JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. :- This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the District Judge, Debradun dated 28th May, 1977. 2. The dispute is with respect to shop No. 1 Babuganj, Dehradun. The shop belonged to respondents I to 3. This shop had been let out to one Ram Saran Das, against whom a decree for ejectment was passed. The shop was thereafter allotted to Kishan Lal Gulati, respondent No. 8. 3. On July 3, 1973 respondents I to 3 filed on application for release of the shop in their favour on the ground that the shop was required by them for the need of Sushil Kumar, who was a member of the joint family. The respondents 1 to 3 alleged that Sushil Kumar had fallen in bad society and was convicted in a murder case but it was expected that he would be released soon. This application was filed against Kishan Lal Gulati. Kishan Lal did not file any written statement for contesting the application. It, however, appears that some time afterwards Somnath and Ramesh Kumar, petitioners filed an application for impleadment on the ground that they were the tenants of the premises in dispute, therefore, they were necessary parties. The application was contested by respondents I to 3. They denied that the petitioners were the tenants of the disputed shop. It, however, appears that the application was allowed and the petitioners were permitted to file a written statement. In the written statement the petitioners asserted that Kishan Lal Gulati was not the tenant of the shop and that they were the tenants of the same. The petitioners also alleged that as the shop was in their possession on the date of the enforcement of U P. Act No. 13 of 1972, they would be deemed to have become regular tenants under section 14 of the Act. 4. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. The application was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority Against the dig missal of the application respondent N. I to 3 preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was decided by the impugned judgment. Hence this writ petition. 5. The first question that arises for determination in this case is about the status of the petitioners. As seen above, the shop was allotted to Kishan Lal Gulati. The appeal was decided by the impugned judgment. Hence this writ petition. 5. The first question that arises for determination in this case is about the status of the petitioners. As seen above, the shop was allotted to Kishan Lal Gulati. The claim made by the petitioners, however, was that although the allotment order was made in the name of Kishan Lal Gulati but for all intents and purposes they were the tenants of the shop inasmuch as they had been occupying the shop and had been paying rent to the landlord. It was further claimed by the petitioners that Kishan Lal Gulati was not in possession of the shop as he was residing outside Dehradun. The Prescribed Authority held that the petitioners were the tenants. In appeal, however, the learned District Judge set aside the finding of the Prescribed Authority by taking the view that it is not that the shop had been allotted to Kishan Lal but that the latter was paying rent to the landlords. The petitioner's learned counsel challenged the finding recorded by the learned District Judge on two grounds, first, he referred to Annexures 7,8 and 9 to the writ petition which were the rent receipts issued by Shrimati Shakuntala Devi, respondents No 3, who was one of the landlords and urged on the basis of the said receipts that as the rent had been paid by the petitioners to Shrimati Shakuntala Devi, the finding arrived at by the learned District Judge was erroneous. Admittedly, rent paid to Shrimati Shakuntala Devi was only to the extent of ?rd of the total rent payable by the petitioners. In an affidavit filed before the Prescribed Authority Shakuntala Devi denied that she had issued receipts to the petitioners. That apart, the District Judge found in my opinion, rightly that the payment of rent by the petitioners to one of the landlords could not confer upon the petitioners' the status of tenants. According to these receipts what was established was that the rent had been paid some time in 1972 by the petitioners to Shrimati Shakuntala Devi. That apart, the District Judge found in my opinion, rightly that the payment of rent by the petitioners to one of the landlords could not confer upon the petitioners' the status of tenants. According to these receipts what was established was that the rent had been paid some time in 1972 by the petitioners to Shrimati Shakuntala Devi. Even if that be so, unless the petitioners had established that the entire rent of the premises had been paid to her and further that she had been authorised by the remaining two landlords to accept rent of the premises on their behalf as well, the payment of rent to Shrimati Shakuntala Devi could not clothe the petitioners with the status of tenants. In view of this fact, the view taken by the learned District Judge that Kishan Lai Gulati was the tenant of the premises and that the petitioners did not become tenants at any point of time cannot be said to be incorrect. 6. The next question that arises for determination is about the benefit of Section 14 of U.P. Act No 13 of 1972 claimed by the petitioners. The sub- mission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that as the petitioners were in possession of the shop in dispute at the relevant time their possession should be deemed to have been regularised under section 14 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Section 14 applies only to a case where a person is in possession of a premises with the consent of a landlord. In the instant case the finding given by the District Judge was that the petitioners were not in possession of the shop with the consent of the landlords 1 to 3. That being so, the question of getting benefit of Section 14 did not arise. 7. The next submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that as Sushil Kumar, for whose need the application was filed, was in jail, the application ought to have been rejected. As 1 have found above that Kishan Lal Gulati was the tenant of the shop and not the petitioners it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to challenge the finding of the District Judge on this question. As 1 have found above that Kishan Lal Gulati was the tenant of the shop and not the petitioners it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to challenge the finding of the District Judge on this question. The requirement of the premises by Sushil Kumar can be challenged only by a person who was a tenant in his own right and not by a person who was holding the possession on behalf of the tenant-in-chief. In this case the finding of the learned District Judge, with which I agree, was that the petitioners were relations of Kishan Lal Gulati and occupied the premises under his allotment order and, as such, they did not acquire any independent right in the premises in dispute. As a matter of fact, on account of the ground mentioned above even the writ petition by Som Nath and Ramesh Kumar was not maintainable. The tenant, as stated, was Kishan Lal Gulati. The order of the District Judge allowing the application under section 21 of the Act could be challenged by Kishan Lal and not by the present petitioners. 8. Moreover, even if Sushil Kumar was in jail at the time when the application under section 21 was filed or that he had not been released from jail at the time when the appeal was decided that would not be decisive of the requirement of the premises by Shushil Kumar. Sushil Kumar was awarded life imprisonment From the affidavit filed on behalf of respondents I to 3 it appears that he was likely to be released and, as such, if the application was filed for his need, the same could not be rejected on the ground that since he was not released from jail, the same was not maintainable. 9. Counsel for the petitioners further contended that as the application did not mention the business which Sushil Kumar intended to start in the premises in dispute, the application was liable to be rejected. It may be correct that omission to mention the name of the business may be a circumstance for finding whether the requirement of the premises by the landlords is genuine and bona fide, but it cannot be said that such an omission is fatal or conclusive of the controversy. It may be correct that omission to mention the name of the business may be a circumstance for finding whether the requirement of the premises by the landlords is genuine and bona fide, but it cannot be said that such an omission is fatal or conclusive of the controversy. It is only one of the many things which are required to be looked into while considering the need of the bona fide requirement of the premises. If otherwise, the evidence discloses that an application filed by a landlord is genuine, the same may not be rejected simply because the name of the business had not been mentioned therein. On the facts and in the circumstances of the present case I am not prepared to accept that simply because the name of the business was not stated in the application the order passed by the District Judge releasing the premises was incorrect. 10. Apart from what I have said above, even if it is conceded that the petitioners were the tear tits of the shop in dispute, the judgment of the District Judge will not be liable to be set aside inasmuch as the District Judge did not only find that the need of the landlords was genuine but also after comparison held that the landlords would suffer greater hardship by the refusal of the application than what would be suffered by the petitioners from the acceptance of the prayer made therein. As held by the Supreme Court in Munni lal v. Prescribed Authority, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 28 there can be no doubt that a finding that the need of the landlord is greater than that of the tenant is a finding of fact. It is not open to the High Court to reappraise the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. 11. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The petitioners are granted time uptil 31st December, 1978 to vacate the premises. The petitioners are directed to hand over vacant possession of the shop to the landlord within the time allowed, to them. The petitioners are further directed to pay the damages for use and occupation of the shop for the period ending 31st December, 1978 within two months from today failing which the petitioners will not be entitled to get the time given by me.