JUDGMENT Sinha, J. This is a defendant's second appeal arising out of the judgment and decree dated 11th December, 1968, passed by the District Judge, Shahjahanpur, in Second Appeal No. 55 of 1968. The facts of the case, briefly stated, were as follows: The respondent filed a suit against the appellant for his ejectment from four shops which were in his tenancy. One of the grounds on which the relief of ejectment was asked for was that the appellant had made material alterations in the building. The suit was resisted by the appellant and he had, inter alia, pleaded that the alleged material alteration had not been made by him, but by the plaintiffrespondent himself in consequence of an agreement reached between him and the plaintiffrespondent. The trial court held that the appellant, without the permission of the plaintiff, opened a door at a place where formerly there was an Almirah and it amounted to material alteration. In consequence of this conclusion, the learned trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit for possession and for arrears of rent and damages. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendant filed an appeal in the court of the District Judge, Shahjahanpur. The learned District Judge, however, concurred with the finding of the trial court that the appellant had made material alteration in the building and, accordingly, dismissed the appeal vide his judgment and order dated 11th of December, 1968. It is against that judgment that the present appeal is directed. It has been consistently held by the trial court and the lower appellate court that the appellant removed some bricks at the back of the wall and thereby opened a door towards the east. That finding is final. The only question that remains for consideration is whether this amounts to "material alteration" within the meaning of that expression as used in clause (c) of section 3 (1) of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947, In the case of Sh. Mohammad Ata Hitsain v. Haji Qadir Baksh and others(A.I.R. 1930 All. 560) while interpreting the provisions contained in section 178 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, it came up for consideration as to whether opening of a door in an existing wall materially alters a building and this Court answered the question in the negative. Mohammad Ata Hitsain v. Haji Qadir Baksh and others(A.I.R. 1930 All. 560) while interpreting the provisions contained in section 178 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, it came up for consideration as to whether opening of a door in an existing wall materially alters a building and this Court answered the question in the negative. Again in the case of Sarclur Bahadur Mathur v. Kali Prasad Gupta(1961 A. L. J. 137) to which reference has also been made by the lower appellate court, it was laid down that for a construction to constitute a 'material alteration' it is necessary that: (i) the construction has in substantial manner changed the form or structure of the building. (ii) the constructions are inconsistent with the reasonable user of the premises. (iii) some harm has been done to the building and the harm is irreparable. (iv) the premises have been rendered unfit for being used for the purpose for which they are intended to be used. (v) the constructions are not separable and removable without affecting the premises prejudicially. (vi) the landlord could prevent the building of the constructions by an injunction and claim damages. Out of the aforesaid conditions prescribed in the case of S. B. Mathur v. K. P. Gupta (supra) the conditions mentioned at nos. (iii) (iv) and (vi) have lost their force in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Dass Shah v. Bhhun Dass(1966 A. L. J. 1053.) wherein it has been expressly held that in order to constitute 'material alteration' it is not necessary that the alteration has diminished the value of the building. Other requisites laid down by this court in the aforesaid case of S. B. Mathur v. K. B. Gupta (supra) however, still hold the ground. In that case the following constructions had been made by the tenant: (1) In the bottom portion of the second floor a verandah was enclosed on the eastern and western sides by walls. (2) Above the iron rod of the jangla the tenant had constructed a wooden jali. (3) Another wall "3thick and 7'2" wide has been constructed in the verandah from east to west dividing the verandah in two portions. (4) On the third floor the tenant constructed a brick jali from east to west, the height of the brick jali varied from 1'2 "to 16'3''. (3) Another wall "3thick and 7'2" wide has been constructed in the verandah from east to west dividing the verandah in two portions. (4) On the third floor the tenant constructed a brick jali from east to west, the height of the brick jali varied from 1'2 "to 16'3''. It was held by this Court that these constructions did not amount to 'material alteration.' In the case of Dr. Jai Gopal Gupta v. Bodh Mal(1969 A. L. J. 477.) the tenant had constructed a new bathroom and a new kitchen in the house let out to him. They covered one third portion of the courtyard. It was, however, held that they did not amount to material alteration. In the case of Moinuddin v. Sh. Imam Uddin(5) the tenant had closed down gates by filling them by brick work and attaching shutters in one of the gates. It was held that it did not constitute 'material alteration'. It was stressed in all the aforesaid cases that the impugned constructions should be of a nature that they materially alter the accommodation. In the instant case all that the appellant did was to have taken out a few bricks from the back of an almirah in order to create an opening on the eastern side. This could be closed at any time without prejudicially affecting on the premises. Indeed, the opening created on the eastern side could not materially alter the form of the premises in the tenancy of the appellant. In view of the aforesaid decisions I have no doubt in my mind that the impugned act of the appellant in taking out the bricks and creating an opening on the east could not constitute a material alteration within the meaning of that expression as used in clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 3 of Act III of 1947. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that the question as to whether any construction would or would not amount to "material alteration'' is a question of fact and a finding thereon cannot be assailed in second appeal. Reference in this connection was made to a Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Jai Bhagwan v. Padam Sen(6). That view, however, is no more a good law in view of what has been said by a Division Bench in the case of Dr. Jai Gopal Gupta v. Bodh Mai (supra). Reference in this connection was made to a Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Jai Bhagwan v. Padam Sen(6). That view, however, is no more a good law in view of what has been said by a Division Bench in the case of Dr. Jai Gopal Gupta v. Bodh Mai (supra). The contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot, therefore, be accepted. Learned counsel for the respondent next urged that in the case of Manmohan Dass Shah v. Bishun Dass (supra) the impugned construction was opening of a door and the Supreme Court held that it amounted to material alteration. Learned counsel stressed that, since in the present case also the alteration made by the appellant consists of opening a new door in the east, it should be held to constitute a material alteration. I regret my inability to accept that argument. In the case of Manmohan Dass Shah (supra) it was not only a door that was opened but a lot of over alterations were made, as is apparent from a perusal of the decision itself. It would be relevant for that purposes to quote the following observation from the judgment: "Lowering the level of the ground floor by about 11/2 ft. by excavating the earth therefrom and putting up a new floor, the consequent lowering of the front door and putting up instead the larger door lowering correspondingly the height of the chabutra so as to bring it on the level of the new door step, the lowering of the base of the staires entailing the addition of new steps thereto and cutting the plinthband on which the door originally rested so as to bring the entrace to the level of the new floor are clearly structural alterations which are not only material alterations but are such as to give a new face to the form and structure of the premises." The alteration made in the case before me has absolutely no analogy to the large scale alterations that were found to have been made in the case of Manmohan Dass Shah v. Bishan Dass (supra). Learned counsel for the respondent then urged that, in any case, by creating an opening on the east, the form of the accommodation in suit had been altered. This argument is not at all understandable to me. Learned counsel for the respondent then urged that, in any case, by creating an opening on the east, the form of the accommodation in suit had been altered. This argument is not at all understandable to me. Whether the accommodation was of a residential nature or a shop, creating an opening on the eastern side could not alter the nature and the shape of the accommodation, nor could that opening be said to be inconsistent with the purpose for which the accommodation had been taken on rent. In above view of the matter, I find that the alteration said to have been made by the appellant did not constitute material alteration and the finding to the contrary recorded by the trial court and the lower appellate court is clearly erroneous. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the trial court and affirmed by the lower appellate court are modified and the plaintiff's suit, in so far as it concerns the relief of ejectment of the appellant from the accommodation in suit is dismissed. In other respects the decree passed by the trial court is maintained. In the particular circumstances of this case, however, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.