date will have the jurisdiction to receive the complaint and adjudicate upon the same and it would not be necessary that on the date it must be in seisin of the proceeding. In support of my view, I may refer to a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Prabhakar Shamrao Marathe and others V. The Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Bombay and another where it was clearly laid down that section 33A does not imply that at the time when a complaint is preferred by the aggrieved workmen, the main dispute must be pending before the Tribunal to which the complaint is preferred. The word 'such' clearly refers to the Tribunal which had seisin of the main dispute i.e. the dispute which was referred to its adjudication. It has no reference to the pendency of the main dispute. 7. Mr. Ranen Roy, however, sought support from some cases dealing with situation under section 33 (2) of the Act. I may refer to only one of them, namely, P. D. Sharma V. State Bank of India. In this case the appellant before the Supreme Court was a clerk working in the Dehradun Branch of the State Bank of India. During the pendency of an industrial dispute between the respondent-Bank and its workmen before the National Industrial Tribunal, the appellant being one of the Office bearers of a recognized Trade Union, was found guilty in a departmental proceeding and it was proposed to dismiss him from his service. The respondent-bank applied on the 27th of April, 1962, to the National Tribunal for permission to discharge the appellant from service. Before, however, any order could be passed on this application, the Tribunal made its award in the reference on June 7, 1962, thereafter the court dropped the said proceeding by its order dated 10th February, 1965, on the ground that in view of the award having been already made, it had no competence to deal with that application. The Allahabad High Court summarily dismissed the writ application against the said order and the matter ultimately went to the Supreme Court, The Supreme Court took the view that, no doubt, at the time the application in question was made, the industrial dispute was pending between the parties, but the workman had not been discharged or punished before the industrial dispute was decided, though no doubt the respondent had proposed to dismiss him after obtaining the necessary permission from the Tribunal; and once the pendency of the industrial dispute ended, the bank placed on the common law the statutory or contractual rights of the respondent stood removed and it was free to exercise these rights. In the circumstances, it was observed by the Supreme Court that there was no necessity to take any body's permission to exercise its right and the limitation placed on the respondent's rights by sub-section (3) of Section 33 disappeared the moment the industrial dispute was decided. 8. In the circumstances, it was observed by the Supreme Court that there was no necessity to take any body's permission to exercise its right and the limitation placed on the respondent's rights by sub-section (3) of Section 33 disappeared the moment the industrial dispute was decided. 8. The ratio of this case has got hardly any application to the facts of the case before us. In the case before the Supreme Court no final order was passed against the workmen and the management having made an application for passing the proposed order against the workman had committed no breach. The dismissal of the application seeking permission was, therefore, entirely in a different situation and not on the ground that the authority had become functus officio. 9. The first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, must be rejected and it be held that respondent no. 2 had jurisdiction to entertain the application in question. 10. Now remains for consideration the second contention of Mr. Roy as to whether respondent no. 1 had any locus standi to make the complaint in question. As already seen above, Section 33 A requires that the contravention must have been made by an employer during the pendency of a proceeding before any of the authorities mentioned therein and the employee must be aggrieved by that contravention. It is, therefore, obvious that a workman other than a workman concerned in the dispute has got no locus standi to make a complaint under Section 33A, if there has been any change in his service conditions to his prejudice or he is otherwise punished. It is admitted that respondent no. 1 was not a party to the industrial dispute apparently, therefore, he cannot be said to be a person concerned in the dispute within the meaning of Section 33, but this expression cannot be limited to the workman directly or actually concerned with the dispute in question but includes all such workman on whose behalf the dispute was raised as well as those who would be bound by the award which may be made in the said dispute. This view was expressed by the Supreme Court In the case of M/s New India Motors (P) Ltd. New Delhi V. K. T. Morris Relying upon this decision, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 contended that respondent no. This view was expressed by the Supreme Court In the case of M/s New India Motors (P) Ltd. New Delhi V. K. T. Morris Relying upon this decision, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 contended that respondent no. 1 although may not be bound by the award in the reference in question, the manifest intention of the petitioners was to dismiss him on account of his trade union activities connected with the dispute in the Industrial dispute in question. It is, no doubt, true that in New India Motor's case the dispute was between the management and an individual workman, namely, the works manager who was later on given an assignment of Field Service Organisor. His services were terminated on the ground that the appellant had decided to abolish the post of Field Service representative. The respondent invoked Section 33A on the ground that at the time when his services wert terminated an Industrial dispute was pending between the appellant and seven of its employees. That dispute was with respect to the termination of the services of the seven employees, who were working as apprentices. Evidence had come in that case that the respondent had supported the case of those seven workmen which had provoked the appellant to take the steps of terminating the services. No such case has, however, been made out by respondent no. 1 rather the petitioners have very clearly stated in para 6 of the writ application that respondent no. 1 was neither a party to the dispute nor had any concern with the same. As already seen earlier, respondent no. 2 has also not recorded any finding as to what was the link between the dismissal of the workmen in the year 1968 and that of the petitioner in the year 1969. In the domestic enquiry he was found to be guilty of the charges of misappropriation and dereliction of duty when the bus he was conducting was checked. In the circumstances, it is difficult to imagine as to how the order of discharge of respondent no. I could he said to have a link with the discharge of the other employees whose matter was pending. 11. In the circumstances, it is difficult to imagine as to how the order of discharge of respondent no. I could he said to have a link with the discharge of the other employees whose matter was pending. 11. Be that as it may, the Supreme court again had an occasion to consider a similar question in the case of Digwadih colliery V. Ramji Singh the judgment of the court was delivered in this case as also in the earlier case by the same learned judge, namely Gajendra Gadkar, J. In the latter case the Supreme Court made a clear observation to the effect that where the pending previous reference was an Individual dispute in respect of an employee, it could not be said that all workmen were concerned in that dispute. Reference in this connection may be made yet to an another decision of the Supreme court taking the above view in Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply co. Ltd., Moradabad V. G. S. Sriavastva. A decision again by Gajendra Gadkar, J. In Digwadih Colliery's case the Supreme Court on consideration of its earlier decision observed that even if the broader consideration of section 33 (2) is adopted, it is necessary to enquire what was the subject matter of reference and unless it is enquired as to what was the nature of dispute pending in the said reference, it would plainly be impossible to decide whether the respondent is a workman concern ad within the meaning of Section 33(2). In the application under Section 33A, in this case no averment about the nature of the said dispute was made and the management bad denied before the Tribunal that the respondent was concerned with the said dispute. 12. This court also had on an earlier occasion to consider the question in the case of Cane Manager, New India Sugar Mills Ltd. Darbhanga V. Krishna Ballabh Jha and others. This case has been relied upon by respondent no. 2 in support of his order. It wall observed by this Court that there must be some common feature in the nature of disputes in two cases which should serve as connecting link, thereby rendering the workmen in the latter case also as workmen concerned with the dispute in earlier case. This case has been relied upon by respondent no. 2 in support of his order. It wall observed by this Court that there must be some common feature in the nature of disputes in two cases which should serve as connecting link, thereby rendering the workmen in the latter case also as workmen concerned with the dispute in earlier case. It was clearly observed that the mere fact that some Union has taken up the cause of the two workmen or else by virtue of Section 18 (3) (d) all workmen may be bound by the award in earlier dispute may not suffice. In this view of the matter this Court refused to give a wider effect to the provision of section 33A on consideration of a large number of decisions on the question. The situation in this case, however, was that there were two unions in the factory one of them being sponsored by the employers themselves. In order to pressurize the workmen to join the rival union the workmen of the other union were victimized. In the circumstances, it was observed that there was an important common point between all these disputes and if in the earlier reference it is held by the Tribunal either that the rival union was not sponsored by the management, or that the management was not trying unfair means to persuade the workmen to give up the other Union and to join the rival Union, that decision will vitally affect the present dispute also Referring to the New India Motor’s case, it was observed by Narsimham, C.J.-In my opinion, this extreme contention cannot succeed in view of the later pronouncements of the Supreme Court mentioned above there are clear observations to the effect that where the pending previous reference was an individual dispute in respect of one employee, it could not be said that all workmen were concerned in that dispute.” 13. From the above discussions, it becomes clear that it is not sufficient that the decision in previous pending reference should be binding on the other workmen by application of the provisions contained in section 18 of the Act, but it should also be necessary that the other workmen should also be affected by that decision. Union this condition is satisfied, resort to section 33A cannot be made. Union this condition is satisfied, resort to section 33A cannot be made. It is for this reason that it was observed in Digwadih Colliery's case by the Supreme Court that the nature of the pending dispute would be a relevant consideration. 14. From the above discussion, it becomes clear that respondent no l. is not a workman concerned in the industrial dispute in Reference No. 17 of 1968 and therefore he had no locus standi to file the complaint in question. I would accordingly allow this application, set aside the order dated 10th June, 1975 passed by respondent no. 2 in Misc. Case No. 30 of 1972 (Annexre-4). Let an appropriate writ be issued accordingly. In the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs. M. P. Singh. J. I agree. Application allowed.