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1978 DIGILAW 722 (MP)

Shyam Sunder v. R. T. A. Gwalior

1978-09-25

H.G.MISHRA, K.K.DUBE

body1978
Short Note : 1. The only important question raised in this petition is whether in the circumstances of the case, the Regional Transport Authority was bound to hear the petitioner before passing an order determining the number of stage carriages for which permit may be granted on Guna-Padone route, under section 47 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 2. The petitioner seeks to challenge this order on the ground that the Regional Transport Authority ought to have heard him before determining the scope on the said route as he was the existing operator on the route a good part of which overlapped the route for which a permit had been granted to him. The order adversely affected him. 3. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, the State is enjoined to co-ordinate road and rail transport and prevent deterioration of road system and uneconomic competition among the motor vehicle owners. The State is given all the powers to control road transport having regard to the advantages offered to the public, trade and industry by the development of motor transport. The Regional Transport Authority to achieve the above purposes fixes the number of stage carriages that should run on a particular route. He has to objectively determine this and pass an administrative order. The jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority exercising powers under section 47 (3) would be different from the one exercised under section 57 (3) and the Regional Transport Authority in not required to hear anyone while limiting the number of stage carriages on the route. The procedure of hearing applications and representations is not applicable while exercising powers under section 47 (3). The matter is wholly concluded by the decision in Mohd. Ibrahim vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal Madras, AIR 1970 SC 1542 . The Supreme Court while deciding the nature of the jurisdiction of Regional Transport Authority under section 47 (3) analysed the scheme and laid down that it was not required to hear any person while determining the limit of the stage carriages that were to run on a particular route not withstanding that the order has to be passed after objectively determining the scope. 4. 4. Dealing with the right of an operator who was aggrieved by the determination of the scope, the Supreme Court in the above case held that neither the right of appeal nor the right to apply for revision is itself decisive of the true function of Regional Transport Authority as to whether the said Authority has to grant hearing to persons at the time of fixing the limit of number of stage carriage permits. The Regional Transport Authority while acting under section 47 (3) of the Act is the master of its own procedure because it does not deal with individual or competing rights of operators but is required to arrive objectively at its own conclusion independent of any application or representation by operators. 5. We think that merely because the petitioner on an earlier occasion challenged the order of the Regional Transport Authority determining the scope under section 47 (3) of the Act before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal the Regional Transport Authority seized of the matter in remand, was not obliged to hear him. It would also be seen that the remand was made because the Regional Transport Authority did not specify the exact line of the route. The fact that the petitioner is interested in the route and that he had earlier challenged the order in revision passed by Regional Transport Authority under section 47 (3) of the Act does not, in any way, clothe him with such a right as necessitated the Regional Transport Authority to give him notice and to hear him before passing the order. The distinction sought to be made out between the petitioner's case and other operators is without substance in so far as the procedure to be followed by the Regional Transport Authority under section 47 (3) is concerned. AIR 1968 SC 410 and AIR 1969 Mad. 441 referred to. AIR 1970 SC 1542 relied on. Petition dismissed.