JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. These four connected writ petitions have been preferred by the four tenants occupying four different portions of a premises situated at Hardwar. Prabhu Dayal Trust itself was established long time back at Peshawar. It was running a Musafirkhana, a Dharamshala, and a hospital at Amritsar. The trust was public charitable purposes. After partition in 1947, its field of activities were confind to India. For facility of pilgrims at Hardwar, the Prabhu Dayal Trust purchased half portion of a building, situated at Upper Road, Hardwar, for a sum of Rs.30,000/ under a sale deed dated 28th December, 1967. At the time of its purchase, different portions of this premises were in occupation of different tenants. The petitioners were also the tenants of four different portions of the said premises. As the Prabhu Dayal Trust wanted to establish a Dharmshala in the disputed premises, it obtained licence required by the bylaws framed by the Municipal Board, Hardwar. On 9.12.1975, the Prabhu Dayal Trust filed four applications against the petitioners for release of the portions in their occupation on the ground that the same were required by the Trust for its objects. The object mentioned in the applications was that the Trust wanted to convert the premises in dispute into a Dharamshala in order to keep the accommodation available for pilgrims. The applications were contested by the tenants on the ground that a considerable accommodation was already lying vacant in the building of the Trust and it did not require any further accommodation for its occupation. The tenants claimed that the need set up by the Prabhu Dayal Trust was not bona fide, and that they would suffer greater hardship in case the applications made by the Trust were allowed. Both the parties filed affidavits and also some documentary evidence. The Prescribed Authority upheld the case of the Prabhu Dayal Trust and, accordingly, allowed the application filed under Section 21(1) (a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The appeals preferred against the aforesaid judgment were dismissed. Hence, these petitions. Both the parties filed affidavits and also some documentary evidence. The Prescribed Authority upheld the case of the Prabhu Dayal Trust and, accordingly, allowed the application filed under Section 21(1) (a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The appeals preferred against the aforesaid judgment were dismissed. Hence, these petitions. The first point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that as the Prabhu Dayal Trust did not file a copy of the document under which it was created, the courts below committed an error in holding that the Prabhu Dayal Trust was a trust for public charitable purposes, and that it could file the aforesaid applications under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act. Elaborating the argument, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that a trust could be created only by a written document, and as no written instrument was produced, the courts below should have held that the Prabhu Dayal Trust was not a legally created body and, as such, was not entitled to file the applications. The submission has no substance. Section 5 of the Indian Trusts Act lay down that no Trust in relation to immovable property is valid unless declared by a nontestamentary instrument in writing, signed by the author of the trust or the trustee, and registered, or by the will of the author of the trust or the trustee. The Indian Trust Act applies to Hindus. But, Section 1 of the said Act clearly saves from its operation all religious and charitable endowments, either public or private. It is thus clear that except where a trust is created by a will, it is quite competent to a Hindu to dedicate for religious or charitable purposes, any immovable property without document in writing. For creating a trust, what is required is the unequivocal declaration of the intention followed by the dedication of the property. B. K Mukerji in his book on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts stated as follows : "There are a large number of decided cases where it has been held, that to constitute valid dedication of property by a Hindu for religious or charitable purpose, no document in writing or registered is necessary.'' The first point, therefore, fails. B. K Mukerji in his book on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts stated as follows : "There are a large number of decided cases where it has been held, that to constitute valid dedication of property by a Hindu for religious or charitable purpose, no document in writing or registered is necessary.'' The first point, therefore, fails. Coming to the second submission, the learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the evidence produced by the Prabhu Dayal Trust to prove its objects were insufficient, and that the courts below should not have acted upon the same. The question as to what were the objects of the Trust was essentially one of fact. As to how much evidence is needed to prove a fact is again a question of fact. In writ, it is not possible for this Court exercising powers of superintendence to act as an appellate court and to set aside a finding of fact only because it would not have taken the same view as was taken by the subordinate tribunal. In the instant case, the finding recorded by the two courts below thus that the Prabhu Dayal Trust was a public and charitable trust, cannot be assailed on this ground. Even otherwise, it appears that the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance. Prabhu Dayal Trust filed a number of documentary evidence to show that the trust was engaged in the religious and charitable activities. Two copies of the orders passed under Section 3 of the Hindu Religious and Endowment Act proved the fact that this was held to be a charitable trust. The courts below rightly placed reliance on these documents and correctly held that Prabhu Dayal Trust was a religious and charitable trust. On the basis of these papers and other documents, the two courts below found that the purpose for which the applications were filed for release was one of the objects. Apart from the above, the sale deed obtained in December, 1967 by the Prabhu Dayal Trust also establishes the said fact. The third submission was that on the allegations made in the applications filed under Section 21(1) (a) themselves, the petitioners were not the tenants and, therefore, the applications were liable to be rejected on this ground. Apart from the above, the sale deed obtained in December, 1967 by the Prabhu Dayal Trust also establishes the said fact. The third submission was that on the allegations made in the applications filed under Section 21(1) (a) themselves, the petitioners were not the tenants and, therefore, the applications were liable to be rejected on this ground. It is correct that an application under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act can be filed by a landlord against a tenant alone and not against a licensee or a trespasser. It is, however, incorrect that the petitioners were not the tenants of the Prabhu Dayal Trust. Admittedly, they were living as tenants in December, 1967, when the property was purchased by the Trust. It is not the case of the petitioners that this relationship of landlord and tenant was brought to an end. The petitioners continued in possession of the premises in the same capacity in which they were occupying it on the date when the sale deed were executed in favour of the Prabhu Dayal Trust. Reliance was, however, placed on the averments made in the applications filed under Section 21(1) (a) by the learned counsel for the petitioners to show that the respondent Trust itself alleged that the petitioners were not the tenants. I am unable to find any such averment in the applications. In order to show its bona fides that the premises were required to be used for Dharamshala, the Trust stated that the rent had not been realised from the petitioners, only for the purpose that it was not interested in its letting but in its conversion into a Dharamshala. The last point urged was that the finding given by the courts below about the question of comparative requirement of the premises was erroneous. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the courts below erroneously took irrelevant considerations into account while deciding this point. The Proviso added to subsection (1) of Section 21 makes it incumbent upon the Prescribed Authority to take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. The courts below examined this question and found that the tenants would not suffer greater hardship from the grant of the application than by the landlord by its refusal. The courts below examined this question and found that the tenants would not suffer greater hardship from the grant of the application than by the landlord by its refusal. The question of hardship is one of fact. Its determination depends on the consideration and examination of evidence brought on record. The word "hardship" is, however, description of adverse repercussions of every kind, leaving transient discomfort or inconvenience out of its purview. It may be physical, financial or mental, and in some cases both. In fact, in most of the cases the injury that one person may suffer cannot be measured in contrast. The injury of either side may be different. In spite of all these, the problem of determination of hardships is not insurmountable. The Court should try to find out which of two sides would suffer least injury or inconvience. In doing so, the courts would look into and assess the magnitute. Intensity or degree of the likely hardship of each of the parties. Under the proviso, referred to above, both sides are required to adduce evidence before the Court in support of their cases. As said by the Supreme Court in P. B. Desai v. C. M. Patel, A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1059. "The landlord must show that other accommodation was not available to him and the tenant must also adduce evidence to that effect." In the instant case, since the Prabhu Dayal Trust needed the building in question for the purpose of a Dharamshala, it could not be asked to prove the nonavailability of another building for that purpose. So far as the tenant are concerned, the finding of both the courts was that three of them excepting Veerbhan had houses available to them. It is correct that what was required to be decided was not that the tenants were juridically in possession of other premises, but that they were available to them for occupation. In this case, the courts below found that despite the fact that alternative premises had been purchased by them much before the present proceedings, but they took no action to occupy those buildings. The courts below held that the petitioners deliberately did not take legal action as having obtained the premises in dispute on low rents, they wanted to stick to them. The courts below held that the petitioners deliberately did not take legal action as having obtained the premises in dispute on low rents, they wanted to stick to them. So far as Veerbhan is concerned the finding is that he would purchase another house and shift in it. Moreover, as the Prabhu Dayal Trust is a Charitable Trust and requires the building for its object, the standard of the comparison of need has to be slightly less rigorous than ordiniry cases. In the result, all the four writ petition; are dismissed, but I make no order as to costs. The petitioners in all the writ petitions are granted six months' time to vacate the premises.