JUDGMENT M. N. Shukla, J. This appeal is directed against the order dated 3131973 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Varanasi in Hindu Marriage Petition No. 27 of 1969 refusing to pass a decree of judicial separation under section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act 25 of 1955) hereinafter referred to as the Act. The allegations in the petition were that the petitionerappellant married respondent No. 1 Smt Shail Srivastava on 1051952 at Varanasi according to Hindu Dharma Shastra and custom prevalent in the community of the parties. The respondent No. 1 was at that time residing with her parents at S12/16, Pearia Pokhari, Varanasi. After marriage she came to the house of the appellant and started living with him as his wife and a son was born to her from the appellant on 1791953. The respondent No. 1 was very desirous of further education and appreciating her desire the appellant bore all the expenses of her education and respondent No 1 gradually acquired the degrees of M. A. and B. Ex. in the years 1956 and 1958 respectively. Thereafter the appellant in order to satisfy his wife's desire for doing service got her employed as a teacher in Kanya Kumari Vidya Mandir Inter. Collge, Varanasi. This according to the allegations in the petition was an unfortunate turning point in their lives and the education as well as the emoluments which came to respondent No. 1 as a result of her employment went into her head and she lost interest in the appellant and his household affairs and began passing much of her time in the College and with some of her friends. Gradually the appellant's life became miserable and all the felicity and comforts of home and conjugal life vanished. The respondent no. 1 began visiting some undesirable persons and used to return late in the night and in spite of the appellant's admonitions she did not mend her ways and shed her associations with such persons. Crisis came when she actually went away with her most favourite person, namely Lalit Mohan Srivastava, respondent No. 2, residing at S12/80, Pearia Pokhari, Varanasi, Lalit Mohan was the husband of her elder sister. This incident gave rise to a great scandal and not only was the appellant much perturbed by it but his family prestige was also at stake. Crisis came when she actually went away with her most favourite person, namely Lalit Mohan Srivastava, respondent No. 2, residing at S12/80, Pearia Pokhari, Varanasi, Lalit Mohan was the husband of her elder sister. This incident gave rise to a great scandal and not only was the appellant much perturbed by it but his family prestige was also at stake. He lodged a first information report with the police against Lalit Mohan on 2441960. However, it is alleged that respondent No. 1 was found out at the residence of Lalit Mohan and was brought back to the appellant's house and on intervention of some of his relations he was prevented from taking any further action in the matter. The respondent No. 1 proved incorrigible and persisted in her objectionable activities. The final breach came when in June 1966 she deserted the appellant and without his consent she left his house bag and baggage and started living with Lalit Mohan and did not return to the appellant. The appellant served a notice datted 1251969 on her severing the relationship of husband and wife. Still, however, the notice gave her a week's time to return to him and he willing to lead a normal happy marital life with him. She did not return when the Petition No. 27 of 1969 was filed in the court of the 1st Additional District Judge, Varanasi on 28/3051969. The petition also contained the allegation of adultery against respondent No. 1 (which was introduced by a subsequent amendment) and it was averred that the said respondent had been found indulging in sexual intercourse with Lalit Mohan Srivastava even before and after her return from his house in the first instance and that Lalit Mohan Srivastava used to visit the residence of the appellant on the pretext of his being a relation with the object of carrying on illicit affair with her. The respondent No. 1 filed a written statement denying the allegations in the petition and making counter allegation that ever since her marriage the appellant had been highly dissatisfied with her because of her dark complexion and ugly features and had been maltreating and beating her. At times he turned her out of the house and afterwards permitted her to return only on the mediation of relations and wellwishers. At times he turned her out of the house and afterwards permitted her to return only on the mediation of relations and wellwishers. The appellant, as she would have it, was obsessed with the desire of getting another beautiful woman with fine complexion and chiselled features as his wife. He was also accused of drunkenness and cruelty and beat her on numerous occasions. The allegation of her deserting the appellant and going to live with Lalit Mohan Srivastava was denied. On the other hand, it was' stated that he himself beat her and turned her out from his house along with her son on 1841969 and since then she had been staying on her mother's house. An analysis of the petition shows that it was founded on two allegations, namely desertion and what may be loosely called adultery. It may be noted at the every outset that adultery or living in adultery as normally understood is not a sufficient ground for allowing judicial separation under section 10 of the Act. The requirement of the section is, as provided in clause (f) of subsection (1) of section 10, that either party to a marriage, whether solemnised before or after the commencement of this Act may present a petition to the District Court praying for a decree for judicial separation on the ground that the other party has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, had sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse. It is, therefore, clear that nothing short of proof of actual sexual intercourse after the solemnisation of marriage with a person other than the spouse is sufficient to entitle the petitioner to judicial separation. It appears that with this end in view an amendment application was filed by the appellant later and allowed on 1281972 whereby an allegation was added to the effect that respondent No. 1 had sexual intercourse with respondent No. 2 and it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that since initially the petition did not contain any such allegation as required by clause (f) of subsection (1) of section 10, this ground which was subsequently added should be excluded from consideration and the petition must be dismissed so far as that allegation was concerned. It is true that literally in terms of clause (f) an allegation to that effect had not been made initially in the petition, nevertheless it has never been endorsed by judicial opinion in this country that pleadings should be examined in a spirit of carrying criticism. So long as the substance of the relevant grounds is traversed in the pleadings and the parties go to trial with full awareness of the allegations made against each other and also lead evidence in accordance with the same, no prejudice can be said to have been caused and a plea cannot be ruled out from consideration merely because it was not expressed in literal or categorical terms. In fact, after the amendment had been allowed, this ground must be deemed to have been woven into the very texture of the petition and no adverse inference could be drawn against the appellant on that ground. It cannot be denied that substantially, though indirectly, such allegation had already been made even originally in the petition when a reference was made to the close intimacy between respondent No. 1 and the respondent no. 2, her free association with him which had resulted in the lodging of the first information report with the police on 2441960, which fact was expressly adverted to in the petition. It was observed in B. Prabhu Narain Singh and others v. B. Jitendra Mohan Singh and another(1), that the court must take the pleadings in the case as they stand and leave out of consideration the pleadings as they stood before the amendment. In Warner v. Samposon(2), it was laid down that a writ as amended became for that purpose the original comencement of 'the action and that once the pleadings were amended that which stood before the amendment was no longer material. In my opinion technicalities must not be allowed to stand in the way of doing substantial justice between the parties and the ground which in essence is already covered by the pleadings does not suffer in force if the parties chose to make it more explicit and better by subsequent pleadings. I, therefore, proceed to examine the two grounds of the petition, namely, desertion and what may for the sake of convenience be called adultery. I, therefore, proceed to examine the two grounds of the petition, namely, desertion and what may for the sake of convenience be called adultery. In my opinion the most concise definition of 'Desertion' is to be found in 'Halsburys Laws of England' Third Edition, Volume 12 at page 241. It is observed: "453. Meaning of desertion. In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage......" The Explanation to section 10 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act also throws light on the meaning of 'desertion'. It runs as under: "In this section the expression 'desertion' with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage." Generally two elements are regarded as essential for the act of desertion firstly, the factum, or physical separation and secondly the 'animus deserendf or the intention to desert. It is true that these two elements coincide in a most cases of desertion but on close scrutiny it would be realised that desertion is not necessarily an act of physical separation. It is an essential a mental act. The mere physical separation between the two spouse is not deseition, similarly the mere intention of one spouse to separate from the other without any overt act will not amount to desertion. In its essence disertion is a repudiation of the obligations of marriage. It is an essential a mental act. The mere physical separation between the two spouse is not deseition, similarly the mere intention of one spouse to separate from the other without any overt act will not amount to desertion. In its essence disertion is a repudiation of the obligations of marriage. That is why the decisions of the Indian Courts have classified desertions into three heads: (1) where the deserting spouse leaves the other spouse and lives separate, which may be called ordinary desertion (2) where both live together but one of them brings cohabitation to another or makes it impossible, which may perhaps be called 'virtual desertion' and (3) where the deserting spouse by his or her conduct compels the other to leave the former and live separate from him or her, which is commonly called 'Constructive desertion.' In the case in hand the allegations fall in the first category i. e. what may be described as ordinary desertion inasmuch as the appellant has alleged not only the physical separation on the part of respondent No. 1 but also her wilful termination of cohabitation without his consent. The burden will be on the appellant to prove both the grounds in the petition and so the onus was on him to establish that respondent No. 1 deserted him since 1966. Both parties adduced evidence to substantiate their respective allegations. Apart from the oral evidence there was some documentary evidence also which would throw light on the question as to whether respondent No. 1 had actually separated from the appellant and was living separate from him and at the residence of respondent No. 2, namely Lalit Mohan Srivastava. In his oral deposition the appellant repeated the allegations contained in his petition. Besides, he examined Jagdish Lal (P. W. 1) who stated that he used to visit the house of the appellant and knew that Smt. Shail left Shyam Narain's (appellant's) house some time in May or June 1966 and thereafter she never returned to his house again. The testimony of this witness, however, is wholly unworthy of credence. He stated that he had been living in the house of one Vishwanath Prasad over since 1963 which as contiguous to the house of the appellant. He could not, however, produce any receipt of payment of rent with regard to his premises nor did he possess any ration card of those premises. He stated that he had been living in the house of one Vishwanath Prasad over since 1963 which as contiguous to the house of the appellant. He could not, however, produce any receipt of payment of rent with regard to his premises nor did he possess any ration card of those premises. It is, therefore, not clear as to whether he lived in the vicinity so as to be (sic) about the same. There is, however, some documentary evidence which gives a lie to the appellant's allegation. In the first place, Zamin Husain (D. W. 3), Supply Inspector of Chetganj Ward stated that the appellant's house was in his circle and he brought a ration enquiry form pertaining to that house which was filed on 981964 and later verified on 1021968 and again checked on 1591972 and the entries in the ration card revealed that the names of Smt. Shail Srivastava and her son Pradeep Kumar continued to be recorded as units of the ration card pertaining to this house even much after 1966. He was fully corroborated on the point by Markande Pandey (D. W. 5) who was responsible for checking the ration cards in respect of the house situate in post No. 3. He stated that the house in question fell within his ward and the enquiries made by him in the years 1966. 1968 and 1972 revealed that Smt. Shail Srivastava and her son Pradip Kumar continued to stay in the house of the appellant even after 1966, Secondly, there is another important piece of evidence which has greatly impressed me. It is the admitted case of the parties that respondent No. 1 was employed in the Chakraverty Kanya Vidyalya, Varanasi as Assistant Teacher. During that period she applied for leave on several occasions on the basis of Medical Certificates. Dr. P. L. Varma (D. W. 4) was examined to prove the several medical certificates marked Exhibits A4 to A9 issued by him on 1031966, 1211968, 2111968, 121968, 2421966 and 2621966 respectively. All these medical certificates relate to Smt. Shail and show that Dr. Verma treated her during the illness for the period 1966 to 1968. He deposed that during that period as mentioned in the certificates i. e. in the years 1966 to 1968 he had gone to the house of the appellant and attended on Smt. Sliail Srivastava during her illness. Dr. Verma treated her during the illness for the period 1966 to 1968. He deposed that during that period as mentioned in the certificates i. e. in the years 1966 to 1968 he had gone to the house of the appellant and attended on Smt. Sliail Srivastava during her illness. Dr. Varma is a man of status and a wholly disinterested person and I have no reason to disbelieve him specially when he is corroborated by Smt. Ramapati Bhattacharya (D. W. 2), Principal of Bipin Behari Chakravarty Kanya Vidyalaya, Varanasi. 'She produced in the court the leave application of respondent No. 1 accompanied by the medical certificate to which I have already referred, which proved beyond doubt that the statement of Dr. Varma was correct and that the certificates, issued by him had been actually utilised by respondent No. 1 for obtaining leave from the Principal of the College. The Lady Principal further deposed that she had gone to see Smt. Shail Srivastava in February 1968 in Ramakant Nagar Colony's residence where she was ill in those days and that she was suffering from jaundice.. One of the medical certificates of Dr. Varma also mentioned the same disease about respondent No. 1. This shows beyond doubt that Smt. Shail Srivastava was living with the appellant even after 1966 and in 1968 as well. Learned counsel for the appellant strongly urged that the appellant's notice dated 1251969 was sent by him at the address of Lalit Mohan Srivastava and was received by respondent No. 1 there and also replied to from the same address which established that she had been living with Lalit Mohan Srivastava. I am not prepared to lay much store by this circumstance alone. As will be evident from the facts that Lalit Mohan Srivastava had been acting as wellwisher and virtual guardian of the family of Smt. Shail's. mother in the absence of any male member and consequently if she sought shelter with him for short while and he afforded asylum to her who according to her allegations was the victim of maltreatment by her husband, it is not sufficient to justify the inference that she had forsaken her husband and had come to stay with Lalit Mohan Srivastava. Thus, the appellant has failed to prove that respondent No 1 deserted him in the sense of desertion as defined in section 10;1) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Thus, the appellant has failed to prove that respondent No 1 deserted him in the sense of desertion as defined in section 10;1) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The second ground of the petition was the charge of adultery and the appellant adduced direct evidence to prove this allegation. For the purposes of relief in the matrimonial jurisdiction adultery means consensul sexual intercourse during the subsistance of the marriage between one spouse and a person of the opposite sex, not the other spouse. As I have already observed, the requirement of clause (f) of section 10(1) is proof of actual sexual intercourse with a person other than the spouse. There had been in the past a good deal of divergence of judicial opinion on the standard of evidence required to prove a charge of adultery in matrimonial cases. The matter has has now been set at rest by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane(3), which laid down that in a petition under section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act the burden must lie on the petitioner to establish his or her case but the section does not require that the petitioner must prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. It really confers on the court the power to pass a decree if it is satisfied, as provided in section 23, on the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) and (f) of section 10 and the word 'satisfied' in this context means' satisfied on a preponderence of probabilities and not, satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. It was pointed out that proof beyond reasonable doubt was proof by a higher standard which generally governs criminal trial or enquiries into issues of a quasi criminal nature but it was wrong to import such connotations in trial of a purely civil nature. The burden no doubt lies on the petitioner but if the court is satisfied on the ground specified in section 10 it can grant relief. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court followed Lord Denning's dictum in the leading case Blyth v. Blyth((1966) 1 All. E. R. 5241 336). "It is wrong, therefore, to apply the analogy of criminal law. We should not say that adultery must be proved with the same strictness as is required in a criminal case we should say simply that it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court......... E. R. 5241 336). "It is wrong, therefore, to apply the analogy of criminal law. We should not say that adultery must be proved with the same strictness as is required in a criminal case we should say simply that it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court......... "In short it comes to this: so far as the grounds for divorce are concerned, the case, like any civil case, may be proved by a preponderance of probability but the degree of probability depends on the subjectmatter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear. So far as the bars to diverse are concerned, like connivance or condonation, the petitioner need only show that on balance of probability he did not connive or condone or as the case may be." The evidence adduced on the ground of adultery In the instant case must, therefore, be scrutinised according to the touchstone of the preponderance of probabilities and it would be erroneous to expect the appellant to satisfy the test which has been accepted as essential for the appraisal of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases, namely that it must exclude the possibility of Innocence of the accused or that such innocence must be incompatible with the evidence adduced in the case. On a careful appraisal of the evidence in the Instant case I am constrained to come to the conclusion that the appellant's evidence does not satisfy even the standard of proof which in law has been held to be applicable to matrimonial cases. The first occasion when the appellant made such allegation is said to have arisen when a report was lodged by him on 2441960 in which it was alleged that Lalit Mohan Srivastava had enticed away Smt. Shail with anintent to have illicit sexual Intercourse with her. It is not disputed that the appellant had not personally witnessed this incident. It is said to have been reported to him by Vishwa Nath (P. W. 2) who is wholly unreliable witness. He deposed that he was a peon and Beldar in the Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi wherein the appellant was employed as a Sanitary Inspector. The witness had, therefore, been under his subordination and he is not an independent witness. It is said to have been reported to him by Vishwa Nath (P. W. 2) who is wholly unreliable witness. He deposed that he was a peon and Beldar in the Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi wherein the appellant was employed as a Sanitary Inspector. The witness had, therefore, been under his subordination and he is not an independent witness. He gave the time of the occurrence as 6 P. M. in his crossexamination while according to the first information report it was 7 a. m. Further, according to the appellant Smt. Shail came back to him afterwards and he accepted her on the mediation of certain relatives. Not a single witness has been produced to prove such reconciliation and it is also a circumstance which throws great doubt on the incident. The appellant examined one other witness, namely, Radhey Shyam (P. W. 3) who is again a highly interested witness. He admitted that the appellant had got him employed as Beldar in the Nagar Mahapalika on three occasions in leave vacancies. He further stated that he kept a ration shop from 1962 to Iv64 and the appellant used to purchase ration from his shop on credit and consequently one evening in January 1963 he had gone to the appellant's house to make a demand for the price of the ration which the appellant had purchased from him and then he found the room bolted from inside and on his knocking it was not opened. Then, he rapped the window which was flung open and he noticed Smt. Shail and Lalit Mohan sharing the same bed. I am unable to place reliance on his testimony. He is highly partisan. Besides, he deposed that he used to maintain an account of the goods sold by him on credit in a note book. He, however, did not care to produce any such note book in the court. Lastly there was the testimony of the appellant himself. He tried to prove the allegations made in the petition but in view of the observations that I have already made with regard to the other witnesses examined by him and the circumstances of the case, his evidence also does not inspire confidence. I have already disbelieved the entire incident about which a report was lodged of the elopement of respondent no. I have already disbelieved the entire incident about which a report was lodged of the elopement of respondent no. 1 with Lalit Mohan and her subsequent return to the appellant and the latter accepting her on the intervention of the relations. The appellant stated that in Mayor June 1966 he was residing in a house in Ramkant Nagar and then one day he saw Smt. Shail and Lalit Mohan together in a closed room in the house and although the doors were shut from inside, yet he was able to observe them in that position through the chinins in the window of the room. He added that Smt. Shail had been associated particularly with Lalit Mohan and used to go out with him and stayed away from the house without the consent of the appellant and she refused to mend her ways in spite of his repeated admonitions. Firstly, as I have already remarked, the evidence given be the appellant Is inconsistent with the broad circumstances of the case and it does not commend itself to me. Besides, in my opinion it is not safe to base the finding with regard to adultery on the sole testimony of the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant referred me to some decisions e. g. V. Varadarajulu v. Baby Ammal(A. I. R. 1965 Mad. 29) and Subbarama Reddlar v. Saraswathi Ammal(A. I. R. 1967 Mad. 85), in support of the proposition that in divorce cases courts can act even on the uncorroborated testimony of adultery and grant relief to the parties. In Kistamma v. Dr. H. T. Vira Reddy(1971 (3) S. C. Cases 968), the law laid down is that the inference of the abandonment of the matrimonial home cannot be based on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant. In the instant case as has beem observed earlier, the appellant's allegations have been completely rebutted by the weight of the evidence adduced by the respondents. Smt. Shall examined herself as D. W. 6 in the case and denied the allegations made by the appellant. She was corroborated on material points by Dr. P. L. Varma (D. W. 4) and Smt. Rampati Bhattacharya (D. W. 2) Principal of the Bipin Behari Chakravarty Kanya Vidyalaya whose evidence I have already discussed. Smt. Shall examined herself as D. W. 6 in the case and denied the allegations made by the appellant. She was corroborated on material points by Dr. P. L. Varma (D. W. 4) and Smt. Rampati Bhattacharya (D. W. 2) Principal of the Bipin Behari Chakravarty Kanya Vidyalaya whose evidence I have already discussed. It is necessary for the satisfaction of the court in matrimonial cases that the allegation of the petitioner should at least be corroborated by the circumstances of the case. The statements of the doctor, the" Lady Principal, and the Supply Inspector furnish ample circumstantial evidence to belie the version given by the appellant. I am also unable to discard the testimony of Lalit Mohan Srivastava (D. W. 7) who was the main target of attack by the appellant. His statement has a ring of truth. He retired as Office Superintendent in the Collectorate of Varanasi. At the time of his deposition in the year 1973 he was aged 63 years whereas Smt. Shail was only 40 years old. Her eldest sister was married to him. He stated that her father had also died and her brother lived and worked outside Varanasi and, therefore, he used to look after the family of Smt. Shail. He completely denied the allegation of his illicit connection with Smt. Shail and also that she had deserted her husband. He stated that she was at that time residing with her parents. He stated that he had actually performed the secret ceremony of Kanya Dan i. e. that he had given away Smt. Shail in marriage to the appellant. In view of the selfless and wholly benevolent role which Lalit Mohan had been playing in his form of the guidance and supervision of the family of the mother of Smt. Shail I am unable to give credence to the vulgar and reckless aspersions cast on him by the appellant. It is not unlikely that the appellant had himself fallen into evil ways and had developed some kind of aversion for his wile and finding her not exceedingly beautiful he started maltreating her and ultimately beat her and turned her out of the house. It is not unlikely that the appellant had himself fallen into evil ways and had developed some kind of aversion for his wile and finding her not exceedingly beautiful he started maltreating her and ultimately beat her and turned her out of the house. Thus, on a conspectus of the evidence in the case I am of the opinion that it is not safe to come to the conclusion that Smt. Shail had ever deserted the appellant or had indulged in sexual intercourse with Lalit Mohan Srivastava, respondent No. 2 and the petition was rightly dismissed by the Trial Court. In the result I find no force in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs.