JUDGMENT J. M. L. Sinha, J. This is a plaintiff's second appeal arising out of the judgment and decree dated 31st October, 1968 passed by Civil Judge, Agra in Civil Appeal No. 39 of 1968. The facts leading up to this appeal can briefly be stated as under. The appellant filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment of the respondents from the premises in suit and for mesne profits. It was alleged that the appellant was owner and landlord of the house in suit. In the year 1959, he filed a suit wherein a compromise was entered into between the parties. In consequence of that compromise, a lease was executed in favour of the respondents on 31st August, 1961, under which the respondents were to continue to occupy the house in suit for a period of five years. That period of five years expired in 1966 but the respondents did not vacate the premises and hence necessity to file the suit. It was also alleged that a notice termintating the tenancy of the respondents had been served on them. The suit was resisted, inter alia, on the ground that it was not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in Section 3 of U. P. Act, No. III of 1947. The other contentions raised in the suit are not materials for the disposal of this appeal. The trial court held that the suit was not barred by the provisions of Act No. Ill of 1947, and, in the result, decreed the appellant's suit for ejectment and for mesne profits. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the trial court, the respondent filed an appeal in the Court of District Judge, Agra. The learned Additional Civil Judge, who heard the appeal, came to the conclusion that the suit was barred by the provisions of U. P. Act No. III of 1947. In consequence of that conclusion, the lower appellate court dismissed the plaintiff's suit for ejectment and for mesne profits. It was, however, decreed for Rs. 52.50 P. on account of arears of rent. Feeling dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, the plaintiff has come up in appeal before this Court. Learned counsel for the appellant contended before me that even accepting that the suit was barred by the provisions of U. P. Act. It was, however, decreed for Rs. 52.50 P. on account of arears of rent. Feeling dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, the plaintiff has come up in appeal before this Court. Learned counsel for the appellant contended before me that even accepting that the suit was barred by the provisions of U. P. Act. No. Ill of 1947 when it was filed, that Act is no more on the statute book having been repealed by U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, and, consequently, the appellant is now entitled to get the decree for ejectment and mesne profits against the respondent. It was urged by the learned counsel that the appeal in continuation of the suit and the appellate court must take notice of the legislative changes in order to grant necessary relief to a plaintiff. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, since U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947, which contained a bar, has been repealed and since there is no bar in Act No. XIiI of 1972 against a suit for ejectment being filed where the tenancy is for a fixed term, made in consequence of a compromise, this court should grant the decree in favour of the appellant. Having given my careful thought to the contention raised, I find ample substance therein. In Qttdrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly, (1) the Municipal Board fixed suit against Qudrat Ullah for his eviction from certain " premises. The suit was resisted on the ground that it was not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in U. P. Act No. III of 1947. The trial court upheld that objection and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the HighCourt upheld the judgment of the trial court in regard to the shop and sheds. Ultimately the matter went up to the Supreme Court. By the time, the case came up for hearing U. P. Act. No. Ill of 1947 had been repealed and replaced by U. P. Act. No. XIII of 1972. In that setting, a contention was raised before the Supreme Court that U. P. Act. No. Ill of 1947 having been repealed, the disability that attached to the filing of the suit because of the provision contained in Sec. 3 of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 had ceased to exist and the suit should be decreed. In that setting, a contention was raised before the Supreme Court that U. P. Act. No. Ill of 1947 having been repealed, the disability that attached to the filing of the suit because of the provision contained in Sec. 3 of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 had ceased to exist and the suit should be decreed. On the side of the Municipal Board, it was contended that Sec. 3 of U. P. Act III of 1947 conferred a right on the tenants and, in view of the provision contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the repeal of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 could not adversely affect that right. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 3 of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 did not confer any right on the tenant but imposed a disability on the landlord and, after the repeal of Act No. Ill of 1947, that disability ceased to exist. The Supreme Court also held that section 6 of the General Clauses Act did not apply on the repeal of Act No. Ill of 1947. It was further held that the effect of the aforesaid legislative changes viz. the repeal of UP. Act No. Ill of 1947 should be taken notice of. In consequence of these conclusions, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted a decree of ejectment. It will be of use to reproduce the following from the observations contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court: "From what we have stated above, it follows that the argument of any vested right in the defendant being taken away does not hold good; nor is there any foundation for the contention that the later Act is being applied retrospectively. All that we hold is (a) that a disability of the plaintiff to enforce his cause of action under the ordinary law may not necessarily be transmitted into a substantive right in the defendant, (b) that rights of a statutory tenant created under a temporary statute, as in this case, go to the extent of merely, preventing the eviction so long, as the temporary statute lasts, (c) that the provisions of section 43 do not preserve subsequent to repeal, any right to rebut the plaintiff's claim for eviction and (d) that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not justify anything larger for any time longer than S. 2 of the Act confers or lasts. It is appropriate for a court to do justice between parties to the litigation and in moulding the relief in the light of the subsequent developments, to take note of legeislative changes. A court of justice should if it could, adjudicate finally and not leave the door ajar for parties to litigate again. In the present case, it is not seriously disputed that if the plaintiff were to sue for recovery of possession today, the Rent Control Law does not stand in the way. Therefore, it is manifestly a measure of doing justice between the parties and ending litigation, which has seen two decades past, to conclude it here by taking cognizance and adjusting the relief in the light of the later Act and repeal of the earlier Act." It will thus appear that the aforesaid case applies on all force to the facts of the present, like in that case, in the instant case, there is no bar against a decree for ejectment being passed against the respondent even under the new Act viz. Act No. XIII of 1972. Act No. XIII of 1972. As already stated earlier, the lease, which was executed in favour of the respondent, was a fixed term lease for five years, made in consequence of a compromise that had taken place between the parties the previous suit, Section 20 (1) of Act XIII of 1972 reads as under: "Save as provided in subsection (2), no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner: Provided that nothing in this subsection shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed time was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceeding, which is either recorded in court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant." The present case would squarely fall within the purview of Section 20 and, consequently, a suit for eviction of the respondent under the present Act is not barred. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, I think the contention raised on behalf of the appellant must be accepted and the appellant must be granted a decree for ejectment as prayed. In the result, therefore, the appeal is allowed with costs, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court are set aside and that passed by the trial court are restored. In view of the request made on behalf of the respondent, however, they are granted time upto 31st October, 1978 i.e. to vacate the accomodation in suit provided they deposited in the trial court within a period of one month from today, the entire amount of mesne profit upto date. In the event, of default, it will be open to the appellant to obtain possession over the accommodation in suit by getting the decree executed.